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Article
An Event Study Analysis of Too-Big-to-Fail After the Dodd-Frank Act: Who Is Too Big to Fail?
Journal of Economics and Business
  • Kyle D. Allen, Boise State University
  • Ken B. Cyree, University of Mississippi
  • Mattew D. Whitledge, Mississippi State University
  • Drew B. Winters, Texas Tech University
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-1-2018
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.03.003
Disciplines
Abstract

One feature of the Dodd-Frank Act is the elimination of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks. TBTF is a government guarantee of large banks that has been shown to increase the value of these banks, so removing the guarantee should result in a price decline of TBTF bank stock. Using event study methods, we find very limited reaction to the process of eliminating TBTF. Specifically, there is limited reaction among the largest banks and banks receiving special attention, such as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) banks. Instead, smaller banks not receiving special attention show some evidence of negative returns with the elimination of TBTF.

Copyright Statement

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. © 2018, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivertives 4.0. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal of Economics and Business, doi: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.03.003

Creative Commons License
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
Citation Information
Allen, Kyle D.; Cyree, Ken B.; Whitledge, Mattew D.; and Winters, Drew B. (2018). "An Event Study Analysis of Too-Big-to-Fail After the Dodd-Frank Act: Who Is Too Big to Fail?". Journal of Economics and Business, 98, 19-31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.03.003