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Article
Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets
Economic Design (1995)
  • Jose Alcalde, University of Alicante
Abstract
Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale-Shapley stability and ξ-stability. The first one applies best to markets where no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents’ preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and ξ-stable outcomes.
Keywords
  • Matching markets,
  • Roommate problem,
  • Stability.
Publication Date
1995
Citation Information
Jose Alcalde. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets" Economic Design Vol. 1 (1995)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jose_alcalde/2/