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Revolt Against the Czars: Why Barack Obama’s Staffing Critics Are (Mostly) Wrong
Presidency Research Group Report (2010)
  • José D. Villalobos, University of Texas at El Paso
  • Justin S. Vaughn, Cleveland State University

Rather than view the alleged proliferation of “czars” in recent presidential administrations as a threat to the constitutional order, we consider it part of an ongoing reorganization of the presidential branch designed to maximize leadership capacity as presidents continue to take more responsibility for policy development and implementation, a phenomenon driven as much by congressional abdication as presidential zeal for power. The real debate lies over whether the president can delegate his constitutional authority to those who work beneath him. We posit that presidents may choose to delegate within their own discretion, so long as it is within the limits put forward by the constitution.

  • Czar,
  • Presidential Appointments,
  • Executive Branch,
  • Appointments Clause,
  • Congressional oversight
Publication Date
Spring 2010
Citation Information
José D. Villalobos and Justin S. Vaughn. "Revolt Against the Czars: Why Barack Obama’s Staffing Critics Are (Mostly) Wrong" Presidency Research Group Report Vol. 32 (2010)
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