"Silly creations of an imagination that is not conscious of its freaks": Multiple Selves, Wordless Communication, and the Psychology of Mark Twain's No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger

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In the well known and problematic ending of No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger, Forty-Four explains to the young narrator August Feldner that nothing exists. By this he means that nothing material exists. “Life itself is only a vision, a dream,” Forty-Four declares. “Nothing exists save empty space—and you!” Moreover, “you are not you—you have no body, no blood, no bones, you are but a thought,” a singular, inextinguishable thought, wandering alone forever in empty, shoreless space, imagining or dreaming out of nothing such fictions as the universe, the world, and Forty-Four himself.¹ This is a curious conclusion, especially when we recall that Twain reaches this point after years of studying materialist psychology—much of which would have declared that all thoughts, visions, and dreams are effects of the body and brain, and not this other way around. Sherwood Cummings, following John S. Tuckey and joining others, has suggested that Twain in his last writings vacillates between materialism and idealism, between a deterministic science and a kind of spiritism.² And indeed this seems to be the most typical explanation, that Twain works in his twinning way, moving between opposites, distilling the problem to a binary. My aim in this essay is to complicate that picture a bit, further flesh out the importance to Mark Twain of developments in late nineteenth-century materialist psychology, and suggest how the ending to No. 44 plausibly emerged from that psychology.

Twain knew quite a bit about turn-of-the-century “mental science.” We know that in 1896 he was reading William James’s Principles of Psychology (1890); in 1898 he made reference to “French psychologists
of the school of [Jean-Martin] Charcot," and he read a book on the ideas of the German philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart, who proffered a psychology he called "mechanics of the mind"; then in 1900 he read American psychologist James Mark Baldwin's *The Story of the Mind* (1899).³ To this turn-of-the-century reading we might add Twain's longer habit of reading the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., another fairly dogged psychological materialist.⁴ And on top of that we might include his apparent familiarity with British psychophysics; his favorite conception of "unconscious cerebration," to describe his uncontrolled writing process, came from there, ultimately from William Carpenter. All this work was part of the physiological psychology of the later nineteenth century. And Twain embraced this psychology as he thought about his own psychic life—his unconscious mental processes, his wild and unwilled creativity, his sense of other persons living in himself, and his grim notions of humans as machines.

A number of scholars of Twain have explored some of this territory; I think particularly of Susan Gillman, who has written about the late writings in relation to William James, Jean-Martin Charcot, Ambroise-Auguste Liébault, Hippolyte Bernheim, Pierre Janet, and Frederic W. H. Myers (one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research);⁵ also, Jason Gary Horn, who has written about Twain and William James—and in so doing has addressed some of the issues I will raise here, though he treats them differently and comes to a completely different conclusion.⁶ The task remains, however, to situate more fully the problem of Twain's "Mysterious Stranger" and materialist psychology in relation to the larger currents of British psychophysiology, French neurology, German psychophysics, and American mental science—the intellectual currents in which, I think, Twain swam. Such a reframing can help us understand how and why Twain seemingly moved from this fascination with materialist psychology to what looks like an idealist monism—as it can help us understand the peculiar nature of this monism.

But to back up a bit: Twain remains poised in this late writing between two conceptions of mind that had materialist bases. First, there is the model of mind in which the brain receives sensory impressions and can connect and recombine them; this "associationist" version of human mental machinery is usually anchored in the writings of John Locke and, then, James Mill, though by the mid-nineteenth century it had been given a more particular physiological basis by Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer, who hypothesized that such associations were rooted in networks of neural connections.⁷ Second, there was a newer, emergent, more dynamic conception of the psyche as consist-
ing of multiple, autonomous, contending, processual forces; under this
general conception we can gather the work of Henry Maudsley, Wil-
liam Carpenter, Thomas Laycock, Pierre Janet, William James, Théod-
ule Ribot, and, finally, much of late-nineteenth-century psychology.8
Within this latter psychology there developed spiritist strands, which
Twain followed as he grappled with his ideas of telepathy (or mental
telegraphy) and wordless communication—the kind of topics that pre-
occupied some mental physiologists as well as the investigators for the
Society for Psychical Research. If in this Twain travels a route others
had prepared, he nonetheless arrives at a strikingly original conclusion,
as I hope to demonstrate, when he applies conceptions of this newer
materialist psychology to the noumenal realm, ultimately ascribing to
the divine creator a variety of unconscious neural processes that issue
in a nightmarish, “hysterical” universe. There is something typically
Twainian here, a perverse doubling: if the universe becomes just an
idealist thought, that thought then becomes a product of a psychology
modeled on materialist principles.

Despite the emergence in the later nineteenth century of a dynamic
psychology of mental forces, Twain never quite jettisoned a basic, rather
Lockean, associationism, which persists in the Mysterious Stranger
stories.9 By the early 1880s he was preoccupied with the idea that, as
he put it in a talk before the Hartford Monday Evening Club, “man is
merely a machine,” and “the human machine gets all its inspirations
from the outside and is not capable of originating an idea of any kind in
its own head.”10 What Is Man? written between 1898 and 1905, reiter-
ates and amplifies this basic idea, declaring that humans are machines
(125) that gather thousands of impressions, mainly unconsciously, and
that combine them—but do so automatically through mental mecha-
nisms we did not make and have no command over (127). Shakespeare
differs from the rest of us only because we are sewing machines, and
he is a Gobelin loom (130). But in every case, “Men perceive, and their
brain-machines automatically combine the things perceived. That is
all” (182). This is his most explicit and repeated message. And it resur-
faces repeatedly in No. 44, too, especially when Forty-Four tries to
explain the difference between a human mind and a god’s: “A man
originates nothing in his head, he merely observes exterior things,
and combines them. . . . His mind is merely a machine, that is all—an
automatic one, and he has no control over it!” (333). In What Is Man?
however, this mental machinery is hardly passive. Twain invokes the
kinds of examples of automatisms, of multiple, uncontrolled brain pro-
cesses, so common in the materialist psychology of the time—hearing
jingles that play through the mind and can’t be stopped (178), playing a
complicated piece on the piano while thinking of something else (210), simply watching the “drifting panorama” of dissolving views manufactured by the mind without conscious help (182), enduring a racing mind that keeps one from falling asleep (176), catching the strange dreams produced by uncontrolled brain machinery (179)—all of which add to his perceiving and combining mind a more complex mind that comprises and is subject to multifarious operations, impulses, and “forces” which he can sometimes select and foreground through attention (199–200), but which also operate outside of consciousness.

These ideas of multileveled, automatically operating brain processes gave shape to Twain's ideas in No. 44 about multiple levels of consciousness and multiple selves. As I have suggested, examples of the newer psychology—indeed of both general kinds of psychology—were widespread, and Twain could have been culling them from multiple sources. He liked to say, in accord with his conception of mind, that these ideas came to him from elsewhere, though as often as not they came in below the threshold of consciousness, and as a result he couldn't say where he picked them up or whether he was engaged in “unconscious plagiarism.” But we do know that W. E. H. Lecky profoundly influenced Twain, and Twain may have derived his understanding of “unconscious cerebration” from Lecky's summary of the work of mental physiologists Sir William Hamilton, William Carpenter, and Thomas Laycock; Lecky's discussion may have been of special interest to Twain not only because it stressed automatic and unconscious cerebral operations and associations, but also because Lecky foregrounded possible contrasts in personality between a dreaming self and a waking self and referenced cases that have come down to us as early instances of multiple personality disorder.11 William James's Principles of Psychology, of course, may also have been a source for Twain's ideas both about associationism and about unconscious cerebration or “cerebral reflexes.”12 James's chapter on habit relies heavily on William Carpenter's ideas about unconscious cerebration and the “automatic activity of the mind” that brings people to think, feel, and do things without having any consciously formed purpose of doing them.13 And James's attention to the possible existence of second, separate consciousnesses, and “double” or “alternate” personalities, would have interested Twain and could have informed his thinking about the multiple selves in No. 44.14

From among the various possible sources Twain could have drawn from to forge his ideas of multiple levels of consciousness and multiple selves, I would like for the moment to foreground a book we know Twain read, but which has not been given much attention—John Adams's
The Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education (1897). About the psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart, the book accommodates associationism at the same time that it provides a model of the psyche riven by competing forces or modules. It lays out the Herbartian scheme in which the “soul,” instead of being a spiritual essence, amounts only to a passive consciousness, one that has no capacity of its own to receive or produce anything; instead, ideas, or ideas grouped together (or associated) in what Herbart called apperception masses, compete to occupy this soul. The theory joins—and perhaps embodies the tension between—the psychology of associationism and that of conflictual forces; it also suited Twain’s version of the human mind as a machine which creates nothing on its own.

In a conception that resonated with later materialist psychology, Herbart theorized that ideas (or Vorstellungen) that repeatedly occupy this soul strengthen their chances of returning, in much the same way that the furrowing of neural pathways was understood to invite the repetition of nervous discharge. Because of “connective cerebral arrangements,” Adams writes, familiar systems of ideas are more quickly called up in the brain. But multiple idea clusters exist below the threshold of consciousness, in an “infra-conscious or extra-marginal” condition, battling for their day in the light of the soul. In addition, the soul can accommodate more than one apperception mass; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Adams writes, “makes a marvel of our having three distinct trains of thought going on at the same time,” but this is actually a commonplace thing; there can indeed be multiple strains of thought going on simultaneously—within consciousness, with some at its margins, or below the threshold of consciousness. Twain wrote an appreciative letter to Adams, referring to apperception masses as the effect of automatic and unconscious combination of sensory perception and declaring that even our combinations are not original to us but are received from elsewhere—though he notes that “my automatic mental machine is not one of the fine and good ones, but a lubberly and ill-made one which is always likely to combine its raw materials into foolish and mistaken patterns—but getting its scheme from the outside and therefore not personally blameable for its crazy work.” The remark is still focused on perception and associationist combination, but Twain could not have failed to register the primary Herbartian point about multileveled and competing elements of the psyche.

James Mark Baldwin’s The Story of the Mind also affirmed Twain’s conception of the mind as a material mechanism that originated nothing but that recombined materials it received from the outside (Twain’s marginalia in the book provide an illuminating dialogue about this). But,
from a materialist point of view, Baldwin also discusses unconscious and uncontrolled mental phenomena; although he characterizes "so-called Dual Personality" as an amnesia and brain disorder, he gives prominence to investigations into somnambulism and hypnotism and asserts, against the school of Charcot, that "normal" people can be subject to such states, not just hysteric$\textsuperscript{21}$. Finally, the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, too, upheld Twain's conviction that we have no original ideas, but, instead, our mental machinery, in a reflex action of the brain, constantly engages in unconscious plagiarism and unconscious recombinations of ideas. Holmes's ideas about these unconscious processes were also linked to his conception of multiple levels of consciousness—usually three, as Adams noted, but Holmes also repeatedly wrote about doubles, including the double of the dreaming self, or the personality who exists outside consciousness, and the "double, who is wiser and better than we are, and who puts thoughts into our heads, and words into our mouths."$\textsuperscript{22}$ In his novel The Guardian Angel (1867) he writes of how "We all do things awake and asleep that surprise us," because, perhaps, "we have cotenants in this house we live in," multiple distinct personalities in the "omnibus" we call our body.$\textsuperscript{23}$ In The Poet of the Breakfast Table (1872) he writes of two parts of the self, No. 1 and No. 2, who argue, who are radically different, the boaster and the cynic, and who take turns being chief or retiring into semiconsciousness.$\textsuperscript{24}$ Finally, near the end of his life, in Over the Teacups (1891), he writes of second personalities, of the Me-Number-Two who behaves automatically and often wrongly, and after having read William James on plural personalities, he declares the corporate existence of I-My-Self & Co.$\textsuperscript{25}$ These ideas about multiple personality are furthered in his authorial ruminations on the creation of literary characters, who he says not only must resonate with part of the author, but also, like one's automatically behaving selves, take on a life of their own and assert themselves during writing$\textsuperscript{26}$—an account that clearly matches Twain's description of how the characters in Pudd'nhead Wilson took over the novel. Some of the characters at the fictional breakfast table in Holmes's later years are numbered—like the character Number Seven. And this takes me, finally, to Twain's No. 44 and, first, to Twain's treatment in this manuscript of multiple selves and multiple levels of consciousness.

When, not long into Twain's novel, the men of the printshop strike because they don't want to work with Forty-Four, the entire printshop comes to life seemingly by itself—type is set, forms are made up, presses press, all seemingly automatically, all unbeknownst to the strikers. The explanation for this seemingly inexplicable phenomenon is that Forty-
Four has set in motion *duplicates* of the workers. The Duplicates, in this first appearance—or, rather, this first invisible nonappearance—are immaterial (281–82). As Forty-Four eventually explains to August, “you are not one person, but two” (315), one being your Workaday-Self, which “tends to business,” the other your Dream-Self, which “has no responsibilities, and cares only for romance and excursions and adventure.” While one sleeps, the other is in control (315). Forty-Four has put the Dream-Selves of the workers to work.

It is worth noting that Twain engages in his typical play of doubling and inversion, pointedly confusing matters. The Duplicates who are working industriously in the printshop are the Dream-Selves, the supposedly irresponsible and adventurous ones, while the awake workaday selves of the strikers lounge irresponsibly about. Although all the Dream-Selves do is work, Forty-Four asserts that they retain creative imaginations that far surpass those of the Workaday-Selves, so “if they imagine that it takes them but half a second to set a whole galleysful of matter, that is what happens!” (316). But, still, the printshop Dream-Selves, Duplicates operating duplicating machines, visible only through the action of these machines, literalize the double as automaton, as a registering mechanism—as if the Dream-Selves were themselves split between imagination and automation, romance and business. Forty-Four then confuses things a bit more: according to him, the Dream-Self is substanceless, a spirit, while the Workaday-Self “can’t get away from the flesh, and is clogged and hindered by it.” But after the Duplicates finish this initial print job, Forty-Four puts flesh on them, making these spirits material. The adventurous and the workaday, the imaginative and the automatic, the embodied and the immaterial—Twain turns these hierarchical oppositions upside down.

Everyone in the story now literally has two selves walking around—selves whose relations are rather poor. The Duplicates act entirely independently of the Originals, who are unaware of what the Duplicates are doing. Indeed, the Originals fight with their Duplicates (305), and the two work at cross-purposes, and compete for the attentions of the young women of the house (317). Here are truly autonomous parts of the self, unaware of each other, unacquainted with each other, following and embodying multiple, contradictory impulses. The fleshing of the Dream-Selves inexplicably commits them to work in the printshop, true automatons now; August is left bored, with nothing to do (335), and his Dream-Self yearns, as he puts it, to be released from “this odious flesh” (380–81), and to be back in August’s skull, the base for his dreaming excursions (380). As this Dream-Self interferes with August’s romantic prospects, August also thinks it would be good to put it back
“into my body and lock it up there for good” (349). In another paradox, the Dream-Self locked in August’s body, encased in August’s skull, would be freed from the odious flesh, ready to go on his imaginary trips.

This unavoidably raises the question: Just how dependent is the Dream-Self on flesh, or on the materialized mind—on August’s body and brain? Forty-Four steps in with another explanation: Humans really have three selves—a Waking-Self, a Dream-Self, and a Soul. The Waking-Self and the Dream-Self are fleshed, “functioned by the brain and the nerves, and are physical and mortal; they are not functionable when the brain and nerves are paralysed by a temporary hurt or stupefied by narcotics; and when the man dies they die, since their life, their energy and their existence depend solely upon physical sustenance and they cannot get that from dead nerves and a dead brain” (342–43). So the Dream-Selves are effects of the material body and brain. Now, curiously, with the Dream-Selves fleshed, they still depend on the flesh of the Originals, which eat and drink for the two of them, echoing Twain’s Siamese twins; and August’s Dream-Self advises August on his health, thinking of their shared body as if it was “a piece of mere property that he was commercially interested in” (378–79). On the other hand, August’s Soul is immortal and substanceless. When Forty-Four makes August invisible, only his Soul remains (343).

This conception of the immortal soul contributed to the kind of idealist monism with which Twain ends his novel. More important, he could have derived his idea of such a soul from a number of writers about psychology, even from some of those we most associate with materialist, physiological psychology. Despite being a leading promulgator of mental physiology, William Carpenter, for one, believed in a transcendent divinity as the first cause and in an autonomous human soul.27 Offshoots from German Naturphilosophie (such as the psychophysicist Gustav Fechner) saw nature and spirit springing from a common spiritual principle, an absolute that manifests itself in both nature and mind.28 A scientist like Thomas Laycock, a materialist who extended the concept of the reflex into the territory of the cerebrum, nonetheless held a monistic view of Mind derived from Naturphilosophie, in which a divine Mind expressed itself in the nervous system and consciousness.29 And members of the Society for Psychical Research, whom Twain read avidly, relatedly proposed that the basis of consciousness might be found in a new, fundamental—primordial and irreducible—force of nature, something like gravity or electromagnetism, something that would show that idealism coincides with materialism.

Indeed, as a way to understand Twain’s movement toward the imma-
terial soul, and to diminish the stark contrast between the opposites of material and spirit, it will pay to chart the resonances between Twain's conceptions and those of the Society for Psychical Research. Twain had noted in 1896, "Been reading Apparitions of the Living," which John S. Tuckey justifiably concludes must have been *Phantasms of the Living* (1886), by the core SPR members Edmund Gurney, Frederic W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore (though most of the work was done by Gurney). And one thing the book makes abundantly clear, especially in the introduction by Myers, is the attentiveness of the SPR to brain biology as the basis for thought, to "the neural side of our mental processes, and the relation of cerebral phenomena to their accompanying emotion or thought" and to the prospect that "the increased precision in psycho-physical researches" may illuminate psychic phenomena.

For example: Just as Twain's Dream-Self has more imagination, passion, emotion, and sensation than the Workaday-Self, and "therefore its pains and pleasures are far more real and intense than are those of the other self, and its adventures correspondingly picturesque and extraordinary" (313, 344), so, as Myers explains, do states of somnambulism and hypnotism—when normal perception and memory are suspended—allow "the emergence of unnoted sensibilities" and the revelation of "latent and delicate capacities of which his ordinary conscious self is unaware." Myers's hypothesis about the enhanced capacities under somnambulism or hypnosis is clearly grounded in the materialist psychology of the time. James Mark Baldwin in *The Story of the Mind* had written that in a somnambulic or hypnotized state the mental faculties and senses are exalted, "together with a corresponding refinement in the interpretive faculty." The French researchers Alfred Binet and Charles Févé (plausibly included in the "school of Charcot" that Twain referred to) had argued that people in somnambulistic states had "hyperaesthesia," or heightened sensory experience—vision, smell, hearing—as well as improved memory, and they are subject to "excessive psychical excitement," tending to laugh, cry, and feel intensely. The Scottish writer on psychology Eneas Sweetland Dallas had written that "our minds lead a double life—one life in consciousness, another and vaster life beyond it," the "unknown and automatic life" of imagination and dream characterized by the free play of thought, "the absence of control," "freedom from supervision," wandering, and so on. A great deal of mainstream psychology, in other words, supported Twain's idea of the expanded powers of the Dream-Self.

What of the topic of telepathy, or thought-transference (as the SPR tended to put it), or "mental telegraphy" as Twain referred to it? In No.
44, August is able to tell Forty-Four his printshop duties by issuing instructions telepathically “from my brain” (256). And after that, repeatedly, Forty-Four reads August’s mind, and he attempts “wordless communication” with August, to the extent that August’s deficient human brain can handle it (e.g., 318–19). And though this ability is a godly one belonging to the supernatural boy, Forty-Four gives a little comic history of the decay of telepathic communication through dreams, in which dream-communication is compared to, and once far surpassed, the telephone and Western Union (382–85). Telepathy was the main concern of Phantasms of the Living, and both Myers and Gurney, too, wrote of physical, scientific explanations for it, though each ultimately acknowledged that no satisfactory scientific explanation existed. Myers looked to “physiological inquirers” and “psycho-physicists” for possible explanations having to do with “undulations” or “particles” emitted from one mind to another. Gurney wrote of “the transmission and reception of vibratory energy” as a possible “physical basis for the fact of the transference,” and invoked analogies of “magnetic and electric induction,” so that “it is possible to conceive that vibration-waves, or nervous induction, are a means whereby activity in one brain may evoke a kindred activity in another—with, of course, a similar correspondence of psychical impressions.” Such explanations echo the ruminations on the topic by Oliver Wendell Holmes. In Over the Teacups (1891), Holmes’s character Number Seven—a character who is not always reliable, but, Holmes stresses, neither is he wrong—provides an explanation of a seeming case of telepathy by saying: “Brain action through space without material symbolism, such as speech, expression, etc., is analogous to electrical induction.” In the case at hand, a letter came charged from “the cells of the cerebral battery” of the letter’s writer. The “brain-cell power corresponding to electricity,” which Number Seven calls cerebricity, was stored in the letter, and transferred to Holmes’s brain by cerebral induction. Holmes’s case, and his explanation, resonates strikingly with Twain’s own writing about “mental telegraphy.” Even for this kind of paranormal phenomenon, the explanatory framework of materialist psychology was close at hand.

And this is my ultimate point—that even when Twain leaps into the territory of the spiritual, the noumenal, the immaterial, he brings along the terms and conundrums of materialist understanding and physiological psychology. The most striking example is that puzzling end of the novel; when Twain thinks his way to the isolated thought as the origin of all things, it is a stupid divinity, split, dual. This free-floating thought, this idealist notion, is not fully itself. As Forty-Four tells August, you are not you. Here is the primordial fact—that the
Absolute, the Universal, does not coincide with itself; a gap traverses it from within, the inner split of the primordial void. This is materialist psychology applied to the divine, the only way Twain could explain the cruelties and irrationalities of the universe. The originating thought is a multiplex consciousness, dreaming dreams it cannot control, thinking thoughts beyond its ken, unconsciously harboring multiple apperception masses, unaware that it is the source of all its sees. The universe is made up of dreams, visions, fictions, which are "hysterically insane—like all dreams." It is made up of contradictions and cruelties, divine obtuseness and ignorance, grotesqueries, "pure and puerile insanities, the silly creations of an imagination that is not conscious of its freaks." In effect, then, idealist monism does not quite have the last word; the model, the frame, of a materialist psychology persists, in which subjective experience is shaped by unconscious mechanisms which decenter self-experience and are beyond one's control. So Mark Twain, following his habit of mind of doubling and inverting things, allows a bleakly solipsistic idealism momentarily to prevail, then undermines it with the quirky contingencies and determinisms of his materialism, writing an ending to his story that leaves us with a problem, not a conclusion.

NOTES

4. Cummings, in Mark Twain and Science, stresses the importance of Holmes to Twain (56, 156).
5. Susan Gillman, Dark Twins: Imposture and Identity in Mark Twain's America.
7. Rick Rylance, in Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850–1880, provides a full account of this development in associationist psychology.
8. Tracing the shift from associationist psychology to a mind riven by dynamic forces—and charting the implications of this shift—could be said to be an underlying purpose of Jonathan Crary's Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture, but see, especially, 42–43, 60–61.
9. If my interest is to link Twain to a materialist psychology that came to dominance in the late nineteenth century, Gregg Canfield, in Sentimental Twain: Samuel Clemens in the Maze of Moral Philosophy approaches Twain from the early nineteenth century,
through the then-dominant faculty psychology of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. I mention Camfield’s book here because he roots Twain’s associationism in this earlier psychology and he sees it persisting through Twain’s very last writings.


14. James’s chapter 8, “The Relations of Minds to Other Things”; the beginning of chapter 9, “The Stream of Thought”; and chapter 10, “The Consciousness of Self” all develop ideas about second consciousnesses, multiple levels of consciousness, and double or alternative selves that Mark Twain would have found arresting.


16. Gregg Camfield’s essay in this volume rightly associates Herbart with German idealism; Herbart was indeed a follower of Immanuel Kant and a student of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. But as Camfield also notes, Herbart developed a mechanical conception of how the mind operates and, indeed, he developed mathematical equations to describe mental operations. He laid the groundwork for the psychophysics of Gustav Theodor Fechner and was poised, one could say, between idealism and a scientific-materialist psychology. So Camfield’s conclusion is persuasive—that Herbart enabled Twain to have the matter both ways, preserving a transcendent soul, yet declaring the mind a machine, and playing in the gap between these opposites. My aim, again, is to flesh out the materialist-psychological side of Twain’s thinking. As justification I’ll note that Twain imbibed Herbart through Adams’s book, which was written at the zenith of the dominance of “mental physiology” and made explicit connections to materialist psychology. And the most influential Herbartian ideas in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seem to have been those that were most pertinent to the psychology of the time. See, for example, the articles by G. F. Stout in Mind: “The Herbartian Psychology (I),” 22–24; “The Herbartian Psychology (II),” 473–98; “Herbart Compared with English Psychologists and with Beneke,” 1–20; and “The Psychological Work of Herbart’s Disciples,” 353–68.


18. Ibid., 79.

19. Ibid., 77.


22. Mechanism in Thought and Morals, 45, 56.


24. Holmes, The Poet at the Breakfast Table, 206, 243.


26. Ibid., 299–301.


28. Anne Harrington, Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought, 123; Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The
History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, 202–3; Thomas Laycock, Mind and Brain, 2:203, 205.


32. Ibid., xlii.


36. Myers, introduction, Phantasms, xlv.

37. Ibid., I.

38. Gurney, Phantasms of the Living, 111–12.