Clio and Compound Republic

Brent Cebul
Karen Tani
Mason B Williams
Although Martha Derthick has received most recognition for her contributions to political science and government, we argue that her astute accounts of federalism in action offer precisely what historians of American governance need at this moment. This essay highlights several of her contributions: her insistence on seeing the United States as a “compound republic” comprised of multiple levels of authority rather than equating government with the national government; her focus on federalism’s shifting dynamics and concern with demonstrating those dynamics empirically; her dedication to studying “the middle tier” and showing that states gained real power during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they took on functions previously performed by localities; and her attentiveness to the endurance of localism in American politics and policy. Drawing on case studies and recent scholarship, we explain why these insights are vital to historians and suggest how historians’ more thorough incorporation of them could enrich our understanding of key aspects of the American past.

We come to this symposium as three historians of twentieth-century U.S. politics and policy, all owing debts of gratitude to the scholarship of Martha Derthick. Though she has received the most recognition for her contributions to political science and government, we are eager for historians to claim her legacy, as well. In Derthick’s astute accounts of American federalism in action, we see precisely what historians of American governance need at this moment.

This essay highlights several of Derthick’s key contributions. First, Derthick insisted on seeing the United States as a “compound republic,” comprised of multiple levels of official authority, rather than equating the government with the national government. To be sure, she recognized broad changes over time in the actual distribution of power among these levels; but for her, federalism was “a pervasive fact of [American] public life and institutional arrangements,” in every era (Derthick 2001, 67).

Second, Derthick was attuned to federalism’s shifting dynamics and demonstrated those dynamics empirically. Her work showed that federalism operated differently in different time periods and policy arenas, sometimes assuming an
oppositional form, while at other times fostering cooperation and co-dependency. Moreover, she treated almost no federalism dynamic as presumptively illegitimate, understanding that the framers anticipated (and themselves engaged in) strategic uses of federalism’s architecture.

Third, at every stage of her long career, Derthick was dedicated to studying “the middle tier.” Derthick recognized that the states not only enjoyed “a formal and chronological primacy” within the federal system, but also that they gained real power over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as they took on the domestic functions that had once been the province of local governments. Their power grew despite (and sometimes because of) the dramatic exercises of federal power that loom so large in American historiography, and Derthick was committed to seeing how that power operated in practice (Derthick 2001, 44, 46–47).

Fourth, Derthick was attentive to the endurance of localism in American politics and policy, even as Americans increasingly looked to their state and federal governments for the services and protections that local government or voluntary institutions once provided (Derthick 2001, 10). She noted (sometimes wistfully) the erosion of local power, while refusing to treat local, place-based governance as a dusty artifact.

Drawing on case studies and a variety of recent scholarship, we explain why these four insights are (or should be) vital to historians today, and we suggest how historians’ more thorough incorporation of these insights could enrich our understanding of key aspects of the American past.

The United States as a “Compound Republic”

Nearly all scholars of twentieth-century American history, we suspect, would acknowledge that federalism has had a crucial part in American politics and governance. Yet, it is also safe to say that federalism—the structure itself and the dynamics it has fostered—has not received scholarly attention in proportion to its historical significance. In surveys and textbooks, historians frame the key episodes of twentieth-century U.S. political history almost entirely in terms of national political developments. In the scholarly literature, the national government receives outsized attention; non-national studies (even those which shed new light on the national government) risk being written off as “local studies.” In spite of a quarter-century’s worth of efforts to de-center the nation, “the national” remains the default framework for thinking about twentieth-century U.S. political history, its primacy embedded in the very definition of the field itself: “American political history.” The result has been an abundance of research on the federal government,
The outsized place of the national in our treatment of twentieth-century U.S. politics is a product of broad cultural and institutional forces as well as the lingering influence of mid-twentieth-century scholarly frameworks, whose narratives and categories have persisted even after many historians dismissed those frameworks’ core assumptions. But this preoccupation with the national is also symptomatic of our difficulty in thinking conceptually about federalism and the modern American state. There are at least two important dimensions of this problem which historians will need to confront if we are to incorporate federalism more fully into historical political analysis. Derthick’s treatment of the American federal system, and the descriptive approach to federalism in practice that she modeled in her accounts of policy design and implementation, can help us to address both.¹

The first dimension concerns how historians of the twentieth-century United States think about federalism. Bluntly, we tend to mistake federalism as it was used in the twentieth century for the essence of the federal system. Throughout American history, state and local authority has been implicated in efforts to create and maintain white supremacy, in the face of national-level guarantees of equality (albeit ones that the national government often failed to vindicate). In the twentieth century, as national government efforts challenged white supremacy (via more robust civil rights laws, national economic regulation, and so on), federalism was an oft-used tool in opponents’ arsenals. Invoking the principle of federalism, they called for decentralization and local control—calls that contemporaries and later historians alike understood as mere pretexts for preserving racial hierarchy (Mayeux and Tani 2016, 130). By the end of the twentieth century, unfortunately, many historians and most political commentators had grown accustomed to thinking about federalism in these terms. That is, they understood federalism to mean a stark and fixed division of power between the national government and state and local governments. And they understood American federalism to carry with it a preference for decentralization and local control, which in turn implied a preference for (or at least a tolerance of) racial exclusion.²

As Derthick shrewdly notes, however, the framers designed the federal system to be ambiguous as to policy ends; they knew that it would be used strategically—and so it has. Derthick cites Madison’s own shifting position on constitutional questions from the 1780s through the 1820s (Derthick 2001, 3-4). Another example is the politics of “states’ rights” in the age of sectional crisis and Civil War: To be for states’ rights in the late 1840s and early 1850s was to support state-level personal liberty laws; the strongest champions of national-state authority were those who had pushed for the Fugitive Slave Act. Ten years later, the poles had reversed (Glover 2006; Brooks 2016, 29–30; Glass 2014; Benedict 1974). It is not
that past actors had no principled commitment to particular understandings of federalism—only that federalism’s policy implications were indeterminate, and that principled commitments have always coexisted with pragmatic uses of a system that was designed to be used strategically.

Seen in this light, struggles over the proper functions of the various levels of government were not inevitable outgrowths of any uncontestably true or correct view of federalism. They were, and are, a piece of larger struggles over enfranchisement, policy development, and implementation. Using Derthick’s own words (2001, 3), the “positions of leading politicians and the major political parties on the question of centralization versus decentralization have often been determined largely by expediency.” The implication for historians is this: rather than assuming that federalism pointed in particular directions, we should look instead at the variety of ways political actors have used the system, and the (often unintended) consequences those efforts have produced. Once we do so, we are able to see a broader range of ways in which federalism has structured American politics and governance.3

The second problem concerns historians’ conception of “the state.” As the historian Gary Gerstle (2015, 55) has recently noted, the very term “the American state” indicates the influence of European theory which understood the state as “a unitary institution powerfully directed from a political center.” The most important recent work on the history of the American state has deconstructed this “Weberian” model of the state, often in terms that call attention to the importance of subnational governments (e.g., Novak 2008; Balogh 2015). Yet in spite of these conceptual advances, and despite a number of excellent studies of subnational politics and governance, we still have difficulty thinking about federalism, subnational governments, and intergovernmental relations as core features of the American state. As a consequence, Gerstle (2015, 55) writes, few accounts of the American state “know what to do” with non-national governments (see also Tani 2016, 16).

Derthick’s treatment of the American regime as a “compound republic” may help historians move beyond these conceptual obstacles. For Derthick, the system of government at the core of the American state was neither “unitary” nor purely “federal” (akin to what had existed under the Articles of Confederation), but rather a mix of the two. The United States was neither one political community nor many. Rather, the framers of the Constitution had crafted a complicated and ambiguous institutional ensemble which allowed Americans to be “both one great nation and many relatively quite small, local communities” (Derthick 2001, 10).

The framers believed (and Derthick agreed) that such an ambiguous structure would facilitate an accommodation between the benefits of centralization and the merits of local democracy, allowing Americans to reconcile “competing conceptions of liberty” (Derthick 1999, 8).
Intentions aside, the regime the founders created was (as Derthick put it) “inherently unstable,” the division of power within it “constantly changing” (Derthick 2001, 138). For that reason, she argued, a proper understanding of the federal system had to attend not only to the theories and doctrines that divided authority between levels of the American government, but also to the ever-changing practical relationships between governments and political communities. And a proper understanding of American politics had to grapple with the resulting “dilemmas of scale”—a phrase intended to capture the tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities at the heart of this unstable American regime. For Derthick (1999, 9), this conceptual understanding of America’s compound republic served as the starting point for her primary task: “the empirical task of showing how dilemmas of scale and the definition of political community have entered into politics and policymaking in the United States, both historically and presently.” To phrase the point slightly differently, a Derthickian approach to the history of the American state would be a history of relationships—between polities, and between dimensions of what might be called a compound state.

The Dynamism of American Federalism

Turning now to Derthick’s descriptive accounts of federalism in action, we see three relational dynamics by which the plural nature of the American polity shaped the content of governance. We also note a fourth dynamic, which Derthick did not explicitly name, but which follows naturally from her insights. Historians have not been attentive to all of these dynamics. As we discuss in more detail at the end of this section, however, an emergent cohort of scholars is fast making amends.

The first dynamic might be called oppositional federalism, a scenario in which the political agency of one (set of) government(s) serves to impede the political will of others. One variant of this dynamic is deeply familiar to historians of twentieth-century American politics: non-national governments functioning as a drag on national authority. Thomas Sugrue’s (2003) survey of the influence of local administration on New Deal and Great Society programs offers an especially insightful case in point. Historians have found similar processes at work in the history of Prohibition and (more tentatively) the War on Drugs (McGirr 2015; Lassiter 2015). More broadly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the reining in of state police powers in the 1950s and 1960s—the primary theme of Gerstle’s treatment of the states—also represent an instance of oppositional federalism (Gerstle 2015, ch. 9). In cases like these, federalism really is a zero-sum game.

In other instances—and here we arrive at the second dynamic—national and non-national governance and state-building projects have been co-dependent. By design or happenstance, the strengths of different levels of governments have paired
in such a way as to advance a shared project of governance (though, to be sure, rarely in an even fashion). This is the realm of cooperative federalism. Historically, this variety of federalism often resulted from the national government’s efforts to move into policy areas previously dominated by states and localities. Cooperative relationships formed not only because the national government was incapable of fully displacing local authority, but also because it needed to borrow strength from other levels in order to achieve its objectives. In other instances, this has occurred when the national government sought to build non-national capacity where none had previously existed, as in the areas of poor relief administration and infrastructure, to be discussed below. In rare cases, a complete unity of purpose between governments may obtain in such arrangements. But as Derthick has shown, the normal condition has been one of tension, and the terms of the relationship, “as if the terms of a treaty,” a continual subject of “negotiation” (Derthick 1970a, 209).5

Derthick’s work also alerts us to a third dynamic: compensatory federalism, or instances in which central-state weakness or dysfunction leads to innovation at non-national levels (Derthick 2010). This dynamic is clearly visible in contemporary American governance. We see it, for example, in immigration policy, economic development strategies, environmental policy, and abortion rights restrictions. Historically, we see it in state-level fair employment laws: when the push for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee bogged down, civil rights leaders took the campaign to the states (Chen 2009). It is apparent, too, in the mobilization of non-national officials as a lobbying force. Mayors, governors, and other state actors have used their distinctive forms of political capital to try to address what they perceive as inadequate national governance, often pointing both to their own, compensatory efforts as well as to the ultimate insufficiency of those efforts (Haider 1974; Flanagan 1999).

Finally, we note a fourth federalism dynamic—one which does not appear in Derthick’s scholarship, but which builds logically upon her relational approach to the subject. This is a scenario in which changes at one level of government reorganize the constellation of forces contending for power at other levels, thereby reshaping the political landscape in ways that transcend any one particular policy area. Richard Valelly’s account of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party in the 1920s and 1930s offers a particularly stark case in point. By “disarrang[ing] the politics of state-level radicalism,” Valelly (1989, xv) writes, the national New Deal “organized a type of politics out of the American regime, closing off the possibilities for America to handle certain questions of material welfare and political participation in a decentralized way.” Heather Ann Thompson (2010) has made a related argument about the impact of the carceral state upon late-twentieth-century urban/labor politics: by disenfranchising some citizens and bolstering the representation of
others, mass incarceration has reshaped power at all levels of government, with political consequences that we are only beginning to understand.

Engagement with these various federalism dynamics, so prominent in Derthick’s work, is a unifying and underappreciated theme of some of the best recent work in American political history. One especially rich vein of scholarship charts how particular groups of national policymakers have defeated their opponents by channeling authority to non-national governments more likely than the national government to govern in line with their own preferences. Building on a large literature on race and the New Deal welfare state, Ira Katznelson (2005; see also Katznelson 2013) has shown how the southern wing of the New Deal coalition used local administration to build a racially stratified system of social insurance, labor regulation, and human-capital investment. Suzanne Mettler (1998) and others have shown how divisions between national and non-national government structured a gendered welfare state. We are used to thinking of these stories as evidence of the limits of the American national state. But perhaps we should think of them, instead, as instances in which state-builders across the scales of the compound republic deployed federalism to create and preserve a white-supremacist and patriarchal national state.

A more recent body of research looks at the ways in which national and non-national state-building efforts have been mutually implicated—and the ripple effects these efforts produced, often ending in contested or fragmented governance. Gail Radford (2013) has charted the efforts of federal policymakers to encourage the development of public authorities as a way of building planning and fiscal capacity in the area of economic development, helping to reorder local politics and governance in the process. Two of the present authors (Cebul and Williams) have treated New Deal statebuilding as a process in which the national government empowered local governments as a way of building auxiliary state capacity and legitimizing the extension of federal authority. In doing so, they argue, the New Deal amplified the governing capacity of local elites and thereby facilitated the reconstruction of local governance and political economies. This federalism-centered version of the New Deal story reveals that “urban liberalism” and “Sunbelt conservativism” were not as conceptually distinct as historians have treated them, but in fact products of the same state-building processes (Cebul forthcoming; Williams 2013; Cebul and Williams 2015).

The value of the Derthickian approach extends well beyond the New Deal state, however. Two additional examples indicate how Derthick’s insights could help historians better understand key developments in more recent American history. One is the making of the “carceral state,” which is the subject of perhaps the most vibrant and fast-growing literature in twentieth-century American history. Scholars of the carceral state, more than twentieth-century U.S. historians generally, are calling attention to the contours of the compound republic—as one would expect,
given the longstanding role of state and local governments in the policy areas of criminal justice and policing. The advent of the War on Crime and the War on Drugs in the 1960s and 1970s, these scholars are finding, unsettled older divisions of authority, but in complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways. Recent work by Elizabeth Hinton (2016), for example, has shown that the national project of governing-through-crime required building the capacities of state and local institutions such as courts, prisons, and police forces—which the federal government did through grants and other incentives and forms of assistance (see also Simon 2007). But local states retained a degree of agency: When New York State enacted the highly punitive Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973, a key moment in the War on Drugs, the New York Police Department responded with a policy of non-enforcement toward street-level drug markets, effectively refusing to implement the policing policy implied by the Rockefeller Laws (Williams n.d.). By the mid-1980s, though, many cities had implemented “quality of life” policing practices of a piece with the national War on Crime and War on Drugs—and, indeed, were pushing the national government for additional support, arguing that their cooperative efforts gave them the right to demand more of the national government. As late as 1988, big-city mayors were assailing Reagan’s war on drugs as “grossly underfunded” (Black Enterprise 1988, 29).

This emerging body of research raises big new questions—further suggesting the value of a Derthickian approach. What is the relationship between the intergovernmental dynamics that Hinton has surfaced and broader issues of economic structure that appear to be so tightly bound up with the carceral state, namely, the segmented development of the post-New Deal era and the “neoliberal” patterns of the late twentieth century? What has been the significance of carceral-state-driven political disenfranchisement (both formal and informal) to the composition of local, state, and national political communities and their respective powers? (for scholarship that poses these important questions, see Manza and Uggen 2006; Thompson 2010; Lerman and Weaver 2014). Existing scholarship makes clear that national economic policy, changes in fiscal federalism, and federal grants-in-aid have encouraged non-national officials to pursue some policies and have made it more difficult to pursue others. But it will take more detailed political analysis to understand how these pieces fit together.

A second example, too recent to be the subject of extensive historical scholarship but of obvious historical significance, is the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the signature domestic policy of Barack Obama’s presidency. Since at least the 1940s, state and local governments have engaged in compensatory efforts to fill the space created by the absence of a national insurance system; one such effort, the system of individual mandates that Massachusetts put into place in 2006, served as a model for the ACA (Jacobs and Skocpol 2016, 6, 90–91). As enacted in 2010, the ACA envisioned a mixture of oppositional and cooperative federalism. The law
essentially required states to expand Medicaid eligibility (a state’s failure to do so could result in loss of its entire Medicaid grant, at a time when states were already deeply invested in the Medicaid program). But the law also allowed for flexibility in how state-level insurance exchanges would be designed and administered, creating space for innovative states to bring their own capabilities and preferences to bear on the ACA’s administration (Bulman-Pozen 2014).

Then, just as the law was coming into operation, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced still another federalism dynamic. In *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius*, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate, but it also deemed Congress’s Medicaid expansion scheme to be an unconstitutional exercise of the spending power. With the removal of the strong financial disincentive, state-level oppositional federalism abounded. Nineteen states refused to expand Medicaid, thereby undercutting a key component of the ACA (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016). In short, the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the meaning of the ACA by changing the mix of federalism dynamics that governed its development during crucial early years.

It remains to be seen how these dynamics will play out in the long term. But these examples illustrate the basic point we wish to make: A Derthickian sensibility helps us to understand some of the biggest governance stories of recent American history—and, indeed, of our own time.

**Rediscovering the Importance of the Middle Tier**

Derthick’s attention to the compound nature of American government went hand-in-hand with close study of the fate of each governmental tier. She was particularly insistent that scholars not neglect the states, even as she recognized the importance of the national-level changes that have so preoccupied historians.

Derthick’s approach to the states stemmed in part from her understanding of the U.S. Constitution and the governmental arrangements that the founding generation preferred. But Derthick’s commitment to the “middle tier” was also a result of her astute observations about the way that power actually operated during different eras. She saw how states gained power over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as they took on governmental functions that had once been the province of localities or private associations (Derthick 2001, 14–17). She also recognized how an empowered national government sometimes also empowered the states, because of the mismatch between federal legislators’ ambitions and national administrative capacity. Where states have shouldered the administrative burden of federal policies, critics have often seen conscription and coercion, but Derthick recognized the opportunities that this burden created—opportunities to mold federal policies to state preferences (Derthick 2010; Derthick 2001, 61-64). One of her most contrarian observations was that the decisions of the Warren Court—often
described as a coercive, nationalizing force—pushed in this direction. As the Court vindicated national rights and appeared to augment the federal government’s power, states gained power, as well, Derthick argued. Judicial suspicion of local decisionmaking (in policing, education, and other realms) created a vacuum; by default, state-level decisionmaking often filled it (Derthick 2001, 17–29).

In history departments, states have provoked less interest, to our collective detriment. Authors of state-based histories have tended to sell them as microcosms of larger, national stories or harbingers of larger-scale trends (e.g., Cohen 2003, Brilliant 2010). To the extent that states figure into national histories, they often appear as one-dimensional foils for national state-builders or vehicles for parochialism and bigotry. These characterizations—which the great federalism historian Harry Scheiber has described as the general view of “New Deal liberal[s]”—are not without some basis in reality (Scheiber 1995, 437). Well into the twentieth century, many state legislatures remained a stronghold for rural interests, and inhospitable terrain for activist liberal reformers. States also offered only a weak commitment to New Deal reforms, and, in well-known cases, staunch resistance to racial integration and equality (Weir 2005; Patterson 1969). This jaundiced view of state government has contributed to historians’ neglect of the complicated practical workings of the “middle tier,” including its ability to facilitate outcomes that advanced such agendas as racial equality and more robust regulation of business.7

That said, there are notable exceptions to this historiographical trend, worth flagging as models of a Derthickian approach. One is Jon Teaford’s The Rise of the States (2002), which explores the evolution of state government between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth. Teaford (2002, 6–7), who to that point had been known as an urban historian, drew on his knowledge of road-building, public finance, and the lawmaking process (among other aspects of governance) to describe how state and federal policymakers steadily “curbed the authority of local, partisan amateurs and moved responsibility up the governmental ladder to state capitals.”8 The apparent resurgence of the states in the late twentieth century, he argued, was in fact a product of a much longer process.

Synthetic in nature, The Rise of the States could be faulted for glossing over variations among the states and declining to dive deeply into every relevant policy area.9 Tracy Steffes’s more recent book School, Society, and State (2011) exemplifies the virtues of the latter, and, again, offers a model of the kind of historical insights to be gained from a Derthickian approach to state-level authority. Through a careful study of state and local policymaking and administration, Steffes tracks the expanding role of public elementary and secondary education in American governance in the early twentieth century. Of particular note, for our purposes, are her findings on the variety of state-level interventions that “subtly reshaped and circumscribed local control,” while maintaining the impression that education was
a community affair (Steffes 2011, 3). These ranged from accreditation policies to compulsory attendance laws, but in all cases, they served to augment the power of state government, while also laying the foundation for greater federal intervention in subsequent decades. These insights, in turn, shed light on the contemporary American state, which appears to be both centralized and decentralized, deferential to community preferences and committed to uniform standards.

The historical subfield that perhaps best exemplifies the promise of a Derthickian approach to the “middle tier,” however, is that of public welfare policy and administration—to which we devote the remainder of this section. Derthick wrote about this topic herself, most notably in *The Influence of Federal Grants*, but this classic has yet to attract a wide readership among historians.

Historical writing on public welfare currently encompasses two distinct bodies of research: one on “the old poor law,” by which historians generally refer to the highly localized public relief systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a second on the national-level reforms of the twentieth century, including the New Deal and the War on Poverty. Both bodies of research have tended to emphasize the darker aspects of public welfare: the “old poor law” subjected the poor to localized forms of discrimination, surveillance, morals regulation, and labor discipline; later national-level reforms incorporated, rather than rooted out, these traditions, despite the best efforts of poor people and their advocates. Meanwhile, Derthick’s “middle tier” has suffered from neglect, even as historians recognize states’ formidable role in the post-1996 welfare reform landscape.

Paying attention to the “middle tier” demands a merging of the “old poor law” stream of scholarship with the federal welfare state stream, and results in a reconsideration of one of historians’ stock characterizations of New Deal-era welfare reform. For decades, historians have portrayed these reforms as essentially federal subsidies for traditional local programs, implemented with little federal oversight and even less federal enthusiasm (in contrast to the federal government’s path-breaking Old-Age Insurance initiative). This interpretation has a basis in truth. New Deal public assistance programs, which provided income support to the elderly, the blind, and fatherless children, did rely on the architecture of local poor relief operations. In their design, these programs also showed great solicitude for other tiers of government, most notably in the lack of a federally proscribed “floor” for public assistance payments. (Powerful Southern senators made clear that a national minimum would be an unacceptable infringement on their states’ treasuries and their citizens’ ways of life.) But these programs also demanded significant structural changes—with vast impacts on the “middle tier.” For example, as a condition of accepting federal grants, states agreed that a central state agency would supervise or administer directly the new public assistance programs. In other words, states could not simply pass federal dollars on to the local bodies that had traditionally cared for the poor. And if they lacked the necessary
administrative machinery, states had to create it from scratch. Other federal grant conditions included uniform, state-wide rules and procedures; systems for state-level reviews of local benefit decisions; and, after 1939, personnel standards for state and local welfare workers (i.e., the use of a merit system). All of these requirements demanded inward and upward shifts in the locus of decisionmaking power (Coll 1995; Derthick 1970a; Tani 2016). Many states, to be sure, were already moving in these directions (and federal policymakers explicitly drew on their experience), but none had taken all the steps that federal law now incentivized.

To say that state officials agreed to federal conditions does not, of course, mean that states immediately transformed into the partners that federal law envisioned. In many cases, state officials said what they needed to say to obtain federal funds, but struggled (or outright refused) to implement the required changes (Stevenson 1938; Lansdale et al. 1939; McKinley and Frase 1970; Patterson 1969; Derthick 1970a; Coll 1995; Stein-Roggenbuck 2008; Tani 2016). Over the next few decades, however, state welfare agencies actually did (to varying degrees) become the kind of governmental units that New Deal reformers had demanded. By the early 1960s, when national-level policymakers began to contemplate another major change to the public welfare system, state welfare operations looked much like their federal counterpart. Though often headed by political appointees, they were staffed with experts and professionals. They maintained manuals of state-wide rules, and had mechanisms for distributing and interpreting those rules to their local counterparts. The day-to-day work of administering public assistance continued to take place at the local level, but states had much more authority over local decision-making than ever before and were growing accustomed to wielding it (Derthick 1970a; Tani 2016).

Many of these observations are ones that Derthick herself made in her writing on public assistance in Massachusetts, where federally subsidized state welfare programs contended with an extraordinarily robust tradition of local government. With a historian’s tool kit and sensibilities, however, it is possible to extend these lines of inquiry in new directions, tracing out unanticipated consequences and impacts on real people. For example, one outgrowth of greater state-level authority and diminished local responsibility was a transformation in the meaning and material content of state citizenship. One of us (Tani) has explored this phenomenon in the Southwest, in the context of American Indians’ efforts to secure greater economic security while also preserving the right to govern themselves. Tani shows how representatives of various Pueblo and Apache tribes, among others, leveraged their new rights under state law, along with the oversight machinery of the federal government, to win state welfare benefits from Arizona and New Mexico. Simultaneously, they resisted the *quid pro quo* that states demanded: expanded jurisdiction to police and regulate life on Indian reservations. The result was a new and unusual configuration of rights and obligations, some
flowing from Indians’ status as federal “wards,” others from their federal and state citizenship, and still others from their membership in ostensibly sovereign nations (Tani 2015).12

Another under-explored outgrowth of the “rise of the states” in this context is the way that it both constrained and enabled anti-welfarism in the late twentieth century. Consider, on the one hand, the fate of the infamous thirteen-point welfare reform plan advanced in Newburgh, New York, in 1961. When Newburgh’s zealous city manager promised to discipline the city’s welfare recipients by cutting off women who bore children out of wedlock, placing time limits on relief, and replacing cash payments with vouchers, state authorities easily shut the plan down (even if some officials agreed with its thrust). Newburgh and other once-autonomous localities had become thoroughly enmeshed in a state welfare system; they had to adhere to state rules (Tani 2016, 1-7).

But consider, on the other hand, the impact on poor Americans when state authorities themselves committed to thinning out the rolls and enforcing morality. Around the same time as the Newburgh episode, Louisiana removed 22,500 children from its welfare rolls, all within mere months of implementing a new “suitable home” policy. “Suitable home” policies were essentially vehicles for evaluating the morality of poor mothers and denying assistance to those who appeared to be engaging in non-marital sex. Other states did the same and achieved similar results, thanks in part to the reach of their now-robust state welfare bureaucracies (Levenstein 2000; Lansdale 1962).13 Federal officials could and did object, marshalling the power of the purse and the language of federal law, but by the mid-twentieth century, it was clear that states had the tools to be powerful adversaries. Encouraged to develop their own administrative capacities, they had also gained sophistication and expertise, strengths that state officials readily deployed in negotiations with their federal benefactor (Tani 2016).14

**Toward New Histories of Localism**

While political historians often overlook the “middle tier,” the same is not true of the local level. Local case studies have formed the bedrock of many historical sub-disciplines. And yet despite this attention to “the local,” historians have largely neglected localism—the belief that certain civic cultures or roles of governance are best nurtured and carried out at the local level. We attribute this neglect to the same trends outlined earlier in this essay. Historians of the twentieth-century United States have tended to fixate on national reforms, electoral outcomes, policy developments, and judicial rulings, a tendency that dates at least to Robert Wiebe’s influential 1967 work, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920*. Within this framework, the local case study evolved as a powerful way to understand the origins of national reforms (e.g., Cohen 1990), or, less frequently, as crucial context for understanding
processes by which federal policies were undermined or transformed by local actors (e.g., Crespino 2007).

This construction of the local and of localism is not so much incorrect as incomplete. To use Derthick’s (2001, 23) words, “[t]he dominant tendency in American political development” was, indeed, “centralization of the federal system,” but as she noted in the same breath, there were “often ambiguities in the change.” Local governments did not simply become extensions of the central-state government, but rather maintained important governmental powers. And localism did not disappear. The implication for scholarship is clear: studying the local might well be a useful way of understanding the doings of the national government, but we should also be alert to the ever-changing relationship between the central and the local and to the ways in which invocations of localism affected the patterns and practices of governance.

Derthick’s understanding of the New Deal is a case in point. To many scholars, the New Deal is “patient zero” for explaining the rise of centralized government. Derthick (2001, 124), however, reminded her readers that Franklin Roosevelt was deeply “sympathetic to the institution” of federalism “and was simultaneously and deliberately both a centralizer and decentralizer.” She interpreted New Deal policies similarly—as reciprocally hedged investments in localism and centralism. In doing so, she was ahead of her time. Despite one leading historian’s call to attend to the “persistence of localism” in the twentieth century (his notes are studded with references to Derthick’s work), historians have only slowly illuminated the New Deal state’s effective use of localism (Sugrue 2003). We are just beginning to benefit from more nuanced, Derthickian, understandings of how the New Deal state cultivated, depended upon, and updated localism—in housing and slum clearance programs, welfare and unemployment benefits, civil rights initiatives, and public works and development projects (e.g., Radford 1996; Katzenelson 2005; Smith 2009; Chen 2009; Williams 2013; Tani 2016; Cebul forthcoming). Indeed, as federal resources poured into local governing bodies, public officials, business elites, and citizens all looked with fresh eyes upon the capabilities of their local institutions, effectively localizing the national state’s power and authority.15 The result is a changed understanding of New Deal state building: its legitimacy owed much to the marriage of capacity, interest, and consent made possible by creatively melding federalism and localism.

Derthick brought similar insights to a range of policy areas, including housing and education (e.g., Derthick 1970b). With regard to these areas and others, she was particularly attentive to the interplay between federalism and the governmental powers that continue to belong largely to municipal jurisdictions. She noted how better off Americans “use[d] their freedom to congregate in communities that suit[ed] their tastes,” and then “use[d] the power of local governments to protect their property values and lifestyles” (Derthick 2001, 84). This, in turn, shaped the
character and dispersal of federal social policies. These very insights are now at the core of a flourishing subfield of political history: institutionally informed urban history, which has undergone a “spatial turn” through the incorporation of suburban and metropolitan frameworks (e.g., Kruse and Sugrue 2006).  

Where else might historians benefit from a Derthickian approach to the local and localism? In what follows, we explore one fertile area: the history of urban renewal, one of the signal programs of midcentury “big government” liberalism.

The urban renewal program is often remembered as one in which ruthless planners like Robert Moses constructed massive housing projects and destroyed neighborhoods with the aid of the “federal bulldozer” (in Martin Anderson’s [1964] influential, if flawed, critique). Yet, as conceptualized by New Deal economist Alvin Hansen and Federal Reserve advisor Guy Greer, urban renewal drew upon profoundly localist rationale. It was also based upon their understandings of New Deal redevelopment and planning efforts taking off across the country, which were already blending the capacities and interests not only of the local and national states but also of local public and private sector elites. For Hansen (1943, 70), the program held great promise to give cities more authority in relation to the states in order to “control the use of their land areas” through locally based powers of zoning and eminent domain. Greer, meanwhile, was especially attuned to the differing fiscal capacities of governments within the federal system. He argued that short of “a nation-wide overhauling of our traditional arrangements for taxation and public expenditures” that might enable local government to tax income at greater rates, the federal government quite literally owed it to local governments to assist with the redevelopment that would boost their property tax revenues (Greer 1948).  

In other words, we cannot understand the genesis of urban renewal without being attuned to the historical appeal of localism and of national-local dynamics that Derthick’s work explored.

Nor can we understand what happened next: a bonanza of locally driven, federally funded redevelopment schemes. Urban renewal extended the New Deal’s model of blended capacities—federal–local, and public–private—well into the post-war United States. As local elites pulled federal funds into their communities, eventually pursuing some 4,000 projects, many framed the massive program in terms of their private sector, localist worldviews. As an attorney hired to vet the legislation explained to the Portland, Oregon chamber of commerce, “There need be no fear that federal co-operation on these problems entails surrender of self-decision or local and private initiative” (The Oregonian 1955). Portland’s chamber, like hundreds of others across the country, plunged enthusiastically into the program. Through local policy feedbacks first generated by the New Deal’s decentralized associationalism, urban renewal quickly constituted a key plank in liberals’ construction of a postwar “businessman’s utopia” of public–private, local–national partnerships (Bloom 2000). As historian Samuel Zipp (2010, 25) has
argued, a number of liberals even considered renewal a potent “weapon” in “the Cold War struggle for hearts and minds.” “Public/private urban renewal,” Zipp contends, “could operate as a potential immunization against the threat, a way to beat the Soviets at their own game” of economic planning. Far from an incursion against elites’ local prerogatives, then, the program amplified and modernized local public and private capacities—albeit often at heavy costs to marginalized constituencies and beneath rationale that could have as much to do with Cold War nationalism as urban revitalization (see e.g., Connolly 2014; Rubin 2012).

Despite billions of dollars spent and thousands of minority Americans disproportionately dislocated, urban renewal failed to assuage the crisis of urban land values and forge sustainable local tax yields. Once again, a Derthickian approach explains why local governments continue to this day to doggedly pursue highly regressive forms of revenue: particularly property taxes, sales taxes, and punitive fees and fines, as the Department of Justice’s investigation of Ferguson, Missouri’s Police Department powerfully indicated (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). That the federal government enjoys a superior fiscal position through its dominance of the income tax (and its ability to incur debt), ensures subnational governments, particularly those with declining economic bases, remain junior partners in the system of fiscal federalism (Peterson 1981; Monkkonen 1995).

The urban renewal example is also useful in addressing one important limitation of Derthick’s approach to the local and the localism, which we flag as a note of caution for historians seeking to follow her lead. Derthick had a normative commitment to the local but did not specifically interrogate who constituted the local. Phrased differently, she generally did not ask whose opportunities localism supported, and whose it did not. Derthick’s construction of the local and of localism was implicitly majoritarian. So too were many programs that blended local and national capacity into the big government localism that characterized much of twentieth-century liberalism and which, perhaps not coincidentally, escaped Derthick’s criticism, thanks to their decentralization.20

Here we come once more to urban renewal. Local and national elites’ prerogatives favored a particular vision of redevelopment—a vision that was profoundly undemocratic, geared toward middle class concerns, and often baldly racist. As one 1965 analyst of the program put it, elites’ definition of blight was “simply that ‘this land is too good for these people.’” (quoted in Pritchett 2003, 21). Nearly two decades before urban renewal had begun, the NAACP raised an alarm about the decentralized powers the New Deal state was unleashing in communities across the country. The ubiquity of local control, an NAACP report found, made it essential that “efficient and capable Negroes be employed on the board and administrative and supervisory staffs of every department of the Federal Government, and in every locality of the country in which a Federal program is launched.”21 The kind of guarantees that the NAACP sought made Derthick uneasy
(because of the way they meddled in local, majoritarian democracy), and that unease is problematic. The absence of such measures ensured that, whatever value localism offered the administration of federal policies, their benefits and costs were meted out in deeply uneven and discriminatory ways.22

**Concluding Remarks**

We hope that we have done justice here to Martha Derthick’s extraordinary body of work. To us, three historians, her work teaches that the best way to map the exercise of political power in the twentieth-century United States and after is by attending to multiple scales of governance and practices of democracy. This will not be easy, but we must try. We should also heed Martha Derthick’s concerns about a polity evermore focused on (and frustrated by) national, centralized government. When scholars uncritically adopt that focus, our analysis suffers, as does the activism and policy development that might flow from our work.

We also hope that we have convinced more historians to pull up a chair at the federalism table, now populated mainly by scholars of political science and public law. The intergovernmental dynamics that so captivated Derthick have played out in complicated, nuanced, and often counter-intuitive ways. They have also intersected with social, economic, and cultural structures, in ways that historians are uniquely well-suited to explore. We have offered examples of twentieth-century American political history that builds (sometimes tacitly) upon Derthick’s insights, while also foregrounding the historian’s attention to contingency, unintended consequences, and ground-level impacts on real people. More work in this vein will be vital to the study of American governance, for we are convinced that Derthick is right: the United States was, and still is, a compound republic. The full implications of this multiplicity remain to be discovered.

**Notes**

The authors thank Maeve Glass, Elena Schneider, and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and critique.

1. Harry Scheiber (1975, 1978, 1980, 1996) is an example of a historian who has consistently taken this approach and whose older work ought to be revisited, alongside Derthick’s.

2. To be clear, there are times when it is appropriate to understand American federalism as a considered choice about the division of power between the national government and state and local governments. Much of the literature on the origins of American federalism adopts that approach (e.g., Greene 2011). Our critique is of historians who perceive that division of power as starker and more fixed than the framers intended it.
to be and who unreflectively associate federalism with the policy preferences of
twentieth-century federalism champions.
3. In addition to looking at Derthick’s work for inspiration, historians might fruitfully
draw upon legal scholars, some of whom have worked hard to push the definition of
federalism away from conventional binaries and fixed allocations of power (e.g., Resnik
4. This should be understood as distinct from “dual federalism,” which presumed the
existence of relatively differentiated spheres of authority (Corwin 1950).
5. Although historians have devoted scant attention to this dynamic, recent historical work
by political scientist Kimberley Johnson (2006) suggests how much remains to be seen
and how our conception and periodization of the modern American state might change
if we were more alert to cooperative technologies and arrangements.
6. Historians would also do well to consult a political science literature (especially Miller
2008) on the role of federalism in shaping the politics of crime.
7. We have focused here on trends in twentieth-century U.S. historiography. For an
account of how and why states disappeared as a unit of analysis among historians of
nineteenth-century America, see Glass 2014, 1029–42.
8. An older exception to the trend we have identified is Patterson 1969 and related
literature on “little New Deals.” As Teaford (2002, 3) notes, however, these works in
fact privileged the federal level, by anchoring states’ significance primarily in their
“react[ion] to the federal overlord.” More recent exceptions, omitted from our
discussion but not for lack of importance, include Sribnick 2008; Fein 2008; Edwards
2009.
9. Reviewers also critiqued the book’s relative inattention to race and limited exploration
of the obstacles that states faced (Gais 2003; Donohue 2004).
10. Michael B. Katz deserves credit for synthesizing these bodies of work. But he, too, often
emphasized the endurance of “old poor law” assumptions (e.g., Katz 1986; 1989).
11. Important exceptions include Krainz 2005; Stein-Roggenbuck 2008. These books do not
appear to have made their way into the welfare history canon, unfortunately.
12. Other examples include Tani 2016; Minoff 2013, both of which explore the legal and
political ramifications of substituting state residence for local settlement as a basic
welfare eligibility requirement.
13. On the similar impact of “substitute father” policies, which states turned to when
federal officials prohibited the use of “suitable home” rules, see Lefkovitz 2011.
14. This is an example of illiberalism on the part of state officials, but as Derthick would
likely note, these same state capacities could be deployed by liberal state officials to
contest conservative federal policy.
15. Michael Mann (1984) termed the filtering of state power through alternative
institutions, actors, and scales “infrastructural power.”
16. Historians in this subfield could benefit from even greater attention to Derthick’s work.
While Derthick always understood these processes to be in dynamic coevolution—
tergovernmental structures, local institutions, and federal policies—much of the
spatially informed urban-historical literature still travels unidirectional lines: it follows a
federal law or policy into a locality, or traces the emergence of social, political, or
spatial dynamics that have been particularly formative for national political developments (e.g., busing-based desegregation). Rare is the historical work that engages sustained policy analysis between the local and national and back again or that traces the role of localism in shaping these policies and political cultures.

17. Greer (1948, 196, 199–200) framed the matter in terms of equity: “the people and business concerns of the urban communities have been paying almost all the taxes collected by the federal government . . . with strictly limited tax resources left for the local governments’ own expenditures” for essential projects like redevelopment. Thus, “it seems only fair that the federal government should aid the local governments to the extent necessary to cover their urgently needed outlays.” See also Hansen and Greer 1941; Pritchett 2003. This rationale for national support of local fiscal autonomy was echoed in the Nixon administration’s General Revenue Sharing, a program designed by Derthick’s friend and Brookings Institution colleague, Richard Nathan. On Nathan’s sense of revenue sharing in the broad sweep of fiscal federal relations, see Nathan 1975.

18. Urban Renewal is often thought of as a big city program, but civic leaders in small cities enthusiastically pursued the funds and eventually won a preponderance of the grants. A majority of the projects were in cities with populations of 50,000 or fewer, and majority of that total were in cities of 25,000 or fewer. Figures compiled from Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Administration, “Urban Renewal Project Characteristics” Reports, 1956 through 1964; and Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Urban Renewal Directory” Reports, 1962–1974.

19. To be sure, renewal programs often ended in acrimony and frustration, and national organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed the program from the outset. But local elites’ ire was most often directed at federal regulations and contestation over plans by local minority or civil rights groups, not the fact of federal spending. As the Nixon administration brought Urban Renewal to an end, it partnered with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as well as local chambers to explain the benefits of the new program created with the newly deregulated funds, Community Development Block Grants. Nixon invited local private sector elites to take a leading role in administering the program. See, specifically, The Better Communities Act, *U.S. Chamber of Commerce Newsletter*, August 1973, box 5, series II, US Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware; Cebul forthcoming, ch. 5.

20. Derthick (1972, xv) implicitly lauded the New Deal and postwar development programs, when she argued that Lyndon Johnson’s “new towns” program failed because it “was an unsuccessful attempt at centralized action in a governmental system that remained extremely decentralized more than a generation after the New Deal and two decades after World War II.”


22. There is a lesson here for a new generation of social scientists who have updated Derthick’s optimistic assessment of the local and of localism (e.g., Katz and Bradley
2014), particularly in the context of today’s chronically paralyzed national political institutions. As the NAACP’s cautionary words suggest, centralization alone did not drive the enervation of local institutions or authorize undemocratic practices. Local asymmetries of power and political disfranchisement were built into federal programs and can matter just as much for Americans’ disengagement with the political process today.

References


Bloom, Nicholas Dagen. 2000. Merchant of illusion: James Rouse, America’s salesman of the businessman’s Utopia. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.


The Oregonian. 1955. *Hurdles to center in blighted area seen*. April 1.


