From Economic to Socio-Cultural Emancipation: The Historical Context of the New International Economic Order and the New International Socio-Cultural Order

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FROM ECONOMIC TO SOCIO-CULTURAL EMANCIPATION: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL ORDER*

Karl P Sauvant

Introduction

Forty years ago, the Third World was under colonial or hegemonic domination. It was an object of world politics, not a participant in it.

Forty years hence, the Third World may well be a full partner in political, military, economic, and socio-cultural international relations. It will participate in world affairs on an equal and independent basis.

Today, we are in a process of transition. It is a process of adapting the colonial structures of the past to the realities of tomorrow.

This transition began with the achievement of political independence. Political decolonisation was largely completed by the end of the 1960s. The emergence of the Nonaligned Movement during the 1960s signalled the successful organisation of the Third World as an independent international political force.

With the consolidation of political independence, it became increasingly apparent that political emancipation alone was not sufficient to bring about real changes in the dependency relationships of the developing countries. Thus, attention shifted to economic decolonisation and, increasingly, to socio-cultural emancipation. The concepts of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the New International Socio-Cultural Order (NISCO) have come to symbolise these two dimensions of the decolonisation process.

The Historical Context

The present attention given to the NIEO and the NISCO is mainly a result of the following seven interrelated factors:

a) the consolidation of the political independence of the developing countries and the stabilisation of the global political-military situation;

b) the full recognition of the importance of economic development and the disappointments with the development efforts of the 1960s;

c) doubts about the prevailing development model;

d) the emergence of the movement of the nonaligned countries (NACs) as an

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nation, and thereby satisfy some of the more politically involved citizens. In this setting an authoritarian regime has serious weaknesses. Ultimately, all authoritarian regimes face this legitimacy pull towards the polyarchic model, with political freedom for relatively full participation, or toward the committed, ideological single party model. Hence, while one cannot predetermine dictatorial or democratic outcomes, neither should one prejudge the possibility of outcomes simply on the basis of the military origins of many Third World revolutions. 15

international pressure group for the re-organisation of the international economic system;

c) the politicisation of the development task;

d) the growing assertiveness of the developing countries; and

g) the beginning of the recognition of the interrelationships between economic and socio-cultural emancipation.

National Political Consolidation and International Political-Military Stabilisation

Most developing countries had become independent by the middle of the 1960s, or liberated themselves from the political domination of their former hegemonic powers. The highest priority of these countries was, naturally, to consolidate their independence. This was all the more important since, during the period of the Cold War, pressures to affiliate with one of the two rival superpowers were particularly intense. The 1955 Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung was the first major attempt of those developing countries that desired to resist these pressures to secure political independence through international cooperation. The foundation of the movement of the NACs during its first summit in Belgrade in September 1961 gave this cooperation a stronger and continuing basis. The main objectives of NACs were at that time principally of a political nature and reflected the militarily weak and politically threatened position of the individual members of the movement: decolonisation, national self-determination, opposition to apartheid, dissolution of the political and military alliances and blocs, peaceful co-existence, dissolution of military bases on foreign territories, disarmament, recognition of the territorial integrity of all states, non-interference into the internal affairs of states, and the strengthening of the UN.

By the beginning of the 1970s, most of these objectives had been achieved or had at least lost their urgency. Most colonies had become independent and most of the new countries had consolidated their sovereignty in its formal political aspects. The global rivalry of the superpowers – and the resulting pressure on the countries of the Third World – had receded, and competition seemed to have been channelled into the acceptance of strategic balance, peaceful co-existence and détente. A certain global political-military stability had been achieved.

Although these developments did not resolve the fundamental problems of the East-West conflict, they stabilised the political-military situation sufficiently to allow greater attention to other international problems.

Disappointing Development Results

For the developing countries, this meant that questions of economic development began to receive greater attention. After independence, it was widely believed that many of the problems of the developing countries had largely been a function of their political status. Once independence had been achieved, they would become full and equal members of the international community. Participation in international economic interactions – the benefits of which were expected to
trickle down quickly to them – supported by a number of regional and international development efforts would soon result, it was hoped, in a considerable improvement in their economic situation.

By the end of the 1960s, these hopes had been shattered. The First UN Development Decade, launched with high hopes in 1961, fell short of its objectives; its extension in 1970 was viewed with dampened expectations. The Alliance for Progress, also launched in 1961 with similar hopes, quietly faltered. Another regional effort, the First Yaoundé Convention of 1963, was replaced by the Second Yaoundé Convention and the Arusha Convention (1969), but the expectations associated with them were not fulfilled (in spite of the improved conditions negotiated in the latter two agreements). The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had a promising start with its first meeting in 1964, but did not make considerable progress in its second (1968) and third (1972) sessions, thus only increasing the sense of frustration in the developing countries. The same can be said for the Group of 77 (G77), which had constituted itself in 1964 during UNCTAD I.

By the end of the decade, it became apparent that the economic situation of most developing countries, aggravated further by unchecked population growth, had remained desperate. For many of them, in fact, it had worsened in comparison to that of the developed market economies. Although per capita income (at 1970 prices) in the developed market economies increased from about $2,000 to $3,000 during the period 1960 to 1975, in the developing countries it rose by a mere $91 – from $169 to $260. It appeared, thus, that the international and regional development efforts (or, more generally, the mechanisms of the international economic system) had failed to contain, let alone eliminate, absolute poverty. This was all the more disappointing since the developed market economies had experienced unparalleled growth during the 1960s.

Importantly, the disappointments with the functioning of the international economic system came at a time when political-military developments allowed the full realisation of the implications of the failures of the international economic system. It became increasingly apparent that political independence would be a mere chimera unless complemented by a minimum of economic independence, unless genuine development were to transform the hierarchical structures of economic dependence that characterise the relationships between developing and developed countries into horizontal structures of interdependence. Economic development came to be sought with greater urgency.

Doubts about the Prevailing Development Model

The question arose, therefore, of whether the continuing difficulties of the developing countries might not be, at least partially, a function of the nature of the international economic system and especially the mechanisms and structures through which the developing countries were linked with the developed market economies. Doubt was even cast on the development model of the overwhelming majority of the Third World nations. Two of the main characteristics of the
prevailing model, in particular, were questioned: its world-market orientation and its emphasis on GNP growth rates.

The key characteristic of the development model of virtually all countries of the Third World—and one strongly supported by the developed countries—is that its frame of reference is the world economy and the world market. The close integration of the Third World countries into the world economy and their orientation towards the world market are expected to trigger and then maintain the development process. While this integration involves a whole range of transactions (eg. technology, consumption patterns, skills, capital), trade has traditionally been regarded as the most important among them. Aid-by-trade is then the key mechanism of the prevailing model; trade is the 'engine' of development. The operative assumptions are that the industrial states continue to grow; that this growth translates itself into increased demand for imports from the developing countries; and that this, in turn, stimulates the industrial development of the latter.

The experiences of the 1960s had made suspect a number of the elements of this approach. Trade was not as dynamic as was expected and, in fact, the share of the developing countries in world trade decreased continuously. At the same time, financial transfers in the form of development assistance stagnated in real terms and decreased in terms of percentage of the GNP of the industrial countries. Growth and prosperity had not trickled down to the extent desired and, when it occurred, were often perceived as mainly benefiting transnational enterprises. Furthermore, in the 1970s, the recession in the developed market economies highlighted the dependence of the developing countries on the vagaries of the world market, and the increased protectionism raised questions as to the absorption capacity of the developed market economies for industrial products originating in the developing countries. The latter development, in particular, threatened to undermine the entire rationale of a world market-oriented, export-led development strategy. In fact, since the growing protectionism also affected the developed countries; since, even more importantly, the disintegration of the Bretton Woods arrangements had left the international monetary system in disarray; since it appeared to be impossible to control world inflation; and since the insecurity over the supply of primary products continued, the old order appeared no longer to serve even the interests of the developed countries.

For the Third World nations, an additional consideration must be mentioned. In many countries, the prevailing development strategy tended to accentuate structural underdevelopment. In other words, even if the mechanisms of the export-led development model would work, the 'best' that could be achieved would be dependent development. The structural nature of underdevelopment is mainly a function of the malformation of the economies of the developing countries and their economic dependence on the industrialised countries.

These doubts found their expression in the emergence and rise of the concept of individual and collective self-reliance which became, since 1970, one of the main

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planks of the economic programme of the NACs. Self-reliance involves the strengthening of autonomous capacities for goal-setting, decision-making and decision-implementation in all areas of a developing society. It seeks to de-emphasise the predominant reliance of developing countries on linkages with the developed countries in favour of a greater mobilisation of indigenous resources (and those of other developing countries) and a greater selectivity in traditional linkages. Thus, instead of looking towards external impulses for growth, the self-reliance approach looks towards internal impulses, particularly the creation and expansion of domestic market transactions (especially trade) with the developed market economies are no longer the engine of development but rather have a supplementary function.

Although the concept of self-reliance was not to inspire the main documents laying down the foundations of the NIEO — in fact, most measures suggested in these documents are derived from the prevailing development strategy — it has steadily gained support in the Third World. This is borne out most impressively by the declaration adopted by the G77 at their Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Arusha in February 1979, during which the developing countries formulated their positions for the May/June 1979 UNCTAD V session in Manila. For the first time in its history, the G77, as the principal organisation of the developing countries for matters of collective economic interest within the UN system, shifted away from its exclusive dependence on the integrative, world-market-oriented development strategy and embraced the concept of self-reliance. The document adopted in Arusha — the ‘Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations’ — signalled this shift in its very title.

Although an export-led strategy remains the prevailing development model, the self-reliance approach has important functions. It remains an alternative development strategy that — even if it is very difficult to implement it in its extreme form of 'de-linking' the South from the North — can at least provide guidance for the kinds of change that are required to eliminate underdevelopment. As an ideal type, it can provide direction for partial strategies. Naturally, the attractiveness of this alternative increases as the limitations of the export-led approach become more evident and/or the negotiations about the implementation of the programme for the NIEO remain deadlocked. The Arusha Programme is a case in point.

The most important contribution of the self-reliance discussions to the movement towards the NIEO, however, was that it led the developing countries to recognise the political dimensions of development and to examine seriously the international framework of the development effort. This led to a questioning of the purposes of the international economic system and channelled the development discussion into more fundamental directions.

Apart from the world-market orientation of the prevailing development

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2 The relevant documents are contained in Odette Jankowitch and Karl P. Sauvant (eds), The Third World without Superpowers: the collected documents of the nonaligned countries, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1978; 4 vols, hereinafter cited as Jankowitch and Sauvant.

strategy, its quantitative growth emphasis and especially the prevalent practice of measuring development by—or equating it with—the growth of GNP particularly drew criticism and contributed to the rising doubts about the model itself. It was pointed out that the growth rate specified for the First Development Decade was a group target, whose attainment might disguise the fact that many countries are growing at a slower pace. More importantly, however, such a GNP growth target may well be achieved although some sectors (e.g., agriculture) perform very poorly, while regions (e.g., rural areas) remain untouched by growth, and certain groups of the population (especially the poor) actually experience declining incomes. Growth alone does not eliminate poverty and general growth rates do not provide information about the quality and the distribution of growth. If development involves the qualitative improvement of the standard of living of the entire population, growth cannot simply be equated with development. Hence the basic question was raised again: what kind of improvements are sought for whom? In other words, what is the objective of development?

In response to this question, the concept of basic needs rose to prominence. Accordingly, development meant first of all that the needs of the entire population for primary consumption goods (food, clothing, shelter), services (water, health, education, transport), and employment had to be satisfied, and that development policy had to address itself squarely to this objective. Such a goal-orientation also requires growth, but growth that is qualitatively different than that of the past and, most notably, that is directly geared towards the 40 per cent of the population that has so far been neglected. This model no longer subscribes to an internal trickling-down effect but, instead, focuses on domestic production and consumption patterns.

The Role of the NACs

Thus, a number of developments converged at the beginning of the 1970s: most developing countries had obtained and consolidated their political independence; the global political-military situation had stabilised; the countries of the Third World began to pay greater attention to development questions; the regional and international development programmes had shown disappointing results; and doubts were raised about the propriety of the prevailing development model. Increasingly, it became recognised that the institutions of the international economic system had been established by the developed market economies to serve primarily their own purposes. Since the interests, needs and special conditions of the developing countries had largely been ignored, they remained in poverty and dependency. Hence, fundamental changes were required in the international economic system to establish an international framework conducive to development and to create the economic basis of independence. In fact, the system itself had come under serious strain with the breakdown of the Bretton

4 For instance, apart from the Latin American states, only the following developing countries took part in the Bretton Woods Conference: Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, and the Philippines.
Woods system, the food and oil crises, a general surge of inflation, world recessions, rising environmental concerns, and the spectre of the scarcity of raw materials. When the economic tranquility of the 1960s gave way to the turbulence of the 1970s, international economic matters could no longer be ignored.

By drawing the political consequences from the combination of these processes, the NACs came to play a crucial role in the promotion of the development issue. The Nonaligned Movement alone could do this because it was the only organisation of the Third World that could draw political conclusions and lend them the weight necessary in the arena of international discussions.

Before this occurred, however, the Nonaligned Movement had undergone three crucial changes. First, the Nonaligned Movement established itself as the principal political coalition of the developing countries. From twenty-five members at the first summit in Belgrade in 1961, membership increased to ninety-two members at the sixth summit in Havana in 1979. In addition, a number of observer and guest countries participated in the movement. In 1979, three-quarters of the members of the G77 were also members of the Nonaligned Movement. Thus, the Nonaligned Movement had succeeded in mobilising most of the nations of the Third World.

Secondly, the movement had set up a highly structured organisation. Before the 1970 Lusaka summit, the Movement's organisational structure consisted only of the summit conferences (held at irregular intervals) and the preparatory conferences of foreign ministers. Since 1970, several organisational layers emerged which reached down to the level of seminars and symposia. These increased institutionalised contacts created horizontal lines of communication (i.e., lines of communication that are independent from the former colonial powers), led to intensified contacts, and allowed the NACs to exchange information, define their interests and coordinate their policies—all in a framework that is characterised by a stronger political awareness than that of the G77. The Nonaligned Movement provided, therefore, the organisational infrastructure for effective cooperation.

Thirdly, the Nonaligned Movement embraced the development issue and included it among its principal objectives. Before the 1970 Lusaka summit, the NACs had mainly a political perspective—witness their principal objectives listed earlier. At the Lusaka summit, development questions received considerable attention for the first time. This shift evolved further at the 1972 Georgetown foreign ministers' conference and was ratified during the 1973 Algiers summit. The economic programme adopted at Algiers called for fundamental reforms of the international economic system; it was, in fact, the basis of the resolutions adopted several months later during the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

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4 In fact, the NACs perceive themselves as playing a 'catalyst role' in the G77.
Politisation

This transformation of the Nonaligned Movement had a crucial effect on the way in which development matters were perceived, presented, and pursued. During the 1960s – and as late as UNCTAD III (1972) – questions of economic development were regarded as 'low politics': they were left to the ministers of economics, finance, and planning. Attempts to politicise these issues (for example, the G77's Charter of Algiers, 1967, which had been adopted in preparation for UNCTAD II) therefore failed. With the beginning of the 1970s, however, this attitude changed and development questions became 'high politics': they were elevated from the level of heads of ministries to the level of heads of state or government. The development issues had become politicised.

It is not important that many of the concrete suggestions of the development programme had already been presented earlier in one form or another. It is perhaps not even important that basic changes were desired. What was important, however, is that the Movement of the NACs, as the political coalition of the Third World, embraced these suggestions and supported them with its entire political weight. The decisive factor was not the novelty of the ideas but the historical context in which they were advanced and the political support that was given to them.

The 1973 Algiers summit represents the formal recognition by the decision-makers of the developing countries that their problems were not a function of their political status alone but also of their economic status. The summit's 'Economic Declaration', 'Action Programme for Economic Cooperation', and 'Economic Resolutions' constituted, therefore, in the words of the President-in-Office of the NACs, 'a decisive turning point' in the objectives of the Movement, 'which determined henceforth to work towards the constitution of a New International Economic Order'. Consequently, the NACs desired to bring the development issue before the UN, but not, as in the past, in a committee of the General Assembly but rather 'at a high political level' in a special session 'devoted exclusively to the problems of development.' This request was supported by the UN General Assembly, which decided, on 17 December 1973, 'to hold a special session of the General Assembly at a high political level' about development questions. This decision led to the 1975 Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

Hence, the key importance of the Algiers summit was that it politicised the development task and made it a priority item on the agenda of the NACs; with the Seventh Special Session it was scheduled to become a priority item on the international agenda. These were the political consequences drawn by the Third World countries from the experiences of the 1960s, and they were consequences that could only be drawn and implemented by a political and not a technical body. But the timetable of the Nonaligned Movement was compressed when, one month

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5 Resolution S/172 (XXVIII).
after the end of the summit, war broke out between Israel and the Arab states.

The Growing Assertiveness of the Third World

With their growing appreciation of the importance of economic matters, the developing countries became increasingly aware of their bargaining power. Limited as this bargaining power is, it lies in the economic sphere and depends on the ability of the Third World to maintain a minimum of solidarity. Primary products play a key role.

This role has two aspects. The first concerns the generation of financial resources for development and the full integration of the production of raw materials into the domestic economy. Since primary commodities are essential for the development process of most developing countries, they have to be fully utilised for this purpose. The greatest efforts are therefore needed to ensure that the largest possible share of the value created through their production accrues to the developing countries. Prices, royalties, and the like are the means through which this objective can be achieved. In addition, efforts have to be made to capture the indirect (multiplier-) effects created through the processing of raw materials in order to utilise them for the stimulation of domestic development. Consequently, a larger share of processing has to be located in the producing countries. But since, for historical reasons, raw materials are frequently controlled by transnational enterprises — whose normal preference is to favour transnational vertical linkages over national horizontal ones (i.e., backward and forward linkages in the host economy) — the developing countries reserve their right to nationalise these natural resources and the production facilities associated with them if this should become necessary in the interest of national economic development.

The second aspect of the role of primary products concerns their function as a bargaining instrument in North-South relations. The developed countries together obtain nearly half of their primary commodity imports from the developing countries. For some important products — minerals, fuels, and related materials as a group — this dependence ranges between 70 per cent for the European Community to over 80 per cent for Japan and the US. For some specific products — like uranium or petroleum in the case of the European Community — it can reach nearly 100 per cent.

Naturally, this dependence provides the developing countries with a certain bargaining leverage — and not only for the purpose of maximising the economic returns on raw materials. But the *sine qua non* for the exercise of this leverage is cooperation among the producing countries. Producers' associations offer the framework for such cooperation. They facilitate, for instance, the exchange of relevant information (e.g., about new production technologies); strengthen the bargaining position of each member *vis-a-vis* consumer countries and transnational enterprises; allow efforts to contain price and income fluctuations; and, finally, facilitate the formulation and implementation of common policies.

The prototype of a producers' association is, of course, OPEC. And OPEC also demonstrates how increased awareness about the importance of economic factors
influenced the actions of the Third World. Although OPEC had been established in 1960, it had spent the entire decade of the 1960s negotiating minor improvements in the division of revenues which, in the end, resulted in additional government income of $25 million. Between 1970 and 1974, on the other hand, the income of OPEC increased by about $80 billion. Moreover, most oil production facilities passed into domestic ownership.

The success of OPEC was, in fact, responsible for speeding up of the schedule agreed upon at the 1973 Algiers summit. Following the oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices, the US invited the major developed oil-consuming countries to a February 1974 conference in Washington to deliberate about a coordinated response. In reaction to this suggestion, the Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne, in his capacity as the President-in-Office of the Movement of the NACs, requested the Secretary-General of the UN to convene a special session on the problems of raw materials and development.°

The Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly was thus called to take place from 9 April to 2 May 1974. It adopted the 'Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order' and the 'Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order'. The restructuring of the international economic system had become a priority item on the international agenda. The purpose is to make development a main objective of the international economic system, a system constructed without the active participation of most of the developing countries and designed primarily to serve the needs of the developed countries. The programme for the NIEO is an effort to outline the changes required in the main areas of North-South interaction – trade and commodities, money and finance, science and technology, industrialisation and transnational enterprises, food and agriculture – to make the international economic system maximally conducive to the economic emancipation of the Third World.

While the NACs played a key role in making the development task a priority item on the international agenda, the G77 is the principal organ of the Third World through which the concrete actions required for the establishment of the NIEO are negotiated within the framework of the UN system. This objective has dominated all major North-South conferences since 1974.

Whether or not the programme for the NIEO as currently formulated can actually be expected to bring about the desired structural changes is certainly a question that needs serious analysis. But the developing countries' commitment to it demonstrates that economic emancipation has become a priority concern for them.

**Socio-Cultural Emancipation**

During the colonial period, the countries of the Third World were not only subjected to political and economic but also to socio-cultural colonisation. In the

process, important segments of Third World societies adopted values and
behavioural patterns that reflected those of the metropolitan countries. After
independence, these infused patterns were maintained and, in fact, reinforced
through a variety of mechanisms.

Education, for instance, has traditionally played a key role. Old socio-cultural
unities are also strengthened by foreign-language broadcasts, newspapers, and
extensive cultural programmes of major developed countries. In addition, local
broadcasting frequently draws on whole series of programmes acquired from
developed countries, and popular music in particular is strongly foreign
dominated. An even higher degree of import-dependence is characteristic for the
film industry, a dependence that is virtually total for news films. Newspapers and
magazines, in many of which syndicated US comics have become fixtures, have to
rely for their global news (including news about other developing countries)
almost entirely on two or three international news agencies and their selection of
what is newsworthy. Since the beginning of the 1960s, furthermore, television has
become a major transmission belt for socio-cultural investments, reaching already
approximately one-quarter of the world population. A high percentage of the
television programmes in developing countries (especially during prime time) is
imported from a few developed countries. Finally, the international spread of
transnational enterprises and – in their tow – advertising agencies has led to the
direct implantation of socio-cultural bridgeheads in developing countries.
Foreign affiliates introduce their parent corporations' business practices, modes
of operation, corporate organisation and, beyond that, influence the business
culture of the host country. In addition, of course, they make a direct contribution
towards shaping the production apparatus of the host economy, the selection of
products that are produced by it, and the types of process that are used for their
production.

Together, these mechanisms disseminate the values and behavioural patterns of
the main developed market economies and anchor them in the industrial base of
the developing countries. Through them, the developing countries are kept –
intentionally or not – in the socio-cultural orbit of the developed countries.

This is particularly apparent in the area of consumption patterns which do not
reflect the needs and absolute poverty of the developing countries but rather the
wants and relative abundance of the developed countries. To the extent that these
consumption patterns shape the (domestic and foreign components of the)
production apparatus of the developing countries, the issue becomes one of the
proper allocation of scarce resources: should they be used for the establishment of
a production apparatus geared primarily to the consumption wants of the small
upper and upper-middle classes or be used for the establishment of a production
apparatus geared primarily to the satisfaction of the basic needs of large portions
of the population? Under conditions of very scarce resources, the emulation of the
socio-cultural systems and especially the consumption patterns of the rich home

11 See, in this context, Oswaldo Sunkel, "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in
countries means first of all that the provision of basic foodstuffs, health services, clothing, housing, drinking water, education, reliable transportation and the like is neglected. It furthermore means that production processes tend to be utilised which actually may increase unemployement and underemployment; and that, in fact, resources are wasted in products subject to planned obsolescence. Moreover, to the extent that the satisfaction of foreign-oriented consumption wants requires inputs from abroad, continuing dependence on countries and their institutions (especially transnational enterprises) that can provide these inputs remains almost unavoidable.

It is here that the discussions about the NIEO and the NISCO link up again. Although the socio-cultural and the economic dimensions of North-South relations are analytically distinct, they are, in reality, mutually reinforcing, with transnational enterprises in service and manufacturing industries playing a key role in both of them. Thus, economic decolonisation and the choice of an appropriate development path are inseparable from socio-cultural emancipation. Conversely, of course, the establishment of a NISCO cannot be disassociated from changing the economic basis, ie, the establishment of the NIEO. Both have to go hand in hand.

The recognition of the importance of socio-cultural decolonisation and its interrelationship with economic emancipation began at the 1973 Algiers summit of the NACs. To quote from the summit's 'Economic Declaration':

> It is an established fact that the activities of imperialism are not confined solely to the political and economic fields but also cover the cultural and social fields, thus imposing an alien ideological domination over the peoples of the developing world.  

In spite of this broad formulation of the problem, however, the concrete follow-up activities of the Nonaligned Movement had focused to date on one sub-field only, information and mass media. But there they rapidly rose to prominence in a pattern similar to that of the development issue; in fact, the 'establishment of a new international order in the field of information and mass media for the purpose of forging new international relations in general' was explicitly included among the 'essential objectives' of the Nonaligned Movement, as enumerated in the 1979 Havana summit's 'Political Declaration'.

At all times, however, the need for this new order was clearly seen as one aspect of the overall decolonisation process. Thus, the 1976 Ministerial Conference of the NACs on the Press Agencies Pool noted:

> Just as political and economic dependence are legacies of the era of colonialism, so is the case of dependence in the field of information which in turn retards the achievement of political and economic growth. . . . The Conference reaffirmed . . . that the establishment of a New International Order for Information is as necessary as the New International Economic Order.  

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13 In Jankowitch and Savvant, op cit. p 226.
14 ibid. vol V, forthcoming.
15 ibid. pp 1554-5. Similarly, the 'Political Declaration' of the 1976 Colombo summit affirmed: 'A new international order in the fields of information and mass communications is as vital as a new
The NACs took again the lead and established the organisational infrastructure to assure that this subject matter receives continued attention. To achieve the same on the international level, the Nonaligned Movement (as in the case of economic decolonisation) politicised the issue in UNESCO, the main forum in which socio-cultural questions relating to development are being considered. The result has been the establishment of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems ("McBride Commission"), whose mandate was "to study the totality of communication problems in modern society" (with, of course, special attention to the need for a New International Information and Communication Order) and the adoption, by the XXth General Conference of UNESCO in 1978, of the Mass Media Declaration. Furthermore, shortly after the conclusion of UNESCO's XXth General Conference, the UN General Assembly decided to include 'International relations in the sphere of information and mass communications' in the agenda of the 1979 thirty-fourth General Assembly. At that session, the General Assembly established a Committee on Information to promote _lateralia_, the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order.

Thus, as with economic matters, and in a similar process, the highest organ of the UN system has turned its attention to socio-cultural questions. Again, it is not so important that many of the concrete actions that are being sought had already been suggested on earlier occasions, in some instances reaching back to the early 1950s. What is important is that the subject matter has been advanced in a historical context in which its importance and its interrelationships with other aspects of the decolonisation process are clearly recognised, in which the issue is politicised, and in which strong political and economic groups, the Nonaligned Movement and the G77, lend it their support.

Certainly, these efforts have greatly contributed to shifting attention to a dimension of the decolonisation process that has hitherto remained largely ignored. But the problem is broader than the discussions about the New international economic order..."The manipulation and development of national information media is an integral part of the overall struggle for political, economic, and social independence..." (Ibid., p. 78).

16 Ibid., p. 2.


19 General Assembly resolution 38/155 B of 14 December 1978.

20 See, Karile Nordenström, Defining the New International Information Order: parameters, principles and terminology with regard to international relations. Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere, 1980 (mimeo).
International Information and Communication Order lead one to believe. The issue is, as outlined at the beginning of this section, the entire socio-cultural dimension of development and North-South relations. The discussions on the full scope of this dimension, which was recognised by the 1973 Algiers summit, are still outstanding, as are the practical consequences to be drawn. And, what is more, this has to occur at the highest political level.

The Algiers summit represented a 'decisive turning point' for the perception and presentation of economic decolonisation. Perhaps what is needed is a socio-cultural equivalent of the Algiers Declaration and Action Programme in order to set into motion the process of full socio-cultural emancipation.

Conclusions

The reorganisation of the international economic and socio-cultural systems in their North-South dimensions will remain on the international agenda because it is sought by well-organised coalitions of developing countries. It will also remain on the agenda because the integration of the developing countries as equal partners into the international economic and socio-cultural systems are logical steps in the emancipation of these states from colonial subordination. Inevitably, this will transform the existing system. The only question is whether this transformation will require catalytic events, proceed in chaos, and will be accompanied by disruptions and violence; or whether we meet the challenge and keep the tensions that are necessarily associated with such a process of adaptation at a minimum and manage this transformation as rationally, smoothly and speedily as possible.