SYMPOSIUM InCOMPLETE CONTRACTS: JUDICIAL RESPONSES, TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND LITIGATION STRATEGIESCASE WESTERN LAW REVIEW (2005)
AbstractScholars working in the law-and-economics tradition have suggested that courts should use a hypothetical bargain approach to incompleteness, filling in terms that are optimal (efficient) and that the parties themselves would have achieved were it not for the transaction costs.While the authors in this Symposium draw on this traditional economic analysis of contracts, they explore new insights from economics and “economic contract theory”that complicate the analysis of incompleteness in contracts. Relying on economists’ theories of incomplete contracts, the Symposium authors identify uncertainty and the cost of and limited access to information as key problems affecting parties both ex ante when contracts are being drafted and ex post when they are being enforced. Uncertainty is a factor that makes it difficult to negotiate contracts that can simultaneously protect specific investments and also promote efficiency ex post.
- Incomplete Contracts
Publication DateFall September 1, 2005
Citation InformationJuliet P Kostritsky. "SYMPOSIUM InCOMPLETE CONTRACTS: JUDICIAL RESPONSES, TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND LITIGATION STRATEGIES" CASE WESTERN LAW REVIEW Vol. 56 Iss. 1 (2005)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/juliet_kostritsky/10/