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Modelos de Emparejamiento: Conflicto y Coincidencia de Intereses en la Contratación Descentralizada de la Mano de Obra
Cuadernos Económicos de I.C.E. (1992)
  • Jose Alcalde, University of Alicante
Abstract
This paper studies, from a theoretical point of view, the assignament of workers to different departments within a firm: our first contribution to this analysis pertains to a non-traditional modelling of workers' preferences, as they can rank different tasks and can even reject some potential jobs. In this context we characterice a set of conditions that insure the existence of stable allocations, and illustrate that concerning assignments encompasses both the existence of a conflic process among groups and an agreement within members of each group. Finally, we study incentive problems in this type of models: In general agents will not report their true types. Hence, we study truth-telling mechanisms, and we obtain some positive results.
Keywords
  • Mechanisms Design,
  • Job Marching Market.
Publication Date
1992
Citation Information
Jose Alcalde. "Modelos de Emparejamiento: Conflicto y Coincidencia de Intereses en la Contratación Descentralizada de la Mano de Obra" Cuadernos Económicos de I.C.E. Vol. 52 (1992)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jose_alcalde/23/