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Alliance and Conflict: The World-System of the Inupiaq Eskimos - Book Review

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Mohammed Bamyeh
  *The Ends of Globalization*
  Reviewed by Bruce Podobnik

Hansen Blom and Finn Stepputat (eds.)
  *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*
  Reviewed by Omar A. Lizardo

Ernest S. Burch Jr.
  *Alliance and Conflict: The World System of the Inupiaq Eskimos*
  Reviewed by Jon D. Carlson

Christopher Chase-Dunn and E.N. Anderson (eds.)
  *The Historical Evolution of World-Systems*
  Reviewed by Thomas D. Hall

Joshua S. Goldstein
  *The Real Price of War: How You Pay for the War on Terror*
  Reviewed by Emanuel Gregory Boussios

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Globalization and often rapacious, authoritarian nation-states. Populations found their aspirations for a better future thwarted by unbridled。（horizon。）Drawing in particular on cases from the Middle East, Bamyeh abounded. But, as Bamyeh correctly demonstrates, there were problems on the horizon. When the world undergoes significant change, from one apparent era to another, the effect on existing scholarship can be profound. In some cases, books published just prior to watershed events can appear prescient, if they hinted at what was coming. In other cases, books can be caught like treatises in amber—with their diligent investigations of a specific moment overtaken by new and unpredicted events.

The insurgent attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent responses by the United States and its coalition partners, are widely believed to have reshaped the world’s political, economic, and cultural foundations. And, given that we are now a few years into this new era of heightened conflict, a host of studies are emerging that explore the current features and possible trajectories of a post-9/11 world. Key questions in this scholarship include: How might tensions between local cultures and national governments fuel regional and even global conflict? What kinds of global political-military conflicts can we expect to experience over the coming decades? And how might global capitalism intensify or ease the new threats of our times?

Interestingly, precisely these kinds of questions were laid out in the pre-9/11 book The Ends of Globalization, by Mohammed Bamyeh. Written in the late 1990s, when large-scale geopolitical relations were peaceful and yet genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were fresh in our minds, The Ends of Globalization offers one attempt to define the major trajectories of change that were underway as a new century began. And, though Bamyeh’s analysis has been at least partially covered in amber by post 9/11 events, his book does have the virtue of raising crucial questions that remain relevant today.

Bamyeh’s central objective is to map out transformations in the cultural, political, and economic features of a world that was just absorbing the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies in Eastern Europe. It was, as Bamyeh points out, a time of unbridled optimism in the United States. Treatises proclaiming the triumph of capitalism and representative democracy abounded. But, as Bamyeh correctly demonstrates, there were problems on the horizon. Drawing in particular on cases from the Middle East, Bamyeh explores the tensions that were building within many postcolonial states—as populations found their aspirations for a better future thwarted by unbridled capitalism and often rapacious, authoritarian nation-states.

Indeed, a strength of The Ends of Globalization lies in its investigation of the social and cultural tensions that are emerging within nations of the global south, as post-colonial dreams give way to the harsh realities of an increasingly polarized, unforgiving capitalist world-economy. Bamyeh’s nuanced analysis of the cultural contradictions embedded in many nation-states sheds important light on the new ‘totalitarianisms’ that were beginning to emerge in the developing world. And he also pointed out that leaders in the United States were busy trying to identify new enemies, defined not as communists but instead as rogue nations, terrorists, and fanatics. In a particularly astute phrase, Bamyeh points out that these new American adversaries “are typified by total unpredictability and possess a mysterious capacity or desire to strike at random, anywhere” (p. 74). Less than a year after The Ends of Globalization was published, of course, an unprecedented set of attacks was launched against the World Trade Center and Pentagon by terrorists linked to Al Qaeda. Subsequent strikes in other countries demonstrated that this loose network has the capacity to support or inspire insurgent operations in many different contexts. Surely, this is an adversary that is even more mysterious, unpredictable, and dangerous than anyone realized prior to Sept. 11, 2001.

If Bamyeh’s analysis of cultural contradictions is strong, his examination of geopolitical dynamics is less convincing. He argues that a “new imperialism” is emerging that is “less attached to economic or other material interests than the traditional theory of imperialism had supposed” (p. 64). He suggests that powerful states will become less predictable in their behavior—in that they will undertake political-military campaigns more for symbolic than materially-rational reasons. But, missing from this analysis is any discussion of the possibility that competition for raw materials like oil, gas, or even water will fuel rising geopolitical tensions. This interpretation of imperialism, while certainly imaginative, does not seem to explain the recent intervention by the US in Iraq—or many future geopolitical conflicts that are likely to occur in this century as tensions over natural resources intensify.

Bamyeh’s discussion of the likely trajectory of global capitalism—in its economic dimension—is also somewhat problematic. He argues that “…one of the fundamental economic features of globalization is that capital has managed to reacquire the sense of autonomy from politically inspired regulation that it lost several decades ago” (p. 147). Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, this argument about the rising power of the global corporation was advanced by many analysts. After the attack, though, there was a turn of the screw, and corporations were again revealed to be highly dependent on the political-military protection of nation-states. While “free market” and “deregulation” debates rage within specific countries, on a global level it has again been demonstrated that there...
The Ends of Globalization concludes with an interesting analysis of possible strategies for reforming the global system. Bamyeh begins by dismissing the idea that constructing a world state should be part of any project of reform. He asserts that such a state would likely become “the most totalitarian institution that humanity has ever known” (p. 149). Instead, he argues in favor of a movement of global solidarity that integrates a wide variety of spiritually-based, class-based, and identity-based groups into a campaign designed to enhance “the possibilities of freedom in the world” (p. 157). Bamyeh’s argument here is again prescient, given that soon after the book was written a multi-faceted “anti-globalization” and anti-war movement did indeed emerge to contest elite-driven forms of globalization and militarism.

In the end, Bamyeh’s analysis has both areas of strength and of weakness. His discussions of geopolitical and economic dynamics have been at least partly covered in amber, as the onset of a new era of political and military conflict have rendered his analysis (and those of many others) somewhat obsolete. On the other hand, his examination of the cultural contradictions of the global capitalist system provides a useful overview of factors underlying the rise of modern fundamentalism in the world. Readers interested in this aspect of our age will certainly profit by reading The Ends of Globalization.

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In the wake of events of 9/11 scholar across the social sciences have been forced to rethink a host of basic assumptions and theoretical commitments. One of the most important of these concerns the idea of state sovereignty in the contemporary world system. The traditional conception of sovereignty, wedded to the Weberian distinction between the arbitrary use of force of the traditional despot and the legitimate monopoly of violence of the representatives of the modern centralized state, is central to our conception of the distinctiveness of the contemporary inter-state system. This is evident in the fact that, along with an international economy centered around competitive markets, the Westphalian system of states subject to the logic of mutual recognition of each other’s internal territorial sovereignty and the repudiation of a centralized imperial control system is—according to Wallerstein’s influential formulation—the sine qua non of the modern Euro-American-centered world-system.

In the volume under consideration here, Blom Hansen (Professor of Anthropology at Yale University) and Finn Stepputat (Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies) bring together a collection of readings designed to make us reassess the ease with which we assume sovereignty as an inherent and unproblematic property of modern states. The book can be read as in a state of critical dialogue with Hardt and Negri’s Empire, the first major salvo against traditional notions of imperial authority as centralized as localizable. The book’s authors take to heart Hardt and Negri’s call to begin to think of sovereignty as decentralized and mobile, but bring with it a concern to move beyond general theoretical pronouncements. They productively focus on local empirical materials that attest to how state sovereignty is undergirded by local and translocal links and flows and is sustained by a discontinuous process of iteration and performance.

In the excellent introductory chapter, the editors lay out their larger programmatic perspective. In their view, it is time to question “…the obviousness of the state-territory-sovereignty link.” Instead of assuming sovereignty as a natural “capability” of state entities (as in most neo-realist treatments in IR), the volume attempts to “…conceptualize the territorial state and sovereignty as social constructions” (p. 2). Thankfully, at this point the reader is spared yet another rehashing of the now tired debate between “realism” and “constructivism” in IR theory. Instead, the authors move beyond the usual constructivist positions associated with a “macro-phenomenological” view of the discursive and narrative construction of the identities and commitments of international actors (and the associated concern with a normative “logic of appropriateness” over a calculative “logic of consequences”), and move toward a post-constructivist concern with how state sovereignty manifests itself at the micro-level.

For Hansen and Stepputat, the multifarious process of externalization of power at the level of practices takes the form of iterative performances of violence, state power, and the colonization of the bodies and minds of those subject to the “civilizing” imperatives of state action. These take the form of micropractices of domination and the “subjection” and normalization of bodies
through mechanisms of control, physical conscription, bodily regulation and unconscious habituation. In this respect, the authors move beyond the sometimes problematic idealism of constructivist theory, which is sometimes perceived to flounder when faced with the empirical realities that form the core of this volume: those associated with state violence, abuse of power and the internalization of rituals of life and death for the purpose of the staging of the ultimate and unquestioned authority of the legal framework of the state (6–19).

This concern with the very physical basis of state sovereignty and the unabashed treatment and consideration of the violent foundations of the legal order of the modern state, leads the editors to draw on relatively neglected sources in contemporary theorizing of the politics of sovereignty.

In particular, Hansen and Stepputat are able to frame their project as a creative blend of the Neo-Spinozist Marxism of Hardt and Negri, tempered with a clear sense of the need to supplement this overarching macro-theoretical stance with a post-Foucauldian sense of the importance of iteration and “performance” (by interested state agents and other competing centers of power) for the establishment of both routinized and unstable (or emergent) regimes of state sovereignty (a theme that while broached by Hardt and Negri is never developed beyond the general sense that the “micro-politics of bodies” should be an important concern of contemporary theorists).

However, those who think that this “dramaturgical” framework is still too closely tied to post-structuralist concerns with language and discourse to properly deal with the “hard” realities of violence and the imposition of state power through force in the contemporary scene of the “new world disorder”, should breathe a sigh of relief. The contributors’ concern with the empirical realities of the bodily and physical procedures and consequences of the imposition of force by centralized state agents prevent them from falling into the post-structur- alist vice of hypostatizing signs. Instead, the authors draw on contemporary re-interpretations of the work of the middle and late Foucault (especially his concern with governmentality and political practices), Bataille’s radical sociology of the violent excess hidden behind the façade of the “routinized” rational legal authority of the modern state and even the Schmittian formulation of the radically “illegal” basis of legality and the differentiation between friend and enemy, citizen and non-citizen, outsider and insider as the fundamental performat- ive act of establishment of political authority and sovereignty.

This theoretical scaffolding is supplemented by an overall attentiveness to the historical development of the ideological systems and the institutional practices associated with the concept of state sovereignty. A particular strength of the book is that instead of offering a purely “Europe-Centered” account of the process through which European states achieved their idiosyncratic sense of

the importance of sovereignty in the realm of political conduct (as in the work of Tilly and Mann for instance), we are given a broader account of the process of the development of the European performative sense of sovereignty, one that is situated in the larger colonial project of the 19th century, and which takes into consideration the sometimes complex process of importation and exportation of procedures, institutional practices and ideas regarding sovereignty from metropolitan centers to colonial outposts and back again (here the pioneering work of Benedict Anderson is of central importance). The authors show how Europe’s own sense of the distinctiveness of its political project was only possible through the contrast and exclusionary practices made possible by the existence of the “parallel world” of the colonies, which like the subjugated body of the criminal in Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, forms the proper inversion of the sublime body of the King represented by the colonial centers.

As the authors make clear the colonies far from being a static point of comparison (or simply a “symbolic” presence that allowed European identity to acquire its own sense of significance through a Saussuerian logic of difference) was in fact a real-life laboratory, where the liberalizing project of citizenship in the European metropolis was supplemented by a virtual real-life “laboratory” in which alternative practices—often of a deeply violent and illiberal cast—were developed in the colonial context that deemed local indigenous populations as “quasi-citizens” not endowed with the full-complements of rights and freedoms that were slowly doled out to the residents of the European core. In this sense, not only is the Euro-American experience of political “exceptionalism” (a core theme in the current “war on terror” being waged by the American establish- ment) unintelligible without understanding the exclusionary practices of domi- nation of the European powers, but neither is the contemporary experience of fractured and multiple forms of sovereignty that populate the “chaotic” post-colonial zones of Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia. These constitute reflexive “late-modern” attempts to impose practices of sovereignty and domina- tion that were developed throughout the colonial period as a result of the mixing of European conceptions of the right of the colonizers, and their related realiza- tion that complete subjugation of indigenous populations (without mediation by local elites) was not possible. The result is mixed (and sometimes even pro- ductive and creative as well as violent) regimes of sovereignty that are spread throughout the post-colonial world, in which state, civil, and economic centers of sovereignty compete in sometimes complicated and overlapping ways even as they are embedded in ever widening circles of neo-imperial domination from the U.S. center and global capital flows of currency, laborers and technologies. This creates a patchwork state of fluctuating and overlapping zones and cycles of order and disorder that is both a product of and a reaction to the colonial experience.
Issues related to the fragility of citizen identities, and the performed nature of state authority cut across most of the contributions. The book opens with historical and cultural considerations of racial and ethnic identity (as these intermeshes with issues related to status and class) in a post-colonial context in Mexico and Peru. Partha Chatterjee goes on to explore the concept of political society as a counterweight to the neat division between politics and civil society in Western scholarship, a model that it is argued may not be applicable to post-colonial state entities. Political society is a mixed space where issues of governmentality and the conduct of everyday life are not clearly separate. He uses a study of conflict between government agents and local religious groups in India to illustrate the point. Navaro-Yashin uses the concept of “borders of the imagination” to understand how state boundaries and state power are performed in state rituals in the “Turkish Republic of North Cyprus.” Two contributions (by Lars Buur and Stefen Jensen) concentrate on the bottom-up reorganization of coercive authority (local police forces and “neighborhood watch” groups) in states (such as South Africa) that are too weak or racked with corruption to effectively provide these public goods. They note the constitutive role that violence plays in recreating a semblance of order and morality at the local level and how issues of ethnic and religious identity, local self-control and morality intertwine in complex ways. The Comarroffs undertake a study of discourse surrounding “invasive plant species” in South Africa, which they deftly show parallels very closely xenophobic declarations regarding the impurity and invasive nature of immigrant populations. For the Comarroffs, this “naturalization” of the nation by way of botanical and natural analogies represents and alternative way of reestablishing the racist overtones of national sovereignty and citizenship.

Another basic concern running through many of the contributions in the book revolves around a problematization of the issue of individual citizenship (as a relation of “belonging” to a particular state formation) and the related notion of a separate “civil society” under contemporary conditions of decentered imperial dominance. Barry Hindess, in an excellent introductory chapter to the last section of the book productively takes on Hardt and Negri’s contribution to this issue by focusing on how even as they promote radically new ideas regarding sovereignty and control, they continue to implicitly hold on to a traditional conception of citizenship as involving only intra-statal links between rulers and citizens. For Hindess (p. 242), this account is “seriously incomplete” because citizenship “should also be seen as part of a supranational governmental regime” composed of INGOs, TNCs and other international agencies and regulatory entities. The chapters that follow explore these issues in detail. Aihwa Ong uses the notion of “cosmopolitan citizenship” to study the variegated patterns of residence and residential exchange between Vancouver and Hong Kong. Peter van der Veer explores how India’s entry into the global economy by way of exporting flexible labor in the IT industry—“body shopping”—creates complex connections between national identity, religion and capitalism between American corporations and Hindu modernity. Oivind Fluggerud notes how Norwegian national identity has undergone radical changes sustaining a renewed emphasis on Norwegian uniqueness and the “quality” of locally made products while attempting to become integrated into a global system in its terms (i.e. by emphasizing the “Norwegian model” in foreign policy) and carefully protecting its boundaries from outside migration. Fuglerud notes how state sovereignty is transferred away from regulating economic flows to regulating population flows under these conditions. Finally, Simon Turner’s contribution enriches the concept of “suspended spaces” (i.e. internment camps) where state sovereignty is suspended and “special populations”, reduced to what Agamben refers to as “dead life”—become the purview of overlapping regimes of management and authority. He notes how Burundian refugees in Tanzania are subject to the regulation and control of both the local government and foreign INGOs, and how their attempts to begin to manage their own lives are carefully structured by these centers of authority.

Overall, the book provides an excellent overview of contemporary theory and research at the interstices of globalization and citizenship studies, International Relations theory, anthropology and political sociology. Like many works crafted when fields are undergoing paradigm shifts this work is full of new concepts, exciting turns of older ideas and radical reformulations, some of which seem more prima facie useful that others.

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Ernest S. Burch, Jr.’s Alliance and Conflict: The World System of the Inupiaq Eskimos addresses what has been a sorely overlooked area in world systems analysis: what the structure of the world system in ancient times might have been, when societal relations were dominated by hunter-gatherer societies. Indeed, as
Burch points out, it is this type of system that was likely prevalent throughout the world prior to the emergence of organized agriculture, yet these systems have been difficult to study due to a lack of scholarly attention, written record, and historical distance. How does one answer the questions: What did the pre-modern, hunter-gatherer world system look like? How did this system make the transition to one of chiefdoms?

Burch applies his own considerable research experience—some four decades worth—studying the Inupiaq Eskimos of Northwest Alaska to sketching a portrait of a hunter-gatherer world system. Burch’s research includes an impressive amount of first-hand interview data with Native historians and indigenous people, anthropological and archaeological research, alongside the historical observations of Western traders and explorers. These sources taken together, combined with Burch’s impressive body of knowledge and understanding of the region, give a credible account of what such a system looked like, at least in the region in question. Temporally, the study is justifiably limited to the period of 1800—1848, when the various sources of information available coincide with a period prior to considerable social disturbance and indigenous decline.

The emphasis of Burch’s book is, self-admittedly, descriptive. In this, it excels. The level of detail and quality of research is impressive. Chapter One offers an introductory overview, addressing conceptual and methodological issues. For example, issues of boundaries and what constitutes a “nation” among mobile populations are addressed, and descriptions of the various peoples relevant to the study are detailed. Social delineations of ingroup/outgroup expression—such as language, dress, and personal appearance—are discussed, lending credence to the claim that the conceptual frame of distinct ‘nations’ can be used when discussing mobile social groups. Further, Burch does a good job of exploring notions of territoriality, trespass and the use of easements, which are concepts scholars of non-mobile social-political groups often do not need to explain when discussing mobile social groups. Here the reader can see the author’s love of his subject, as Burch notes that “friendly relations were at least as widespread as hostile ones, but they had different focal points and connections.” Indeed, context matters, and considerably complex social protocols emerged to signal friendly intent and desire to a Hobbesian state of nature, albeit on an extended kinship-group level. This may not be surprising given the tenuous state of existence in the region, and begs the question—would hunter-gatherers in more resource-rich areas be similarly predisposed? In fact, much of the conflict described by Burch derives from a desire for personal vengeance (often for earlier acts of violence—creating an ongoing circle of retribution), and he explicitly attempts to refute arguments of ‘economic imperative’ or ‘ethnic enmity’ as key variables driving inter-group conflict. His refutation appears convincing, at least in the system under discussion. As a result, the system is characterized by a nearly continuous, low-level conflict. His refutation appears convincing, at least in the system under discussion. As a result, the system is characterized by a nearly continuous, low-level conflict, including either planning for, defending against, or at least worrying about the possibility of attack.

Given such an environment, Chapter Three, “Friendly Relations” may be expected to be a very short chapter. Yet here is where some of the more complex relationships in the hunter-gatherer system of the Inupiaq are explored, and Burch does an admirable job of examining and explaining these relationships. Here the reader can see the author’s love of his subject, as Burch notes that “friendly relations were at least as widespread as hostile ones, but they had different focal points and connections.” Indeed, context matters, and considerably complex social protocols emerged to signal friendly intent and desire in a region characterized by high levels of hostility. Paradoxically, Burch notes that conflict also results in one of the significant reasons for peaceful international relations: international marriages. Because of population pressures and availability (or lack) of spouses, marriage occasionally occurred across estate boundaries. Further, kin-based relationships, once established, further promoted interaction. Other unique social institutions like that of a ‘trading partner’ and ‘comarriage spouse’ carried obligations that underlay peaceful relations between groups. Also, perhaps offering a cosmopolitan-Kantian counter to the
The opening chapter by the editors, Christopher Chase-Dunn and E. N. Anderson use Ibn Khaldun's generational account for the rise and fall of states as a vehicle for discussion of the general problem of the rise and fall of states and world-systems. In addition to cohesiveness or solidarity, what Khaldun calls *asabiyah*, they add climate shifts, ecological devastation, disease, war, and shifting trade links as factors that shape cycles of rise and fall. They link these with expansion of world-systems and the pivotal roles of semiperipheral states in the sporadic amalgamation of smaller world-systems into the modern world-system. Their final section assesses how these factors and processes figure in the various theories of rise and fall of states. This, in turn, serves to place the subsequent papers on a larger canvas.

William R. Thompson unpacks and expands Chernykh's models of ancient migrations, dubbed C-waves, as processes embedded in and driving world-system evolution. He notes that different regions, the Mediterranean, Europe, Central Asia, and China all had somewhat different dynamics. Shifts in internal dynamics render, for different reasons in each region, each more susceptible to the shock of external migrations. He concludes that Chernykh's emphasis on intermittent crises is very useful for understanding world-system change, but sees two, not...
one, crises. Furthermore, these crises do link all of Eurasia generating considerable continuity, despite significant regional differences and important reorientations of trade patterns.

Sing C. Chew discusses a millennium and a half of ecological cycles drawing on his argument that as world-systems or civilizations grow they gradually exhaust their ecologies, leading to collapse with deurbanization and population loss over a 600 or so year cycle, which he labels dark ages. He compares and contrasts Harappa, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Mycenae. These Dark Ages lead to reorientations of trade. As with Thompson, he sees larger processes at work in regional variations.

Mitchell Allen unravels why in the late Bronze Age (first millennium BCE) empires underwent significant leap in size through a close examination of the Assyrian Empire. The basic explanation is that by improved administrative technology which entailed using currency, developing a lingua franca, and new taxation techniques all of which enabled them to maintain a large standing army for the first time in history. They also learned from their mistakes and successfully co-opted various frontier peoples to become agents of imperial administration, rather than raiders on the periphery. Most critically they kept other states outside the empire, but linked them into trade relations that were mutually beneficial, and integrated new ideas and technologies from the frontiers into the central empire.

Chase-Dunn and his students Alexis Alvarez and Daniel Pasciuti examine the roles of power and size in empire formation and urbanization. Their findings are somewhat mixed. There is a medium term association between city size and empire sizes in Europe and West Asia, less in Mesopotamia, almost none in South Asia, Egypt and East Asia. As yet they have no systematic explanation for these regional differences, though degree of centralization may be a major component. Another, in some ways more surprising finding is that the largest and second largest cities grow in tandem, along with empire size. Though spotty, the evidence supports contentions for the important roles of regional and interregional interactions in city and empire growth. These findings must be bracketed by the weaknesses in the data, especially for South Asia. Still, with a variety of indicators and types of associations reported in this chapter and in previous works, the findings appear to be robust. Thus, the most significant implication is the need for much better data to sort out what is, in fact, happening.

E. N. Anderson's chapter is one of the most innovative in recent world-system history. He uses food practices as shown in preserved court documents on food preparation regimes in 14th century China to chart hegemonic cycles, specifically the rise, and later decline of Mongol dominance of China. Mongols brought many new foods into China, few using rice. The court was prompted to continue this

trend under the Mings, both to show hospitality to visitors and to show its power “by serving food from all parts of its far-flung empire” (p. 118). Anderson argues that rather than barbarians, the Mongols built the first global world-system, “complete with self-conscious globalization of knowledge and economy” (p. 118). The system became undone when the Mings realized that long-distance ocean trade was a losing proposition, even while trade with Southeast Asia remained profitable.

Eric Mielants compares the rise of South Asia and Europe, in an occasionally turgid, yet stimulating chapter. His analysis of incorporation uses Wallerstein’s division of external arena and peripheralized areas. Yet, his discussion of why South Asia is different, on how frontiers function, and on roles of nomad invasions into the northeast of South Asia are insightful. South Asia is quintessentially in the middle: between West Asia/Europe and China, with a nobility stronger than that in Europe, but weaker than that in China, and urban autonomy more than in China, but less than in Europe. One of his more interesting jabs is that Andre Gunder Frank replaced Eurocentrism with Sinocentrism. His key point, however, bears repetition: lack of development in India must be understood as part of a world-systemic process, and not as a result of internal factors, nor through comparison with Europe. With these insights, one cannot help but wonder what else he might have uncovered had brought to bear the work of Thomas Barfield (The Perilous Frontier, Blackwell, 1989) or explicitly dealt with some of the other versions of world-system history in this volume. Still, this chapter is far richer than this summary suggests.

Ho-Fung Hung explains China’s lack of development as a complex result of the conjuncture of several conditions and trends. He sees the lack of adoption of capitalism as rooted in legacies of Ming and Qing dynasties and in a gentry that preferred examinations and avoided capital accumulation through market participation. Furthermore, as the state devolved toward more localized control, local elites were freed to concentrate on accumulation of the means of violence in reaction to increased subaltern unrest fueled by ecologically rooted food shortages. He also notes that there was no labor absorbing frontier as there was for Europe. Finally, the legacy of the White Lotus millenarian religion made it easier for utopian socialism to take root.

The final chapter by Stephen G. Bunker and Paul S. Ciccantell is the boldest of the papers in this volume in seeking to present, in abbreviated form, a theory of world-system change that focuses on technology, matter, and space. This trinity is interconnected by transportation technology and costs and its role is examined by comparing Portugal, Holland, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, focusing on dynamics, successive ascents, and causes and consequences of global inequality. In their view contemporary globalization is best seen as the latest iteration “in a
centuries-long, cumulative series of cycles” (p. 175). This is a self-reinforcing process entailed reduced cost of transportation of raw materials, further lowering the costs of transport mechanisms, which in turn required new organizational forms. Based on a nuanced discussion of these five cases they conclude that securing a reliable variety of cheap raw materials is paramount and becomes more difficult with each cycle. Running through all of this are contradictions of economies of scale which create discontinuities of space. Eventually this cycle will butt up against various natural limits which cannot be solved by financial responses. The issue then will be whether the central actors—states, firms, and sectors—“will be able to invent new forms of collaboration that do not require intensification or spatial expansion” (p. 208).

Collectively, these papers provide rich and nuanced accounts of world-system evolution or world-system history. Several demonstrate how regional differences are vital, yet must be understood in their larger world-systemic linkages. Readers familiar with monographic world-system literature will recognize that the power lies in demonstrating how both differences and similarities are simultaneous consequences of world-systemic forces and processes played out in the context of, and against, myriad, specific local conditions and processes. A second set of themes running through these papers are complex roles of ecological relationships of various world-systemic processes. Again, ecology is not a “master variable,” so much as a set of factors and processes that must be integrated into the mix of social factors and processes that explain world-system evolution.

The volume might have benefited from a concluding chapter that brought out these and other themes connecting the papers. In many ways, however, the introduction serves that purpose. It could be read profitably as a concluding chapter. Overall, this volume is an important addition to the study of world-system history. The release of a less expensive paper version would make it a useful addition to various courses.

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Goldstein is a political scientist who takes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of war. Goldstein’s argument is simple, yet powerful and persuasive: Americans have not spent enough to win the war on terror, and cannot afford not to. The Real Price of War presents three arguments. The first argument concerns the costs of war. The war is considerably more costly than planned, particularly so when including hidden, indirect, and future costs. The second argument focuses on the theory that Americans are forced to pay the price and more than likely a rising price for war, in the immediate future. Third, the Bush Administration and Congress have camouflaged the real price of this present war, and have presented tax cuts as well which will only delay paying the costs of the present war to the future generation.

Goldstein argues that the war on terrorism is considerably more costly than Americans have been told. A tremendous influx of capital and resources must be utilized to win the war on terrorism or Americans will be asked to contribute far more in the future. Goldstein acknowledges that the American public often obtains information on war—related information from the press—and therefore these numbers for war costs are in a form that appear astronomical and out of touch with what most Americans’ understanding of what war is costing them. Goldstein’s model of war spending places the burden on the individual—how much the war effort is costing you personally through the cost of war per household in the United States. Goldstein breaks down billion-dollar government spending into the costs the average American household is paying through their taxes. Goldstein makes a clever analogy of war spending as a “parking meter in their living room” to an equivalent of approximately $500 a month to finance war.

Goldstein also argues that the war effort and sacrifices stretch far beyond military spending to include casualties, lost tourism, strain on local government budgets, civilian-to-military hardships for personnel, etc. The longer the war continues, the more these costs grow. This is important to acknowledge. By highlighting upon this phenomena, Goldstein adds credibility to his model on war spending. Americans keep a watchful eye on continued war spending. However, the ‘real’ costs in human lives and quality of human life should never be underestimated. By explaining and emphasizing the importance of these costs beyond tax dollars, Goldstein has added an important real life dimension to his model. It may have benefited Goldstein’s work to have discussed in detail other considerations outside of direct costs of war—including public opinion of the war—although these ‘costs’ could never be truly quantified. Prior administrations have felt the heat of negative war opinion. A common example is President Johnson’s decision to not seek reelection in the 1968 presidential race due, in part, to the strong negative sentiment against the Vietnam War. Although public opinion costs could never be quantified in an effective manner, the burden on war policy making could be considerable. By discussing the
importance of public opinion, Goldstein could have considerably strengthened the backbone of his theoretical arguments.

For those who argue ‘Americans are spending too much’, Goldstein counters with that argument that a range of historical evidence exists to prove that Americans are spending much less in comparison to the spending for past wars. Goldstein’s examples of spending in prior wars were well-founded in his research. Traditionally, governments have financed war by raising taxes. Others have done so by borrowing money (the US government has also partially adopted this strategy as well). This increases government debt, which could drive nation-states into bankruptcy as it did to Spain in 1557 and 1596. The two World Wars were enormous military efforts—mobilizing entire societies for war—conscripting labor and military service, inflating prices in markets for industrial goods and various natural resources, and shifting investments from civilian to military capital. Also, Goldstein argues that Americans have been told that the War on Terror is a war without sacrifice. But as Goldstein emphatically states: “These truths should be self-evident: The nation is at war. The war is expensive. Someone has to pay for it.” As Goldstein presents in his argument, liberal readers will need to consider the possibility that the war deserves even more money and attention than President Bush has given it; conservative readers will need to consider the possibility that Americans need to raise taxes to cover the costs for the war.

Goldstein closes with the arguments that in order to win the war on terror at a more rapid pace, Americans need to better finance the battle coffers. This increase in war spending would cost the average American $100 per household per month. For this, Americans would see improvements in all branches of the military and its wings—including diplomacy.

Goldstein presents his arguments and the historical narrative of war spending in language suitable for most readers. Goldstein’s writing style is suited for interdisciplinary readers. This makes his work attractive for graduate courses and undergraduate courses in various fields of study beyond political science alone.

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