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Article
Labor Market Search and Optimal Retirement Policy
Economic Inquiry
  • Joydeep Bhattacharya, Iowa State University
  • Casey Muligan, University of Chicago
  • Robert R. Reed, University of Kentucky
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Submitted Manuscript
Publication Date
10-1-2004
DOI
10.1093/ei/cbh081
Abstract

A popular and long‐standing view is that social security is a means for young, unemployed people to “purchase” jobs from older workers. Can social security, by encouraging retirement and hence creating job vacancies for the young, improve the allocation of workers to jobs? Maybe, according to a standard model of labor market search, but public retirement programs currently pay the elderly substantially more than their jobs are worth. An important effect is that retirement reduces the value of other vacant jobs. Our results imply that recent reforms aimed at reducing retirement incentives are likely to improve labor market efficiency.

Comments

This article is published as Labor Market Search And Optimal Retirement Policy (with Robert R Reed and Casey Mulligan),Economic Inquiry, 42, 560-571, 2004. DOI:10.1093/ei/cbh081. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner
Wiley Online
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Citation Information
Joydeep Bhattacharya, Casey Muligan and Robert R. Reed. "Labor Market Search and Optimal Retirement Policy" Economic Inquiry Vol. 42 Iss. 4 (2004) p. 560 - 571
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/joydeep_bhattacharya/49/