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Article
Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court—An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010)
Asian Journal of Political Science (2013)
  • Laarni Escresa, European University Institute
  • Nuno Garoupa, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
It has been argued that, under certain conditions, judges are motivated to engage in strategic defection against their appointer once they perceive the latter to be losing effective power. This behaviour should generate a clustering of decisions unfavourable to the incumbent administration at the end of their term, when they are perceived to be weak. In this article we investigate empirically the application of the strategic defection model on the Philippine Supreme Court in the period 1986 to 2010. Our results do not seem to strongly corroborate this model. We discuss these empirical results in the context of the Philippines’ unstable democracy and general implications for comparative judicial politics.
Keywords
  • Strategic Defection,
  • Judicial Politics,
  • Democracy,
  • Philippines
Publication Date
September, 2013
Citation Information
Laarni Escresa and Nuno Garoupa. "Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court—An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010)" Asian Journal of Political Science Vol. 21 Iss. 2 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/laarni_escresa/4/