Skip to main content
Article
Competition for Procurement Shares
Games and Economic Behavior (2013)
  • Jose Alcalde, University of Alicante
  • Matthias Dahm
Abstract
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
Keywords
  • Procurement Auction,
  • Affirmative Action
Publication Date
July, 2013
Publisher Statement
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
Citation Information
Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm. "Competition for Procurement Shares" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 80 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jose_alcalde/28/