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Article
Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2009)
  • Leonardo Boncinelli, University of Florence
Abstract
In this paper I apply stochastic stability to compare the effect on welfare of local information and global information when agents adopt imitative behavioral rules. Under global information, agents can potentially imitate anyone, while under local information, the sets of observable agents are choice-dependent. The evaluation of information in terms of welfare enhancement is ambiguous over finite time horizons, while in the long run global information is worse (better) in the presence of pure negative (positive) spillovers. However, when preferences also depend on the choice itself, further ambiguity emerges, generally making the comparison uncertain.
Keywords
  • imitation,
  • local information,
  • global information,
  • stochastic stability
Publication Date
October 20, 2009
Citation Information
Leonardo Boncinelli. "Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators" The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Vol. 8 Iss. 1 (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/leonardo_boncinelli/3/