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The Shifting Interpretations of INTERPOL’s Article Three

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Abstract

Article Three of INTERPOL’s Constitution prohibits INTERPOL from undertaking “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” Notwithstanding this prohibition, INTERPOL itself has taken an active role in pursing the perpetrators of one of the most politically, religiously, and racially charged forms of crime, terrorism. The following Note discusses how INTERPOL has rationalized its pursuit of terrorists in light of Article Three’s mandate. The Note concludes by reassessing the value of Article Three, showing how, although Article Three has been interpreted to afford INTERPOL the latitude to pursue terrorists, it nonetheless represents an effective means of upholding INTERPOL’s neutrality in addressing international crime.

Background: The Nature of Terrorism v. Article Three of INTERPOL’s Constitution

When considering what is meant by the term “terrorism,” many would agree that “terrorist activities by definition contain a political element in terms of their motive.”\(^1\) Indeed, it is hard to imagine a crime that evokes greater considerations with respect to politics, military force, religion, and ethnic conflict than terrorism. For this reason, INTERPOL’s involvement in confronting terrorism is, at first glance, troubling. Article Three of INTERPOL’s Constitution states that “it is strictly forbidden for the Organization [(INTERPOL)] to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”\(^2\) Modern views seem to place terrorism squarely within the province of what Article Three envisions. In spite of this apparent contradiction, INTERPOL’s efforts to confront terrorism have been on the rise in the last three decades, particularly in the last ten years.\(^3\) Authorities at INTERPOL justify this apparent contradiction by assuming a policy of “de-politicization,” whereby INTERPOL’s

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\(^3\) Deflem and Maybin, supra note 1 (discussing INTERPOL’s increased involvement in addressing terrorism since the early 1980’s).
efforts theoretically take place outside the context of its idealistic motives.⁴ No doubt, INTERPOL’s efforts have served public interests by curbing violence and bringing terrorists themselves to justice.⁵ Obviously under these circumstances, it would be against the public interest to construe Article Three strictly and thereby end INTERPOL’s efforts to confront terrorism. However, we must still ask, if INTERPOL is able to pursue political offenses, what function does Article Three then serve?

This Note proposes that the changing interpretations of Article Three helped prepare INTERPOL for the demands prompted by the events of September 11, 2001. The Note will examine the changing interpretations of Article Three, from the strict approach with which it was addressed at its inception, to the more liberal approach afforded by the processes depoliticization and criminalization. The Note will conclude by reassessing the value of Article Three and the role it plays in allowing INTPEROL to address issues related to terrorism and the future of international crime.

**Article Three, the Early Years: INTERPOL Avoids Politically Motivated Crimes**

At first glance, the justifications for Article Three seem self-evident. From an international relations perspective, the Article appears designed to accord respect on INTERPOL’s part for the sovereignty of independent States.⁶ The functional utility of Article Three is closely related to this aim. It discourages INTERPOL from giving preference to States, groups, or individuals due to an agenda outside the context of fighting crime. Member States would lose the incentive to participate in INTERPOL’s mission if they felt their efforts were working against their own

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⁵ Secretary General Ronald K. Noble’s Statement, “Interrupting terrorist travel: Strengthening the security of international travel documents” (2 May 2007) gives several distinct examples of how INTERPOL is helping to fight terrorism. Available at, <http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/speeches/default.asp>.

⁶ See, “Legal framework governing action by INTERPOL in cases of a political, military, religious or racial character,” available at, <https://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS07.asp>.
domestic and extraterritorial interests. Thus, “remaining politically neutral is fundamental if the organization is to remain effective and fulfill its basic role of supporting international law enforcement co-operation.”

Although these justifications give credence to Article Three on a surface level, a look at history lends a more dynamic explanation and likewise explains the shifting interpretations of Article Three in the last few decades. In, The Legal Foundations of Interpol, Rutsel Martha outlines the historical bases that influenced INTERPOL’s Constitution. As he points out, “when it was reconstituted in 1946 [after its period under Nazi control], the ICPC [INTERPOL] faced the challenge of raising its profile in [the] world… without sacrificing the autonomy that allowed it to do its work as defined by its professional culture.”

Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman offer a similar insight, finding that INTERPOL had a need to raise its status internationally, but likewise wanted avoid external checks that would threaten its autonomy. This dilemma explains the desire on part of INTERPOL’s members to avoid political conflicts, which would in turn invite State interference.

In looking at INTERPOL’s early avoidance of political crimes, Sociologist Mathieu Deflem proposes that INTERPOL’s efforts represent a pattern of “Bureaucratization.” The theory of “bureaucratization” (pioneered by Sociologist Max Weber) “refers to the organization of political and economic administrative institutions on the basis of the principles of a

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8 Martha, Rutsel Silvestre J., The Legal Foundations of INTERPOL (Hart, 2010), pg. 51.
10 Id.
bureaucracy.”¹² For the purposes of this discussion, among the important consequences of bureaucratization is “the gradual formation of a bureaucratic machinery that is relatively autonomous from political and popular control.”¹³ As has been mentioned, Barnett and Coleman argue that INTERPOL’s members wanted to avoid state involvement in INTERPOL’s functions. In the view of police, such involvement would interfere with their ability to work as they saw fit.¹⁴ Deflem takes this argument one step further. According to him, “international police organizations with broad international representation could only be formed when police institutions were sufficiently autonomous from the political centers of their respective national states to function as relatively independent bureaucracies” (emphasis added).¹⁵ Consequently, Deflem attributes the failure of previous attempts at international police enforcement to the fact that these “police institutions… remained intimately linked to the political dictates of national-state governments and had not yet sufficiently developed as bureaucratic expert institutions that could claim independence from national (and international) political affairs.”¹⁶ In other words, these attempts at international police enforcement were not merely tarnished by state interference- they were doomed to fail by it. Under Deflem’s analysis, then, Article Three not only helps shield INTERPOL from outside forces, but it is also necessary for INTERPOL’s survival.

These considerations help put the language of Article Three and its initial interpretation in context. As is mentioned on INTERPOL’s website, one of the interesting characteristics to note

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¹³ Deflem, supra note 11.
¹⁴ Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 606.
¹⁵ Deflem, supra note 11.
¹⁶ Id.
about Article Three is its “particularly rigorous and absolute terms.”\textsuperscript{17} These terms have the effect of insulating INTERPOL from political influence in a manner consistent with the need for autonomy cited by Deflem. The first Resolution used to interpret Article Three, Resolution No AGN/20/RES/11 of June 1951 (Lisbon) has the same, if not greater, effect (note that this Resolution was drafted before the current version of Article Three, which did not occur until 1956).\textsuperscript{18} This Resolution interprets the precepts of Article Three as they apply to INTERPOL’s internal governance to allow the Chief of the International Bureau in agreement with the Secretary General of the I.C.P.C. to suspend the circulation of any request by a member State “in case of doubt with regard to the political, racial or religious character of [that] request.”\textsuperscript{19} More importantly, this Resolution also requests that member National Central Bureaus (NCB’s) “take care, as far as possible, that the requests which reach [INTERPOL] from foreign police authorities do not appear to violate” Article Three’s principles and “to notify immediately, if necessary, the international Bureau in Paris, who will inform the Secretary-General.”\textsuperscript{20} As an added precautionary measure, this interpreting Resolution attempts to skirt any responsibility for violations of the Article’s precepts by claiming that member states themselves “must take full responsibility for any political, racial or religious question that may be raised by their request.”\textsuperscript{21}

Notwithstanding the air of caution evoked by these portions of Resolution No AGN/20/RES/11, another important characteristic of this Resolution stands out. Article Three merely directs INTERPOL to abstain from “any intervention or activities of a political, military,
religious or racial character” (emphasis added). However, the Article says nothing about the specific crimes that INTERPOL may help pursue. Resolution No AGN/20/RES/11, on the other hand, requests that its member States and NCB’s “see that no request for information, notice of persons wanted and, above all, no request for provisional arrest for offenses of a predominantly political, racial or religious character” reach INTERPOL altogether (emphasis added). As will be discussed later, the contrast between this approach and the modern one employed by INTERPOL has important implications with respect to the different ways that Article Three can be interpreted.

The above discussion makes reference to several conceptual justifications for a strict approach to Article Three. However, the drafters of INTERPOL’s Constitution had several real-world examples from which to draw in opting for a strict approach. In discussing the early years of INTERPOL’s Constitution, Rustel Martha refers to an incident that illustrates the rationale behind a strict approach: “Following the Second World War, INTERPOL disputes [tended] to relate to the Organisation’s professed political and ideological neutrality.” As Martha points out, one of the most famous of these disputes involved an Interpol Red Notice issued on the request of Czechoslovakia for the famous Czech Airlines hijacking that occurred in March of 1950. In that incident, Czech nationals hijacked three Czechoslovakian airliners and flew them to the American airbase at Erding, West Germany, in an effort the Czechoslovakian regime.

When Czechoslovakia issued requests for Red Notices in this case, INTERPOL was forced to choose between two opposing views. The U.S. argued that this was a “highly political act”-

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22 Art. 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, supra note 2.
23 See, “Resolution No AGN/20/RES/11” (1951), supra note 18.
24 Martha, supra note 8, at 62.
25 Id.
“refugees ‘from a Communist regime [were] using a legitimate means of escape.’”

Consequently, in the view of the U.S., INTERPOL had no business aiding in efforts to apprehend the hijackers. Conversely, Czechoslovakia contended that this was a case of air piracy, arguing that INTERPOL should aid in the pursuit of the hijackers as their act was better understood as criminal rather than political in nature.

In a surprising move in light of INTERPOL’s caution with respect to political crimes, INTERPOL sided with Czechoslovakia and published the Red Notices. Not surprising in light of the Cold War period in which this incident occurred, J. Edgar Hoover took issue with INTERPOL’s decision. Citing lack of political neutrality on INTERPOL’s part, Hoover withdrew the FBI’s (the US police agency responsible for exchanges with INTERPOL at that time) participation in INTERPOL affairs until 1958. This withdrawal prompted INTERPOL to reconsider its approach to addressing crimes with implications that might lead member States to question its allegiance.

As Deflem and Maybin point out, “politically sensitive Interpol cases that involved police from former Communist countries in Eastern Europe” as this case was, helped serve as the driving force that motivated the implementation of what is now Article Three. On a deeper level, this incident and others helped influence the policy of non-involvement in offenses that could be construed as political, a policy that would last for the next 20 years. However, although the time period immediately following World War II represented a period wherein INTERPOL had to “curtail activities” it might have otherwise pursued, the decades following

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27 Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 608.
28 Id.
29 Martha, supra note 8, at 62.
30 Id.
31 Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 608.
32 Deflem and Maybin, supra note 1.
33 See, e.g., Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 608.
this period would eventually drive INTERPOL in the opposite direction, forcing it to engage in activities it might otherwise have avoided.\textsuperscript{34} This change was brought about by the rise of terrorism.

**A Change In Policy: The Criminalization of Terrorism**

After the withdrawal of the U.S. in the Czech hijacking case and other negative experiences implicating INTERPOL’s political neutrality, “INTERPOL categorized terrorism as political and thus outside its mandate. In fact, INTERPOL officials believed that the organization's very existence hinged on its nonintervention in terrorism cases.”\textsuperscript{35} In the 1960’s, this avoidance was not nearly as problematic as it became in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{36} At that time, terrorism was much more of a local problem affecting individual States- terrorist acts were often associated with nationals attacking the governments of their own nations in an effort to obtain power.\textsuperscript{37} Barnett and Coleman explain that although INTERPOL could have seized the opportunity to expand its horizons in tackling terrorism, INTERPOL had yet to secure its position in the international arena and did not wish to engage issues that might incite States to interfere with its operations and threaten its autonomy.\textsuperscript{38} Considering the Czech hijacking experience, officials at INTERPOL likewise did not wish to risk losing further support. Thus, “for the secretary general and others, tackling terrorism might increase Interpol's resources and status, but it also would threaten the organization.”\textsuperscript{39} For the purposes of Article Three, the upshot of these issues involved the fact that the strict approach adopted in the drafting of INTERPOL’s Constitution remained protocol. As such, INTERPOL’s stance of abstention with respect to terrorism was

\textsuperscript{34} See, id.
\textsuperscript{35} Id.
\textsuperscript{36} Id.
\textsuperscript{38} See, Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 610-11.
\textsuperscript{39} Id, at 611.
relatively uncomplicated, although it frustrated world leaders wishing to enlist INTERPOL’s assistance.  

Three major developments gave rise to change in INTERPOL’s policy. First, INTERPOL gained more support throughout the 1960’s. With more resources at its disposal, it no longer feared the potential withdrawal of individual supporters the way that it did in the 1950’s. Second, terrorism itself began to take on international dimensions, thus warranting the need for cooperative, international responses. As such, it presented a greater opportunity for INTERPOL to grow as an organization. Third, and perhaps most important in terms of influencing a shift in INTERPOL’s policies, in the absence of support from INTERPOL, States began employing other resources in the fight against terrorism, threatening to unseat INTERPOL as the foremost police organization worldwide. Under these circumstances, INTERPOL was forced to give up its policy of avoidance and allow its channels to be used in the pursuit of terrorism.

Notwithstanding the forces driving INTERPOL to change its policies and approach regarding terrorism, it still faced a dilemma with respect to Article Three’s prohibition on involvement in matters of “military, political, religious, or racial” import. INTERPOL overcame this dilemma, however, by “depoliticizing” terrorist acts and framing them and their perpetrators in strictly “criminal” terms. This process, the “criminalization” of terrorism, allowed and continues to allow INTERPOL to aid in efforts to pursue terrorists in a seemingly neutral and uninterested manner.

As Matthieu Deflem points out, “at least two strategies are used by police to accomplish an effective criminalization of terrorism. First, terrorism is from the police viewpoint defined in
vague and general terms,” if defined at all. This strategy has been employed not just by police, but also by international organizations in general. International bodies like the United Nations and the European Union tend to agree on the fact that terrorism typically involves “violence” or a threat thereof that targets a large number of innocent people. However, they are slow to offer definitions that mention specific motives of a religious or ethnic or political character, even though these motives are typically associated with terrorism. “From the police point of view, domestic and international crimes,” if defined in such broad and unspecific terms, “form the basis of systems of knowledge that are beyond political and ideological considerations and that therefore can also be shared among police of different nations to foster international cooperation efforts.”

A second strategy in the process of criminalizing terrorism is to “disentangle terrorist activities into their various constituent parts, only the criminal elements of which become the target of police work.” This strategy is illustrated by the “EU COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,” which divides the purposes of terrorist

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45 Id.
47 The UN has avoided implementing a comprehensive Convention that defines terrorism. In its proposed “Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism,” (supra note 46) the UN defines terrorism with respect to acts that are designed “to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” Compare this definition with that in the EU COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, which likewise addresses the motives that inform terrorism in broad terms. Under this text, certain enumerated acts qualify as terrorism: “where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.” “EU COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,” supra note 46.
48 Deflem, supra note 37.
49 Id.
actors, stated in vague terms, from certain enumerated criminal acts, which then become the focus of the Organization’s efforts.\textsuperscript{50} INTERPOL employed the second strategy in its initial approach to terrorism, successively addressing different acts that qualify as terrorism in a piecemeal fashion.\textsuperscript{51}

INTERPOL’s first step in the process of criminalizing terrorism came in 1971 with Resolution No AGN/39/RES/3, which addressed “Unlawful Acts against International Civil Aviation.”\textsuperscript{52} This Resolution was followed by, among other resolutions related to terrorism, Resolution No AGN/41/RES/7 of 1972 (covering “Hostages and Blackmail”),\textsuperscript{53} Resolution No AGN/48/RES/8 of 1979 (covering “Acts of Violence Committed by Organised Groups”),\textsuperscript{54} and Resolution No AGN/50/RES/2 of 1981 (covering the “Tagging of Explosives”).\textsuperscript{55} The important point to note in light of these four Resolutions is their language with respect to Article Three. The 1971 Resolution, No AGN/39/RES/3, states that in targeting “unlawful seizures of aircraft and other acts of violence directed against international civil aviation,” member States should use the “machinery and services set in place by the ICP0-INTERPOL… within the limits of the Organization's Constitution (namely Articles 2 and 3)” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{56} The fact that this Resolution framed the pursuit of aircraft hijackers as being potentially coextensive with the precepts of Article Three is representative of INTERPOL’s criminalization of terrorism itself and of its departure from the traditional, strict interpretation of

\textsuperscript{50} “EU COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,” supra note 46.

\textsuperscript{51} Deflem, supra note 37.


\textsuperscript{53} “Resolution No AGN/41/RES/7” (1971), available at, <https://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/Agn41/Resolutions/AGN41RES7.asp>.


\textsuperscript{55} “Resolution No AGN/50/RES/2” (1981), available at, <https://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/AGN50/Resolutions/AGN50RES2.asp>.

\textsuperscript{56} “Resolution No AGN/39/RES/3” (1970), supra note 52.
the Article. Resolution No AGN/41/RES/7 of 1972 takes a similar tack. The Resolution first recommends “that member countries take appropriate measures in order to prevent or suppress” the holding of hostages for the purpose of perpetrating blackmail (which it frames as a form of “criminality”). The Resolution then restates the text of Article Three itself, as if to again suggest that the pursuit of hostage takers is compatible with Article Three’s prohibitions.

In Contrast to the 1971 and 1972 Resolutions, the Resolutions of 1979 and 1981 include no references to Article Three or its provisions. Although it is not explicitly clear why this shift occurred, Barnett and Coleman point out that “in 1975 the member states of the European Community (EC) established its own transgovernmental police network, Trevi, to coordinate antiterrorist information clearing and policy.” Considering the fact that Trevi established a competitive presence in the sphere of police enforcement, in Barnett and Coleman’s view, INTERPOL “entered the 1970s feeling financially secure, but exited feeling vulnerable.” Regardless of whether the absence of Article Three’s precepts in the language of the 1979 and 1981 resolutions reflects a desire on INTERPOL’s part to opt for a looser interpretation of Article Three, INTERPOL chose to address this issue directly in 1984 with Resolution No AGN/53/RES/6 (“Violent Crime Commonly Referred to as Terrorism”) and Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 (“Application of Article 3 of the Constitution”).

Resolution No AGN/53/RES/6 and Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 work in tandem with one another and represent a pivotal shift with respect to INTERPOL’s interpretation of Article Three.

57 “Resolution No AGN/41/RES/7” (1971), supra note 53.
58 See, e.g., id.
59 “Resolution No AGN/48/RES/8” (1979), supra note 54; “Resolution No AGN/50/RES/2” (1981), supra note 55.
60 Barnett, M. and Coleman, L., supra note 9, at 611.
61 Id.
Resolution No AGN/53/RES/6 “asks the NCBs, while respecting the provisions of Article 3 of the Organization's Constitution, to co-operate as fully as possible to combat terrorism as far as their national laws permit.”\(^{63}\) In light of Article Three, this language is confusing, since the Resolution itself likewise points out in another part that perpetrators carry out acts of terrorism to “attain allegedly political objectives.”\(^{64}\) Viewed in light of this concession, the Resolution seems to be saying, “do and do not adhere to the precepts of Article Three.”

Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 offers some clarity on this issue, however. This Resolution reiterates the principle laid down in 1951, that Article Three “covers ‘offences of a predominantly political, racial or religious character... even if - in the requesting country - the facts amount to an offence against the ordinary law.’”\(^{65}\) However, the Resolution goes on to state that even if a crime has a definite political motive, it might not come within the scope of Article Three if there is no “direct connection” between the offences committed and the “political life of the offenders’ country.”\(^{66}\) The Resolution further clarifies that “generally speaking, a valid criterion” for whether an offense falls within the scope of Article Three “is whether or not there is anything to connect the victims directly or indirectly with the aims or objectives pursued by the offenders, and with the countries in the conflict area or with the relevant political situation.”\(^{67}\) Consequently, although Resolution No AGN/53/RES/6 seems to ask NCB’s to violate Article Three, Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 reconciles this contradiction by adding exceptions to the strict interpretation of Article Three, namely that INTERPOL’s channels may be used to pursue terrorists so long as the terrorists themselves are not committing terrorist acts on behalf of their home States and against specified enemies of their home States.

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63 See, id.
64 Id.
65 “Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7,” supra note 62.
66 Id.
67 Id.
One important point to note with respect to Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 is that the exceptions it outlines are not proper exceptions. Rather, they may be understood as conceptually falling outside the scope of Article Three under the aforementioned notion of criminalization. In Deflem’s analysis, police institutions on an international level do what they can to “ensure that international activities are conceived as extensions of the primary function of police to enforce the ‘laws of the land.’”\textsuperscript{68} In other words, under a bureaucratization model, police organizations like INTERPOL discharge their efforts apolitically, focusing on “so-called ordinary-law crimes.”\textsuperscript{69} For a politically nuanced crime like terrorism, this approach allows police to “disentangle terrorist activities into [their] various constituent parts, only the criminal elements of which become the target of police work.”\textsuperscript{70} Consequently, police might access INTERPOL’s channels in addressing an incident of terrorism by confronting it under a theory of murder, arson, theft, vandalism, or kidnapping, to name a few examples. This concept applies to the crimes “excepted” by Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7.\textsuperscript{71} In this respect, these crimes do not constitute proper exceptions. Rather, they represent an opportunity for police to pursue a crime outside the idealistic context that may have motivated it.

With respect to Article Three and the events surrounding and following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Resolutions of 1984 essentially gave INTERPOL the latitude to engage whatever level of participation it saw fit in global efforts against terrorism. In 1998, “Interpol’s commitment to combat international terrorism was explicitly confirmed in a ‘Declaration Against Terrorism,’ condemning terrorism because of the threat it poses ‘not only with regard to security and stability, but also to the State of Law, to democracy and to human

\textsuperscript{68} Deflem, supra note 37.  
\textsuperscript{69} Deflem and Maybin, supra note 1.  
\textsuperscript{70} Deflem, supra note 37.  
\textsuperscript{71} See, “Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7,” supra note 62.
Insofar as Article Three’s interpretation is concerned, this declaration did little more than confirm conditions that already existed. It did little to change the interpretation of Article Three itself, as the groundwork had already been laid, in the form of criminalization, for INTERPOL to address terrorism as it saw fit. By the time of the events of September 11, Article Three’s new interpretation gave INTERPOL the leeway to address terrorism with all the force it could muster. The real question then, was how much autonomy it was willing to sacrifice in the process.

**Conclusion: The Status of Article Three in the Future**

As has been emphasized earlier in this Note, Article Three’s text focuses on the actions of INTERPOL itself and the motives that inspire them. Rather than prohibit its involvement in offenses of a “military, political, religious, or racial character,” the Article merely restricts interventions and activities on INTERPOL’s part that themselves may be considered a manifestation of political or other bias on INTERPOL’s part. Consequently, INTERPOL has latitude to address terrorism in two different senses. By way of Resolution, INTERPOL can choose to avoid specific offenses under a theory that merely addressing them constitutes a violation of Article Three (the strict approach of Resolution No AGN/20/RES/11). Conversely, it can address crimes that are indeed political in nature, but avoid violating Article Three through the process of criminalization. This latitude itself would appear to raise a question as to the validity and value of Article Three in the first place. What value is the Article if INTERPOL has full sway in manipulating its approach to crimes that are military, political, religious or racial in character? The fact that INTERPOL has managed to thrive in spite of the aid it provides in pursing terrorists provides a resounding answer to this question. INTERPOL’s success appears to prove the value of Article Three. Although INTERPOL has indeed taken an active role in pursuing

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72 Deflem and Maybin, supra note 1.
offenses of a military, political, religious, or racial character, member States do not appear to have viewed this approach as a manifestation of improper bias on INTERPOL’s part. Consequently, it can be said that Article Three allows INTERPOL leeway to pursue a broad range of criminal acts, some of which are motivated by the aims of terrorism. However, the value of this Article is that it allows INTERPOL to take this approach without threatening its own autonomy and existence.