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Article
An Equitable Structure for Hedge Fund Incentive Fees
Journal of Investing
  • David K. C. LEE, Singapore Management University
  • Steven LWI, Ferrell Asset Management
  • Kok Fai PHOON, Singapore Management University
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
9-2004
Abstract

There are a variety of problems in fee structures between hedge fund managers and their clients. Examples here illustrate issues such as the free rider problem and the “claw-back” syndrome that can arise in fee contracts. A different “equalization” process that is both equitable and transparent to investors would involve multiportfolios that give any fund a structure similar to that of a partnership organization, and overcomes the current drawbacks in contracts. Application of this structure should improve fund manager and investor compatibility.

Keywords
  • Performance Fee,
  • Equalisation,
  • Hedge Funds,
  • Free-rider,
  • Clawback,
  • Alernative Investment,
  • Multi-porfolio Approach
Identifier
10.3905/joi.2004.434549
Publisher
Institutional Investor Inc
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.3905/joi.2004.434549
Citation Information
David K. C. LEE, Steven LWI and Kok Fai PHOON. "An Equitable Structure for Hedge Fund Incentive Fees" Journal of Investing Vol. 13 Iss. 3 (2004) p. 31 - 43 ISSN: 1068-0896
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/kuochuendavid_lee/5/