

**George Mason University**

---

**From the Selected Works of Lester R. Kurtz**

---

2015

# Fighting Violence against Women: A Toolkit

Lester R. Kurtz



Available at: [https://works.bepress.com/lester\\_kurtz/43/](https://works.bepress.com/lester_kurtz/43/)

Kurtz, Lester R. "Fighting Violence against Women: A Toolkit." In *Women, War and Violence: Typography, Resistance and Hope*, edited by Mariam M. Kurtz and Lester R. Kurtz, Vol. 2: 559-591. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015.

## CHAPTER 31

# Fighting Violence against Women: A Toolkit

Lester R. Kurtz

And we know, or should know, that every decrease of power is an open invitation to violence—if only because those who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands have always found it difficult to resist the temptation of substituting violence for it.

— Hannah Arendt

A paradox: Violence saps our resources, threatens everyone, and transforms us into a culture of permanent war that unleashes terror in the name of fighting terror. Equally, the use of violence delivers the illusion of power, yet conceals that it weakens the user. In sum, if ever the strategies of Minerva were required, it is in the fight against violence. This is particularly true for violence against women, not only because vulnerability is gendered and women systematically are violence's victims, but because, conversely, they are sometimes its perpetrators or accomplices.

Our means of destruction have grown so deadly and ubiquitous, the infrastructure for using them so effective, we must face the issue of violence head on and consider how to mitigate, if not eliminate it. Surely if we were as smart as we think we are, we should be able to figure out how to do it. Gender violence is not a kind of act against an individual or a particular minority; it does not just affect half of humanity, but all of it. Unfortunately, many if not most of our assumptions about violence are false and our efforts to rid ourselves of that scourge not only fail but, in fact, worsen it.

This chapter explores some theoretical tools fashioned by the sociological imagination to address the problem of violence against women and violence itself. Sociologist Max Weber claims that we must wrestle with the demon of our time. For him, in Germany at the dawn of the twentieth century, it was rationality, the effort to disenchant and rationalize the world, creating bureaucratic institutions and the modern socioeconomic order, the iron cage of capitalism. Behind the issues explored here is the question of whether the power of nonviolent civil resistance, which has now toppled numerous political dictatorships, can mobilize for a gender regime change (on the idea of a gender regime, see, e.g., Kardam, 2004; Walby, 2004) and be effective against gender violence.

For us, at the beginning of the 21st century, our central social problem may be violence, broadly defined, although it is linked to many others. What is surprising is how little attention sociologists have given to this core social problem, although there has been a dramatic increase in articles about violence in sociology journals over the last half century from 5 in the entire decade of the 1950s to 450 in the first decade of the 21st century.<sup>1</sup>

My basic assumption is that violence is best conceptualized as a destructive form of conflict, or a way in which conflict is carried out, so that fighting violence against women requires us to have a better understanding of the conflicts that lead to the use of violence as a means of engaging in conflict. According to Georg Simmel, conflict is “a form of sociation . . . designed to resolve dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties” (Simmel, 1971, p. 70). Conflict itself thus has a positive character according to Simmel’s conception; the problem is when the means used to carry it out becomes destructive.

Consequently, fighting violence against women is first and foremost focused on changing the *means* of conflict, how we carry it out from the interpersonal to the transnational levels, so that inevitable conflicts of interest are resolved without violence. Individual acts of violence against women are carried out by individuals—especially men—but they do not act by themselves. The scripts of a culture and the boundaries of a social structure shape how perpetrators act; they legitimate violence against women and provide violent methods of conflict that substitute for power, on the one hand, and empathy on the other.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a set of tools for engaging in an analysis of how conflicts lead to violence, their social psychological, institutional, and symbolic dimensions, and how those conflicts might be transformed. It also proposes tools for mobilizing nonviolent resistance to those structures and processes that nurture and legitimate violence against women. As Jennifer Turpin and I found when comparing the nuclear arms race to sexual assaults 20 years ago, specific cases of violence are

embedded in a web of violence that runs from the micro to the macro levels of human life (Turpin and Kurtz, 1997).

Violence against women cannot be mitigated without fighting against that very web of violent norms, values, behaviors, and structures that perpetuate and legitimate it. This effort to understand violence against women recommends a set of conceptual tools: a sensitizing concept, one legend, two paradoxes, and two metaphors, concluding with a paradigmatic grid for analyzing and planning conflict transformations in order to resist violence against women (see Table 31.1).

We begin with Robert Merton and Eleanor Barber's concept of sociological ambivalence (Merton and Barber, 1976), that is, a contradiction resulting from role structures and the set of expectations surrounding the structure that results in oscillating, contradictory behaviors. Many who struggle to mitigate violence against women advocate stiffer penalties that range from longer terms of incarceration to the death penalty for the more egregious forms of sexual violence. We simultaneously condemn and condone violence against women and set up infrastructures to fight violence with violence that sometimes paradoxically compound the problem rather than getting at its root.

Gandhi embeds this individual and collective dilemma in the ethical legacies of the warrior and pacifist motifs that run through the world's faith traditions and were addressed in the 20th century with the nonviolent activist who fights like a warrior but avoids harming like the pacifist (Kurtz, 2008). The ancient Greeks exposed this dilemma in the legend of Heracles, whose efforts to slay the multi-headed Hydra, which guarded the underworld and terrorized the surrounding territory, were foiled by the very nature of the beast: each time he cut off a head, two grew in its place.

**Table 31.1**  
**Fighting Violence Toolkit**

- 
- One sensitizing concept: sociological ambivalence
  - One legend: Heracles and the Hydra
  - Two paradoxes:
    - Violence seems like the easy solution but is hard to do.
    - Violence is associated with power, but is actually an indicator of its absence.
  - Two metaphors:
    - The nuclear cage, the infrastructure of violence that like Weber's iron cage takes on a life of its own
    - The violence diamond, created by adding the concept of ecoviolence to Johan Galtung's triangle of cultural, direct, and structural violence
  - One paradigm: the Violence Transformation Grid
-

### AMBIVALENCE: THE WARRIOR AND THE PACIFIST

The sensitizing concept we propose, as Herbert Blumer (1954) calls it, is the idea of sociological ambivalence, developed by Robert Merton and Eleanor Barber (sometimes incorrectly attributed only to Merton): social structures often provide people with ambivalent choices, literally *bi-valent*, that is, having both a positive and a negative charge.

Killologist Dave Grossman (as he labels himself) teaches in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and does research on combat. A major conclusion of his research is that human beings share with most other species an inherent tendency not to kill their own kind (Grossman and Siddle, 2008). Indeed, the great revolution in military (and police) training since World War II centers around helping soldiers overcome the natural resistance to killing that not only hampers efficient combat techniques but frequently leads to psychological trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder. I do see the difference between lower-level violence like arrest and incarceration, on the one hand, and actually killing someone, on the other, but there is a dynamic to violence that runs that gamut.

We find ourselves *ambivalent* about violence even when we are trying to fight it. In the strict sense of the term, we are *bi-valent*—that is, most people are both attracted to and repulsed by violence; they condemn and condone it simultaneously. Individuals frequently face contradictory demands either within or between roles. The injured woman, mother, daughter, son, husband, brother, or sister may be moved to such outrage that they want to harm the perpetrator. Many social roles consist of a dynamic organization of norms and counter-norms in this tension that Merton and Barber call “sociological ambivalence.”

It is not simply a matter of social psychology but a consequence of role structures and the set of expectations surrounding the structure. When faced with violence, we contradict ourselves, oscillating between the two poles—presidents tell their countries’ youth to avoid violence while at the same time they are dropping bombs on other countries. If we condemn violence against women but advocate a violent remedy, we might not escape the trap. This is the ancient wisdom embodied in the Asian theory of karma (Kurtz, 2005c): harmful acts ripple out, causing effects that in turn cause again, creating a violent social structure and culture that escalates rather than solving the problem of violence.

A so-called radical response to reprehensible behavior often seems to imply counter-violence, when there is a sense in which a violent response plays into the underlying assumptions about the unacceptable nature of violence and gets us into complicated arguments about the difference between legitimate versus illegitimate violence and the criteria for making the distinction. The argument of patriarchy about violence has never been against violence per se, but in favor of its use against women who refuse

to obey; it has to do, as Arendt would remind us, with a power slippage—overt physical violence against women is often an effort by men to reassert their so-called rightful dominance over women.

Moreover, our ethical guidance systems offer competing moral conclusions about the use of violence: the warrior ethic, on that one hand, that runs through all the world's sacred scriptures insists that violence is a duty under certain conditions. On the other hand, the pacifist motif—also found in every set of scriptures—insists that it is wrong to kill or harm others. The warrior's dilemma is that he or she knows it is wrong to kill, perhaps even to harm others—"his" mother may have taught *him* that! The pacifist also faces moral quandaries, however, by not acting in the face of the evil or injustices that the warrior faces head-on by fighting them.

Gandhi's solution to this moral dilemma was nonviolent direct action, which involves fighting (just as the warrior does), but not harming (like the pacifist) (Kurtz, 2008). This effort to involve the sociological and psychological ambivalence of violence Gandhi claims he learned from his mother and has been used by women successfully throughout history (see Chapter 25 of this volume).

#### THE LEGEND: HERACLES AND THE HYDRA

The legendary Greek monster Hydra, according to Virgil's *Aeneid*, lived deep underwater, as its name suggests, in a cave that led to the underworld. It was the guardian at the juncture between the living and the dead, emerging from time to time to terrorize those living nearby. Heracles labored to destroy it; when he approached the swamp, he had to cover his mouth and nose to avoid inhaling the fatal fumes of the beast's breath.

Each time Heracles severed one of Hydra's heads, two grew in its place. Realizing that his brute force was fruitless and he had to outwit the monster, he sought help from his cousin Iolaus. Together they managed to cut off the mortal heads, perhaps suturing each joint to prevent the growth of replacements. They finally destroy the immortal head with the monster's own poisonous venom, a strategy inspired by Athena (the Roman Minerva), the goddess of wisdom. Even according to Greek mythology, the two men struggling violently against violence needed a different perspective in order to be successful, one coming from a female deity.

Like the ancient foes of Hydra, we moderns struggle in vain to slay the monster of violence. Each time we claim a victory, we find that in the place of the violence we have slain, two more threats emerge. For each terrorist leader we slay, two fierce replacements arise, and so the threat grows exponentially. For every representative of the "Other" ethnic group we slay, more than one rises up to avenge the death.

We have built an infrastructure to fight violence with violence. It is no accident that violence so often becomes the means du jour for carrying out

conflict, because the remedies of our narratives hold so fast to the idea of violence as the ultimate solution to violence. It is no doubt necessary to have a transition period while we move toward nonviolence, and what we have now seems to require using violence of some kind to bring those who use violence to “justice,” but those temporary measures should not become indefinite excuses. Moreover, the most effective punishments for violating others’ rights are often not violent—some of the remedies may not even have occurred to us yet, because we continue to rely on the well-worn path of violence.

The fight against violence is replete with paradoxes, however, a topic I take up next.

## TWO PARADOXES

Violence seems easy, but is hard.

Violence is associated with power, but is a result of powerlessness.

### Violence Is Hard

When Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, chief historian of the European Theater of Operations in World War II, interviewed American soldiers returning from the front, he was shocked to learn that only 15–20 percent of them had fired their rifles at an exposed enemy soldier (Murray et al., 2008). This discovery alerted us to the difficulty humans have in carrying out acts of violence and led to several decades of research into the biological limits on violent behavior that seem to exist alongside the human ability to harm others.

Marshall’s theory also helped to set in motion a revolution in military training designed to address the “problem” that humans seem to share with most species on the planet: a resistance to killing their own kind. Murray et al. observe,

Marshall’s findings have been somewhat controversial, but every available, parallel, scholarly study has validated his basic findings. Ardant du Picq’s surveys of French officers in the 1860s and his observations on ancient battles, Keegan and Holmes’ numerous accounts of ineffectual firing throughout history, Paddy Griffith’s data on the extraordinarily low killing rate among Napoleonic and American Civil War regiments, Stouffer’s extensive World War II and postwar research, Richard Holmes’ assessment of Argentine firing rates in the Falklands War, the British Army’s laser reenactments of historical battles, the FBI’s studies of nonfiring rates among law enforcement officers in the 1950s and 1960s, and countless other individual and anecdotal observations, all confirm Marshall’s fundamental conclusion that man is not, by nature, a close-range, interpersonal killer. (2008, p. 170)

Combat studies suggest that there is a natural resistance to killing; Grossman and Siddle (2008) argue, “Even when there is equal or even greater

danger of dying, combat is much less stressful if you do not have to kill." It may not be going too far to argue that there is a convergence between the conclusion of combat studies and the Dalai Lama's more spiritual contention that humans are naturally nonviolent (Kurtz, 2005b).

The U.S. military hired psychologists to develop training methods that used operant conditioning, with rewards for simulating killing behavior, to condition soldiers to repeat the acts when operating in fearful real-life battles. Indeed, the fire rates increased through the Korean and Vietnam wars (Grossman and Siddle, 2008).

Randall Collins's (2009) crucial microsociology of violence found a similar pattern when he studied violence in many different situations from as many angles as possible. Observing many photos, video clips, and narratives of a wide range of violence, he found that it is difficult to carry out and that a very small number of people actually do so and usually for short periods of time. In the end, Collins argues, violence is situational, that is, it is the result of a process "revolving around emotions of fear, tension, and forward panic, with strong elements of emergence" (Collins, 2009, p. 24).

"Violence is hard, not easy," Collins (2009, pp. 23–24 ) contends. Moreover,

Virtually no cultural discourse admits this; neither perpetrators nor pro-violence groups, nor victims, nor altruistic or righteous observers-from-a-distance. Everyone thinks violence is easy to perform, whether one brags about it, fears it, or hopes to eliminate it. (Collins, 2009, p. 24)

Nonetheless, the real violence that Collins has observed firsthand and in thick descriptions, videotapes, and as many types of media as possible, consists of microsituations in which "talking about violence" falls

into ritual patterns of bluster and bluff, and these rituals provide an ideology that covers up the real nature of violence—that it is hard to perform, that most people are not good at it, including those who are doing the bragging and swaggering. (Collins, 2009, p. 24)

Collins's situational approach is particularly salient to violence against women. First, in moments of confrontation that potentially lead to violence, there is a build-up of tension and fear that may or may not break out into violence.

Second, violence against women operates, according to Collins, with the same dynamics as other kinds of violence. He claims, "Both short-term gender-symmetrical violence and long-term male-dominated severe violence must go through situational build-ups. Like violence of any kind, these can break out only if they can find some way around confrontational tension/fear" (Collins, 2009, p. 143). Collins describes "common couple fights" as going

through a few mutually acceptable moves, an escalation just so far and not farther. These disputes have a scripted ending. The first outburst of violence usually ends the episode; once the violence establishes the dramatic peak, the tacitly agreed-upon limit, the fight stops. The blow-up often clears the air; the participants recognize that to go further would be to threaten the relationship, the balance of power that they have worked out. The scene ends, often with some standardized dramatic gesture, leaving in a huff, slamming the door, followed by a cooling-off period, and either to ignoring the incident in upcoming encounters, or to apologies and reconciliations.

### **Violence against Women Is Hard?**

The problem with this line of argument is that the World Health Organization claims that violence against women occurs in “epidemic proportions” and affects about a third of all women in the world (World Health Organization, 2013). Collins’s optimistic scenario describes a ritual that may be common in his cultural circles but is belied by the statistics of women battering worldwide. Why are so many women injured by violence worldwide every day?

Domestic violence is common and extraordinarily damaging and cannot be minimized, but nonetheless there are structural constraints around it that can be enhanced through cultural transformation movements aimed at building up those barriers. Violence against women is, in the end, usually a ritual act designed to reinforce domination when less forceful, more consensual means of obtaining compliance of consent fail. It is legitimated by patriarchal and sexist cultural norms and, in some subtraditions, by explicitly authorizing sectarian teaching that provides a rationalization for men to enforce the dominator system and their own superiority system in it by using violence when they feel it is threatened.

An important key to the mitigation of violence against women is, therefore, a transformation of the socialization rituals that legitimate such behavior, eliminating the path around the natural barriers against violence in biology (De Waal, 2000). Indeed, that is what happens in the peaceful societies that have very little aggression, as Douglas Fry and others have shown (Fry, 2008; Baszarkiewicz and Fry, 2008).

So if violence is so hard, as Collins and I are contending, why is there so much of it? Social psychologist Albert Bandura claims that it is possible because of a psychological process that involves employing mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). He argues that “moral reasoning is translated into actions through self-regulatory mechanisms rooted in moral stands and self-sanctions by which moral agency is exercised.” In order to engage in “reprehensible conduct,” individuals have to go through a process of moral disengagement, by which they do not employ the moral self-sanctions that normally prevent them from engaging in inhumane conduct (see Table 31.2).

**Table 31.2****Moral Disengagement—Accounts for Violence against Women**

<b>Mechanism of Moral Disengagement</b>	<b>VAW Accounts</b>
Moral justification: detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes	"She needed to be taught a valuable lesson for her own good."
Euphemistic language: sanitizing language to avoid the direct language of violence	"I decided to shut her up."
Advantageous comparison: making harmful conduct look good by comparing it to something worse	"If I hadn't hit her, she might have hurt all of us."
Displacement of responsibility: obscuring or minimizing the agentive role in the harm one causes	"She forced me to take action; I did not want to do it."
Distortion of consequences: minimizing or distorting consequences so there is little reason for self-censure	"I barely touched her—the next day you couldn't tell anything had happened."
Dehumanization: self-censure for cruel conduct can be disengaged by stripping people of human qualities	"That bird is pretty, but she doesn't use her head."
Attribution of blame: blaming the victims for bringing suffering on themselves	"If she doesn't want to get hit, she shouldn't treat me like that—it's her own fault."

*Source:* The mechanisms of moral disengagement are from Bandura; the examples are mine.

Violence against women thus requires, according to Bandura, a psychological process that calls on repertoires in the culture that justify reprehensible actions by reframing them in a positive light. These psychological processes do not operate in a vacuum within a perpetrator's brain, but are situated within cultural frames and institutional boundaries that either promote or inhibit the activation of internal mechanisms. In a culture where violence is assumed supremely powerful, however, it may not be necessary for conscious moral disengagement to occur when preempting or reacting to a threat of violence in self-defense. It might simply be an automatic first response to someone who is threatened and attempting to respond proportionately.

One of Bandura's students, Alfred McAlister, developed a public health experiment based on Bandura's theories. He first distributed an opinion survey about a military invasion, followed by a brief communication

about moral disengagement, one encouraging them to use it and the other to resist it. When asked if they wished to change any of their opinions, both groups showed some shift, but especially those encouraged to resist. The men, but especially the women in the study, were more inclined “to resist moral disengagement” after the brief communication. This modest experiment suggested that making people conscious of the process might make them more resistant to it, giving credence to the promise of educational approaches to violence against women (see Chapter 34 in Volume 2). The problem, of course, as McAlister points out, is competing messages from other sources such as the media and peers, which might produce different attitudes.

In short, although the specter of violence seems to rise above us like an unconquerable monster, we actually have an ally in human nature. We are not wired for war, as the Seville Statement notes,<sup>2</sup> but we are inherently hesitant to commit acts of violence. The mystery of how to fight violence lies not primarily with biology (although that is part of it), but with sociology, because violence is structured, ritualized, and legitimated by cultural values. They are a consequence of what Mills (1959) calls the link between biography and history, discernible through the sociological imagination.

Violence is, as Arendt insists, a matter of power—but in a somewhat paradoxical way, because its use is an indicator of a *lack* of power, or at least what Weber calls legitimate authority.

### Violence Does Not Equal Power

As Hannah Arendt (1970) observes in her insightful *On Violence*, political and social theorists tend to equate violence and power: “‘All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,’ said C. Wright Mills. He was echoing Max Weber’s definition of the state as the ‘rule of men over men, based on the means of legitimate, i.e., allegedly legitimate, violence.’” Arendt insists that Mills and Weber are wrong, however:

Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course its end is the disappearance of power. This implies that it is not correct to say that the opposite of violence is nonviolence: to speak of nonviolent power is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it. (Arendt, 1970, p. 56)

Those who resort to violence are by doing so demonstrating not power but powerlessness or an attempt to assert power that is not apparent. This may be at the root of violence against women; men are unlikely to hit, rape, or batter women over whom they feel they already have power. The danger in this analysis, of course, is the “blame the victim” syndrome, that is, an implication that the recipient of the violence is responsible for

the attack. If she had only submitted, behaved differently, etc., she would not have been hit. This displacement of responsibility is one of the key “mechanisms of moral disengagement” that Bandura says perpetrators of violence engage in as a way of avoiding self-censure.

Overt acts of violence are necessary not when someone has power but when one is trying to obtain it or to give the appearance of having what has been lost. Arendt observes, moreover, that a decline in police efficiency in making arrests is followed by an increase in police brutality, an observation that may help explain the widespread use of torture against suspected terrorists by agents of the U.S. government in the face of its powerlessness against terrorist organizations.

Much of the development of alternatives to violence is a consequence of a rethinking of the notion of power by Gandhian and feminist thinkers (see Bell, 2008; Sharp, 2005). Much modern social theory defines power as a form of domination, that is, the ability to command others to do one’s will (Weber, 1978).<sup>3</sup> This form of power is, in the end, enforced by violence, a monopoly over which in a given territory is held by the state (Weber, 1978). Another form of power is empowerment, which rather than being zero-sum is shared. The other crucial element in rethinking power is that it has multiple sources (see Sharp, 2005), an idea I will discuss more below in the context of nonviolent alternatives.

Most of the time people manage their social interactions and conflicts without resorting to violence. Indeed, even serial killers are nonviolent most of the time and have killed only a small number of the thousands of people with whom they have interacted.

Violence—and its threat—are, however, important elements of the system of male dominance, but are used when the usual rituals of dominance such as money and social hierarchy and deference norms fail to give men superiority. Any social hierarchy is held in place with a complex network of rewards and sanctions. The role of violence is to increase the costs of disobedience to the system and its elites, so in that sense violence is a mechanism for exercising power, despite Arendt’s insights. In the end, the person who fails to obey the state is threatened with arrest at gunpoint and imprisonment. The woman who fails to submit to patriarchy is threatened with violence, with its use as a necessary implication of the logic because if it is threatened and not used, the credibility of the threat—and the system itself—are called into question.

The rewards and sanctions that hold a social system together and maintain its hierarchy are institutionalized. Violence against women is the visible indicator of a set of hierarchical norms, values, roles, and rituals that keep women “in their place” and make resistance costly—but not impossible. Not only is any system vulnerable, but the increasing consciousness of how the system works precipitated by the women’s movement is challenging it profoundly.

## TWO METAPHORS: THE NUCLEAR CAGE AND THE VIOLENCE DIAMOND

### The Nuclear Cage

In his famous essay *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber concluded that the original moral authority for the spirit of capitalism, an ethic in the Protestant tradition that made people work hard and accumulate their capital, dropped away once early capitalism was institutionalized. Work was no longer was a spiritual option but now bound everyone within a *Stahlhardesgehause*, sometimes translated as an “iron cage.” When cultural themes are institutionalized in the social order, they seem to take on a life of their own and are taken for granted, shaping the roles and narratives that guide daily life.

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. (Weber, 1978, p. 183)

In the 20th century, military infrastructures were constructed both to promote and to counter the Nazi project. A powerful infrastructure was built up that persists to this day, despite the rise and fall of various enemies against which it is directed. This “nuclear cage,” as I like to call it, borrowing from Weber’s metaphor (Kurtz, 1988), takes on a life of its own like the modern bureaucratic order Weber criticized, trapping its creators and subverting its supposed purpose, i.e., the security of its progenitors. Like the Puritan, we have lost our free will about participation in the system, which extracts our resources and puts them to work creating a vast network of units and weapons that make violent conflict almost inevitable when large-scale conflicts emerge. When disputes arise, we have a repertoire of rituals and an infrastructure for violence unparalleled in human history. In this context, violence against women is part of the logic of the war system, as Betty Reardon (1996) put it, and what Robert Elias (1997) deems “a culture of violent solutions.”

What is surprising is not that violence erupts, but that there is so much resistance to it, as evidenced, e.g., in the series of worldwide demonstrations prior to the American invasion of Iraq, and the contorted efforts by the United States to explain its decision to use military force to the international community, the United Nations, and so forth. Military invasions are what superpowers do; what is new is the widespread organized resistance to them. That is, of course, why most political violence is now not the

spectacular international movement of military forces, but more localized conflicts between ethnic groups, often fueled by and serving as proxies for larger geopolitical struggles (see Scherrer (2008) for an excellent database and analysis of large-scale violent conflicts in recent decades). VAW is an age-old phenomenon; what is surprising is not that women are vulnerable, but that they are increasingly organized to resist it.

It is in this context that takes on its special character in contemporary life, for it is not just one stone-age man hitting his female partner or neighbor, but a complex web of violence that runs from the interpersonal to the global. The foundations of violence upon which the modern global system rests is intertwined with patriarchy, as Betty Reardon (1996; see also Reardon, 1999; Reardon, 2013) argues, with daily rituals and elaborate explanations that allow men to morally disengage and commit acts of violence with impunity, sometimes even avoiding self-censure.

The nuclear cage metaphor helps us understand, moving forward from Weber, how the institutionalization of violent conflict sets the stage for escalations to violence on a routine basis. Long-worn paths of conflict lead to violence through ritual behaviors and long-established “truths” that give acts of aggression against women a kind of moral explanation. Like other systems of extreme hierarchy, however—slavery, apartheid, and so forth—patriarchy is no longer self-evident and is now often illegal. International agreements signed by nation-states declaring the equality of all and setting up safeguards against violence against women, give women around the globe new leverage to challenge the norms and institutions of the patriarchal system.

Violence appears in many forms, however, and is not always the kind that leaves visible scars or physical deaths. It is to the multiplicity of forms of violence that we now turn our attention.

### The Violence Diamond

Johan Galtung’s classic triangle of direct, structural, and cultural violence is an indispensable piece of the violence puzzle. To that I add violence against the environment, a fourth and related type of violence against nature that feeds back (like the iron cage) on its attackers in the form of climate change and violent natural occurrences. This now four-fold typology of violence—like its literal mineral counterpart—provides a picture of violence that is hard to break and persists on a number of levels.

A major contribution of the Galtung lens is that different kinds of violence have divergent causes although they are all interrelated and affect one another. We begin by seeing that *structural violence*, although often hidden, is just as real and harmful as the explicit, direct violence that is the subject of newspaper headlines. The death of more than 8 million children each year by malnutrition and related causes (UNICEF) is just as harmful

to them and their family and friends as if someone had shot them down with guns or bombs, but they die silently, as far as much of the world is concerned. There are no newspaper headlines—indeed, it is not news, but rather a routine fact of daily life in our world. They are killed by structures of food misdistribution and lack of adequate medical care, victims of vicious structural violence behind the scenes for the world's elites.

As Kathleen Maas Weigert puts it in her lucid explanation of Galtung's concept, structural violence

refers to preventable harm or damage to persons (and by extension to things) where there is no actor committing the violence or where it is not practical to search for the actor(s); such violence emerges from the unequal distribution of power and resources or, in other words, is said to be built into the structure(s). (Weigert, 2008, p. 2005)

These different kinds of violence, according to Galtung (1990), result from the failure to meet various types of human needs: survival, well-being, identity, and freedom needs. Cross-tabulating direct and structural violence with these needs thus identifies eight categories of violence (both direct and structural violations of each type of need).

Cultural violence, then, provokes, or at least justifies structural and direct violence. As Galtung puts it, it includes "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."

Cultural violence against women consists first and foremost, of course, of the culture of patriarchy, the myriad ways in which the subordination of women is justified from daily rituals to worldviews, in the rich cultural fabrics of the social orders in which the inferiority of women is woven and acted out in institutional roles and embodied in rules of etiquette, norms, and laws.

We must be careful, however, to use only the lens of victimhood, because beneath the surface—and often erupting into history, as Anne-Marie Codur and Mary King demonstrate in Chapter 24 of this volume—is a powerful resistance, born of overt domination and creative forms of subversion that are created daily but also transmitted from generation to generation in the socialization of young women to respond with dignity and intelligence in the face of oppression. How that resistance to all kinds of violence might be enhanced and mobilized is where we turn our attention next.

## THE CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION GRID

Fighting violence against women requires the mobilization of a movement to transform the structures and cultures, to resist the cultural and structural violence that facilitates and legitimates the direct violence.

Otherwise all we have is well-meaning individuals who can make small differences here and there, or nice rhetoric, declarations from the United Nations, faith groups, celebrities, politicians, and business leaders that express the right sentiments, but only marginally shift the culture, let alone public policy and the behavior of those who perpetrate that violence.

Declarations, slogans, and public statements are good, of course, and can be used as leverage, but in the end violence against women will not be mitigated until there is a mobilization of people power that counters the elite power benefiting from the existing system that not only allows, but benefits from, a regime of violence against women.

My purpose here is not to start the movement, but to provide the kind of intellectual analysis that might be useful, an exercise in public sociology. It attempts to build especially upon the Gandhian tradition of nonviolent civil resistance, which has emerged as a vital force in geopolitics in recent decades and draws upon various kinds of social movements around the world and over time.

Efforts to mitigate violence against women would involve a shifting from violence to nonviolence along a series of dimensions, on the one hand, and along a number of causes of violence, on the other. The paradigm suggested in the grid in Table 31.3 provides a guide for the systematic analysis of any conflict in order to look for windows of opportunity where that transformation from violence to nonviolence might take place.

This process was inspired by Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, my own developing understanding of the dimensions of conflict rooted in my study of Gandhi, and teaching courses on violence at the European Peace University (see Kurtz, 2008; Fogg, 1985).<sup>4</sup>

The idea is that when the causes and dimensions of a conflict are cross-tabulated, we can look for moments of opportunity in each cell where they intersect. Each of those intersections will be more salient in some conflicts

**Table 31.3**  
**Conflict Transformation Grid**

	Who	What	How	When	Why	Where
Causes	Pillars of Power	Contents	Forms of Conflict	Conflict Triggers	Purposes of Conflict	Geographical Location
Dimensions	Classes & Status Groups; Identity Groups (e.g., race, gender, faiths, political parties)	of Conflicts (Material)	Conflict (Formal)	(Efficient)	(Final)	
Reciprocal						
Institutional						
Ritual						

than in others, but we should analyze each one; the consequences of transforming each component may be multiplicative rather than merely cumulative, and it may be possible that starting at one point in the conflict that is more amenable to change may open up opportunities elsewhere.

In short, the dimensions of the conflict are the reciprocal, at the social psychological level, second, the institutional, and finally the ritual or symbolic aspect. All of these dimensions are interrelated, but have their own characteristics, and intersect with each of the causes or elements of a conflict.

### Dimensions of Conflicts

We can analyze each of three dimensions—the reciprocal or social psychological, institutional, and ritual or symbolic—along the spectrum of “causes,” in Aristotle’s term, so that we get a systematic look into the many aspects of the conference that can be transformed.

The *reciprocal dimension* involves the process of exchanges among actors, with a number of social psychological dynamics that are present in most relationships, regardless of the content of the conflict between parties. Reciprocity is a fundamental building block of social life that apparently exists universally in human (and many other) societies. It is an exchange that has common characteristics no matter what the content of what is being exchanged—whether money, love, power, goods, political status, or whatever. In Simmelian fashion, I distinguish between the forms and contents of reciprocity, which can involve the exchange of either benevolent or harmful content in a number of forms. The most prominent forms are

- Balanced reciprocity: A gives to B and B gives back something equivalent to A;
- Negative (unbalanced) reciprocity: A gives to B and B fails to reciprocate appropriately or at all; and
- General reciprocity: A gives to B, who in turn gives to C.

Almost anything can be given or taken and reciprocated, whether material goods (money, food, resources) or psychological/spiritual intangibles such as affection and love or hatred, praise or condemnation. Whether the content is beneficial or harmful is, of course, a matter of perception—a kiss can be defined as beneficial by one party, harmful by the other. Its definition is constructed out of a complex set of situations, norms, values, and relationships, which both affect and are affected by the exchange.

Reciprocal relations are rarely symmetrical; there is always an element of power involved in an exchange with one another, even when it appears to be benevolent. Moreover, there is an element of escalation involved

because of the value in initiating an exchange. If the content is beneficial, then the recipient feels obligated to give something in return. If it is harmful, the recipient feels justified in harming the perpetrator. Moreover, there is a built-in escalation in the exchange that results from a definition of a lack of balance or equilibrium, which leads to a sense of injustice or injury that justifies retaliation with an escalated intensity. If you initiate a harmful exchange by hitting me, I feel justified in hitting you back, but more than once.

This abstract conceptualization of reciprocity appears at first glance to minimize the underlying tension of asymmetrical gender relations in dominator societies, of course. The building tension and fear of a conflict situation (remember Collins's microsociology) may lead to blows by the culturally defined superior party (usually the man) against the culturally acknowledged "inferior" party, who is unable to reciprocate proportionately, perhaps because of physical prowess, but more likely because of cultural norms. Indeed, contemporary technologies of violence provide a kind of equalizer effect in terms of physical ability.

Generalized reciprocity is even more complicated, in a way, but has some significant implications. Coid et al. (2001, p. 450) found when studying the "relation between childhood sexual and physical abuse and risk of revictimisation in women" that "childhood abuse substantially increases risk of revictimisation in adulthood. Women who have experienced multiple childhood abuse are at most risk of adult revictimisation."

The *institutional dimension* refers to the social organizational context of a conflict, from the informal networks of friendship and family to formal organizations and bureaucracies in every sphere of social life. Because most conflicts take place within an institutional context—usually a formal one—the organizational culture where it occurs shapes the repertoire drawn on by adversaries, the power relations that are a key part of the fight, and the trajectory it takes over time.

The institutionalized systematic inequality of gender roles around the world creates the organizational context within which conflicts take place, and the scripts and expectations are formalized and ritualized within organizational cultures. Violence against women plays out within the boundaries of those institutional settings, which are increasingly formalized in the contemporary world. Institutions function much like force fields, or clusters of relationship networks with forceful reciprocal influences that are in continuous motion like the tightly packed, always vibrating subatomic particles that give the outward appearance of stability and shape to the naked eye. The formal rules and procedures of institutions—like states, corporations, and other bureaucracies—are crystallizations of that activity (Georg Simmel's metaphor) that real life bounces up against but moves around, under, and over in the flow toward new arrangements. Individuals are agents, but not discrete units acting

on their own; their action is always in relation to those around them and the institutional clusters of relationships intensify the effects of their interaction rituals.

Both violence and nonviolence are eruptions of the ongoing energy of those interactions, and are intense rebellions against existing arrangements or the trends of social processes. The difference, it seems increasingly to me, lies in strategies of distancing versus bonding, of harming as opposed to helping.

Violence, on the one hand, sharpens differences and boundaries among individuals and groups, and gains momentum through harming the Other, disrupting the current organization of energies by heightening differences and attempting to damage those on the other side. Nonviolence emphasizes bonding and mutuality that weaves ties across differences and sees value in embracing them, like the interdependence of a diverse natural ecosystem in which survival of the whole and its parts relies on thriving *because* of the difference: some parts inhale oxygen and exhale CO<sub>2</sub>, while their counterparts thrive on CO<sub>2</sub> and emit oxygen.

Perhaps my analogy breaks down here because the natural world is also a pretty violent place as well as a collaborative one, where cooperation and competition are both necessary for the shape of things to emerge, but there is a food chain in which subordinates are devoured by the large and powerful. The other divergence of human organization from the natural world is, of course, the mind and its conscious manipulation of the order of things, its strategizing and construction of the natural and social environment in order to achieve more abstract goals. Of course, this consciousness or rational thought is also part of the natural order, emerging from and reacting back on it, and perhaps is not unique to humans as we once thought. The line is now blurred by so-called artificial intelligence, on the one side, and increasing awareness of the adaptability of nonhuman agents in the world who sometimes seem to transcend purely biologically determined actions.

*Ritual:* Finally, the symbolic aspects of the conflict, the ritual patterns, are drawn upon by its parties and the deep symbolic underpinnings that inform its tone and drama, intensity, and direction. Habitual behaviors with symbolic meaning are reenacted by participants drawing upon sometimes ancient formulas for handling disagreements and focusing on conflict symbols that act like lightning rods for emotions and propel action forward in given directions (Kurtz, 2005a).

Opportunities for conflict transformation may appear in any of those dimensions or, perhaps more likely, at their intersections, and the mobilization of new dynamics is part of the genius of Gandhi's transformative action. We can see this more clearly as we move through the various causes of the conflict where, again, we might find windows of opportunity.

### Causes of Conflict

Aristotle launches our understanding of the causes of conflict (or anything else for that matter). He suggests that there are four basic causes—material, formal, efficient, and final:

1. That out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, . . . e.g., the bronze of the statue [the material cause—what a conflict is about];
2. The form or the archetype, i.e., the statement of the essence and its genera [the formal cause—how the conflict is conducted];
3. The primary source of the change [the efficient cause—when something happens that triggers a conflict];
4. In the sense of end or “that for which the sake of which” a thing is done, e.g., health is the cause of walking about [the final cause—the ultimate reasons for a conflict]. (Aristotle, 350 BCE)

If we add to Aristotle’s list the sociological issue of *who* is involved in the conflict, we have the journalists’ questions of the “who, what, when, why, and how” of a conflict. We might also ask where, of course, because it is sometimes significant (e.g., a change in who is involved in a conflict often involves an expansion of its geographical boundaries).

Again, as with the dimensions, the idea is to look for areas of potential transformation, where a conflict might be shifted from violence to a non-violent mode; it is not so much eliminating conflict—although that is often desirable—but transforming it toward a more creative form.

We begin with the parties to the conflict, who should be identified not only as individuals and groups explicitly involved in a fight, but also in terms of where they are situated in the social fabric of the conflict, the institutions that define the roles individuals play, and the symbolic elements of their identities. From a social movements perspective, I am most interested in how a social movement might be mobilized to address the root causes of a conflict, using nonviolent strategies and tactics to transform both the conflict and the social structuration that created it. When the conflict is asymmetrical, and grows out of legitimate grievances and structures of injustice (structural violence), the only remedy for fighting violence is a transformation of the society toward justice and nonviolence.

### Who

The first question to ask is who are the actors in conflicts that lead to violence? In this case, it is not only individuals but roles involved and the ways in which they are gendered that matters. We probably begin with who is involved with a conflict that involves some type of violence or may

lead to direct violence if not transformed. The sociological lens, of course, leads us to questions of power, social forces, and institutions. Which groups of people and institutions, sectors of society, have been most significant in creating the current situation? Sociologists usually begin by looking at groups within society who are identified along various foci:

- Gender, of course, is where we would begin in our case (not as simple as it once seemed);
- Marx's classes—owners of the means of production versus those who do not own them;
- Weber's classes, statuses and political parties;
- Identity groups formed along demographic and cultural variables: race and ethnicity, nationality, occupation, spiritual identities and memberships, age cohorts, etc.

In addition to the idea of individuals with various social identities interacting with one another, we move to the institutional level where those reciprocities are embedded. To transform the conflict nonviolently, a nonviolent movement (or coalition of them) could attempt to promote defections from within the existing power elite and its institutional pillars of support, like the police and military, civil service and government bureaucracy, the media, and cultural and economic institutions. Although not easily done, there are many precedents of successful transformations of seemingly immutable structures, from the end of the British Raj in India through the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the end of U.S.-backed dictatorships in Latin America, and the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa to the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, where the transformation is still ongoing and uncertain.

Mobilizing to resist violence against women begins with an analysis of the patriarchal support pillars from the local to the global level. Much of the framework is already there, starting with Gene Sharp's sociological systematization of Gandhi and his historical research on nonviolent resistance campaigns. Alongside Sharp's work is the critical work of Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall and the remarkable manual for strategic planning published by the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Strategies (CANVAS) in Belgrade (see Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994; Ackerman and DuVall, 2001; Popovic et al., 2007). It would be fruitful to apply those tools of strategic nonviolent planning to the mobilization of people around the issue of violence against women.

The idea is first to see what holds up the current system (see Table 31.4) and then to look for potential allies, defections, and vulnerabilities that might be susceptible to mobilization and change. Each pillar plays a role in sustaining a system that allows and sometimes supports violence against women. Each one also has considerable potential for resisting it.

**Table 31.4****Pillars of Support**

---

**Pillars of Support****Police, Military, Security****Bureaucracy (civil service, etc.)****Educational System**

- Schools, universities
- Think tanks

**Organized Religion**

- Religious leaders
- Beliefs, rituals, institutions

**Media**

- Mainstream news
- Entertainment
- Social and alternative media

**Economic Institutions**

- Corporations, businesses
  - Labor unions
- 

*Source:* Adapted from Popovich et al., *CANVAS Core Curriculum*

The armed wing of governments—police, military, and security forces—work hand in hand with the judiciary not only in perpetrating violence (e.g., wartime rape and abuse of prisoners) but in enforcing laws against sexual assaults and potentially educating people within their hierarchical structure about its unacceptability. The civil service bureaucracy administers programs that could help to shift cultures away from patriarchy and institutionalized violence against women, from justice to education ministries. Educational and religious institutions, along with the media and entertainment, are central to shaping cultural values and norms that either mitigate or promote violence against women, and economic institutions can facilitate or inhibit opportunities for women and create policies in the workplace that protect or exploit them.

The media and entertainment industry play a key role in perpetuating and legitimating gender violence by diffusing the frames that legitimate it, giving men a sense of entitlement and encouraging women to define themselves as victims rather than agents. Those children who watch more aggressive television shows are more likely to exhibit behavioral problems or even be incarcerated later in life (Palmer and Sullivan, 2008). It is possible that watching aggressive television shows helps boys internalize behavioral norms that encourage violence and girls to see themselves as its victims. Addressing these stereotypes in media and entertainment, as well as advertising, has to be a key part of any campaign to reduce gender violence.

Institutions have their own logic and momentum, which is part of their very *raison d'être*, but they are also made up of individuals with varying levels of commitment to their institution and different degrees of freedom to deviate from its norms. The higher up the ranks of most organizations, the less formal freedom individuals have, to a large extent, because they have sacrificed their personal agenda to the institution's. Their deviation from the norms, however, can have a significant impact, and those on the margins may have even less commitment to the organization, although they might also be more vulnerable to sanctions if they refuse to support institutional strategies and purposes, even if they disagree with them personally.

Often the turning point in the mobilization of resistance is the defection of large numbers or key people in the elites of the pillars of the system's support. Often the defections are, in fact, precipitated by open repression of dissidence that backfires, paradoxically causing a decline in support for the system and increased mobilization for the resistance (see Smithey and Kurtz, 2003; Kurtz and Smithey, unpublished).

### What

The transformation of the contents of the conflict (Aristotle's material category) may involve a shift in the agenda of grievances, sometimes provoked by the sequence of actions on both sides. Often a movement is mobilized around rather modest goals—economic or electoral reform, calls for independent unions or particular freedoms, changes in price or wage structures, civil rights or dignity for certain minority groups, and so forth. When elites attempt to repress the movement, if they are unsuccessful, insurgents may become emboldened to add more fundamental changes to their demands, and a recalcitrant elite may provoke widespread revolt within the citizenry.

Calls for independent unions in Poland, for example, were countered by widespread arrests and imprisonment by the authorities of union activists, which backfired and led to widespread organizing, some overt (from house meetings to an elaborate underground press), finally emerging as a force backed by a large sector, if not the majority of the population, millions of them overtly active in demanding a regime change. This persisted until the government negotiated a settlement and allowed not only independent unions but free elections, which resulted in placing the resisters in office, including union leader Lech Walesa as the popularly elected head of state.

### How

How a conflict is carried out is one of the key factors determining its outcome and the level of violence enacted in the conflict. The best evidence

for this is found in the remarkable study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works* (2011). Their data set of 323 campaigns for regime change, withdrawal of foreign occupying troops, or secession over a 106-year period found that nonviolent campaigns were two and a half times as likely as violent ones to bring about their goal.

Nonviolent campaigns were more capable of mobilizing widespread participation in the resistance, which turned out to be the major variable determining the success of the movement. With lower physical, informational, moral, and commitment barriers to participation, nonviolent campaigns were successful in bringing about major political changes, increasingly so over the decades. The more participation, the more successful the movements were during the century of activism included in the study. The advantage of a movement for women's rights is, of course, that it is the largest existing group of oppressed people in the world. Of course, not all will be mobilized, but Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found that as participation reached 10 to 12 percent of the population, the success rate in their century-long sample of campaigns increased substantially.

By the dawn of the 21st century almost two-thirds of the nonviolent campaigns were successful, compared to just over 10 percent of the violent movements. As Frederick Douglass warned in the 19th century, people in power will not relinquish it voluntarily, but a Gandhian understanding of power as not monolithic and therefore vulnerable to noncooperation and the mobilization of people power as an alternative, leaves open a theoretical door that has been proven practical in many situations since the Indian freedom movement. Indeed, when a power elite begins to repress an insurgency, it is a sign of the movement's efficacy: it has reached a stage of development where those in power consider it a threat.

The repression may well backfire, paradoxically weakening the regime (Smithey and Kurtz, 2003). By calling its legitimacy into question and provoking defections from within its own ranks, the movement may garner increasing sympathy within the pillars of support and the bystander public, some of which may be mobilized as a consequence of their disgust with the repression itself and the injustice and violence of the regime that the repressive acts reveal.

### When

As with the delivery of a good joke, timing matters in the mobilization of an uprising. It is a response to the flow of history and what William Sewell (1996) calls "transformative events." Strategic planning to mobilize against violence needs to look at both long-term historical trends—including the millennia-long patterns of conflict and violence justification in cultures—and recent events that shape public opinion and policy.

In order to mobilize resistance to violence against women, we have to look at the origins of patriarchy in ancient history, on the one hand, and recent rituals of its confirmation, on the other. What kinds of events trigger eruptions of violence, on both the biographical and historical levels? How can repression be managed to enhance backfire and facilitate movement organizing? These historical questions are major issues in any strategic planning against violence.

### Why

What are the fundamental reasons for a conflict and specifically violence against women? More serious disputes may be more likely to turn to violence if the conflict is not transformed. We have to search the depths of the infrastructures for violence that plagues women worldwide and address the fundamental questions.

This question differs from the “what” that the conflict is about, because it goes more deeply into fundamental issues. A domestic conflict may appear to be about household chores or a spouse’s bad habits around the house, but in fact it has to do with deep-seated conflicts over the distribution of power, the nature or trajectory of the relationship, and so forth. The “why” question refers to those deeper issues and, according to the sociological bias, usually has something to do with power and its links to identity, roles, and interaction rituals within the institutions where the conflict is taking place.

### Where

It is important to understand where a conflict takes place in the sense of its geographical location, including hidden participants such as transnational economic or political actors who may have an enormous impact on how it unfolds as well as its outcome.

Successful resistance often involves expanding the stage where a conflict takes place, and violence against women takes place on every scale from the local to the global. The struggle against it is often shaped by geography, local customs and laws, and configurations of power. In order to resist that violence it is significant to strengthen the bonds of allies transnationally, to weave networks of support for those in local struggles everywhere in order to share tactics and generate pressure that counterbalances the ability of specific elites to dominate those under their control.

## WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Whereas violence against women appears to be an intractable social problem, it is (like all the others) socially constructed, variable from culture

to culture, and mutable. The very fact that conflict leads to violence in some cultures and not in others suggests that it is as much the structuring of a situation—from cultural norms, values, and worldviews to institutional roles and practices—as anything inherent in gender or human nature that is at the root of violence against women.

This variability and mutability—this social constructedness—also holds promise for the future of the problem we are addressing here, because of what is often called (Kenneth) Boulding's Law: that which exists is possible. Because men and women have, in some societies, been able to live together with virtually no violence across gender lines, it is possible for them to do so. Because we have constructed the current system with all its violence, we can deconstruct it.

For Gandhi, the key to resistance was noncooperation: no system can exist if people refuse to cooperate with it. The problem, of course, is that noncooperation comes with a price, and as a movement to unseat power moves toward success the repression increases. Insurgents pay with lost sleep and jobs, pain, blood, and sometimes their lives because violence comes most swiftly when power is waning (see Arendt 1970). They are paid, however, with solidarity in the struggle, a sense of doing right, and sometimes victory. Repression often paradoxically backfires and the turning point of a movement is very often when it faces brutal repression. The massacre at Amritsar in colonial India made the British question their own empire. The murder of children in a Birmingham church and vicious beating of young demonstrators as they marched from Selma to Montgomery touched the conscience of white power, discredited the racists, and mobilized the U.S. civil rights movement.

Our ambivalence about violence fosters contradictory attitudes and behaviors, norms and structures. The hydra syndrome of fighting violence with violence is inadequate, but so is apathy, and the fight against violence requires new, smarter systems that make gender violence even harder to commit by empowering women and redefining masculinity and power. The fight against gender violence requires analysis and mobilization, an understanding of how it is sustained over time by patriarchal rituals, and powerful nonviolent frames that move us forward, transforming this ugly side of humanity into something creative and positive. The cage of gender violence is socially constructed but also vulnerable, and the movement to resistance is gaining momentum (see Chapter 24 in Volume 2).

In the meantime, both gender violence and the fight against it wax and wane. There is a danger in a white male American professor, in his secure job and comfortable lifestyle, preaching nonviolence to the female victims of violence, and I have struggled with that. There has to be a transition and we may feel the need to punish the perpetrators of violence somehow in order to stop them, to create broad treaties and laws that say unequivocally that violence against women is unacceptable (see Chapters

23 and 27 in Volume 2). The end of gender violence requires demilitarization of our deterrence systems<sup>5</sup> and the deep structures of our culture. In the end, rewards may be more important than sanctions, and social bonds of relationship—or love, if you will—may prove more effective than the crude technologies of violence.

Although the metaphor is probably overused, it is hard not to think of this time and issue as a hinge of history. How the emerging global civil society deals with gender violence over the coming decades will be a key indicator of whether humanity can live together. There is no doubt that our destinies are now mutual; across genders and nations we are interdependent in a way unequalled in human history. As Dr. King put it, either we learn to live together as brothers and sisters, or we will die together as fools.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This chapter derives from an unpublished paper delivered at the American Sociological Association, New York, 2013. My thanks to Dorota Gierycz, Jack DuVall, Amy Best, and Mariam Kurtz, for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

### NOTES

1. Based on a search for the term “violence” in the abstract of articles on JSTOR, limiting for sociology journals.
2. A meeting of scientists in Seville, Spain, concluded that humans are not naturally warlike. <http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf>
3. Weber distinguished between power and authority, which is perceived as legitimate rather than coercive.
4. Fogg recommends varying the who, what, when, where, why, and how of a conflict in order to develop a “repertoire of creative, peaceful approaches.”
5. I have argued, in “The Geometry of Deterrence,” that a nonviolent deterrent system that emphasizes rewards over sanctions and nonviolence over violence might be more effective, in part because of the trade-off between certainty and severity of sanctions that hampers deterrence regimes.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. 2001. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. 2006. Right to Rise Up: People Power and the Virtues of Civil Disruption. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 30: 33. Accessed at [http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get\\_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/forwa30&section=31](http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/forwa30&section=31)
- Ackerman, Peter, and C. Kruegler. 1994. *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1969, February 27. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. *New York Review of Books*, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1969/feb/27/a-special-supplement-reflections-on-violence/>.

- Arendt, H. 1970. *On Violence*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970.
- Aristotle. 350 BCE. *Physics*, Book II. Translated by R. P. Hardie, R. K. Gaye in 1994. Classic Internet Archives. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html>.
- Bandura, Albert. 1999. Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3 (3): 193–209.
- Baszarkiewicz, Karolina, and Douglas P. Fry. 2008. Peaceful Societies. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1557–1570.
- Bell, Nance. 2008. Alternative Theories of Power. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1703–1709.
- Benford, R. D. 1993. Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement. *Social Forces* 71 (3): 677–701.
- Benford, R. D. 1997. An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective. *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (4): 409–430.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1954. What Is Wrong with Social Theory? *American Sociological Review* 19 (1): 3–10.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Coid, Jeremy, Ann Petrukevitch, Gene Feder, Wai-Shan Chung, Jo Richardson, and Stirling Moorey. 2001. Relation between Childhood Sexual and Physical Abuse and Risk of Revictimisation in Women: A Cross-Sectional Survey. *Lancet* 358 (9280): 450–454.
- Collins, Randall. 2009. *Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- De Waal, Frans B. M. 2000, July 28. Primates: A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution. *Science* 289 (5479): 586–590.
- Eisler, Riane. 1987a. Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action. *Feminist Issues* 7 (1): 25–46, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02933919>
- Eisler, Riane. 1987b. *The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Elias, Robert. 1997. A Culture of Violent Solutions. In *The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global*, edited by Jennifer Turpin and Lester R. Kurtz. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, pp. 117–147.
- Fanon, Frantz. 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Farmer, P. 1996. On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below. *Daedalus* 125 (1): 261–283.
- Farmer, P., P. Bourgois, N. Scheper Hughes, D. Fassin, L. Green, H. K. Heggenhougen, L. Kirmayer, L. Wacquant, and P. Farmer. 2004. An Anthropology of Structural Violence 1. *Current Anthropology* 45 (3): 305–325.
- Fogg, Richard Wendell. 1985. Dealing with Conflict: A Repertoire of Creative, Peaceful Approaches. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29: 330–358.
- Fry, Douglas P. 2008. Aggression and Altruism. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* 2nd ed., edited by Lester R. Kurtz, 14–28. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Galtung, J. 1969. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (3): 167–191, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/422690>
- Galtung, J. 1990. Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (3): 291–305.
- Galtung, J., and T. Höivik. 1971. Structural and Direct Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1): 73–76.

- Gandhi, Mahatma. 1999. *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (electronic version). New Delhi, Publications Division Government of India. 98 volumes. Available online at <http://www.gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm>
- Gandhi, Mahatma. 2009. *The Bhagavad Gita According to Gandhi*. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2003. *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2006, June. Review: What Do We Really Know about (Suicide) Terrorism? *Sociological Forum* 21 (2): 315–330.
- Gopin, M. 1997. Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution. *Peace & Change* 22 (1): 1–31.
- Gopin, Marc. 2002. *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gramsci, A. 1998. Hegemony, Intellectuals and the State. *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader* 2: 210–216.
- Griswold, Wendy. 1987. A Methodological Framework for the Sociology of Culture. *Sociological Methodology* 17 (1): 1–35.
- Grossman, Dave, and B. K. Siddle. 2008. Psychological Effects of Combat. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 3, pp. 139–149.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2004. Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights. *Philosophy* 79 (1): 5–18.
- Hanner, J., and M. Maynard. 1987. *Women, Violence and Social Control*. Vol. 23. New York: Macmillan.
- Hanna, C. 2010. Book Review: Recent Scholarship on Male Violence against Women. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 35 (4).
- Hess, D., and B. Martin. 2006. Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 11 (2): 249–267.
- Hillenbrand, Carole. 2000. *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Huda, Q., and United States Institute of Peace Press. 2010. *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Jacobs, M. D., and N. W. Hanrahan. 2005. *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Jacobs, Mark D., and Lester R. Kurtz. 2012. Sociology of Culture. In *The Handbook of Sociology and Human Rights*, edited by David L. Brunzma, Keri Iyall Smith, and Brian Gran. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press.
- Jones, S. G., and M. C. Libicki. 2008. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*. Vol. 741. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1984. The Gandhi Revival: A Review Article. *Journal of Asian Studies* 43 (2).
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2004, Spring. Is Religion the Problem? *Hedgehog Review* 6. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4n92c45q#page-1>.
- Kang, H. K., B. H. Natelson, C. M. Mahan, K. Y. Lee, and F. M. Murphy. 2003. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome-Like Illness among Gulf War Veterans: A Population-Based Survey of 30,000 Veterans. *American Journal of Epidemiology* 157 (2): 141.

- Karatnycky, A., and P. Ackermann. 2005. *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*. New York: Freedom House.
- Kardam, Nuket. 2004. The Emerging Global Gender Equality Regime from Neoliberal and Constructivist Perspectives in International Relations. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6 (1): 85–109, [http://works.bepress.com/nuket\\_kardam/18/](http://works.bepress.com/nuket_kardam/18/)
- Keane, T. M., A. K. Silberbogen, and M. R. Weierich. 2008. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In *A Guide to Assessments That Work*, edited by John Hunsley and Eric J. Mash. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 293–315.
- King, Mary Elizabeth. 2007. *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolence Resistance*. Introduction by Jimmy Carter. New York: Nation Books.
- Klare, M. T. 2002. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.
- Kurtz, Lester R. 1988. *The Nuclear Cage: A Sociology of the Arms Race*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Kurtz, Lester R. 1994. The Geometry of Deterrence. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 6 (2): 187. doi:10.1080/10402659408425794. [http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=lester\\_kurtz](http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=lester_kurtz)
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2005a. From Heresies to Holy Wars: Toward a Theory of Religious Conflict. *Ahimsa Nonviolence* 1: 143–157, [http://works.bepress.com/lester\\_kurtz/31/](http://works.bepress.com/lester_kurtz/31/)
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2005b, September–October. Dalai Lama Darshan. *Ahimsa Nonviolence* 1.
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2005c, November–December. Karma as Social Theory. *Ahimsa Nonviolence* 1: 574–551, [http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=lester\\_kurtz](http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=lester_kurtz)
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2007. *Gods in the Global Village: The World's Religions in Sociological Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2008. Gandhi and His Legacies. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Amsterdam: Elsevier, [http://works.bepress.com/lester\\_kurtz/1](http://works.bepress.com/lester_kurtz/1)
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2011. Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Nonviolent Jihad. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23 (2): 245–251.
- Kurtz, Lester R. 2012. Rethinking Power: From Simmel to Gandhi and Foucault. *Ahimsa Nonviolence*, [http://works.bepress.com/context/lester\\_kurtz/article/1049/type/native/viewcontent](http://works.bepress.com/context/lester_kurtz/article/1049/type/native/viewcontent) (accessed October 23, 2014).
- Kurtz, Lester R., and Lee Smithey, eds. *The Paradox of Repression*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Leatherman, J. L. 2011. *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict*. London: Polity
- MacNair, Rachel. 2001. Psychological Reverberations for the Killers: Preliminary Historical Evidence for Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress. *Journal of Genocide Research* 3 (2): 273–282, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14623520120062457>
- MacNair, Rachel. 2002. *Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The Psychological Consequences of Killing*. Westport, CT: Praeger, <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=enEOd8YgR0YC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Per>

- petration-induced+traumatic+stress&ots=9TiSzTNUN4&sig=EamxsdiCp-KmjYDPlcTVPVyOy7M
- MacNair, Rachel. Forthcoming. The Psychology of Agents of Repression: The Paradox of Defection. In *The Paradox of Repression*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz and Lee Smitley.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1992 [1956]. *Essays on the Sociology of Culture. Collected Works of Karl Mannheim* Vol. 7. Oxford: Routledge.
- McAdam, Doug. 1986. Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer. *American Journal of Sociology* 64–90.
- McDermott, J. 2009. The Forgotten Victims of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. *Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine* 163 (6): 587.
- McKay, S. 1998. The Effects of Armed Conflict on Girls and Women. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 4 (4): 381.
- Merton, Robert King, and Elinor Barber. 1976. Sociological Ambivalence. In *Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays*, 3–31. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Milgram, S. 2010. *Obedience to Authority*. New York: Pinter & Martin Ltd., <http://www1.psych.purdue.edu/~willia55/120/LectureSocialF10.pdf>
- Mills, C. Wright. 1959. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Morris, M. 1995. By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture. *Duke Law Journal* 45: 651, [http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get\\_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/duklr45&section=27](http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/duklr45&section=27)
- Muller, Edward N. 1985, February. Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence. *American Sociological Review* 50 (1): 47–61, <http://www.jstor.org.mutex.gmu.edu/stable/2095339>
- Murray, Kenneth R., Dave Grossman, and Robert W. Kentridge. 2008. Behavioral Psychology of Killing. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Muskeg, D. M., O. Mohamed-Ahmed, and J. R. Fitches. 2010. Rape as a Strategy of War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *International Health* 2 (3): 163–164, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876341310000446>
- Nanda, B. R. 2002. *In Search of Gandhi: Essays and Reflections*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nathan, Andrew J. 2001, February. The Tiananmen Papers. *Foreign Affairs* 80 (1): 2–48, <http://www.jstor.org.mutex.gmu.edu/stable/20050041>
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson, and Lester R. Kurtz, eds. 2012. *Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing.
- Niditch, Susan. 1995. *War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Niebuhr, R. 1940. *Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist*. Student Christian Movement Press.
- Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. Preventing Genocide. *Contemporary Sociology* 29 (1): 1–13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2654927>

- Obi, C. I. 2010. Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne D'études Du Développement* 30 (1–2): 219–236, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02255189.2010.9669289>
- Ong'ayo, A. 2008. The Post-Election Violence in Kenya: An Overview of the Underlying Factors, <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/46094> (accessed February 19, 2014).
- Özerdem, A., and S. Podder. 2011. Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism. *Journal of Strategic Security* 4 (4): 4.
- Palmer, Edward L., and Tia N. Sullivan. 2008. Children, Impact of Television on. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict*, 2nd ed., edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Oxford: Academic Press, pp. 229–239.
- Pape, Robert A. 2003, August. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97 (3): 343–361, <http://www.jstor.org/mutex.gmu.edu/stable/3117613>
- Pape, Robert. 2010, October 18. It's the Occupation, Stupid: Extensive Research into the Causes of Suicide Terrorism Proves Islam Isn't to Blame—the Root of the Problem Is Foreign Military Occupations. *Foreign Policy*, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/it\\_s\\_the\\_occupation\\_stupid?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/it_s_the_occupation_stupid?page=full)
- Peterman, Amber, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp. 2011, June. Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *American Journal of Public Health* 101 (6): 1060–1067.
- Popović, Srdja, Slobodan Djinovic, Andrej Milivojevic, Hardy Merriman, and Ivan Marovic. 2007. *Canvas Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle Students Book*. Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B9ydHnuCkyP8Y1daWIVwekVIX0U/edit?usp=sharing>
- Rapoport, David C. 2008. Terrorism. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* 2nd ed., edited by Lester Kurtz.. Oxford: Academic Press, pp. 2087–2104.
- Rawls, J. 2003. *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Reardon, Betty A. 1996. *Sexism and the War System*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Reardon, Betty A. 1999. Women or Weapons: The Militarist Sexist Symbiosis. In *Towards a Women's Agenda for a Culture of Peace*, edited by Ingeborg Breines, Dorota Gierycz, and Betty A. Reardon. Paris: Unesco, vol. 737, pp. 143–153.
- Reardon, Betty A. 2013. Patriarchy, Pedagogy, and Learning toward a Culture of Peace. In *Voices for a Culture of Peace: Compendium of the GSI-USA Culture of Peace Distinguished Speaker Series*. Santa Monica, CA: Culture of Peace Press, pp. 77–91.
- Rehn, E., and J. Sirleaf. 2002. *Women, War, Peace*. United Nations Development Fund for Women, <http://147.96.1.15/info/ucmp/cont/descargas/documento7201.pdf>
- Rubenstein, Richard E. 2010. *Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.

- Rummel, Rudolph J. 1995. Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (1): 3–26, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/39/1/3.short>
- Rummel, Rudolph J. 1998. *Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900*. Vol. 2. Munster, Germany: LIT Verlag Münster, [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=LFDWp7O9\\_dIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR6&dq=democide&ots=VVVex5vAAM&sig=tGW-EVEI0wt\\_mnrYRFf9rWh9V48](http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=LFDWp7O9_dIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR6&dq=democide&ots=VVVex5vAAM&sig=tGW-EVEI0wt_mnrYRFf9rWh9V48)
- Rummel, Rudolph. 1997. *Death by Government*. Transaction Pub., <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N1j1QdPMockC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=democide+rummel&ots=0piXvaH2dp&sig=TOcfc3XgnTwx-626HiUQ0-qg5k>
- Russell-Brown, S. L. 2003. Rape as an Act of Genocide. *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21: 350.
- Scherrer, Christian P. 2008. Violent Conflict: Contemporary Warfare, Mass Violence and Genocide—Dataset 1985–2005, Typologies, and Trends. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict*, 2nd ed., edited by Lester R. Kurtz. Oxford: Academic Press, pp. 2331–2382.
- Seville Statement on Violence. 1986. Paris: UNESCO. Available online at <http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf>
- Sewell, W. H. 1996. Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille. *Theory and Society* 25 (6): 841–881.
- Sharp, Gene. 2005. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*. Boston: Extending Horizons Books.
- Shultzinger, Doron. n.d. Transformative Events and Regime Change: Theoretical, Psychological and Empirical Aspects. In *The Paradox of Repression*, edited by Lester R. Kurtz and Lee A. Smithey.
- Simmel, Georg. 1971 [1908]. "Conflict." In *On Individuality and Social Forms*, edited by Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sjoberg, G., E.A. Gill, and N. Williams. 2001. A Sociology of Human Rights. *Social Problems* 11–47.
- Slotkin, Richard. 2000. *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Smith, P. K., D. J. Pepler, and K. Rigby. 2004. *Bullying in Schools: How Successful Can Interventions Be?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smithey, Lee A., and Lester R. Kurtz. 2003. Parading Persuasion: Nonviolent Collective Action as Discourse in Northern Ireland. In *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*. Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Publishing Group 24: 319–359.
- Smock, D. R. 2002. *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford Jr., S. K. Worden, and R. D. Benford. 1986. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review* 464–481.
- Stephan, M. J., and E. Chenoweth. 2008. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security* 33 (1): 7–44.
- Tilly, Charles. 2002. Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories in Contentious Politics. In *Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 13–31.

- Turpin, Jennifer E., and Lester R. Kurtz. 1997. *The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Virgil. 199. *The Aeneid*. Champaign, IL: Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/228>
- Walby, Sylvia. 2004. The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regime. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 11 (1): 4–29, <http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/4.short>
- Watts, M., and E. Kashi. 2008. Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in the Niger Delta. In *Photographs by Kashi E.* Brooklyn, NY: Powerhouse Books.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weber, Max. 2001 [1905]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Talcott Parsons, trans. London: Routledge.
- Weigert, Kathleen M. 2008. Structural Violence. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* 2nd ed., edited by Lester Kurtz. Oxford: Academic Press (pp. 2004–2011). <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123739858001690>
- Wessells, M. G. 2006. *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wood, E. J. 2006. Variation in Sexual Violence During War. *Politics & Society* 34 (3): 307–342, <http://pas.sagepub.com/content/34/3/307.short>
- World Health Organization, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and South African Medical Research Council. 2013. Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available online at <http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/9789241564625/en/>
- Young, Nigel, ed. 2010. *The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zehr, Howard. 2002. *The Little Book of Restorative Justice*. Intercourse, PA: Good Books.