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The Plea Jury

Laura I Appleman
Abstract
This article provides a call to reform the much-criticized guilty plea process. My original proposal would incorporate the local community into the guilty plea through the use of a plea jury, thus solving a multitude of problems. In a plea jury, a lay panel of citizens would listen to the defendant's allocution and determine the acceptability of the plea and sentence, reinvigorating the community's right to determine punishment for offenders. My goal in this article is to restore the community jury right to its proper place by envisioning its integration into the guilty plea, based on recent Supreme Court decisions, punishment theory, and practical procedural concerns. In doing so, I will illustrate not only how a standard jury would be incorporated, but also why the critical norms embedded into jury participation will help improve the existing guilty plea procedure.
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Introduction

The time for revolution in the criminal justice system has come. The system as it now exists is in crisis.\(^1\) For over thirty years, scholars, courts, defense attorneys and prosecutors have been deeply troubled by the guilty plea procedure, concerned about the sacrifice of rights and due process for cheap efficiency. Yet with the exception of a few commentators,\(^2\) the vast majority has been content to either merely critique the process or call for the plea’s abolishment—tactics that have resulted in little change. Indeed, the guilty plea now disposes of approximately ninety-five percent of all criminal

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indictments—a sign of its continuing popularity despite some considerable disquiet. Although many legal players seem to dislike the plea, few have taken on its reform.

With the advent of the Supreme Court’s recent focus on the role of the jury, however, a way to break this impasse has finally arisen. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial right, relying on the jury’s historical and constitutional origins as reasons why a criminal offender must have a jury determine all aspects of punishment. The Blakely Court grounded its decision on the community’s traditional role in determining an offender’s moral blameworthiness. Ultimately, Blakely underlined the jury’s function as the lay public’s representative and as the primary provider of community-based punishment.

Although the Court has focused its analysis on jury decision-making in criminal trials, there is nothing in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases to suggest that this type of community participation in criminal adjudication should be so limited. Although Blakely is technically formalist on jury trials, a functionalist view of Blakely, applying its focus on community participation to all criminal procedures, nicely serves its underlying values. Indeed, looking through the Blakely lens highlights how subversive guilty pleas can be, since they entirely eliminate the people’s role in the criminal justice system. Thus changing the guilty plea procedure to make it more trial-like in form—by including the jury—would be a way of restoring full constitutional rights to the most frequently used form of criminal adjudication, as well as a nod to the political theory implicit in the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.

This issue is particularly salient because in today’s world, there are so few criminal trials and so many criminal guilty pleas. Logically, then, the next step would be the expansion of the community jury function into the guilty plea procedure. One way to do so would be through the use of a plea jury.

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Incorporating the community into the guilty plea process through the use of a plea jury would serve a number of functions. First, the use of a plea jury would allow the community, as jury, to finally get some voice back into the one criminal procedure that disposes of the majority of crimes. The use of a plea jury would return the community to its longstanding constitutional role as decider of guilt and imposer of punishment, while not imposing the entire jury trial structure onto the guilty plea.

Second, by introducing a fresh, less-jaded element, through the incorporation of the lay public, into the business of plea bargains, the often-overlooked procedural rights of the defendant would get renewed attention. Similarly, with the use of a plea jury, the factual basis of the plea would receive greater scrutiny, helping to more tightly link punishment with the crime committed. Finally, involving the jury would transfer many aspects of the guilty plea away from its insider, back room status to the public light of day, reducing some of the disparity in prosecutorial power that currently exists in plea bargaining.

Additionally, the use of a plea jury in the standard guilty plea would apply the Court’s recent iteration of the jury’s constitutional rights and powers to all forms of criminal adjudication. Considering that the primary tool of modern criminal justice has been the guilty plea, not the trial, the focus of the Court’s new jury-centered jurisprudence on criminal trials only ends up addressing a small amount of criminal procedure.

The Court’s new jury-centered philosophy, focusing on the rights of the community, applies to the guilty plea as well as to the criminal jury trial. The Court’s reliance on the historical origins of the jury trial signifies their return to a more robust community right. But this community right has been almost completely excised from modern criminal process, the guilty plea procedure being the most striking of examples.

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5 Although the phrases “guilty plea,” “plea agreement” and “plea bargain” seem relatively interchangeable in this piece, they are not. By guilty plea, I mean the entirety of the procedure, from the first meeting of defense counsel and prosecutor to and through the court proceeding. By plea agreement, I mean the details of the bargain crafted by the two parties. And by plea bargain, I mean the specific discussions and deal-making done by the prosecutor and defense counsel, before presentation to the court.
It goes without saying that the function of the petit jury—to represent the community—is deeply entwined with our general understanding of legitimacy, democracy and punishment. Ironically, however, the current configurations of the criminal guilty plea leave no room for the community’s voice. Guilty pleas, although indispensible to the smooth processing of criminal justice, have become hasty and rote, allowing little to no expression of the community’s voice. Moreover, the chronic imbalance of prosecutorial power in the last thirty years has shrunk the roles of the defendant, defense attorney and even the court to ones small and easily pushed aside.\(^6\)

Incorporating a plea jury into the guilty plea process provides the solution to many of these problems. Although the Supreme Court has made clear that a defendant may waive her right to trial, this does not necessarily mean that community participation cannot still happen within a plea. The obvious stumbling block is getting the community involved as the arbiter of punishment. I propose having the defendant allocute to a petit jury instead of a trial court during the plea process, and allowing that same jury, with some limited judicial oversight, to accept or reject the plea.

With its enshrinement of the jury trial, the 6\(^{th}\) Amendment delineates perhaps the most important right in our criminal justice system—a right that has for too long been neglected and pushed aside. As a fundamental matter of political theory, it is the people who should run the government, not the legal elite, and this extends to criminal justice arena as well as legislatures and the executive. Although many scholars and academics focus on the roles of the judge and the prosecutor in the criminal law, the true constitutional role for people has been sadly neglected.

My goal in this piece is to restore the community jury right to its proper place by envisioning its integration into the guilty plea, theoretically as well as procedurally. In doing so, I will illustrate not only how a standard jury would be incorporated, but also why the critical norms embedded into jury participation will help improve existing guilty plea procedure. By doing so, I begin to build a bridge

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\(^6\) As Stephanos Bibas points out, “No government official in America has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.” Bibas, *Prosecutorial Regulation*, supra note __, at 4.
between standard punishment theory (based primarily on criminal trials) and everyday criminal process, providing in the process a principled theoretical account of plea practice.

Part I reviews the existing Supreme Court case law addressing the jury trial right and the guilty plea, and explains why current criminal practice necessitates the expansion of the Apprendi-Blakely line to this aspect of criminal procedure. In this Part, I briefly discuss how a theory of expressive restorative retribution best supports the original conception of the right to a jury trial, and how this might translate into the philosophical underpinnings of a plea jury procedure. As scholars have noted, the substantive values underlying many of our criminal procedures have been greatly undertheorized. This Part will help provide the jurisprudence which supports the plea jury proposal.

Part II addresses the specific mechanics of including a jury into the guilty plea process, including the proposed procedure, the size of the jury, the duration of service, the division of labor between judge and jury, and the somewhat changed roles of the prosecutor and the defense attorney. This section also locates and differentiates this proposal within the wide array of scholarship already existing about the guilty plea, both pro and con.

Part III discusses the classical criminal procedural values that are served by a plea jury, including voluntariness, real retributive values, articulation of the public interest, and the expressive power of allocution. By carefully exploring the values underlying the community’s interaction with the justice system, I build the case for why the community, in its form of a jury, needs to be integrated into the guilty plea procedure, and why a defendant’s waiver of the trial right does not end the community’s participation. Although the defendant may be able to waive his interest in having the community take part, this does not erase the community’s role as a critical participant in the process. Finally, Part IV addresses some potential challenges in implementing a plea jury system.

It is my hope that incorporating the community jury right and its underlying jurisprudence into the practice of guilty pleas will not only re-establish the lost voice of the people, but actually create real

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change in our current criminal justice system. Restoring the community voice to its full valence, in the form of a plea jury, will not only permit us to follow the constitutional requirements of the Court, the 6th Amendment, and the Constitution, but also provide balance and new energy into the business of adjudicating criminal offenders.

I: Blakely, Punishment & Constitutional Community Rights

A. Lessons of Blakely, History and Community

In the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the Sixth Amendment jury right, concentrating on the need for the community to impose punishment. By focusing on this basic idea—that all aspects of a crime must be determined by a jury for a valid conviction—the Court “provided the basis for [its] . . . decisions interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing procedures.” The Court relied heavily on the historical role of the community as arbiter of punishment to support its contention that only the jury could find facts that increased an offender’s punishment. Thus the basis of the Court’s new approach to criminal adjudications honed in on the importance of the community’s determination of punishment.

For the past decade, the Court has stressed the role of the community as critical to the fulfillment of the jury right. In Jones v. United States, for example, the Court carefully explicated the jury trial right as a community right, basing its reasoning in part on the history of the jury. Jones framed the participation of the jury in criminal adjudication as one of constitutional importance, thereby laying the groundwork for the Court’s even stronger reliance on historical sources in its future criminal cases.

A year later, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court expanded on its vision of the jury’s communitarian role. The “twelve of [the

8 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
10 See id. at 244, 248.
11 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
defendant’s] equals and neighbours,”\textsuperscript{12} part of the offender’s local community, were described as “the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties.”\textsuperscript{13} In this way, the Court recognized the critical role of the local community’s participation in the criminal adjudication. If there was no community, the “great bulwark” could not exist. Justice Scalia’s \textit{Apprendi} concurrence further fleshed out this community jury right, arguing that historically, the jury-trial guarantee was a critical preservation of the community’s rights.\textsuperscript{14}

The Court’s belief in the importance of the role of the community jury came to full fruition in \textit{Blakely v. Washington}.\textsuperscript{15} In holding that a court can sentence a defendant only on facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant himself,\textsuperscript{16} the \textit{Blakely} Court gave strong support to the idea that the community must have the final word on criminal punishment.

In \textit{Blakely}, the Court explained that community’s role in the jury trial was a key reservation of the community’s power in the structuring of our government: “[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, a jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”\textsuperscript{17} By relying on the jury’s function as the public’s representative and as the primary provider of community-based punishment to support its holding, the \textit{Blakely} Court endorsed a collective understanding of the jury trial right. Ultimately, \textit{Blakely} contended that the liberal, democratic decision making vested in the jury’s determination of blameworthiness relied on the community’s role in linking punishment to the crime committed, so that the offender would feel more responsibility for her actions.\textsuperscript{18}

The Court’s focus on community participation in criminal adjudication should be applied not only to criminal trials but also to guilty pleas. But to best find a way to apply the Court’s community focus to the guilty plea, we must also look at the philosophy

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Id.} at 477 (quoting 4 \textsc{William Blackstone}, \textsc{Commentaries on the Laws of England} 343 (1769)).

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.} (quoting 2 \textsc{Joseph Story}, \textsc{Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States} 540–41(4th ed. 1873)).

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{15} 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

\textsuperscript{16} See \textit{id.} at 313.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.} at 306.

\textsuperscript{18} See \textit{id.} at 309.
supporting the *Apprendi-Blakely* line of cases. Accordingly, the next section briefly explores the jurisprudential currents animating this return to community power, and how they might apply to the plea.

B. Finding a Theory to Fit: Expressive Restorative Retribution

The community right to determine an offender’s punishment, as championed by the Court, is closely intertwined with a philosophy of expressive, restorative retribution. I have argued elsewhere that a framework of expressive restorative retribution encompasses both the historical antecedents of the 6th Amendment jury right and modern ideals of punishment.19 This is so because community determination of punishment is one major way that the lay public’s voice can be incorporated into our current criminal justice system.20

From the beginnings of the American colonial experiment, the community right to a public trial was deeply intertwined with a combined retributive and restorative understanding of punishment.21 This was a philosophy closely tied to the sovereign will of the people, the community’s traditional role in determining moral blameworthiness, the importance of popular authority, the public right to trial, and the community’s willingness to forgive wrongdoers and eventually restore their rights. The use of expressive restorative retribution was inexorably tied to the community’s right to determine punishment for wrongdoers.

But how do we translate that community jury trial right, and its underlying philosophy of expressive restorative retribution, into the current criminal justice system? Unquestionably, we now live in a world of guilty pleas. And this world of guilty pleas is an unregulated one, devoid of much due process and lacking a credible theory of punishment. Although various theories of guilty pleas have been offered—a contractual view, a motive theory, a crime-control theory, a social cohesion theory—none has truly worked on both a practical and philosophical level.22 As Ron Wright contends, “We

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20 See id. at 1338.
22 Wright, *Trial Distortion*, supra note __, at 96-98.
need an alternate theory of guilty pleas, one that transcends the hidden intentions and grudgingly spoken words of defendants and the contradictory incentives at work on prosecutors in particular cases.\textsuperscript{23}

The consistent use of a plea jury, supported by an underlying framework of expressive restorative retribution, would meet this need for an alternate theory of guilty pleas. Thus my vision of the plea jury process would operate on two levels, one theoretical, one practical.

On the theoretical side, the incorporation of the community into the primary organ of criminal adjudication and sentencing permits all three aspects of expressive restorative retribution. First, although the full expressive aspects of a trial do not occur with the plea jury, there is still the offender’s expiation of his crimes to a segment of the public. With use of the plea jury, the plea is no longer enacted only before a limited audience of the judge, the prosecutor and the defendant. Second, requiring a plea jury to decide whether the offender’s allocution is truthful and whether the sentence is appropriate satisfies the basic requirements of retributive justice, as it permits the injured community to impose punishment on its offenders.

Finally, restorative justice also plays its part in the plea jury process, since the participation of the lay public not only allows the community to impose punishment, but also allows the demonstration of mercy and forgiveness. If the community sees that the offender is truly remorseful for his actions, then they are more likely to accept a shorter sentence, as well as be more supportive of the offender’s reintegration into the community after release from incarceration.

Each value of expressive restorative retribution can be found in the workings of the plea jury. Below I trace the contours of each theoretical aspect as it would operate in a guilty plea.

1. Expressive Values & Social Norms

The power of expressive values in the criminal law cannot be understated. Scholars have argued that criminal law in general

\textsuperscript{23} Wright, \textit{Trial Distortion}, supra note __, at 96. Wright argues for a mid-level theory of plea bargaining that evaluates plea bargaining as an artifact of a particular criminal justice system, with different features depending different practices. \textit{See id.} at 99-100.
should track social norms to be effective. The theory of expressive law goes further, contending that law and legal process have a strong effect on individual behavior through their power to affect the social, normative meaning of that behavior. According to expressive theory, “the expression of social values is an important function of the courts or, possibly, the most important function of the courts.”

The nexus between law, norms, and social meaning is also important to expressive law. This is particularly true when considering the impact that law and its procedures may have on mediating or influencing the social meaning of an activity, such as belonging to a community.

If law and legal procedures do not merely dictate what people and institutions are permitted to do, if they are also a part of the culture that helps form prevailing values and understandings, then the participation of the community in criminal punishment and sentencing helps express the people’s beliefs and values on the wrongdoer, the crime, and the injury to society. The expressive aspect of the community’s decision is particularly apparent in the trial and guilt phase of the jury trial, since that is both public and communal.

Following Blakely, the Court’s interest and dedication to the community’s right to determine punishment can be seen as an expressive approach to the rights and needs of the community. The Court relies upon the “citizenry’s moral representative”—the jury—to express the community’s condemnation of the act and re-establish the victim’s unfairly reduced value. Jury decisions help publicize

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27 See Geisinger & Stein, Expressive International Law, supra note __, at 84.
28 See Geisinger & Stein, Expressive International Law, supra note __, at 84.
consensus about desirable behavior for the community.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, jury decisions provide an instrument for the changing social norms within a community by extrinsically expressing commitment to socially positive behavior and beliefs about what is punishment-worthy.\textsuperscript{31}

Now that we have almost eliminated the jury trial from criminal adjudication, we have lost much of the expressive value of community punishment. To truly involve and invest the community back into the criminal justice system, to truly reinvigorate one of the primary reasons for punishing wrongdoers, the community must be reintegrated back into the process through the plea jury. Otherwise, by ignoring the expressive dimension of punishment—as guilty pleas currently do—we risk bypassing community beliefs about crime and punishment, which threatens the democratic legitimacy and political salience of the regime.\textsuperscript{32} To work properly, legal expression, such as criminal punishment, must enlist and utilize the natural sense of justice among citizens.\textsuperscript{33} In criminal adjudication, this means directly involving the community.

2. Retributive Justice

Historically, the community always determined the blameworthiness of the offender. The Court’s recent line of cases endorsing the right to jury decision-making is equally an endorsement of the community’s determination blameworthiness. Thus, retributive justice principles can be found in the Court’s rediscovery and reaffirmation of the right of the jury to set out all criminal punishment, in all of its forms.

As a community, when we punish an offender who knows or should have known her actions were illegal, we are letting the offender know that her deeds matter—that she has affected not just the victim, but the network of shared laws that makes a community


\textsuperscript{31} See, e.g., Cooter, \textit{Expressive Law and Economics}, supra note __, at 607 (concluding that by expressing commitments to certain principles, laws provide instruments through which social norms may change).


\textsuperscript{33} See Cooter, \textit{Expressive Law and Economics}, supra note __, at 596.
of us all. Accordingly, when the jury determines punishment, the wrongdoer has more difficulty avoiding the burden of criminal responsibility, because her fellow citizens, her community, and her peers have pronounced her blameworthiness. Because criminal laws in liberal democracies reflect a democratic pedigree, crimes can be seen as expressions of superiority to the state and the community. By involving the will of the people through the incorporation of a jury, the plea jury procedure helps offset the unfairness the offender created in the community.

A framework of retributive justice cannot function without some involvement from the public. Its very legitimacy is threatened without the actual imprimatur of punishment from the community. Markus Dubber has correctly observed that “[t]he diminution of lay participation in the United States . . . and elsewhere reflects the gradual but continuous disappearance of concern for the legitimacy of state punishment.”34 This understanding of retributive justice ties neatly into the Court’s repeated arguments, in its recent decisions, that the jury must make the decisions on almost all facts that affect punishment. Only a decision made by a fair cross-section of the community imposes onto the offender the responsibility of accepting moral blame.

3. Restoring the Offender.

Restorative justice also has a strong role to play when the community is involved with crime and punishment. Formally, restorative justice emphasizes restitution and rehabilitation, requiring that everyone affected by the crime (the victim, the defendant, and the relevant community) should participate in determining the offender’s punishment.35 Many supporters understand restorative justice to include a set of moral and substantive principles, including responsibility, remorse, atonement, making amends, moral learning, forgiveness, and reconciliation.36 These principles of restorative justice, however, also include restoring the offender to the community, by reintegrating the offender after her punishment,

34 Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 601.
35 See Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, supra note __, at 375.
36 See id., at 376.
providing financial restitution, offering apologies, and other various types of reparations, both symbolic and real.  

Restoring the offender to the community is an important theoretical foundation of the plea jury, since when an offender commits wrongdoing, he or she injures the community. By passing judgment on the offender, by determining both the offender’s crime and deciding on the punishment, the community can return itself to where it was before the original harm. Thus the community’s role in the plea jury process helps heal the imbalance created by the offender’s crime.

Re-establishing fairness and equalizing the community are important components of restorative justice, which also plays a part in the community’s role as arbiter of punishment. Restorative justice envisions crime as “a violation of people and relationships that creates obligations to make things right.” The restorative theory of punishment conceptualizes justice as a process that incorporates both the community and the offender in an attempt to repair and reconcile the harm done.

When a lay jury, whether a petit jury or a plea jury, helps determine the crime and punishment, the wrongdoer has more difficulty avoiding the burden of criminal responsibility, because his fellow citizens, his community, and his peers have pronounced his blameworthiness. Thus it makes sense that the plea jury should have some hand in imposing sanctions and moral blame upon the wrongdoer. At its most basic level, the plea jury injects an egalitarian cross-section of that very same cultural and actual community into the guilty plea process, where there has been none before.

The plea jury, however, works for more practical and procedural reasons as well. In the next Part, I describe how such a procedure would work, along with the functional benefits that would accrue with its use.

37 See id. In the United States, restorative justice has been primarily used by drug courts.
40 See id. at 319–20.
II: Theory into Practice: Implementing the Jury into the Guilty Plea

Incorporating the community into the criminal justice system, based on a framework of expressive restorative retribution, is easy to discuss in theory but much more challenging in practice. Courts and scholars alike have devoted much time and space to the constitutional procedures inherent in trials. With the such heavy use of guilty pleas, however, it is important that substantive, theoretical values are integrated into the actual processes of the criminal system. As Nancy King notes, these non-trial rights have assumed much greater importance as “trial substitutes.”

In addition, following both the political theory inherent in the animating principles of the Sixth Amendment and Blakely requires that the community have its voice heard in some sort of way during criminal adjudication. Thus including the community’s imprimatur into any widespread criminal process, both substantively and procedurally, is critical to ensure that the criminal justice system remains balanced and fair.

If integrated into the procedure of the guilty plea, the jury’s position as community representative functions simultaneously in a number of roles, both theoretical and practical. Although the idea of a plea jury or plea panel has been briefly discussed by other scholars, it has never been fully explored, either procedurally or substantively. Below I take a serious look at the possibility of implementing a plea jury into modern criminal procedure, and review the benefits and drawbacks.

A. The Guilty Plea in the Courts of Opinion

42 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 141, 144 (2004); (suggesting that plea and sentencing juries could assess defendants' remorse and apologies); Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, supra note __, at 874-78 (briefly proposing the inclusion of citizen panels in guilty pleas to help to protect the public values underlying criminal constitutional rights.)
Guilty pleas have colonized the criminal justice system. With 90-95% of all convictions resolved by guilty plea, what was once an infrequent disposition has become the norm. As scholars have exhaustively discussed, however, the change from criminal trial to criminal plea has not been accompanied by an equal shift in either constitutional protections or punishment theory. “Criminal settlements do not efficiently internalize the law.”

In short, the land of guilty pleas has been an unregulated one, focused on efficiency and disparity rather than any particular theory of criminal punishment. Among other problems, this has given short shrift to the recently reinvigorated Sixth Amendment jury trial right. In John Langbein’s terminology, we have come to rely on a system of “condemnation without adjudication.” The practical landscape of current criminal justice system, engrossed as it is in pleas, leaves no room for the recently reinvigorated theoretical importance of the jury trial right.

Currently, the Court’s Blakely jurisprudence has found only a limited toehold in the practical workings of the justice system. The plea jury, however, creates that space.

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43 See Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 90-91.
46 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2468 (2004) (describing how plea bargains and guilty pleas rely on sentencing factors such as wealth, sex, age, education, and intelligence rather than any traditional theories of criminal punishment).
48 For further arguments on how the guilty plea undercuts the 6th Amendment, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 932 (1983); Langbein, Myth of Written Constitutions, supra note __, at 120.
Responses to our current realm of guilty pleas have been varied. On the whole, prosecutors, defense attorneys and courts have been largely accepting of this dramatic procedural shift. Plea bargaining is supported by the belief that “any harm to the public or to third parties from the enforcement of plea bargains is outweighed by the benefits of enforcement.”

Scholars have been more varied in their reaction. Some have argued for either resigned or cheerful acceptance, contending that such a process is inevitable, and that plea bargaining has triumphed. Another set has demanded that the guilty plea be abolished entirely, calling for more trials in its stead. A third set has tried to set a middle course, calling for more supervision of guilty pleas in the form of judicial oversight, prosecutorial screening, rewards for good

50 See GEORGE FISCHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 16 (Stanford 2003). Fisher particularly notes that for the prosecutor and judge, not only did the plea bargain alleviate crushing workloads but also spared them both the risk of loss and the potential humiliation of defeat. See id.
51 King, Priceless Process, supra note __, at 116.
53 See FISCHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, supra note __, at 1. Fisher argues that “plea bargaining has so fast a grip on the mechanism of justice that antagonistic institutions cannot survive.” Id. at 3. Fischer also contends, convincingly, that plea bargaining has insinuated itself into almost every aspect of the criminal justice system, resulting in a constant inducement of defendants to plead guilty. Id. at 162-64. See also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2008) (arguing that even for innocent defendants facing charges, plea bargaining may be “manifestly least-bad option.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909 (1992).
prosecutorial behavior,\textsuperscript{55} better enforcement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,\textsuperscript{56} and the like.\textsuperscript{57}  

As Michael O’Hear has argued, once we accept the middle ground on guilty pleas—that as imperfect as they are, they are here to stay—it is critical to develop “a more complicated normative framework that is capable of endorsing some plea deals while disapproving of others.”\textsuperscript{58} That framework must acknowledge what has been lost by the move from the trial to the guilty plea in criminal justice, despite the gains in efficiency and cost.\textsuperscript{59} Although there have been a few “middle course” proposals which recognize this truth, many do not. The plea jury proposal meets such a challenge head-on.

None of the middle course guilty-plea modification proposals has proposed the incorporation of the jury into the plea process. The reason seems obvious: how can there be a jury if the defendant has waived that right? But looking at the role of the jury as solely the right of the defendant is a mistake. The jury has long been the primary way that the community played its part in criminal decision-making, something clearly marked out for the people in both Article


\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., Wright & Miller, \textit{Screening/Bargaining}, supra note ___ (pointing to structured prosecutorial screening as the principal alternative to plea bargains); Jenia I. Turner, \textit{Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View}, 54 \textit{Am. J. Comp. L.} 199, 200 (2006) (making the case for increased judicial involvement in guilty pleas to improve accuracy); King, \textit{Nonnegotiable Features}, supra note __, at 136 (supporting trial judge’s ability to reject pleas and dismissals, and calling for greater exercise of power).

\textsuperscript{58} Michael O’Hear, \textit{What’s Good About Trials}, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. \textit{PENNUMBRA} 209, 209 (2007). O’Hear explains that such a normative framework must discuss not only the innocent but also guilty defendants, including their sentencing reductions, the role of victims, which procedural rights they are allowed to surrender. \textit{Id.} at 211.

\textsuperscript{59} See O’Hear, \textit{What’s Good About Trials}, supra note __, at 210.
III and the Sixth Amendment. Because the sanctions applied in the criminal justice system can be so severe, the Framers expected the community, in the role of the jury, to prevent abuses of state power.

As I discussed in Part I, this understanding of community involvement in criminal adjudication has been recently reified by the Supreme Court, which placed great emphasis on the Bill of Rights’ emphasis on the collective jury right in determining punishment. The Court’s focus, however, has been almost entirely on the mechanics of the jury trial, despite the trial’s declining use in determining the nation’s criminal punishment.

So this raises an interesting question. If the collective right of the community to determine punishment rises to a constitutional level—or even if it doesn’t—does the defendant’s waiver of “his” jury trial right in favor of a guilty plea eliminate the role of the jury? Logically, the answer seems to be no. If, as the Supreme Court seems to imply, the community has a right to determine an offender’s punishment, then it seems to follow that the community’s right cannot be waived by the defendant. In other words, the defendant does not have the ability to waive the collective right, only his own. Accordingly, if the collective jury right is distinguished from the defendant’s, then we must address how to integrate the community jury right into all forms of criminal adjudication.

B. Community Rights and the Guilty Plea

Although 20th-century courts, until quite recently, have assigned the jury trial right almost exclusively to defendants, there is no reason why the rights of the people could not have more of a role in modern criminal procedure. In fact, in another facet of the

60 I have previously argued that the right to a criminal jury trial originally belonged to the community; the defendant’s right to a jury trial only came much later. See generally Appleman, Jury Trial Right, supra note --.
62 As Nancy King points out, the procedural rights remaining in the guilty plea process “may serve a variety of social or public goals that will not always coincide with the preferences of defense and prosecution.” King, Priceless Process, supra note --, at 132.
63 See U.S. v. Patton (1930) (assigning jury trial right to defendant).
right to a jury trial we do that very thing. I am talking, of course, about *Batson v. Kentucky* and its progeny, which held that a juror has a right not to be excluded from a petit jury based on race, ethnicity or gender. Much of the recent peremptory challenge law has focused on the juror’s right to serve on a jury, most recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in *Johnson v. California* and *Miller-El v. Dretke*. Likewise, much of the scholarly literature on peremptory challenges has argued for a greater role for the people in selecting a jury, while still balancing the right of the defendant to eliminate jurors. So why not use this balancing model for the jury trial right itself?

Sharing the right to a criminal jury trial between the community and the accused would serve a variety of purposes. First, restoring some measure of the jury trial right to the local community would follow the original understanding of the procedure, both as practiced in the 18th century and as formalized into the Bill of Rights. If the Supreme Court is now basing some of its criminal jurisprudence on the historical practices of the jury trial, focusing on the rights of the community, then the original meaning of the jury trial right has renewed import.

The best example for how to share such a right comes from another aspect of criminal procedure: the peremptory challenge. The body of case law surrounding peremptory challenges initially addressed the prosecution’s illegal dismissal of jurors due to race or ethnicity, but gradually grew to include the illegal dismissal of jurors by either defense or prosecution, based on the right of the juror herself to serve. It is this kind of division of jury rights, based on the rights of the community itself, that I propose to apply to the guilty plea.

1. Community as Stakeholder in Jury Formation

In 1986, the Supreme Court abandoned their previous requirement, as promulgated in *Swain v. Alabama*, that to prove

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64 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
juror discrimination, there must “be broad historical evidence of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Batson v. Kentucky} held that a defendant “could overcome the presumption that peremptory challenges were made legitimately” through a three-step process, and found that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited peremptory strikes based solely on race.\textsuperscript{70}

Over the following decades, as the Court developed its case law on peremptory challenges, its original holding expanded significantly. The discrimination initially forbidden by \textit{Batson}, instructing prosecutors they could no longer strike jurors of the same race as the defendant, was extended to include peremptory challenges of jurors of a different race than the defendant.\textsuperscript{71} In \textit{Powers v. Ohio},\textsuperscript{72} the Court eliminated the requirement that the excluded juror be of the same cognizable racial group as the complaining criminal defendant.\textsuperscript{73} That same year, in \textit{Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.},\textsuperscript{74} the Court extended \textit{Batson} to include the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges in civil actions between private litigants.\textsuperscript{75} A year later, in \textit{Georgia v. McCollum},\textsuperscript{76} third-party standing to raise improper exclusion of potential jurors based on race was extended to the prosecution.\textsuperscript{77} Additionally, the Court held in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Swain}, 380 U.S. at 227.
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{Batson}, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
\item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{Carlson}, supra note 
\item \textsuperscript{72} 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
\item \textsuperscript{73} \textit{Powers}, 499 U.S. at 409-10. A defendant may make a \textit{Batson} complaint for the discriminatory striking of members of any cognizable racial group, including whites. \textit{Id.} at 409-10. \textit{Powers} held that the criminal defendant has third party standing to raise an equal protection claim chiefly on behalf of an excluded juror. \textit{Id.} at 415.
\item \textsuperscript{74} 500 U.S. 614 (1991). Although the Equal Protection Clause requires state action in order for it to apply, the court found that state action occurs in the jury selection process because the peremptory challenges by the private litigant are facilitated by the court’s “overt, significant assistance.” \textit{Id.} at 622-24.
\item \textsuperscript{75} \textit{Edmonson}, 499 U.S. at 616.
\item \textsuperscript{76} 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{McCollum}, 505 U.S. at 55-56. In reaching this holding, the Court concluded that the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge by the defendant constituted state action because the state is the “logical and proper party” to protect the constitutional rights of jurors. \textit{Id.} at 56.
\end{itemize}
J.E.B. v. Alabama\textsuperscript{78} that the Equal Protection Clause bars discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender.\textsuperscript{79}

More recently, the Court handed down two more \textit{Batson} opinions, illustrating its continued interest in the procedure and in its division of rights between the defendant and the community. First, in \textit{Miller-El v. Dretke}\textsuperscript{80} the Court found, in a 6-3 decision, that defendant Miller-El was entitled to a new trial due to discriminatory strikes by the prosecutor during jury selection.\textsuperscript{81} The same day it issued \textit{Miller-El}, the Court also handed down \textit{Johnson v. California}, which gave a ringing endorsement to the community’s jury trial right:

The constitutional interests \textit{Batson} sought to vindicate are not limited to the rights possessed by the defendant on trial, nor to those citizens who desire to participate “in the administration of the law, as jurors.” Undoubtedly, the overriding interest in eradicating discrimination from our civic institutions suffers whenever an individual is excluded from making a significant contribution to governance on account of his race. Yet the “harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror \textit{to touch the entire community}.”\textsuperscript{82}

In \textit{Johnson}, as in its previous \textit{Batson} line of cases, the Supreme Court held that discrimination in jury selection impacts not only the litigants and the individual jurors who have been subject to peremptory challenges, but communities as well.\textsuperscript{83} As lower courts

\textsuperscript{78} 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{J.E.B.}, 511 U.S. at 129.

\textsuperscript{80} 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Miller-El}, 125 S. Ct. at 2340.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Id.} at 2418 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{J.E.B.}, 511 U.S. at 140. The Court went on to note that:

Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.’ It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and . . . reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation. The message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain
have understood it, “[j]ury service—a privilege and duty of citizenship— is . . . a fundamental means of participating in government.”

For one aspect of criminal adjudication, then, the Court has held that the public has a right to serve on the jury. As the Court noted in Powers: “Although “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury . . . he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.”

By ensuring that no juror is struck for constitutionally impermissible reasons, the Batson procedure allows the community’s interest to remain in the selection of the criminal jury. When a juror is illegally stricken under Batson, harm is done not only to the defendant, but also to the individual juror and the community at large. These two competing visions of the jury right underlie the entire body of law regarding peremptory challenges.

Of course, the community’s right to serve on a jury must be weighed against the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. The Batson procedure, however, manages to balance both rights simultaneously. It is a balancing act that can be emulated by incorporating a plea jury into the guilty plea. Like the Batson procedure, the procedure of the plea jury strikes a middle ground between two competing interests: here, the efficiency of the plea versus community involvement in the criminal justice process.

There are a couple of ways in which the local community, through the use of the plea jury, could be directly involved in the guilty plea. These procedures, which I will describe in the next Part, are supported both practically and through the use of expressive restorative retributive theory. Not only does expressive restorative retribution, as filtered through 21st-century mores, permit the

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Id. at 142 (quoting Strader v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
85. Although “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury . . . he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 409.
86 Id.
community a true opportunity to exercise their jury trial right, but it also forces offenders to take more responsibility for their wrongdoings, since the community is involved in the imposition of punishment and restoring the balance disturbed by the offender’s bad acts. This type of community involvement restores the much-needed step that has long been missing from our criminal adjudication since the widespread use of the guilty plea.

C. The Plea Jury: Process and Policy

At first glance, applying a collective jury right to the procedure of a guilty plea seems counterintuitive. After all, the whole point of a guilty plea is to eliminate the jury aspect of the trial. But at further inspection, incorporating the jury into the mechanics of the guilty plea is a positive for both the community and the substantive values underlying our system of criminal punishment. But before we explore the why of the plea jury, we should first look at the how.

The modern guilty plea consists of several stages. First is the charging decision, a decision that is generally left almost entirely to the prosecutor’s control and discretion. Sometimes even before the grand jury returns the indictment, the prosecutor and defense counsel will have a preliminary meeting to discuss possible plea deals for the charged or potentially charged crimes. Usually, defense counsel will then meet with her client and advise him of a variety of matters, including his right to accept or reject a proposed plea bargain, the merits or demerits of the facts and the law, any plea offers made by the prosecutor, the consequences of accepting these offers, the range of the sentence if found guilty after trial, the necessary allocutions to be made to the court, and what, if any, fundamental rights will need to be waived. Upon discussion with the client, the defense counsel

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89 See Herman, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 62, 78.
90 See id. at 62-63. Granted, some plea deals are struck without defense counsel ever truly consulting the client, but I am charting how guilty pleas should be made, without reference to the shortcuts sometimes made in the heat of the moment.
returns to the prosecutor, and either a deal is struck or bargaining continues until an agreement has been negotiated.

Plea deals, however, are not just simple negotiations of guilt, acceptance and sentence length. Today’s guilty pleas often involve haggling over such provisions as: dismissing or reducing a charge against a third person; limiting the factual proffer or fact-stipulation; a defendant’s cooperation or testimony against another party; a defendant’s agreement to leave the jurisdiction; stipulating to testimony in another case; waiver of civil liability; and charge-bargaining. All this complex bargaining and resolution of matters normally decided within a more public and formally legal sphere is now determined in the private meetings of prosecutor and defense counsel. Because of this, the plea jury’s participation is all the more important in the next step.

Once the plea bargain has been struck, it must be brought before the court to be finalized and approved. In most plea agreements, the court has the ultimate power to accept or reject a plea agreement, which includes the imposition of sentence. Thus for a guilty plea to be accepted by the court, all three players must come before the court so the defendant can “take” his plea in front of the judge. Before the defendant can plead guilty, the court must advise him of all of his rights, and must explore the factual basis for the plea during the defendant’s allocution. This is where the plea jury would come into play.

In the standard guilty plea, a defendant allocutes to the particulars of his crime(s) before the court. Formally, this is the time when the court determines whether the defendant’s conduct was intentional and actually constituted the charged offense, as well as whether the plea is knowing and voluntary. My idea for the plea jury

91 Contrary to many Law & Order plotlines, a client is rarely present for the plea negotiations between the prosecutor and defense counsel. See id. at 79.
92 See id. at 77.
93 See id. at 93-94.
94 See id. at 96. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and certain state jurisdictions expressly prevent a judge from participating in plea discussions, although some states, like Vermont, allow participation after counsel have reached an agreement. See id.
95 See id. at 12. These rights include the right to a jury trial, to assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination.
is relatively simple: have the defendant plead to a special guilty plea jury, under supervision of the judge, and have that designated jury make the determination whether the facts stated fit the alleged crimes, whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, and whether the proposed sentence is appropriate.

To incorporate this plea jury more smoothly into the vast and bureaucratic machinery of guilty pleas, the jury would function as a cross between a grand jury and a petit jury. Like a grand jury, it would serve more than once, for at least a month at a time. Like a petit jury, it would probably consist of 12 or fewer people. Like a grand jury, it would be comprised of people randomly selected from the community, with no peremptory or for-cause challenges to shape its ranks. Like the petit jury, it would focus primarily on the facts of the charged offenses, although in this case, the plea jury would also help determine whether the suggested punishment—both charge and sentence—was acceptable.

There would be two important procedural differences between the plea jury and the petit and grand jury functions, however. With the plea jury, the watchful eye of the court would always be a buffer between an irrational or patently unfair jury decision rejecting a proffered plea for either charging or sentencing bases. In other words, the trial court could, with proper discretion, reject or overturn a plea jury’s decision on a plea deal if the court determined the decision was unreasonable. Although I envision this discretionary oversight being used infrequently, the possibility of a safety valve in the process would protect against common concerns about the jury such as bias or ignorance, similar to the court’s discretion over a criminal jury’s “irrational” guilty verdict. Second, there would be no requirement for unanimity with a plea jury. Instead, a majority vote could suffice.

A crucial part of the plea jury’s role would be its part in listening to the defendant’s allocution. Instead of pleading guilty and explaining his offenses solely to the judge, the defendant would

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96 For a detailed look on how the grand jury functions as a populist, community body, and a defense of its discretion, see Roger A. Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703 (2008).

direct his plea and allocution to the plea jury. The lay jury would then determine whether the factual basis admitted by the defendant matched the original charged crimes, whether the plea was knowing, willing and voluntary, and whether the proffered sentence was appropriate. Although the court would still need to first advise the defendant about the nature of his offense, the range of statutory penalties, and the like, the defendant’s actual admission of guilt and proffer of facts would be addressed to the plea jury.

If the plea jury rejected one or more aspects of defendant’s proposed plea, whether for reasons of involuntariness, lack of knowledge, lack of belief in the factual proffer, or unhappiness over the proposed punishment, then the defendant would have several options. First, the defendant could back out of the plea deal entirely, and take his chances with a trial. Alternatively, the judge could grant a continuance, and during that time the prosecutor and defense counsel could fashion a different plea deal, responding to the concerns of the plea jury. Finally, if the problem was a matter of sentencing, the plea jury could recommend a sentence it thinks appropriate for the crime committed, the final sentence to be refined and imposed by the court.  

In cases where the prosecution and defense counsel object that the plea jury’s rejection of the proposed plea or sentence was unfair or biased, the presiding judge or magistrate could make a ruling determining the propriety of the plea jury’s decision. If the decision violated any legal or ethical standard, the plea jury’s conclusion could be overruled. Since the jury’s conclusion would not be a formal verdict, the court’s override would not violate any constitutional roles. Normally, however, the plea jury’s decision would stand, whether favorable or unfavorable to the fate of the proposed plea agreement.

Although the inclusion of a lay jury into a traditionally bureaucratic, administrative-like proceeding such as a guilty plea may seem jarring or quixotic, there are many benefits of incorporating a panel of community members into this important

98 In the federal system, the defendant’s guilty plea and the court’s imposition of sentence are usually two separate procedures. Therefore, it would be important to have the same plea jury convened for both the guilty plea and the sentencing hearing. This might mean that federal plea juries are called for a longer period, possibly two or three months, similar to the service of grand juries.
criminal adjudication. In Part III, I explain the substantive legal and theoretical values which are strengthened and improved by this insertion of the public into the private workings of the criminal justice system.

III. The Jury Plea and Classic Criminal Procedure Values

It is no secret that our system of guilty pleas shortcuts many classic substantive and procedural values taken for granted in criminal justice. The principles that justify our imposition of punishment in public jury trials rapidly disintegrate in the informal, private realm of plea agreements. This difference between “promise and performance, between text and reality,”99 is particularly acute with guilty pleas because of the vast distance between the rights elaborated in the 6th Amendment and the workings of the guilty plea process.

Meaningful lay participation, in the form of a plea jury, would shrink the current distance between the criminal law’s “legitimizing promise and [the] systemic reality”100 of guilty pleas. Moreover, the plea jury would inject some genuine adjudication into our system of plea bargains, something that is badly needed.101

A. Voluntariness

One important way in which the plea jury would help bridge the gap is in determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea. Although courts technically supervise the voluntariness of guilty pleas,102 the reality is quite different. First, as scholars have argued, the prosecutor’s immense discretion as both charging instrument and adjudicator of the guilty plea can compromise the

100 Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 551 (arguing that our modern system of punishment has failed to live up to its legitimizing promise because of the hypocrisy pervading state punishment).
101 See Langbein, The Myth of Written Constitutions, supra note __, at 126.
102 See Abraham Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: The Guilty Plea and the Public Interest, 49 S.M.U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996) (“Judges have an affirmative obligation to police the guilty plea and with it the bargaining process.”)
defendant’s ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision to relinquish constitutional rights. The prosecutor’s vast charging discretion includes her ability to manipulate the offenses on which the accused is charged, both by charging offenses which may not be provable beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and by charging offenses higher than necessary to induce a plea on a lower charge. These abuses of discretion affect the ability of the accused to plead guilty in a knowing and voluntary fashion, because they affect the offender’s ability to accurately assess the risks and benefits of going to trial.

This potential for abuse in plea bargaining is not necessarily balanced out by the role of defense counsel. Often, defense counsel believe that it is in the client’s best interests—and their own—to “go along with a prosecutorially orchestrated plea.” Although following Brady, such induced pleas might technically meet the minimum legal definition of voluntariness, they do not fit our normative sense of the concept. When the prosecutor unilaterally decides innocence or guilt along with the charged offense and sentence, plea proposals tend to become coercive. Because the criminal defendant often does not have the same access to information as the prosecutor—discovery rules do not require the

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104 See Meares, supra note __, at 863.
105 See Meares, supra note __, at 864.
106 See Meares, supra note __, at 867.
107 See Meares, supra note __, at 869. This is often due to defense counsel’s heavy caseload and the hope of continuing the relationship with the prosecutor in the future. Id.
108 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970), held that a guilty plea encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence was legal because it was both voluntary and intelligent. However, the meaning of “voluntary” differs in different criminal contexts—for example, the voluntariness standard for confessions is much more stringent than the voluntariness standard for guilty pleas. See Meares, supra note __, at 872.
prosecution to give a defendant free access to her information—
the prosecutor often acts as sole judge and jury of the case.

To compound this problem, the quick colloquy that the judge
has with the defendant regarding the voluntariness of his plea is
usually rote and perfunctory for both participants. If the defendant
mouths the correct phrases, the judge is unlikely to scrutinize the plea
any further. This lack of scrutiny hinders the defendant’s full
exercise of the Due Process clause. Such an inquiry into
voluntariness should be made with full appreciation that “the plea
occurs in a suspect context and structure,” but rarely does.

Although judges could certainly take a more active role in
reviewing plea bargains, they are in a weak position to do so because
of their institutional capacity. Due to concerns over separation of
powers, courts are poorly situated to oversee prosecutorial charging
decisions or factual bases for said charges. Judges rarely interfere
with “discretionary decisions about which charge to select or whether
and how to plea bargain.” With “crowded dockets and little
personal or institutional investment in the resolution of particular
cases,” judges lack incentives to scrutinize plea deals. Additionally, judges are major beneficiaries of the guilty plea’s
efficiency, adding even less motivation to carefully question a
defendant’s allocation. Finally, claiming involuntariness on appeal
to later overturn the plea is rarely, if ever, successful, leaving the
voluntariness of defendants virtually without scrutiny.

In sum, there is rarely, if ever, any deep investigation by the
court into government practices that may have helped induce the

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110 See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for “Brady”
111 See Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 224.
112 See, e.g., Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 598 (contending
that since courts do not “seriously scrutinize the voluntariness of guilty pleas, the
Due Process clause effectively does not apply to the vast majority of criminal
proceedings in the United States.”
113 See Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 598.
114 See Covey, Fixed Justice, supra note __, at 1266.
115 See Covey, Fixed Justice, supra note __, at 1266-67. See also Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1059,
1075 n.59 (1976).
116 Bibas, Prosecutorial Accountability, supra note __, at 29.
117 Covey, Fixed Justice, supra note __, at 1267.
plea. As Markus Dubber has dryly noted, “American courts have fallen into the comfortable habit of regarding defendants who complain about involuntary pleas as smooth operators who copped a deal with the assistance of a savvy defense lawyers.”118

Allowing a plea jury to determine voluntariness, however, helps break this troubling pattern. Placing a representative section of the lay public into the guilty plea process helps inject a fresher, less jaded outlook into whether the defendant’s plea is actually voluntary. Insiders like trial courts, which hear hundreds of guilty pleas a year, generally do not pay much attention to the voluntariness of the plea unless the level of involuntariness or coercion is extreme.119 In contrast, an outsider body120 like the plea jury, by virtue of its lack of cynicism and more open views about the process, would likely scrutinize each defendant’s level of voluntariness with much more care. Moreover, this reinvigorated scrutiny by the plea jury may well include an inquiry into the defendant’s knowledge of the facts to which state is pleading.

As a general rule, a guilty plea cannot be considered voluntary unless the defendant is aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the guilty plea.121 But the judge’s cursory assessment of the defendant’s voluntariness might differ from an assessment by the plea jury, since the judge is often inured to the routine and rote articulations of the defendant’s colloquy. As George Fischer noted, judges definitely have a stake in plea bargains; they are invested in the procedure and try to facilitate it.122 This investment can dull courts to the sometimes questionable voluntariness of the pleading defendant. Ron Wright has similarly

118 See Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 598.
119 See Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 599 (contending that “plea hearings today are too perfunctory to ensure that even minimum voluntariness requirements for pleas have been met”); William F. McDonald, U.S. Dept of Justice, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 135 (1985) (explaining that courts deny a mere 2% of guilty pleas)
120 For the concept of inside and outside players in the plea bargaining process, I am indebted to Stephanos Bibas. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 (2006).
121 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that standard as to voluntariness of guilty plea is that “a plea of guilty must be entered into by a person fully aware of the direct consequences” of plea).
122 See FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, supra note __, at 175-80.
argued that “courts have walked away” from the voluntariness part of the inquiry, satisfying themselves with a pro forma statement from the defendant that his guilty plea was not coerced.123

A plea jury, on the other hand, can be more sensitive to whether the defendant is pleading guilty under any undue coercion or influence, by virtue of its multiple eyes and ears, combined with a less cursory and jaded view of the guilty plea process. First, the basic level of explanation required by a plea jury in order to understand the workings of an individual plea would necessarily uncover much more of the prosecutor’s charging decisions, laying out the evidence as well as any reasonable and unreasonable indictments made by that office. This will not only clarify matters for the plea jury, but also allow the defendant to potentially reconsider her plea based on the evidence presented, permitting her to make a more meaningful decision on whether to plead guilty.

Additionally, due to its outsider status, the plea jury can better understand and emphasize with the defendant, who is thrown into the complex rules of the criminal justice system. A court’s decision that a defendant understands the “direct consequences”124 of a guilty plea may contain a very different calculus than that of laypeople. Even the most sophisticated defendant usually does not possess the understanding and general wherewithal belonging to the prosecution, defense counsel, and trial court.

Moreover, in cases involving chemical impairment, a plea jury might be equally if not better suited to determine the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Legally, when a defendant informs the court of recent use of alcohol or drugs, a court must inquire further into the defendant’s mental state.125 This brief colloquy usually satisfies the requirement of a “meaningful engagement” to further examine the defendant’s state of mind. Courts, however, are not per se any more qualified than lay people to make a determination whether the defendant’s plea, at his time of allocution,

123 See Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 94. Wright goes on to explain how the very environment of the guilty plea can be coercive, making voluntariness questionable, as the “size of the differential between the post-trial sentence and the post-plea sentence can become enormous.” Id.
124 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
is voluntary or knowing despite the use of any potentially mind-altering substances.

Instead, having the lay public listen to the colloquy, and potentially ask its own queries in addition to the court’s questions, could only improve the quality of the voluntariness inquiry. Cass Sunstein, among others, has argued that heterogeneous decision making, in a group, is often superior to other types of decision-making.126 There is an undeniable advantage of having a group, instead of a single actor, determine an important question such as voluntariness, since the breadth of a group’s experience is necessarily much wider than just one, no matter how expert.

Another related benefit of having the plea jury determine voluntariness, instead of the trial court is the potential for greater diversity. Although certainly strides have been made to diversify the bar and bench, the fact still remains that judges are primarily white127 and defendants often minority.128 The lack of diversity on the bench is true not only for race & national origin, but for gender, sexuality, and class as well.129 Although there is no guarantee than any randomly picked plea jury would contain a perfect cross-section of America, statistically it is far more likely that 10-12 lay jurors would contain more racial, ethnic, gender and class diversity than any one judge.

In sum, the combined experience, diversity, observation powers, and outsider status of a plea jury would provide a much better review of voluntariness in a defendant’s guilty plea. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[A] plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a

126 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 109 (2000) (explaining that eliminating homogeneity in groups improves the deliberative process, because heterogeneous groups build identification “through focus on a common task rather than through other social ties, [and] tend to produce the best outcomes.”)
129 See Judicial Selection in the States, Diversity of the Bench, supra note __.
perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality.” If courts are too busy or too enmeshed within the system to properly examine the voluntary nature of a defendant’s guilty plea, then the plea jury is nicely designed to pick up the slack.

B. Retributive Values, or Punishment Fitting the Actual Crime

The plea jury also helps solve a number of more theoretical problems with the current guilty plea process. As Bill Stuntz has pointed out, one of the defining characteristics of plea bargaining is that it “so often fails to internalize the laws that purport to govern it.” In other words, although scholars and courts have spent much time and effort defining the criminal law’s rules and theoretical boundaries, it is all blithely cast aside when it comes to our most common criminal procedure.

This is particularly true when it comes to Article III and the 6th Amendment, both of which dictate lay participation as a critical element of punishment. As I discussed above, the Supreme Court’s latest sentencing decisions seem to articulate a philosophy of expressive restorative retribution. Yet this entire philosophy—as well as 6th Amendment jurisprudence generally—hinges on the inclusion of a jury as a representative of the community, something the current guilty plea procedure simply neglects. Such a disconnect between trial-based theory and the reality of our criminal justice system exposes the absence of principled accounts of punishment imposition for guilty pleas.

The use of a plea jury helps bridge this gap. Most obviously, it reintroduces the community back into the most common forms of criminal adjudication, thereby satisfying the constitutional and theoretical dictates of both the 6th Amendment and Article III. More subtly, however, the use of the plea jury also provides a way to extend the Court’s recent punishment philosophy to plea agreements.

132 See Dubber, American Plea Bargains, supra note __, at 602 (arguing that “all too little thought has been expended on the question of how to choose among the multitude of possible systems of punishment imposition that would satisfy the vague and modest requirements of the Constitution.”)
Only with the incorporation of the community can we extend the theoretical underpinnings of our current system of punishment to the guilty plea.

These theoretical retributive underpinnings need an independent body such as the plea jury to practically ensure that the factual basis of the plea matches the offenses allegedly committed. There is too often a discrepancy that occurs between the observed and stated facts of the offense and the defendant’s ultimate recital of facts, making the guilty plea an unreliable measure of fair and accurate punishment. This disconnect is due to a number of factors, including prosecutorial overcharging and the resultant charge-bargaining, deal-making between prosecution and defense counsel, and judicial disinterest.

Despite all these problems, it is extremely rare to have a plea agreement rejected because of disquiet between the difference between crime charged and the crime committed. This remains true even when the gulf between the two is so dramatic that non-judicial court officials have found cause for concern. In a recent study, forty percent of federal probation officers believed that the majority of cases were not supported by offense facts that accurately and completely reflected all aspects of the case. But the disconnect frequently found between crime committed and crime charged has not yet forced a change in guilty plea procedure.

This issue is not merely a concern for court officials. It has larger ramifications. When the crime of which the defendant stands convicted has little or no relation to the crime she has committed, there is a distorting effect on the criminal justice system. Too much space between the actual offense and the punished offense collapses the retributive framework of punishment, because the link between the actual crime and the appropriate punishment is severed.

Having an offender allocate and recite facts to a plea jury, however, links the crime back to the proposed punishment. A plea jury is much less likely to accept a plea of guilty to a vastly different crime than the reported offense, and would likely to be less tolerant of puzzling disconnects between the two. If the plea jury is briefed

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134 See Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems, supra note __, at 574.
before the allocution with a short summary of the facts of the offense, most likely from the pre-sentence report (which often contains witness statements, police reports, confessions, and the like), then it is much more likely to spot any massive discrepancies between the actual offense and the charged offense, as well as any differences between potential punishments. If the plea jury is comfortable with the lesser punishment given, then it may approve the plea agreement. If not, it can reject the agreement and direct the parties to find a closer fit between crime committed and crime charged.

Additionally, the role of the plea jury as listening body for the defendant’s factual allocution also provides a safety valve for defendants who have been pressured by prosecutors, and sometimes defense counsel, to accept convictions for crimes they did not commit. A defendant’s literal discomfort with or obvious lack of knowledge about the crime to which they are supposedly pleading guilty is often overlooked by the court as long as the defendant can stumble through the facts. But the formal processes of presenting the plea jury with the basic facts of the offense directly before the defendant’s allocution will make the jury more focused on the actual particulars of the committed crime. This knowledge will help warn the plea jury when a defendant is entirely unfamiliar with the specifics.

Allowing the plea jury to hear and weigh the factual basis of the plea agreement thus helps re-link the imposed punishment with committed offense. The importance of retaining such a link—particularly in a world where more and more acts are criminalized—helps tether the apparatus of the guilty plea to both punishment theory and to retributive practice itself, keystones of our criminal justice system.

C. Articulating the Public Interest

Restoring the community’s voice to the imposition of punishment within the guilty plea process serves a number of

135 See Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 81 (discussing problems with plea bargains, including the pressure on defendants to take pleas for crimes not committed).

136 I mean to distinguish this from Alford pleas, where the defendant can still retain his claims of innocence while still garnering the benefits of a plea agreement.
interests both theoretical and practical. These positive aspects include the public’s increased understanding of the criminal justice system, a restoration of criminal adjudication’s educative function, a better fit between imposed punishment and the constitutional theory of the 6th Amendment, and a better moral consensus among the community.

First, and most basically, the current guilty plea process functions out of sight from the average citizen. Contemporary plea procedure “block[s] the public from learning the full story of the defendant’s crime.”\(^{137}\) The guilty plea hides the criminal justice process from the community in two ways: (1) it excludes citizens from deciding on the proper punishment for community wrongdoers; and (2) it hides any misconduct done by the offenders from the community. This creates not only transparency concerns but also ethical problems,\(^{138}\) because either the prosecutor or the defense might negotiate a plea agreement to cover up other matters, including police misconduct, wide-scale fraud, or yet-undiscovered crimes.

The public has a meaningful interest in uncovering these issues. Requiring plea agreements to pass before the eyes of a plea jury would at least partially illuminate back-door dealings, since any major discrepancies between the original charges and offense descriptions and the details of the agreement would be scrutinized by members of the community. Additionally, enhancing local, popular participation within an existing criminal justice institution\(^{139}\) such as the guilty plea combines the positives of community involvement without requiring new courts or immense change in the existing system.

Granted, the prosecutor is both technically and legally the public’s representative. As the Supreme Court noted over 70 years ago, “[T]he prosecution’s interest . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”\(^{140}\) This role as the people’s representative, however, frequently gets subsumed by a gradual inclination to sympathize with the prosecuting ethos and desire to

\(^{137}\) Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 81.

\(^{138}\) See Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 1178 (focusing on the ethical duties that prosecutors may have to defendants in fashioning plea bargains, and arguing for adoption of a coherent theory by prosecutors’ offices).

\(^{139}\) See Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, supra note __, at 363.

achieve a positive win-loss record. As Abraham Goldstein noted, prosecutors have “their own agendas, both personal and administrative.”141 For prosecutors, the concepts of “public interest” or “justice” are often too diffuse and elastic to constrain them.142 A prosecutor’s simultaneous representation of both the State and the People can get subsumed in the everyday details of doing her job.

Moreover, many prosecutors regularly charge offenses that either do not fit the crime or that they have no plan to take to trial, in order to strengthen their plea-bargaining position.143 As a result, prosecutors often turn a blind eye to such practices as pressuring defendants to take unfavorable pleas or offering pleas that do not properly consider societal interests.144 Thus, the goals of the individual prosecutor are often incongruent with those of the public.145

Defendants, on the other hand, are understandably primarily focused on their own functional realities, and are rarely concerned with principles of legality or public interest.146 And courts, as I discussed above, are concerned with proportionality and neutrality, not in vindicating the people’s concerns. The three major players in the guilty plea process, then, fail to represent the public interest in any meaningful way. As a result, the public often “lose[s] faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal is justice.”147

Scholars rightly argue that “an external evaluation of guilty pleas is necessary because none of the negotiating parties will reliably protect the public interest.”148 Although opinions differ as

141 Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems, supra note __, at 569.
142 See Bibas, Prosecutorial Accountability, supra note __, at 6.
143 See Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 246.
144 See Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 1149.
145 See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note __, at 1987. Schulhofer goes on to explain how a District Attorney’s goals (such as a high conviction rate, a good relationship with other influential private attorneys, an absence of high-profile losses) can differ from the goals of a front-line prosecutor (such as career advancement, job satisfaction, manageability of cases), further complicating the matter.
146 See Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems, supra note __, at 569.
147 Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note __, at 33.
148 Wright, Trial Distortions, supra note __, at 96. Wright is not the only scholar to hold this view. See also Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note
how to best achieve this goal, one way of achieving such public scrutiny and accountability is through the use of the plea jury. Like a trial, a plea proceeding is normally open to the public, which permits any member of the community to attend and watch the procedure. Unlike trials, however, normal plea proceedings are rarely publicized or scheduled in an open manner, making it highly unlikely that even interested community members will attend. The plea jury, in contrast, indelibly inserts the public into the process.

By seeing how the plea jury weighs a defendant’s guilty plea and proposed sentence, the community will come to understand that criminal justice is an open, accessible proceeding. Through repeated participation in a plea juries, the community will better understand how the system adjudicates and punishes crime, which will provide, among other things, an educative function. Through citizen involvement, the “cynicism and contempt” for the criminal justice system that is invariably created by more secret proceedings will be minimized.149

Equally important, the machinations of guilty pleas can create “disappointment and a sense of helplessness”150 in the public mind. Where the initial charges and the ultimate charge and punishment are far apart, and this discrepancy is never explained to the public, there can be disappointed expectations and, often, demoralization.151 Relatedly, the prosecutor sometimes authorizes pleas to non-existent, inapplicable, or time-barred crimes,152 or sentences that the public has not legally authorized through statute.153 These prosecutorial actions further frustrate the public. Finally, some plea agreements include the closure of court proceedings and sealing of court records,154 eliminating even the potential of public scrutiny. Allowing the lay public into the courtroom to weigh these choices will, at minimum, shed light onto the process for the community.

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150 Wright & Miller, *Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff*, supra note __, at 96.
151 See Wright & Miller, *The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff*, supra note __, at 96.
153 Punishments such as banishment or shaming. *See id.* at 725, 735.
154 *See id.* at 729.
The public may also have concerns that innocent defendants are pleading guilty, or that the justice system allows defendants to barter away constitutional rights for a lesser punishment. Their integration into the guilty plea process through participation in the plea jury can either stop the practices some of these problems (pleas to non-existent crimes or non-statutory sentences), solve some others (inclusion of community, through the plea jury, in closed or sealed proceedings), and eliminates concern over much of the rest (by personally scrutinizing allocation for innocence or coercion).

As Kalven and Zeisel noted over 40 years ago, “the jury, in the guise of resolving doubts about the issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of values.” The jury’s ability to import community values into adjudication helps it fulfill one of its primary duties under the Constitution, resisting the governmental abuse of power against the public, as well as counteracting any judicial bias or corruption. The fact that the jury has been completely stripped from the current guilty-plea process means that the experiences of average members of society have also been eliminated from the criminal justice system.

Finally, criminal law plays a critical part in helping sustain the moral consensus needed to maintain social norms in our diverse society. The jury, as representative of the community, needs to participate in all forms of criminal punishment because this community determination of social norms “may be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences.” By eliminating the role of the jury, our current guilty plea procedure robs us of an important norm-creating opportunity in the realm of criminal justice. Restoring jury participation to this most common of criminal procedures likewise restores the community’s role in creating meaningful social norms.

D. The Power of Allocution

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155 See Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note __, at 97.
159 Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert, supra note __, at 154.
The plea jury’s role in hearing the defendant’s allocution gives it much of its power. This feature of the guilty plea process is central to the plea jury’s ability to change aspects of the procedure for the better, in ways practical, theoretical and normative.

1. Insiders, Outsiders and Transparency

One key aspect of the plea jury is its outsider status. Stephanos Bibas has observed that a vast gulf divides insiders and outsiders in the criminal justice system. Insiders such as prosecutors, defense counsel and judges possess power and knowledge, and outsiders such as crime victims, bystanders, and the general public frequently feel excluded and confused.160 This divide creates a tension between the two groups, “impair[ing] outsiders' faith in the law's legitimacy and trustworthiness . . . and imped[ing] the criminal law's moral and expressive goals, as well as its instrumental ones.”161 With the guilty plea rate as high as it is, outsiders undergo considerable frustration when they are excluded from the workings of the criminal justice system.

As a partial solution to this crisis, Bibas suggests efforts in both transparency and participation.162 On the transparency side, Bibas proposes summarizing and publishing accurate charging, conviction, and sentencing statistics. On the participatory side, he recommends sentencing circles and other restorative justice techniques to give the public a say.163 Bibas admits these are partial solutions, as insiders will always have more power, information and practical concerns, but argues that his reforms will at least shrink the gap.164

The plea jury fits in nicely as the next step in the kinds of innovation and reforms supported by Bibas. In regards to transparency, the plea jury affords a window into the workings of the criminal justice system, highlighting such hidden processes as the work of the probation officer, the pre-sentence report, and the

161 See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 916.
162 See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 917.
163 See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 917.
164 See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 918.
function of post-release supervision, as well as better illuminating the sentencing statutes and guidelines, state or federal, that constrain and shape punishment. Because part of the role of the plea jury is to study the pre-sentence report and the descriptions of the crime before hearing the plea, the public gains a much wider understanding about the mechanisms of criminal law, providing better and more realistic comprehension of the complexity of the process.

Since most hearings, including plea hearings, are obscure and not well-publicized,\textsuperscript{165} having a formal mechanism to incorporate the lay public into these procedures will unquestionably shed light on the process. This transparency has important trickle-down benefits, as Bibas points out. With better access and comprehension of how guilty pleas work, the public will have a more realistic understanding of criminal penalties and sentence proportionality, no longer forced to primarily rely on stereotypes, news stories and media hysteria.\textsuperscript{166}

The participatory benefits of the plea jury similarly accrue. There are few roles for the public in the modern criminal justice system. Grand juries are controlled by prosecutors;\textsuperscript{167} jury trials are few and far between; victims have minimal roles at sentencing hearings; and both incarceration and post-released supervision often occur far away from the community. At most, the public can affect the practice of criminal law by electing district attorneys and judges or through referendums, and even this is relatively hands-off and controlled by imperfect information.\textsuperscript{168} Thus the plea jury supplies a way for many different citizens to partake in the practice and imposition of criminal justice, one that is frequent, inclusive, thoughtful and meaningful—an exercise that has become increasingly rare in the modern era.

\textsuperscript{165} See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 924.
\textsuperscript{166} See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 927. Importantly, Bibas explains how constant "misperceptions about average sentences fuel spiraling sentences and discontent with criminal justice. Because voters are badly misinformed, they clamor for tougher sentences, three-strikes laws, and mandatory minima across the board." \textit{Id.} at 929.
\textsuperscript{167} See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 929.
\textsuperscript{168} See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 935. As Bibas points out, due to their lack of participation and knowledge, resentful outsiders can force through new and rigid rules in an attempt to bind insiders, often resulting in unfortunate outcomes or work by insider to evade the new rules, resulting in the same impasse. \textit{Id.} at 940-41.
The plea jury also helps mend the substantive gulf between criminal procedure and criminal values. By better fostering the lay public’s understanding of criminal process, by clarifying the link between crimes and specific penalties, the plea jury both educates the community as a whole and reinforces retributive justice, the latter of which requires that offenders must know the punishment for crimes before they are committed.

The plea jury’s scrutiny of the defendant’s allocution and proposed plea agreement requires it to ponder whether the crime committed matches up with the crime admitted, as well as whether the crime is properly punished by the proposed penalty. Such a review of the community’s enumerated crimes and potential punishments, along with the act of actually helping impose said punishments, will assist in bringing home the lessons of retributive justice in a concrete way. “[T]he criminal law’s most important real-world effect may be its ability to assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of these norms and moral principles.”169

Relatedly, citizens are more likely to think that the criminal justice system is fair if they have had a direct part to play in its workings, helping impose punishment on offenders who have, more likely than not, committed crimes in the community. If “[s]ecrecy and opacity weaken citizens' trust in the law,”170 then the plea jury, by assisting in the sentencing of the community’s wrong-doers, permits the public to see how guilty pleas work both procedurally and substantively, allowing that lost trust in the system to be rebuilt. Reassuring outsiders that guilty pleas are not exercises in self-serving or random lenience for the insiders, but instead a principled and fairly-conducted practice, provides an unmistakable value.171

The plea jury also assists in inculcating public preferences directly into the criminal law. There are few, if any, majoritarian ways in which the citizenry may straightforwardly affect change in any administrative-type body, let alone one as critical as the criminal justice system. Having the community partake in an active process such as the plea jury cannot replace the power and consequence of the jury trial, but it is a decent compromise: the lay public still gets

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169 Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert, supra note __, at 148.
170 See Bibas, Transparency, supra note __, at 950.
171 See O’Hear, What’s Good About Trials, supra note __, at 216.
to decide whether a defendant’s punishment is acceptable, but there is no tremendous sacrifice in efficiency or procedural change. Combined, potentially, with proposed restraints on charge and sentence bargaining, the plea jury procedure could bridge the worst aspects of the insider/outsider gulf while improving the system’s fairness, transparency and legitimacy.

Finally, there is undeniably an important civic interest in having some inquiry and adjudication take place in front of the community, particularly for serious crime. Allowing the public to learn, through the utilization of the plea jury, the circumstances of the crime and the proposed punishment provides a positive externality. Although there is not the public expiation of a trial, the plea jury provides at least some measure of how our institutions have responded to current events.

2. Balancing efficiency with fairness

The plea jury strikes a balanced medium between the need for fairness and probity and efficiency requirements. The reality of the modern criminal justice system prevents any increase in jury trials, due to time, money and processing costs. But as I have explored above, the guilty plea system has become increasingly problematic. We have moved primarily to a de facto administrative regime, “where prosecutors interpret the law and adjudicate cases without written standards or hearings,” and the usual constitutional rights surrounding criminal procedure are largely irrelevant or ignored. The adversary system inherent in the jury trial has been replaced with a balancing of faulty bargains on one end against faulty bargains on the other, attempting to approximate justice. As Wright has rather

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172 See Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note __, at 60-61, 113-16.
173 See Langbein, The Myth of Written Constitutions, supra note __, at 124.
174 See Langbein, The Myth of Written Constitutions, supra note __, at 124.
175 See Langbein, The Myth of Written Constitutions, supra note __, at 124.
177 See Zacharias, Justice in Plea-Bargaining, supra note __, at 1140.
plaintively asked, “can true justice happen in the absence of trials?” 179

The plea jury is the middle ground between full blown jury trials and unregulated plea agreements. The guilty plea process as a whole is relatively untouched; prosecutor and defense counsel may still bargain as they will to dispose of cases, retaining the efficiency gained when the formal adversarial process is bypassed. And integrating the selection of the plea jury into the already-existing apparatus for calling and selecting both petit and grand jurors is as simple as accessing the data rolls and choosing a body of jurors randomly selected from the community. 180 Thus the plea jury can efficiently be called and chosen from the extant jury rolls, and sent to whichever courtroom and judge has need of them for the day.

Because the plea jury would serve for at least two weeks, their required training would not need to be excessive. We expect petit juries to absorb an immense amount of complex legal information, in a short period of time, during the jury instruction phase. Therefore, it does not seem unrealistic to expect a panel of citizens to be able to understand its role in examining the voluntariness, knowingness and factual basis of the defendant’s plea, along with the appropriate level of punishment within a sentence structure.

Granted, the plea jury’s rejection of a defendant’s plea agreement, whether for issues of coercion, incapacity, false factual basis, or improper sentence, would slow down the process somewhat. However, this would not happen during each and every guilty plea. 181 The non-unanimous nature of the plea jury’s decision would also help increase the efficiency of the plea jury assisted guilty pleas without returning to the unregulated wilds of prosecutorial power. Additionally, the presence of the court right there along with the plea jury would allow it to ask any questions on a timely basis.

The crucial task of the plea jury, to weigh the defendant’s allocution, is the crux of the compromise between the current state of

179 Wright, Trial Distortions, supra note __, at 91.
181 I discuss inefficiency concerns rising from the use of plea juries supra Part IV(a).
the jury trial and the guilty plea. The lay public participates in the guilty plea process, but only in a traditional, jury-like capacity: determining the truthfulness of the defendant, the voluntary nature of the testimony, and the crimes for which the defendant should be held liable. The plea jury’s responsibility in helping assess the appropriateness of the agreed-upon punishment is paralleled in the work of sentencing juries, an aspect of jury trial now common in many states.

Equally important, however, the function of the plea jury—listening to and weighing the defendant’s allocution and proposed punishment—is limited in nature. It does not interfere with the prosecutor’s or defense counsel’s normal roles in shaping the initial agreement. It does not require the lay public to have any extra knowledge of criminal law or sentencing. And it does not usurp the traditional role of the judge in managing and supervising all legal functions that come before her court. There is a need for predictability in our current plea-heavy criminal justice system. Having a plea jury would continue that predictability, as the procedure would inject a familiar element into the plea process while roughly maintaining the plea’s current structure.

The presence of both the plea jury and the court in the guilty plea allows these two presences to function as “legitimate counterweights to prosecutors,” injecting more procedural and substantive fairness into the process. There is widespread agreement that “the active involvement of an impartial third party in the plea negotiations makes its own contribution to the fairness of the process.” By balancing the enormous discretion of prosecutors with the scrutinizing power of the plea jury and the oversight of the court, we could reach a middle ground, admittedly imperfect, but definitely serviceable. Guilty pleas could become, as Ron Wright has hoped for federal sentencing generally, “more a servant of truth and less a slave to efficient case disposition.”

3. Expressing Social Norms

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182 Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 139.
184 Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note __, at 86.
One of the most powerful aspects of the plea jury’s part in evaluating the defendant’s allocution is its expressive role. Traditional jury trials have a strong expressive element to them, as any crimes of which the offender was accused are publicly aired out and determined in a community arena. Within the contested public trial’s “detail and drama . . . [it] becomes a morality play which impresses upon the public that the law is being enforced and that justice is being fairly administered.”\(^{185}\) This expressive element is completely absent in the current guilty plea process, where the defendant’s rote allocution to the court is simply an empty rehearsal of the deal made in private by the prosecutor and defense counsel. Although technically held in public, guilty pleas are poorly publicized.\(^{186}\) Even victims of the crimes frequently do not receive notice of or attend guilty pleas.\(^{187}\)

Since publicity is still an important part of our modern criminal justice system,\(^{188}\) we increase the legitimacy of the guilty plea itself by making these private machinations both public and meaningful. As Abraham Goldstein observed:

> Much of the effectiveness of law enforcement depends upon the symbolic role played on the public stage by the [ ] case selected for prosecution. That case sends a strong message to potential violators, reinforcing both the legal norm and the habits of obedience that form a law-abiding population.\(^{189}\)

The offender’s allocution to the plea jury works its expressive power in a variety of ways. First, the involvement of a more impartial body such as the plea jury helps give the impression of fairness both to the defendant herself and to the general public. The public understandably feels that justice is best left in the hands of more neutral decision-makers, such as the plea jury and the judge.\(^{190}\)

\(^{185}\) Goldstein, *Converging Criminal Justice Systems*, supra note __, at 569.

\(^{186}\) See Bibas, *Prosecutorial Accountability*, supra note __, at 82.

\(^{187}\) See Bibas, *Prosecutorial Accountability*, supra note __, at 82.


\(^{189}\) Goldstein, *Converging Criminal Justice Systems*, supra note __, at 569.

\(^{190}\) See Turner, *Judicial Participation*, supra note __, at 244 (quoting a defense attorney who noted that “it is reasonable for the public to expect [impartial bodies
This is particularly true because the procedures surrounding the guilty plea are relatively untouched by constitutional regulation.\footnote{See Susan Klein, \textit{Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining}, 84 \textit{Tex. L. Rev.} 2023, 2028 (2006).} 

The combination of the judge and the plea jury in the allocution process means that the community is better able to trust the convictions and sentences resulting from guilty pleas. This trust forms a direct link between public participation and public confidence in the administration of justice.\footnote{See Goldstein, \textit{Converging Criminal Justice Systems}, supra note __, at 569.} By allowing the community to participate in the open allocution, the public gets “clearer and more accurate signals about how the systems adjudicates and punishes crimes.”\footnote{Wright & Miller, \textit{The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff}, supra note __, at 34.} 

Moreover, the role of the plea jury functions expressively in determining the defendant’s truthfulness, measuring the appropriateness of the agreement, and accepting or rejecting the proposed sentence.\footnote{Granted, the plea jury’s role in reviewing plea agreements is substantially different than the community’s much broader role at trial, where it can freely assign responsibility and blame to wrongdoers. The plea jury, by virtue of its limited participation, can only accept or reject the conviction and sentence proffered by the prosecution and defense. However, the plea jury’s role in listening to the offender’s allocution, and judging whether the alleged facts of the crime meets up with the proposed punishment, provides some measure of involvement, and, if accepting of the plea agreement, a type of condemnation as well. Thanks to Nita Farahany for highlighting this issue.} If, as expressive theory holds, “the expression of social values is an important function of the courts,”\footnote{Robert Cooter, \textit{Expressive Law and Economics}, 27 \textit{J. Leg. Studies} 585 (1998).} then the public’s ability to see the community impose its social values, through the work of the plea jury, is particularly valuable. By requiring the criminal justice system to incorporate the lay public into the guilty plea process, the plea jury helps signal to everyone that fairness and procedural due process is an intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, one that cannot be eliminated by the defendant’s waiver of his jury trial right.

The plea jury allocution also has expressive value for the defendant. By openly admitting her guilt and articulating her offenses to the plea jury, the defendant is able to publicly accept her
blameworthiness and show remorse to the community. In so doing, she is able to fulfill a key aspect long part of jury trials—the outwards expression of guilt. Because the defendant is willingly admitting her wrongdoing and asking for a certain sentence, she not only shows the community her acceptance of responsibility, but also publicly reinforces the link between offense and societal punishment.

Additionally, the acknowledgment of wrongdoing to a plea jury well may have a positive effect on the defendant. By allocuting only to a court, the defendant may very well attribute her punishment to the State and shrug off the desired feelings of responsibility or awareness of her wrongdoing. In contrast, when there is a subsection of the community listening to her admission of guilt, the wrongdoer has more difficulty avoiding the burden of criminal responsibility, because her fellow citizens, her community, and her peers have both literally and figuratively been part of the expiation process. The plea jury’s seal of approval on the proposed sentence gives the impression to the defendant that the public has had at least some say in the punishment, even if the actual bargaining was done between the prosecutor and defense counsel.

If the public “lose[s] faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal is justice,” then a visible guilty plea process and public allocution allows renewed belief in the workings of criminal procedure. The plea jury’s role provides a public resolution of the offense without requiring a full jury trial, and the requirement that the defendant allocate directly to the panel fosters more responsibility and acceptance of wrongdoing.

4. Restorative justice

The defendant’s allocution to the plea jury is a significant feature in the context of restorative justice. Restorative justice, an aspect of criminal justice that has been forgotten over the years, focuses on the community’s role in not only judging and punishing the offender, but also returning her to the fold after the sentence has been served. The restorative theory of punishment conceptualizes justice as a process that incorporates both the community and the offender in an attempt to repair and reconcile the harm done. In other words, part of restorative justice is the community’s

196 Id. at 33.
willingness to forgive wrongdoers and eventually restore their rights. This is an aspect of modern punishment that we have entirely ignored, and it has been to our detriment.

To ensure our system of criminal sentencing and punishment is equally humane and powerful, we must focus on both the punishment and the restoration. The first part of this, discussed above, should ensure that the offender feels the moral approbation of the community, something achieved by pleading guilty to a panel of community representatives. But after that punishment is imposed, the critical next step is to help restore the offender back into her place within the community. Otherwise, we end up with a perpetual underclass of felons, blocked from participating in most of society.\footnote{See, e.g., Scott H. Greenfield, \textit{Beware the Permanent Underclass}, March 24, 2008, posted at SIMPLE JUSTICE, A NEW YORK CRIMINAL DEFENSE BLOG, located at: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2008/03/24/beware-the-permanent-underclass.aspx}

The plea jury’s role in allocution helps fulfill the need for restorative justice as well. By admitting her crimes to a subsection of the community, the offender literally \textit{pleads} to them; not only for the reduced sentence or punishment that she hopes will be approved, but also to the community itself. In accepting culpability for her bad acts, the defendant acknowledges her communal breach, and asks for mercy and reconciliation. This is particularly true if the victim is also in the courtroom, listening to the allocution. Restorative justice removes the offender, victim and community from their usual passive roles and allows all three to become actively involved in resolving the conflict.\footnote{See Umbreit, Vos, Coates & Lightfoot, \textit{Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls}, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 255 (2005).} The plea jury’s removal of the guilty plea from the back rooms of the criminal justice system, while integrating a role for the community, plays an integral role in facilitating restorative justice.

The community as a whole is also more likely to allow the offender to be restored to its good graces if it has heard, via the plea jury allocution, her acknowledgement of wrongdoing. Having literally seen and heard the offender’s plea of guilt, when it is time for the offender to be released from whatever punishment has been imposed, the community will arguably be more willing to forgive the
offense and move on. Having been empowered by hearing the defendant’s allocution, the local public will be hopefully be more willing to allow the offender back into the neighborhood and local polity, whether by restoring felon voting rights, allowing half-way houses in the community, assisting with job training, or other important reintegrative procedures.

The transformative potential inherent in the plea jury’s restorative justice aspect is one that has been little explored since the decline of rehabilitation 40-odd years ago. “Restorative justice regimes reconstruct the identity of the victim and the accused to invite collaboration and permit dialogue,“ and the plea jury allocution helps bridge the gap between accused, victim and community. As Anthony Alfieri has argued about drug courts, the plea jury allocution reunites compassion and punishment, re-envisioning justice as a community mandate.

Integrating restorative justice into the guilty plea procedure has positive benefits for the offender, the victim, and the larger community. Through the vehicle of allocating to the plea jury, the guilty plea can help involve and empower the community, restore victims, reintegrate offenders, and provide opportunities for dialogue—all classic values of restorative justice.

E. Deliberative Democracy

The jury is generally acknowledged as a critical part of democratic government. The creation of jury-like systems in new democracies illustrates how important the incorporation of citizens into legal decision-making can be to polities seeking democratic legitimacy. This is because there is sound belief that citizen participation in lawmaking promotes democracy. In particular,

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200 Id. at 1495.
201 See Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot, Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century, supra note __, at 258.
204 See Hans, Rising Tide, supra note __, at 306.
direct involvement of citizens is said to enhance the legitimacy of the legal system, making it more responsive to community values.\textsuperscript{205} This popular participation in legal deliberation, via the plea jury, provides a way for citizens to resolve moral disagreements in a quasi-public sphere, using collective reasoned discussion.\textsuperscript{206}

The very diversity of the plea jurors helps encourage arguments that ultimately move the group towards mutually acceptable outcomes.\textsuperscript{207} Indeed, the more reflective the jury is of diversity in society, the better it will democratically embody the beliefs of the community it represents.\textsuperscript{208} Only a representative jury, one drawn randomly from a representative cross-section of the population, can truly make legitimate decisions for its community.\textsuperscript{209} A representative jury not only provides democratic decision-making, but also exposes each juror to the diversity within his or her very community.\textsuperscript{210}

The democratically deliberating jury is also a local jury. Pluralist scholars have argued that “the deepest justification for holding trial locally is that only jurors from the community affected by the crime are in a position to render a verdict that democratically reflects that community’s legal and moral judgment about what the facts show.”\textsuperscript{211} This is so because only the local citizen can truly bring the values of her own community setting into the courtroom, whether for a trial or a plea bargain. Although “strangers” can equally hand down the law,\textsuperscript{212} they would not bring the peculiar standards and morals that only those living in the actual community would truly know.

Jury service is the primary way that this country incorporates its citizens into the legal process, whether in grand or petit juries. Although surface complaints about the inconvenience of jury service are common, post-trial surveys of those jurors who have actually

\textsuperscript{205} Hans, Rising Tide, supra note __, at 306.
\textsuperscript{206} See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 125, 125.
\textsuperscript{207} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 129.
\textsuperscript{208} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 129.
\textsuperscript{209} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 130, 133.
\textsuperscript{210} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 133.
\textsuperscript{211} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 136.
\textsuperscript{212} See Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, supra note __, at 136.
have shown that jury service seems to produce more public support for both the courts and the legal system. As the Jury and Democracy Project has shown through its research, jury service has strongly positive effects on civic participation and engagement.

Indeed, some scholars have found that “[t]aken as a whole, the jury may serve a more powerful role in promoting democracy and citizenship than any voluntary association.”

Although jury service through the petit jury has been drastically reduced over the past thirty years, this elimination of civic participation may come with hidden costs for both democratic principles and political participation. For one, eliminating or sharply reducing jury services directly affects the ability of citizens to interact not only with each other but also with the polity. Jury service permits political participation that can be, among other things, “inspiring, empowering, educational, and habit forming,” mediating the divide between the state, political society, and civil society (which includes the individual and community).

In addition, recent studies have suggested that those who participate in jury duty are more likely to vote come election time. More specifically, the enhancement in voting occurs only with criminal, not civil, trials, and it happens with any jury body that deliberates. This means that participation in a plea jury would also likely provide such a benefit. Another benefit that results from criminal jury participation is, interestingly, increased activity in charitable groups by those jurors who decided on a guilty verdict.

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213 It is important to distinguish between attitudes of those jurors who actually serve on a jury and those who simply spend a day or two at the courthouse, waiting around, before they are ultimately dismissed. The latter set of potential jurors often have valid complaints about the time spent sitting aimlessly in the courthouse. Although this is a real problem, it is tangential to the issues set out here.

214 See Hans, Rising Tide, supra note __, at 306.


216 The Jury and Democracy, supra note __, at 2.

217 The Jury and Democracy, supra note __, at 5.

218 The Jury and Democracy, supra note __, at 6.

219 The Jury and Democracy, supra note __, at 6.

220 The Jury and Democracy, supra note __, at 7.
perhaps inspired by a desire, conscious or not, to further improve their community.

Reviving jury service through the use of a plea jury, then, would provide all of these positive externalities, in addition to the classic criminal procedural values such as voluntariness, retributive values, and articulating the public interest.

Part IV. Potential Problems with Plea Juries

Naturally, the incorporation of a lay jury into the guilty plea procedure is not a perfect solution to the woes of modern criminal process. As a middle ground between the costly full constitutional rights of a jury trial and the cheap and quick machinations of the plea bargain, it is inevitable that some aspects of the plea jury proposal will fail to please various constituencies.

Furthermore, inserting the community into the plea process raises some specific concerns regarding costs to defendants, costs to the state, how to define relevant communities, and penal populism. I address each of these areas below, and try to show how the plea jury process can either overcome or answer the specific problem.

A. Inefficiency, Inexperience and Inconsistency

The most basic criticisms against incorporating a form of the jury into the guilty plea are process-based, contending that this sort of change to the procedure would lead to inefficiency, inconsistent results, or judgments by inexperienced decision-makers.

1. Inefficiency, Temporal and Fiscal

   It is likely that the speedy pace of indictment to guilty plea would slow down with the incorporation of a plea jury. This, in turn, might make for slower processing of defendants to jail, prison or probation. In a system that often gives indigent defendants only a brief time to meet with appointed counsel before quickly deciding on a plea, however, this procedural slow-down is not all bad.

   For example, in 2005, Howard Finkelstein, the Public Defender in Broward County, Florida, forbade his attorneys from advising indigent criminal defendants to plead guilty at arraignment
until they had had "meaningful contact" with their clients in advance.\footnote{See Dan Christensen, No More Instant Plea Deals, Says Public Defender, \textit{The Daily Business Review}, June 6, 2005, located at: http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1117789520360} This directive was to combat the practice where public defenders met their clients for the first time and immediately counseled them to plead guilty or no contest, violating the Sixth Amendment.\footnote{See id.} Although Broward County judges were allegedly upset at the initiative, worried that his rule might clog their dockets, Finkelstein’s rule helped carve out a critical Sixth Amendment right—the effective assistance of counsel—even if it did slow down the rapid-fire pace of Florida criminal justice.

Similarly, in November 2008, public defenders’ offices from seven states refused to take on new cases or sued to limit them, citing overwhelming workloads which prevent defendants from receiving adequate attention, time and representation.\footnote{See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, \textit{The New York Times}, November 6, 2008, located at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html?ei=5070&emc=eta1} Since the majority of a public defender’s workload has turned into the processing of guilty pleas, the public defenders argued that the hurried pace of their representation was less justice than “McJustice,” resulting in “plea bargain assembly lines.”\footnote{See Eckholm, \textit{supra} note __, at id.}

All too often, an indigent client’s interaction with her attorney is extremely limited. In many cases, the public defender must accept the police version of events and then, after a short discussion, make what is often a life-altering deal, with no time for legal or factual research.\footnote{See Eckholm, \textit{supra} note __, at id.} Thus once again, the potentially slower pace for the resolution of guilty pleas could end up being a positive, not a negative, for the defendant.

Integrating the community into the guilty plea process may also lengthen the average time of a plea disposition, thus costing the states and federal government money. In a time of worldwide fiscal crisis, this is no minor issue. There are legitimate practical concerns here: any increase in the complexity of guilty pleas will result in slower processing times and more money spent per defendant. But
this point returns us to the essential debate between efficiency and substantive values, which often turns into a battle between quality over quantity. As Bill Stuntz observes, we should be wary of pleas because they are so absurdly cheap, which is unhealthy for everyone.226 This is an issue not just for defendants, but for the larger community in general, given in what low esteem people currently view the criminal courts.

By forcing the criminal justice system to spend time, money and effort on ensuring that classic criminal procedural values are upheld in guilty pleas, the use of a plea jury helps signal to everyone that fairness and procedural due process is an intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, one that cannot be shunted off by back-room machinations and insider plays. Our current criminal justice system is unhealthy, and it is time for the pendulum to swing back towards quality and caution.

2. Inexperience

Incorporating the public into a guilty plea raises some questions about what the plea jury is supposed to determine during the plea process. Obviously the plea jury must pass on whether the proposed guilty plea is acceptable, but what does that mean? For example, would this result in plea juries, ignorant of typical police practices and charging decision, questioning every decision made in prosecuting the defendant? Moreover, what might a randomly picked plea jury know about proper sentencing, or how best to treat, say, a third-time minor offender? As the argument goes, having inexperienced lay people involved in sophisticated legal processes will result in problems in determining complex issues, such as weighing offender status, understanding the machinations of prosecutor and defense counsel bargaining, and determining the right balance of sentence and post-release supervision.

Although this is a valid concern, some of it may be alleviated by looking to the effect of modern sentencing law on trials, which permit sentencing juries to determine the specific punishment imposed on the defendant. If the average jury is capable of determining the correct sentence there (within a range, as in most

states and federal guidelines), then surely the same can be granted to the plea jury.

Moreover, the objection that citizens are particularly unqualified to determine individual sentences seems weak because many of our modern policies are driven by politics and public opinion, not expert criminology. In other words, if our sentencing policies are being determined not by experts but by media, legislatures, public sentiment and popular initiatives, then having a plea jury weigh in on whether a sentence is correct for any one defendant doesn’t seem so different than the status quo. The average citizen is no more or less qualified to decide on sentencing than any decision-maker in our current system.

3. Inconsistency

Likewise, there might be concern that having plea juries determine bargained offenses and sentences might lead to serious inconsistencies between similar defendants. As this argument goes, judges, with their experience and their great familiarity with different types of offenders, simply do a better job at equalizing sentences between and among defendants who plead guilty.

The reality of our criminal justice system and sentencing regime, however, makes this argument much less potent. First, most states have stringent sentencing guidelines which severely limit the sentence that any judge or prosecutor may grant, upwards or downwards. Similarly, the federal sentencing guidelines, although technically voluntary, are followed by federal judges the vast majority of the time. Additionally, the tough sentencing laws enacted by most states end up transferring power and discretion from the courts to the prosecutors, resulting in less transparency but not necessarily less disparity in outcomes for similar cases, both within and between districts.

Additionally, as Bibas cogently argues, there is only so much any one trial court can do to equalize convictions and sentences among and between defendants:

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227 See Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, supra note __, at 388.
228 See Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, supra note __, at 391.
Individual trial judges are limited by the confines of particular cases and controversies. They are not well-suited to take the synoptic, bird’s-eye view needed to police systemic concerns about equality, arbitrariness, leniency, and overcharging.\footnote{Bibas, \textit{Prosecutorial Accountability}, supra note \__\, at 35. As Bibas explains, “[t]hey lack statistical training and expertise, as well as detailed information from prosecutors’ files. Their choices ex post are often crude and binary, requiring them either to find statistical disparities unconstitutional or to put their imprimatur on them.” \textit{Id.}}

Thus in the average court-run guilty plea, inconsistency and disparity of outcomes are simply better hidden than that which might occur with a plea jury. If nothing else, the use of the plea jury would illuminate the more secret machinations of prosecutors behind closed doors.

Moreover, prosecutors do not always keep to the promised sentence in a plea agreement. On January 16, 2009, the Supreme Court heard arguments in \textit{Puckett v. United States} (07-9712), \footnote{See http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-9712.} which asked whether forfeited claims that the government breached a plea agreement were subject to “plain error” review. Although the issue at the Court primarily involved standards of appellate review, the facts of \textit{Puckett} are not uncommon. In \textit{Puckett}, a federal prosecutor changed the government’s promised sentence after the acceptance of the guilty plea but before sentencing, opposing a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility.\footnote{See \textit{United States v. Puckett}, No. 06-10543 (5th Cir. 2007).} These issues often arise in federal plea bargains, where there is usually a time lapse between the defendant’s allocution and the actual sentencing.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{United States v. Villa-Vasquez}, No. 07-3160 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding government breached plea agreement by urging upward departure after acceptance of guilty plea but before sentencing); \textit{United States v. Griffin}, No. 05-4016 (2d Cir. 2007) (divided panel holds that government breached plea agreement by encouraging court to deny departure after defendant pleaded guilty and court held evidentiary hearing). Thanks to Doug Berman for bringing these cases to my attention.}
As Douglas Berman points out, lower courts frequently struggle with various practical questions in the wake of the prosecutorial failures at sentencing to comply with plea promises. Prosecutors, then, who continually make most of the decisions in the guilty plea procedure, do not provide perfect consistency and reliability. There is no reason to think a lay plea jury would prove any less consistent or reliable in practice.

In fact, the lay public makes decisions with greater consistency than currently acknowledged. A variety of recent studies have illustrated that there are a significant degree of agreement in ranking of crimes and punishment in terms of the relative seriousness of crimes. When based on a system of proportionality and expressive retribution, as has been encouraged by the Court, the community’s notion of justice is both wide-ranging and sensitive to subtle factors. “Virtually without exception, citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences for highly specific events.” There is no reason to assume that 21st-century lay juries could not achieve a strong level of consistency between and among guilty pleas, as the community usually has broadly-shared intuitions about the relative blameworthiness of different cases.

B. Greater Risk for Defendants

Defendants may not necessarily prosper with the incorporation of the community into the guilty plea process. “As

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234 See Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in THE HANDBOOK ON CRIME & PUNISHMENT 42–43 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 1998) (noting that many studies have replicated the relative ranking of crimes across a number of countries, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Holland, Kuwait, Norway, Puerto Rico, and the United States.).


judges of the nineteenth century understood, a procedural right may serve a variety of social or public goals that will not always coincide with the preferences of defense and prosecution.\textsuperscript{237} This is particularly so with the community right to a jury trial, the realities of which—when injected into the guilty plea process—might undercut any special, insider deals that the defendant may have her defense counsel make with the prosecutor.

Incorporating a plea jury makes sense as a means to protect public interest, since it protects the collective jury right from obsolescence, provides the guilty plea with a theoretical framework, and removes the screen from the behind-the-scene machinations of plea agreements. But enforcing the public interest can potentially infringe upon the rights of the defendant, or result in competing definitions of rights.\textsuperscript{238} Moreover, using a plea jury may result in more extreme charges and/or higher sentences for the offender in question, depending on how much behind-the-scenes bargaining occurred before the plea was presented to the plea jury.

Again, however, introducing sunshine to the guilty plea process, even if it does produce less desirable results for some defendants, is on the whole a good thing. In the long run, involving the public in the criminal justice process, as it used to be, demystifies both courts and the ways criminal offenders are judged and sentenced. Hopefully, a greater understanding of the criminal justice system would ultimately lead to fewer demands for ever-more harsh and punitive sentencing laws by a frightened, unknowing community.

C. Defining “the community”

Inherent in community decision-making and community justice is a different approach to crime and punishment, an advocacy of local initiatives promulgated through strong citizen participation.\textsuperscript{239} At its best, community justice provides for strong local, popular participation within existing criminal justice institutions.\textsuperscript{240} Generally, those who argue that the community has a

\textsuperscript{237} King, \textit{Priceless Process}, supra note __, at 132.
\textsuperscript{239} See Lanni, \textit{Future of Community Justice}, supra note __, at 359.
\textsuperscript{240} See Lanni, \textit{Future of Community Justice}, supra note __, at 363.
right and a need to participate in all major criminal justice procedures presuppose that said community—whatever it might be—is a defined entity.

The phrase “the community,” however, can mean a variety of things, sometimes simultaneously. One version of “community,” and the one most generally used when discussing jury rights, is usually a definable social entity “to which judicial procedures and behavioral norms can apply.” But community can also simply be a floating normative concept, signifying much but referring to nothing in particular.

Scholars have questioned the legal power and implications of characterizing any living place as a “community,” raising issues of authority, responsibility, and exercise of power. Those who have argued for community self-determination and power have based it on a strong belief of the neighborhood as a place that fosters individual freedoms, balancing liberty and order, someplace that is entitled to great moral respect.

There has been much recent interest in local control over local environments, a trend with which the plea jury harmonizes nicely. Various advocates of localism argue that “local governments are more responsive to the specific needs of unique communities and that local institutions can provide better and increased services.” These arguments parallel ones that can be made for the plea jury—that the local is critical in implementing our criminal justice system, for both constitutional and civic reasons.

Defining community, however, is important but difficult. The rhetoric of community often covers a variety of different meanings, some of them contradictory. For my purposes, my

242 Weisberg, *Community, supra note __*, at 343-44.
243 See Schragger, *The Limits of Localism, supra note __*, at 375.
245 See Schragger, *The Limits of Localism, supra note __*, at 380. Schragger points out that this new localism has arisen as a response to urban disorder and the problems of urban governance.
246 See Schragger, *The Limits of Localism, supra note __*, at 381.
247 See Schragger, *The Limits of Localism, supra note __*, at 386.
vision of community can be classified as a combination of a deep account and a dualist account, following Rich Schragger’s classifications. A deep account of community, or an “affective community,” imagines communities as possessing “the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture,” based on the presence and quality of social connections, shared experience, mutuality, and common fate. A dualist account of community is defined by deliberation, a participatory practice where shared values are crafted by dialogue and negotiation. In other words, the dualist vision depends on the notion that civic engagement only occurs in forums where community members can meet in person, through participation in small-scale democratic governance.

It is this blended account of dualist and deep community structuring which best fits the vision of the plea jury. The very body of the plea jury is comprised of citizens having face-to-face dialogue about governance—here, assisting with decision-making on guilt and sentencing for local crime. The plea jury’s work is helped by the common aspects it shares in its composition of community members.

Of course, for the strict purposes of the plea jury, the community is the juror pool, however it is defined by the local courts. But a fuller comprehension of what is meant by “community” in this context is vital to understanding why such a body should have rights in the criminal justice process.

D. Community fragmentation

Along with the problem of definition, another issue with relying on “community” in the plea jury context is one of more recent vintage: belonging to multiple communities by virtue of differing work and home locations. Local governance based solely on

249 See Schragger, The Limits of Localism, supra note __, at 393.
251 WOLFF, supra note __, at 187-92.
252 See Schragger, The Limits of Localism, supra note __, at 394.
253 See Schragger, The Limits of Localism, supra note __, at 398.
254 See Schragger, The Limits of Localism, supra note __, at 402.
255 Lanni points out that for community justice initiatives, definition of the relevant community usually is defined as a large neighborhood or subsection of a city. See Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, supra note __, at 367-68.
residence ignores the complex realities of metropolitan life.\textsuperscript{256} Individuals may work and live in completely different localities, yet have an equally strong interest in affecting criminal justice in where they work (or go to school) as where they live. Yet currently juror pools are only based on residence. In addition, culling the plea jury only from citizens with fixed residences discriminates against the poor, the homeless, and the young, many of whom do not have permanent addresses from which they can be called to serve. The aforementioned all help comprise the community, but due to their temporary residential status, they are exiled from participation in the criminal justice system.

Moreover, criminal law evokes both community and race,\textsuperscript{257} as well as class. In a still racially-divisive society, the communities of the defendant and the victim may be either shared or separate.\textsuperscript{258} If separate, the two communities may end up clashing in any legal procedure, no matter how much interplay the public is given. The healing balm of community does not necessarily soothe when there are different factions within a given district, whether that district is large or small.

One interesting counterpoint to the problem of community fragmentation, though, has been illustrated in the recent empirical work by Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban. Robinson and Kurzban found that there is a surprising amount of empirical consensus on ranking different offenders’ punishments.\textsuperscript{259} In other words, empirical studies have shown great agreement when it comes to ranking which offenders deserve the most punishment, across America and world-wide communities.\textsuperscript{260} This is important to anyone concerned about community differentiation, since these studies illustrate a bedrock conception of retributive justice—or just

\textsuperscript{256} See Schragger, \textit{The Limits of Localism}, supra note __, at 421.
\textsuperscript{258} See Alfieri, \textit{Community Prosecutors}, supra note __, at 1471.
\textsuperscript{259} See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, \textit{Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice}, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1829, 1846-92 (2007) (finding, based on empirical studies, strong agreement across groups and cultures on relative seriousness of violent, property, and deception crimes, and lesser but still important agreement about drug and sex offenses).
\textsuperscript{260} See Robinson & Kurzban, \textit{Concordance and Conflict}, supra note __, at 1846-92.
deserts—that reach across communities, no matter how different they might be.

E. Penal Populism

When the lay public is incorporated into the guilty plea process, and is granted the ability to decide on both the proposed plea and sentence, the dangers of penal populism arise.\textsuperscript{261} Penal populism, or punitive public attitudes which strongly influence the creation of criminal justice policy, is greatly unpopular in some quarters, and some would rely entirely on experts to determine punishment in order to avoid this problem.\textsuperscript{262}

As other scholars have pointed out, however, “[p]olls consistently indicate that U.S. public opinion on criminal justice is fickle and highly malleable in the face of specific events and political manipulation.”\textsuperscript{263} This has been recently evidenced by the call, in both a variety of states as well as in the federal context, for lighter drug sentences and a partial lessening of the desire for capital punishment.\textsuperscript{264}

If this is true even now, then how much more possible might a lessening of punitive public attitudes be after the implementation of the plea jury? With a plea jury, the lay public would learn more about the such contested arenas as the strict sentencing guidelines for minor drug offenses, or punitive three-strike laws. The educational factors of the public’s interaction with the workings of the criminal justice system would naturally be small at first, but would presumably have compounding effects. Additionally, within a smaller or more tight-knit community, where the offenders might be either known or at least less anonymous to the plea jury, the risk for small-scale, overly harsh penal populism would likely be smaller.

Finally, Robinson and Darley have made the argument that making punishment conform to the community’s desires helps

\textsuperscript{261}Thanks to Alice Ristroph for raising this point.
\textsuperscript{262}See, e.g., FRANK ZIMRING, HAWKINS, AND KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001) (studying California’s experiment in populist penal reform).
\textsuperscript{264}See Gottshalk, Dismantling the Carceral State, supra note __, at 1746.
implement the optimal social policy, instead of clashing with it.\textsuperscript{265} This is so because criminal law is based on voluntary compliance, and the public will not follow said law unless it mirrors its understanding of proper punishment.\textsuperscript{266} Thus penal populism can be seen as simply reflecting the community’s desires, which is not, by itself, a negative thing. Although the plea jury does not tidily solve any of the problems of today’s criminal justice system, it provides partial solution to some of the glaring inequities of the guilty plea process.

**Part V. Conclusion**

The problems with the guilty plea have not been solved by any previously proposed solutions, either practical or theoretical. What is needed, as scholars have observed, is an “alternative theory of guilty pleas, one that transcends the hidden intentions and grudgingly spoken words of defendants and the contradictory incentives at work on prosecutors in particular cases.”\textsuperscript{267} The plea jury, supported by a theory of expressive restorative retribution, strikes a solid middle ground.

Even if my plea jury proposal is only utilized as a thought experiment, the idea of involving the community into the plea bargain is a valuable one. First, the careful look into the inner workings of guilty pleas illustrates that there are grave problems in the most common procedure of criminal justice, especially the grave imbalance of power between the prosecutor and the rest of the participants. Shining light into the ugly reality of guilty pleas, through the use of a lay jury, can only be a positive good.

Second, restoring interest, power and accountability to the local community is a critical step in fixing some of the current problems with our criminal justice system. There is a tremendous need to restore a populist aspect to the punishing and sentencing of criminal offenders. When public feels too distant from the workings

\textsuperscript{266}See Robinson & Darley, *The Utility of Desert*, supra note __, at 477-88.
\textsuperscript{267}Wright, *Trial Distortions*, supra note __, at 96.
of crime and punishment, and only sees the media representation of crimes and the occasional (in)famous trial, they often react by calling for ever harsher and lengthy sentences. In contrast, allowing the community to participate in a much larger slice of criminal procedure gives the lay public a more realistic—and more personalized—view of the criminal justice system, hopefully fostering a less punitive streak.

As both a practical measure and a fundamental matter of political theory, the people should be involved in the machinations of criminal punishment. Our current system of plea bargains and guilty pleas cuts the lay public entirely out of the picture. Although there is no one perfect solution to the complicated reality of the guilty plea world, involving the community via the plea jury is one way to start, a way that reflects our constitutional history, our democratic structure of government, and our desire to ensure criminal justice is both fair and proportional.