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Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Neutrality Result
Journal of Public Economics (2010)
  • Jose Alcalde, University of Alicante
  • Matthias Dahm
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties. The main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort. We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs. In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds. Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction.
  • (non-)deterministic contest,
  • all-pay auction,
  • contest success functions.
Publication Date
February, 2010
Citation Information
Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm. "Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Neutrality Result" Journal of Public Economics Vol. 94 Iss. 1-2 (2010)
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