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Article
Games, goals, and bounded rationality
Theory and Decision (1984)
  • Leigh S. Tesfatsion, University of Southern California
Abstract
A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by “policies”, i.e., endmean pairs of goals and controls (partial contingency plans), which results in naturally disconnected player choice sets. Well-known existence theorems for pure strategy Nash equilibrium and bargaining solutions are generalized to policy games by modifying connectedness (convexity) requirements.
Publication Date
1984
DOI
10.1007/BF00160981
Publisher Statement
This is a discussion paper of an article from Theory and Decision 17 (1984), 149-175.
Citation Information
Leigh S. Tesfatsion. "Games, goals, and bounded rationality" Theory and Decision Vol. 17 Iss. 2 (1984) p. 149 - 175
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/leigh-tesfatsion/74/