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Article
Why it is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions
American Philosophical Quarterly
  • Ken Levy, Louisiana State University Law Center
Abstract
It is generally thought that ought implies can. If this maxim is correct, then my inability to do otherwise entails that I cannot be blamed for failing to do otherwise. In this article, however, I use Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) to show that the maxim is actually false, that I can be blamed for failing to do otherwise even in situations where I could not have done otherwise. In these situations, I do not act otherwise not because I cannot act otherwise but because I choose not to act otherwise.
Comments

42 Am. Phil. Q. 93 (2005)

Disciplines
Date of Authorship for this Version
1-1-2005
Citation Information
Ken Levy. "Why it is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions" American Philosophical Quarterly (2005)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ken_levy2/17/