Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching MarketsEconomic Design (1995)
AbstractTwo stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale-Shapley stability and ξ-stability. The first one applies best to markets where no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents’ preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and ξ-stable outcomes.
- Matching markets,
- Roommate problem,
Citation InformationJose Alcalde. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets" Economic Design Vol. 1 (1995)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jose_alcalde/2/