Contribution to Book
Mecanismos de Asignación en el Mercado de TrabajoJóvenes Economistas en Andalucía (2000)
AbstractThis paper proposes an strategic analysis of mechanisms assigning workers to firms. We point out that the emply of these mechanisms guarantee the market' stability. We study two types of mechanisms. The first one is related to the case in which agents in a side of the market have an active role by searching a job, whereas the other side is mostly passive because its agents just receive offers. The second type of mechanisms is very related to a centralized process in which both workers and firms propose their offers and an employment office decides whcih contracts should be signed.
- Job Matching Markets,
- Mechanism Design.
PublisherEd. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Universidad de Málaga
Citation InformationJose Alcalde. "Mecanismos de Asignación en el Mercado de Trabajo" Málaga (Spain)Jóvenes Economistas en Andalucía (2000)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jose_alcalde/21/