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Article
Burge on Perception and Sensation
Synthese
(2016)
Abstract
In Origins of Objectivity Burge advances a theory of perception according to which perceptions are, themselves, objective representations. The possession of veridicality conditions by perceptual states—roughly, non-propositional analogues of truth-conditions—is central to Burge’s account of how perceptual states differ, empirically and metaphysically, from sensory states. Despite an impressive examination of the relevant empirical literatures, I argue here that Burge has not succeeded in securing a distinction between perception and “mere” sensation.
Disciplines
Publication Date
May 1, 2016
DOI
10.1007/s11229-014-0531-1
Citation Information
Lauren Olin. "Burge on Perception and Sensation" Synthese Vol. 193 Iss. 5 (2016) p. 1479 - 1508 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/lauren-olin/4/