Article
AI AND INTERDEPENDENT PRICING: COMBINATION WITHOUT CONSPIRACY?
Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section
(2020)
Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds the potential to enhance the ability of competitors to
coordinate prices without forming agreements. That could cause widespread market failures.
Competitors in a broad range of industries could use AI to cause the same harms brought about
horizontal price fixing without triggering legal liability. This Article suggests a solution to this potential
problem: adopting the long-contemplated policy of imposing civil liability when competitors achieve
supracompetitive prices regardless of whether they enter an agreement to do so.
Keywords
- Artificial Intelligence,
- Antitrust,
- Technology,
- Conspiracy,
- Price Fixing,
- Parallel Pricing
Disciplines
Publication Date
2020
Citation Information
Joshua P. Davis. "AI AND INTERDEPENDENT PRICING: COMBINATION WITHOUT CONSPIRACY?" Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section (2020) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/joshua_davis/19/