In this article I present a comparative analysis of Schopenhauer’s concept of a human’s intelligible character and Sartre’s concept of a human’s fundamental project. My examination reveals that both Schopenhauer and Sartre posit a groundless, baseless choice of identity which unifies a human’s future conscious states into an integrated whole. I also identify the primary difference between the two accounts: Schopenhauer’s intelligible character is permanent, while Sartre’s theory of fundamental project is capable of being transformed or transcended. Last, I show that the divergence on this point can be explained by the position the two philosophers hold with respect to the relationship of existence to essence. For Schopenhauer’s account, I use The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, and his Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will. For the analysis of Sartre, I rely on Being and Nothingness and his biography of French writer Jean Genet, titled Saint Genet.