Ch5: Japan and the Far East

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Myths, State Expansion, and the Birth of Globalization

A Comparative Perspective

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palgrave
macmillan
To Kym, who has had an abiding interest in this project from the very beginning, boldly venturing into the unknown; and of course Jossie and Alexandra—who remind me daily of what is truly important.
CHAPTER 5

Japan and the Far East: Zipangu, Roofs of Silver, and the Lure of the Orient

The case of Japan may be seen as an odd choice for the discussion of incorporation. But, quite simply, Japan illustrates how a state may join the system after having chosen externality, at least temporarily. Also, since it had prior linkages to the Chinese world-system, it is worthwhile to examine the ability of an area to “reverse” the incorporation process, in addition to the ability to resist political subornation. Furthermore, Japan's involvement with the Chinese system allows another layer of investigation into the early “globalizing” effects of such contact (e.g., culture, language, religion, trade). Finally, Japan is also often used as a singular non-European case in much extant IR literature (e.g., Bull 1984; Snyder 1991; Johnson 1993; Kupchan 1994), and provides a touchstone for engaging these works.

1. Japan in an Asian Context

Japan has historically close linkages with mainland Asia, which was in turn dominated by the empires of China. For that matter, Frank (1998) argues that even Europe was peripheral to the Chinese system, and only later rose to hegemony and dominance of the central world-system. Similarly, Cohen (2000) situates Japan as part of the dynamic Chinese-dominated East Asian system, stretching historically some 4,000 years and geographically to include the southern reaches of the continent. Regardless, most discussion of Japan within a global system addresses only more “recent” events, either focusing on the rise of Japan to the status of a global power in the twentieth century, Japan during the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912), or perhaps even
going back to include some discussion of the Tokugawa Era as way of understanding the Restoration. Very little situates Japan in a larger, metahistorically aware discussion of the long-term impacts of globalization and associated processes of cross-systemic incorporation.

A. Protoglobalization and Neolithic Japan

From the outset Japan has been a country influenced by foreign ideas and imports. While there fails to be a consensus among archaeologists and historians as to the origins of the Japanese people, there is agreement that the early inhabitants came from different areas in separate waves of immigration. For example, early inhabitants likely emerged from a combination of Tungusic peoples from northeastern Asia via Hokkaido1 or Korea, Malayan peoples from South China or Southeast Asia via Formosa and the Ryukyus, and others of Mongoloid origin via the Korean peninsula (Hane 1991:10). This early stage of neolithic Japan is known as the Jōmon period,2 and extended from approximately 4500 BCE to 250 BCE. This period was succeeded by the Yayoi culture3 (ca. 250 BCE–250 CE) in the later part of the neolithic age.

Language and writing patterns show similar signs of early outside influence. The Japanese language appears to have links to both the Polynesian and Altaic languages. This has led to the theorization that during the Jōmon period a language of southern origin was spoken, which was later supplanted with the introduction of a northern Altaic language. Technologically, there is support for this model of cultural dispersion. Rice cultivation, which was unpracticed in northern China, came to Japan from the south either from southern Korea or from southern China, via immigrants fleeing the consolidation of the Han conquerors (206 BCE–220 CE). In either case, "the introduction of rice cultivation revolutionized the way of life of ancient Japan and established the basis for the economic life of the people until the industrial age" (Hane 1991:11).

The links to Korea, Manchuria, and northern China are also evident in the use of polished stone implements during the Yayoi period. The decorative designs support the dispersal of an Altaic language and culture, as the patterns are similar to those found where an Altaic language was spoken on the continent. Other technologies were also imported during the Yayoi period, most notably the introduction of bronze and iron. This simultaneous introduction is quite unusual, as elsewhere the two technologies are separated by a considerable time lag. This early example of "globalization of technology" allowed Japan to leapfrog up the development ladder. To clarify, China was using bronze in the Yin period (about 1200 BCE),

though Chinese civilization during its Bronze Age did not extend to Japan. So, by the time Japan came into contact with China, China had already entered its Iron Age and Japan received the benefits of both technologies, likely through trade routes via North Korea (Inoue 1968).

By the end of the Yayoi period, Japan was undergoing considerable political and cultural consolidation. According to Chinese records, Japan ("Wa") was made up of more than a hundred small kingdoms, each about the size of a modern Japanese subprefecture. Some of the more powerful even sent envoys offering tribute to the Chinese court of the Han Empire, or to northern Korea. Specifically, records indicate that the Japanese kingdom of Nü sent an envoy to China by 57 CE, and that the ruler of Yamatai sent a similar envoy to the Chinese kingdom of Wei toward the end of the Yayoi period.4 The importance of these envoys is found in the reflection of Japan being brought into the Chinese tributary and information networks, if not in the precise dating thereof. So, by the late third century CE, Japan was already being drawn into what would become the Chinese world-system.

This becomes more evident with the examination of the subsequent Japanese historical period, the Yamato Period (ca. 300–710 CE). Several important developments occur. First, the fractured minilkingdoms of Japan were consolidated under the hegemony of the imperial family. Politically Japan was unified, yet local control was often delegated to the leaders of traditional lineage groups or clans (ujii). After unification, each uji (clan) was subject to the imperial family, but controlled its own land and maintained authority over workers organized into hereditary associations or corporations called "be." As imperial authority grew, clans themselves became specialized and organized along the lines of functional corporations, with classifications eventually denoting family names (as Smith and Miller do in English). Hane (1991:17) notes that "there were be for every category of occupation: those engaged in military and religious affairs, ricefield workers, fishermen, sake makers, weavers, grooms, smiths, potters, arrow makers, bow makers, mirror makers, lapidaries, cooks, scribes and so forth."

Furthermore, immigrants from Korea and China were assimilated into the be and became important elements of the corporation system. For example, toward the end of the third century, "a considerable number of weavers arrived in Japan from Paekche and were organized into a weavers' corporation. By the middle of the sixth century, there were over 7,053 households belonging to this community, numbering, it is estimated, over 30,000 members" (Hane 1991:17). This system was reformed in the seventh century, but is important in that it served to extend the control of the imperial family over the rest of the population, as the be (corporations) were indirectly controlled through the associated uji (clans).
Other notable developments during the Yamato period are cultural. The Chinese writing system was introduced from Korea ca. 400 CE, and the recorded written history of Japan accordingly begins. In addition to the system of writing, Buddhism and Confucian thoughts are also introduced in the middle of the sixth century (again via Korea, showing the importance of intermediary linkages in the transmission of social, cultural, and informational practices). Discussion over whether or not to adopt Buddhism actually became a significant debate in the imperial court. One group was led by the Monobe family (in charge of arts) and another by the Soga family (in charge of religious affairs). After a series of open conflicts and intrigues, the Soga faction crushed the Monobe family and officially sanctioned Buddhism in 587. As Hane quips, “even the religion that was to play a vital role in molding the Japanese culture and character was initially a pawn in the struggle for power and influence” (1991:27).

Both the introductions of writing and religion profoundly shape Japanese identity and culture. So, even the earliest, indirect linkages with the Chinese system produce significant incorporative and sociocultural impacts. It is during this period that Japan became a “civilized” nation. A writing system allowed the Japanese vocabulary to enlarge, and a new intellectualism flourished. A Japanese dictionary of 1884 classified 13,000 words of Chinese derivation, compared to 22,000 purely Japanese-originated words (Hane 1991:26). So roughly 37 percent of the language was of Chinese origin. Along with language, Confucian values begin to be extolled and appear in official proclamations, and political thought regarding the maintenance of “proper” relations between ruler and ruled (and father and son) emerge. A legal compendium of penal laws and administrative practices (the Taihō Code) was written, based on models from T’ang China (Hane 1991; Inoue 1968).

More overt interactions and developments of a politico-military nature also occurred over the next several historic periods (Nara 710–784; Heian 794–1185; Kamakura 1185–1333), though these are mentioned only briefly in order to “fast-forward” to the era involving the arrival of the Europeans (i.e., the Ashikaga period, 1338–1573). Relations with China continued to strengthen, and friendly relations with Sung China were established and maintained throughout the Heian period. Hane (1991:69) observes that “Sung influence was manifested in the Japanese economic realm in the form of imported copper coins, and, more significantly, in the cultural sphere in the form of Zen Buddhism and Sung-style painting and literature.” Of particular note, in relation to interactions with the larger Chinese systemic networks, are two Mongol invasions of 1274 and 1281 (during the Kamakura period). The first invasion, against the northern Kyushu in 1274, was foiled when a typhoon struck and destroyed a large portion of the Mongol fleet. The Japanese, expecting a second invasion, fortified northern Kyushu. The second invasion of about 140,000 men came in 1281, and was turned back after seven weeks of fighting and another propitious typhoon. Both storms were seen as divine interventions, and referred to as kamikaze (“divine wind”).

This external threat prompted a greater sense of unity among the Japanese, but also had negative domestic repercussions. The military class, which had grown to prominence during the Heian period, was coming under increased pressure from the growing money economy. Political disorder grew in the provinces as the struggle for land and power increased. These military struggles in Japan resulted in a split of the imperial court, which was later reunited during the Ashikaga period. The following 50-year span of almost incessant civil war saw the rise of the traditional samurai military ethos associated with Japanese feudalism.

B. Peripheralization in the Chinese World-System (1338–1573)

The Ashikaga period (1338–1573) provides the context for Japanese relations immediately preceding contact with Europeans. Accordingly, by this time Japan was at least peripherally part of the Chinese world-system, with trade flows periodically waxing and waning. For example, commerce with China abated during the decline of the T’ang Dynasty, but resumed with the reunification of China under the Sung. Marked by the movement of the Sung court to the south (1127), Chinese commercial interaction increased. The increase was significant enough that Chinese authorities became concerned with the outflow of gold, silver, and copper and began to restrict overseas trade. In systemic terms, adverse bullion linkages and flows are driving political decisions. By 1245 the Sung government asked the Japanese to limit the number of merchants sailing to China. Trade correspondingly declined to more acceptable levels (for the Chinese), and was later further disturbed by internal Chinese turmoil. After the Mongol Dynasty was established in China (1271), commercial contact—informally, then formally—resumed, with official commercial exchange again taking place by 1325 (Hane 1991; Inoue 1968).

Another “informal” linkage to the Chinese develops through the regularized raiding of the coast by Japanese pirates (wakō) by the fourteenth century. Operating mainly from the islands off Kyushu, the wakō pirates increased their activity against the coastal cities of Korea and also began to raid the villages and towns of coastal China. When the Ming government came to power in 1368, it sent an envoy asking that the Japanese government act to curb the pirates, but “because the demand was presented in such
a manner as to indicate that China considered Japan a subject state, it was rejected” (Hane 1991:101). So, even though the two countries are operating within the same world-system framework, there is debate as to relative status. The washi pirates were occasionally curtailed for political gain in trade relations with China, but continued their raids during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, often with the active support of the local lords in western Japan. In addition to looting, the raids also entailed stealing food (e.g., rice and beans) and kidnapping villagers that were later sold as slaves.

Legitimate trade increased under the third Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimitsu, who formally established relations with Ming China. While “trade missions in the guise of tribute bearers began to flow from Japan to Ming China as early as 1371” (Cohen 2000:170), Yoshimitsu established a formal commercial treaty with the Ming government in 1404. Interestingly, as a measure to control “unauthorized” (read: untaxed) trade, the Ming government established a system of certification for ships authorized to trade with China. Legitimate trade with Korea also blossomed around the same time, and was carried on to an even greater extent than that with China. These commercial relations followed an entrepot model, with the city of Hakata in Kyushu serving as the center of trade with Korea, while the port of Hyōgo facilitated the official China trade. One notable contribution of the trade with Korea was “the import of ‘Champa’ rice, an insect-and drought-resistant strain from Southeast Asia that probably doubled Japanese rice production” (Cohen 2000:172).

Commerce also was conducted with the Ryukyu Islands off the southern tip of Japan, and Ryukyu merchants developed a role as middlemen between Japan, Southeast Asia, and China. Ming Chinese efforts at regulating trade along the Chinese coast prompted this middleman role of the Ryukyu merchants. Japanese officials used these visits and trade to extend their known universe, or information network, and later required the submission of formal reports from all trading vessels (Ishii 1998). Japanese ships, sailors, merchants, and warriors were found in every trading port throughout the region, and trade was specifically used for information gathering as part of imperial policy. In addition to the economic benefits trade offered, merchant activity played a strategic intelligence role and reflected the far reach of Japanese maritime contacts throughout the region.

The types of goods traded with China and Korea are instructive as to the economic linkages in place and extent to which the relations are considered systemic (i.e., “bulk” or “luxury” goods). Hane (1991:102) records that “Japan exported to China such things as swords, armor, copper, sulphur, lumber, fans, lacquerware, and pearls and, in return, imported raw silk, cotton thread, fine fabrics, dye, ironware, porcelain, paintings, books, medicine, and copper coins. From Korea, Japan imported cotton goods, in exchange for copper, sulphur, and swords.” Estimates at the number of coins flowing into Japan are placed in the hundreds of millions, because the bakufu did not mint coinage of Japanese origin. So the imported Chinese specie became “not only the medium for international currency exchange, but also for the growing mercantile economy of Japan” (Cohen 2000:171).

From a Chinese world-system perspective, this makes Japan a semiperipheral state; Japan was exporting both: raw products (lumber, sulfur, copper) and value-added finished products (lacquerware, armor, swords) while importing primarily finished goods. In fact, the Japanese skill at armor production and sword making essentially made them the international arms-dealers of the region, as Japanese military products were in great demand throughout the Chinese trading system. The demand for and import of Japanese swords was sufficient to raise the concern of the Chinese government, which notably failed in its attempt to limit the trade and keep the swords out (Cohen 2000:171).

The influence of the increased trade with China during the Ashikaga period also impacted the cultural life of Japan. Books were imported; advanced Chinese printing techniques were introduced; and Chinese calligraphy, painting, and ceramics all altered Japanese art forms. Japanese monks visited China, and cultural styles associated with Zen Buddhism grew in importance: landscape gardening, flower arrangement, Nō theater, painting, and the tea ceremony. Zen Buddhist monks “played the role of cultural brokers” (Cohen 2000:171). A defining characteristic of “traditional” Japanese life, the tea ceremony, is insightful for the cultural connection. The tea ceremony has profound spiritual and aesthetic significance, and further contributed to the development of ceramics (for tea bowls and cups) and fostered the development of flower arrangement (as above decoration in the tea room). Chinese medical knowledge and drugs were also introduced, as were new culinary practices and foods. Other cultural developments during the Ashikaga period include the proliferation of education among warriors and wealthier peasants, the beginning of the temple school as an institution of learning, and the growth of libraries and academies (Hane 1991).

Before the arrival of Europeans in Japan, it is worthwhile to examine the Chinese worldview (and Japanese position therein) at the beginning of the fifteenth century. While few ancient Chinese maps are extant, the Chinese worldview reflected in Korean reproductions show that the world centered on China, much as early European maps place Europe at the center of the world. Though by the fifteenth century, information gathered by the Mongol expansion and 700 years of Chinese seafaring throughout Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean had somewhat broadened China's conceptualization
of its position in the world. The Kangnido\(^5\) (1402) map reflects this. First, while this map is one of the earliest surviving world maps from China, it is a Korean synthesis of two earlier Chinese maps: an early fourteenth-century map by Li Tse-min and a later fourteenth-century work by Chi'ing Chun (both now lost). For our purposes, a translation of the preface indicates that the authors "supplemented and expanded the map of our country [Korea], and added a map of Japan, making it a new map entirely, nicely organized and well worth admiration" (quoted in Ledyard 1994:245). Indeed, it is well worth admiration, and the original includes surprisingly accurate representations of Africa (particularly the east coast) and even Europe. The European continent is difficult to make out because the "interior" bodies of water (i.e., the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea) are not shaded. Nevertheless, the outline of the Iberian Peninsula and the general layout of the relative geography of Europe are striking for their accuracy.

For the mapmakers however, the addition of Japan presents some representational problems, especially as it was the last element of the map supplied by the Koreans. On one hand, Korea's relations with Japan were difficult, largely due to the marauding of the coastal pirates and the apparent unwillingness of the Ashikagi regime to control them. This is coupled with an understandable Korean worldview being added to the combination of Chinese maps, reflected in: "Korea projecting itself as a major East Asian state, refurbishing its traditional view of China as the major center of civilization and playing its eternal game of keeping Japan as far away as possible" (Ledyard 1994:248). More to the point, this bias carries over because Korea, more massive than the overly small African continent, "identifies itself as a very important place, while Japan, as if randomly flipped off the fingers into the ocean, floats uncertainly in the South China Sea" (248). This is the power that goes along with representation. It is also one reason false information, or purposeful misinformation, thrives in the zone of ignorance: who is to verify if something is true or not?

Quite literally this is an issue when examining contact between two world-systems: representation. Who gets to determine what is accurate representation and "truth," especially when the subject is a socially constructed idea, such as justice, right and wrong, or acceptable behavior? Beyond spatial relevance, we are talking about contending worldviews on a very basic level. This is evident when looking at the case of Japan in the context of the Chinese world-system, because the Chinese had an established tradition of mapping. This element of capturing information is missing in our previous cases; while Ethiopia had a long history, with an indigenous alphabet and extensive documentary record, there was no cartographic tradition in the sense that we see in China. The other cases (Asante and Nootka) lack an indigenous documentary record, though oral tradition helps compensate for the lack of written data.\(^6\) Nevertheless, the case of Japan presents an overt confrontation between two drastically different ways of looking at the world, in a figurative, cartographic, and later systemic-social constructive sense.

In the Kangnido, one may wonder if the Philippines rather than Japan is actually being represented. Yet there are some plausible explanations for why the map should take this form. First, one possibility is that the cartographers simply ran out of room to the east so moved Japan into the open space to the south. This is plausible because the map is printed on silk—and nearly square at 171 x 164 cm (5 x 4 ft)—which vitiated tacking on additional space. However, earlier Chinese maps placed Japan east of Southern China, so there is some historic basis for this location. Another concern rises with the apparent rotation of Japan so that the representation appears "flipped," with the west at the top. Again, prior maps from Japan used a west-at-the-top orientation, and the mapmakers failed to adjust for this peculiarity. Ledyard (1994:247) notes that the earliest known map of Japan (ca. 805) has this orientation. All else considered, the map shows an accurate representation of the three Japanese islands (with the exception of joining Shikoku to Honshu), as the northern island of Hokkaido was not yet included as part of Japan at this time. The bend of the country and overall outline are quite accurate (Ledyard 1994).

The fact that such a map exists at all is evidence of a larger systemic network of interactions. As such, it reflects Japan's relative and figurative position within the Chinese world-system: peripheral geographically, yet enough of a competitor to raise antagonism from Korea. Additionally, the types of goods being exchanged and the bureaucratic requirements that became associated with the Chinese trade are also indicative of significant systemic linkage. Finally, the cultural and social factors transmitted throughout the region gir'd the argument that Japan is an integral part of a larger Asian framework. This all combines to provide the backdrop against which Western contact with Japan takes place, and thereby provides not just a case of state incorporation, but cross-systemic interaction.

II. Japan in European Imaginations

The first Europeans to land on Japan were shipwrecked Portuguese seamen in 1543, though Japan existed in the consciousness of Europe much earlier. Even before any European set foot on Japanese soil, it existed in the realm of myth as a result of Marco Polo's accounts of the "Far East." Again we see the tremendous impact Polo's recounts had on the pull of European imagination.
These reports begin Japan's transition from the "zone of ignorance" into the outer "information network" of the emerging European world-system. Though Polo never reached Japan ("Zipangu"), his writings were based on information received at the court of the Great Khan, whose own forces had been twice repulsed by the island kingdom. Since Polo described the Khan's forces as more than a match for all the Christians and Saracens in the world, this island kingdom must be mighty indeed! Polo (cited in Washburn 1952:221) describes Zipangu (or Chipangu) quite enticingly:

Chipangu is an island towards the east in the high seas, 1500 miles distant from the Continent; and a very great Island it is. The people are white, civilized, and well-favored. They are Idolators, and are dependent on nobody. And I can tell you the quantity of gold they have is endless . . .

How much better could this be? A fabulously rich and powerful kingdom located beyond the potential rival of China, awaiting European arrival and the beneficent word of God. And they have the added advantage of being white. This description was guaranteed to appeal to a wide variety of European interests, and it echoes some of the basic elements of the Prester John myth. The confusion over distance (1,500 miles) likely "stems from Polo's confounding the Chinese li, of which there are 250 in one degree of latitude, with the Italian mile, of which there are sixty to one degree" (Washburn 1952:221). This mistake would have some serious repercussions for European cartographers and explorers alike. For instance, it is the misconception over the location of Japan that promoted Christopher Columbus’ discovery of the Americas by requiring it be placed well into the "Western Ocean." Subsequently, "Zipangu" would haunt maps of the Caribbean and other parts of the New World throughout the early sixteenth century (Washburn 1952).

Another error that troubled early cartographers was the miscalculation of distance associated with the actual length of a degree, at about 25 percent less than what it should be. Columbus calculated the distance at approximately 2,400 nautical miles from the Canary Islands, and in his 1484-1485 negotiations with the King of Portugal argued that his "strongest point was the practical possibility of reaching gold-roofed Japan" (Washburn 1952:224). The actual distance from the Canaries is about 10,600 miles. Once in the Caribbean, Columbus continued to labor under the delusion that he had reached Japan, thinking first Cuba, and then Haiti (the island seemingly richest in gold) must be Japan.

By the early part of the sixteenth century, the notion that Zipangu and Asia might actually lie beyond the New World gained credence. Japan started appearing as an amorphous island kingdom in the ocean between the main landmasses of an as yet largely unexplored and unmapped North America and Asia. It was a long time before correct conceptions of Japan and the northern Pacific appeared on European maps.

In Zaltieri (1566), Japan appears roughly equidistant between the two continents of North America and Asia, and the actual outlines of coast and arrangement of the islands bears little resemblance to reality. Of course, much of Zaltieri's map is conjecture, which is especially obvious in reference to the lands lying to the west. The map is important largely for its mythic aspects, because Zaltieri provides "[o]ne of the earliest depictions of the Strait of Anian, the undiscovered but imagined strait separating America from Asia" (Whitfield 1998:86). Directly below the strait, Japan lies enticingly close to the known region of New Spain, a convenient stop on the way across the Pacific to the additional riches of China. The interior of North America is a conglomeration of mountains and rivers, with the acknowledgment of "Terra Incognita" above the "Stretto de Anian." Very little appreciation for the extent of the Pacific is present in Zaltieri's work, which would prove to have deleterious results for future exploration.

A similar depiction was reproduced and widely distributed by Abraham Ortelius (1570). The wide publication of Ortelius' atlases made this conception of Japan lying within easy reach of both California and Asia pervasive. Along with this positioning came other mythical aspects associated with the map: Japan is placed directly south of the legendary Strait of Anian, there is a large inland sea in north Asia, and there appears easy access to a northern water route across America. There are some practical reasons for these anomalies. European contact with Japan only initiated in 1543, when a typhoon forced a group of Portuguese mariners ashore on an island off the coast of Kyushu. Six years later, a Jesuit group led by Saint Francis Xavier (sainted for his work among the heathens) established Europe's first outpost in Japan, and correspondence from this Jesuit mission makes up the bulk of European information about Japan until around 1600. Not surprisingly, while this information was rich in regard to Japanese life, culture, and history, missionaries tend to make poor cartographers (Washburn 1952; Huissen 1973).

Furthermore, ignorance of proper geographic location was actually part of the imperial gamesmanship between Spain and Portugal. The "Treaty of Tordesillas" (1494) established a formal Line of Demarcation, which granted Spain rights to the lands west of the Line and Portugal the right to lands to the east. Dispute grew up as to the proper ownership of the Moluccas, on the other side of the globe. Both nations claimed the islands as part of "their" world according to papal decree. Before the dispute arose,
Portugal placed the islands much farther east from the Cape of Good Hope, but soon adjusted their calculations and moved the islands farther west (much to the consternation of the inhabitants, one would assume). Spain, in contrast, habitually minimized the distance across the Pacific traveled by the Manila galleons, with the purpose of including the Moluccas in the Spanish domain. Cartographically, the dispute served to "expand" both continents and shrink the Pacific. This required that Japan be moved as well, since it was placed in relation to the coast of Asia. So, the purposeful maintenance of a "zone of ignorance" was imperial strategy.

For Japan, the strategy of papal geography meant that the island nation continued to be placed in the middle of the Pacific, either purposefully or out of continued ignorance. Yet Japan still occupied the curious middle ground between myth and reality as far as the information network is concerned. Martines (ca. 1578) captures this moment quite nicely. Again, the Pacific Ocean is drastically constricted, with Japan lying approximately midpoint between New Spain and Asia, to the south of a northern strait. Asia is still imagined to be quite close to the American coast, and New Spain is dominated by the mythical Seven Cities of Cibola, all conveniently flying the Spanish flag. Japan lies with an east-west orientation, but the juxtaposition of the cities of Cibola is most striking. Both features have equal weight; if anything the mythical cities are more "real" because they are flying the Spanish flag. The one major Chinese city depicted, perhaps with a certain amount of prescience, is flying a banner with no markings, perhaps waiting for one to be impressed upon it. Slowly, as the region moved further into the "information network" of the system, the landmasses would recede from the Pacific and Japan would assume a more realistic positioning. The Cities of Cibola would disappear and fade from the consciousness of Europeans, just as Japan became more concrete and fixed in reality. Ironically, some explorers would continue to seek El Dorado, placing it in Japan as late as the seventeenth century.

A. Post-European Contact and the Opening of Japan

Other Europeans soon followed the Portuguese and Spanish (who arrived in 1584) to Japan, and Nagasaki became the main port of trade for the foreigners. The Dutch arrived in 1600 and eventually supplanted the Portuguese as the chief Western traders in Japan. The British trailed behind, arriving by 1613. Merchants tapped into the existing market demands of the Chinese system, and imported silk, gold, sugar, perfume, medicinal herbs, and apparel from China, India, and other Asian countries. After the introduction of firearms and their destabilizing sociocultural impacts, the Japanese demand for lead and nitrate from China also increased. In return, the Westerners exported silver, copper, lacquerware, and pottery (Hane 1991; Inoue 1968).

Silver was certainly one of the most important attractions for the Europeans, with estimates of Japanese production at nearly one-third the world's production in the sixteenth century. Part of the reason Japan was able to produce so much silver also relates to their connection to the Asian information network. The extensive scale of silver refining was enabled by the adoption of refining technology from Korea by 1533, commonly known as the cupellation method ("haisuki-hō"). The process allows for increased production of high-purity silver, which meant that it was much more desired in foreign markets.

Foreign trade stimulated Japanese merchant activity, and Japan also began to send merchants overseas. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Japanese merchant vessels averaging 200–300 tons in capacity were trading with Taiwan, Luzon, Indochina, Siam, and throughout Southeast Asia. The ships carrying on the trade were highly regulated and taxed, carrying official certificates stamped with red seals. Only ships with official papers were allowed to deal in the foreign trade, and any violators were punished as pirates (read: summarily executed). Thus, the incentive to have an official trade license was substantial, especially as ports of embarkation were tightly controlled. As commercial contacts increased, expatriate Japanese communities—mostly merchants, itinerant samurai, and Christians—were established in foreign locations as distant as the Philippines, Cambodia, Java, and Siam. Estimates from 1621 put the Japanese settlement near Manila at a population of over 3,000, with an estimated Japanese population in Siam of 14,000–15,000. Thus, significant transnational labor movements were occurring. When Japan initiated its policy of national seclusion in the 1630s, these Japanese populations were forbidden to return and eventually assimilated into the local societies (Ishii 1998). Part of the motivation behind excluding these populations was the notion that they had been corrupted by outside influences and by living with foreigners, and would therefore be sources of additional social decay if allowed to return. Problems with cultural globalization start early.

The national policies of seclusion of the 1630s were enacted in response to increasing incorporation, and reflect protoglobalizational tensions with the European world-system. The most dominant issue was religion. First, the spread of Christianity caused considerable disruption as differences in customs and moral standards created friction between European missionaries and Japanese elites. Though first welcomed as a means to facilitate trade with the West, Christianity began to sow seeds of unease as converts
were limited to children, samurai, and vassals) began choosing ultimate obedience to a Christian god over obedience to their traditional feudal masters. Conflicts over the Western practice of eating beef, when cattle are plainly useful animals, also caused some consternation among the Japanese. The Portuguese export of Japanese slaves was another point that furthered intercultural discomfort. This unease increased when missionaries grew critical of the loose sexual standards of the Japanese men (who effectively practiced polygamy), especially when cast in terms of the monogamous expectations of Christianity. Elsewhere, anti-Christian sentiment found additional support among Buddhist sects that were feeling the encroachment of the Jesuits.

Regulation of Christianity therefore becomes understandable. Regulation increased after the arrival of the less-discreet Franciscans in 1593, who felt Jesuit circumcision was a failing. Of course, this sectoral rivalry served as a mirror to the colonial rivalry of Portugal and Spain, as the Jesuits were from Portugal and the Franciscans from Spain. With each side feeling that additional converts bolstered their claim to Japan, religion becomes another means to achieve the aspirations of empire. The tensions with the Japanese culminated with the issuance of an imperial decree banning Christianity in 1614. Outlawing the religion outright opened the door to the often cold-blooded persecution of converts, which in turn provided fuel for religious rebellion. Of particular note is the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637–1638. Approximately 37,000 remaining rebels (including women and children) entrenched themselves in a strategically located castle and held off the forces of the emperor (about 100,000 strong) for three months. Virtually all the insurgents were killed, though the emperor lost around 13,000 men (Hane 1991:127; Inoue 1968).

The actual process of limiting foreign access to Japan began shortly after the banning of Christianity, and well before the Shimabara Rebellion. This limited Spain's and Portugal's ability to help the rebellious Christian converts, had they wanted to. In 1616 all foreign merchants except those from China were prohibited from trading at ports other than Nagasaki and Hirado. In 1624 the Spanish were wholly denied the right to trade with Japan, and the English eventually abandoned attempts to open trading relations. In 1633 Japanese ships without official seals were forbidden to leave the country, and in 1636 all Japanese ships were similarly forbidden. In addition, those already abroad were prevented from returning home, abandoned by their home country without hope of repatriation. Many found work elsewhere in the intraregional trade, and many became employees of their former competitors, the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Other regulations from 1633 to 1639 included the expulsion of children of mixed blood and their mothers, and the eventual expulsion of the Portuguese, quite likely in response to the ongoing “Christian problem” illustrated at Shimabara (Inoue 1968; Ishii 1998:1–2; Hane 1991).

The English offer an interesting case of incorporation and reversal of incorporation along the information network. By 1613 the English began an active attempt at solidifying trade relations with Japan, which yielded reports included in “travel tale” collections. Throughout the century the English received secondhand translations and additional reports, but these were often inaccurate and occasionally contradictory. As English interest grew for Japan and things Japanese (especially lacquere ware), “paradoxically their knowledge of that exotic place actually deteriorated toward the centuries’ end just as the cultural response to Japan began to expand into the arts” (Huisen 1973:43). Here Japan is exerting cultural-consumer impact on core European states, yet retreating into the realm of myth. In fact, Japanese wealth in silver had been exaggerated to the extent that as late as 1643 the Dutch still sought a fabled “Eldorado” in the region (Huisen 1973:44).

B. Japanese Resistance and Withdrawal (1630–1853)

British interest in Japan was peaking just as access was being restricted, which meant Japan was sliding back into the zone of ignorance. John Speed (1626) produced the first general atlas for consumption in Great Britain, which was reproduced in various editions for the next 50 years. While the maps are attributed to Speed in the title of the atlas, they are in fact Anglicized copies of contemporary products available in Amsterdam. Not only does this again demonstrate the ready transfer of information throughout the European world-system, but it also is important for the context of Japan. The Dutch had the most advantageous position inside the country and consequently were seen as the best European source of accurate information (Huisen 1973). The type of map produced in Speed’s atlas is from the genre of “cartes à figures,” which included side panels with costumed figures, with town plans and views in the upper and lower borders. Again, this reinforces the Dutch source of origin, as this was a style popularized there. The relative accuracy of the map also reflects Dutch influence. Japan is in proper proximity to the Chinese coast, though the Korean peninsula is distended. Japan’s depiction is based on the stylized “Gyogi” model, which became predominant in Europe and reflects the “view” of Japan as a product of the domestic Japanese cartographic tradition. Just as British fascination with Japan and things Japanese was increasing, the ports were shuttered.

In 1639 the final edict officially closing Japan and mandating a strict policy of isolation was issued. The only ships allowed to enter Japanese
ports were the Koreans, the Chinese, and the Dutch. Koreans were allowed
to trade at Iki Island off Honshu, while the Chinese and Dutch were
allowed to trade at the small island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay under very
restrictive circumstances. For instance, the Dutch were allowed to reside
only on the island and were forbidden to travel without special permission
and escort. Further restrictions on foreign trade were forthcoming. Initially
unrestricted in volume, the silver trade with China was capped at 6,000
kan (about 49,620 pounds) and the Dutch were limited to 3,000 kan. In
1715 the numbers of ships allowed to trade annually was reduced to 30 for
China, and only 2 for Holland. Also at this time, trade in copper was
restricted in response to imperial concerns. By 1813 the annual number
of Chinese ships allowed to visit Japanese ports was reduced to 10, and Japan
remained closed to general international trade until the arrival of Commo-

So, the period from 1630 to 1853 is accurately viewed as a period of
resistance to incorporation. There was still limited contact, with informa-
tion diffusing, albeit with a bit of a time-lag given the restricted and often
intermediary nature of trade. This time-lag associated with information
diffusion is evidenced if one examines contemporary Japanese world maps.
The Japanese maps were taken from outdated Dutch sources being
imported through the island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor, as Japanese
scholars were still immensely curious as to the goings in the outside world.
For example, the Shibukawa (1690) terrestrial globe exhibits several features
that had been present on European maps a century earlier, but were
corrected on then-contemporary representations.

Japan lagged behind more recent European cartographic innovations and
discoveries. In particular, the representation of Australia/New Guinea being
attached to Antarctica is notable, as is the "Gyogi" style outline of Japan
itself. This is reminiscent of Western representations of Australia used
approximately 100 years earlier. Ortelius (1587) serves as an example. The
same stylization of Australia and New Guinea is present, but considerably
outdated by the time the information diffuses into Japan.

The process of information diffusion is often an uneven exchange.
However, it is rarely monodirectional. During the period of isolation, most of
Europe was forced into a state of ignorance regarding Japan, which is reflected
in the cartography of the period. For example, Bellin (1752) provides a good
outline of Japan in the traditional Gyogi style, but misses important interior
characteristics. Other notable errors include the distortion of the Noto penin-
sula and the exaggerated size of the Oki Islands. The Gyogi representation
continued to show up on Western representations of Japan, and embodies the
dialogue inherent in reconciling competing systemic cartographic traditions.

Because this was the standard Japanese stylized representation and Europeans
had limited accurate information, it also became the European representa-
"This depiction of Japan, wrongly aligned and with only two principal islands,
became standard in Europe" (Whitfield 1998:105). Indeed, it was still in use
over 150 years later, illustrating how slowly inaccurate information is sorted
from more accurate data.

In contrast to Bellin (1752), the Sekisui (1783) Map provides a more
accurate, in terms of the Western cartographic tradition, depiction of Japan.
The "Sekisui Map" is particularly relevant for several reasons. Not only is it
one of the first maps published in Japan with accurate meridians and
parallels, but the scale of distance is also clearly marked. This was a compila-
tion of many sources, including official maps compiled by the shogunate,
and served as the authoritative map of Japan for the next 90 years until the
fall of the Tokugawa bakufu. As such, it is the embodiment of the best
available Japanese information. Even European maps would continue to be
inaccurate until Russian expeditions under Baranov (of the Russian-
American Company) accurately charted the coastline in the late eighteenth
century. Of course, when Japan was pulled into the expanding world-system
with the arrival of Perry in 1853, Japan's resistance to incorporation was
effectively breached.

C. The United States, Japan, and Forced Incorporation
(1853–1868)

The arrival of Admiral Perry in Nagasaki Harbor in 1853 signaled the
re-admittance of Japan into the European world-system, though this
re-admittance was plainly not voluntary. The next 15 years were a period
of considerable transition, resulting in the end of the Tokugawa era and the
Meiji Restoration, commonly delineated as the start of "modern" Japan. Yet
the arrival of Perry in and of itself effectively opened the floodgates and
immediately signaled the shift of Japan into the political-military network
of systemic interaction. This, in turn, was followed by the growth of bulk-
goods exchange. Why should 1853 be considered such an important date
instead of the later Meiji transition? Because the arrival of Perry and the
"opening" of Japan was itself the culmination of systemic pressures that
made the opening inevitable, it was only a question of when and how.

On the margins of a system, especially when the information network
is tenuously breached and still subject to the influence of "bad" information—
correct information, myth, and rumor can have a disproportionate impact
on the representations, cartographic and otherwise, of the frontier held by
members of the expanding system. Furthermore, this is merely one very
literal example of cultural representations being "contested." How is it determined which system's portrayal is the "correct" one? Quite literally, the question becomes one of whose vision of the world is to become dominant. In turn, this has implications and application beyond the sphere of cartography. Consequently, it is at the juncture of contact between different societies that these issues get sorted out. And it is the tension in this sorting, the underlying assault on cultural identity and what is taken as "known" that gives rise to such strong antglobal sentiments.

The process of adopting Western technology began even before Perry's arrival. By the 1840s the domains of Mito, Hizen, and Satsuma were casting guns using Western methods, and by 1850 Hizen acquired Japan's first reverberatory furnace to produce iron suitable for modern cannons. Japanese students of the West, while outspoken, suggested abandoning the seclusion policy; the Dutch also warned the bakufu of Western intentions. In 1842 the shogunate reversed a decision of 1825 stating that all foreign ships should be driven from Japanese waters, ordering instead that foreign ships accidentally arriving in Japan be provided with water, fuel, and food (Schirokauer 1989:415–416).

Why the Japanese policy-shift before 1853? Again, the answer lies in Japan's links to the larger Chinese trading system combined with Japan's knowledge of the growing power of the Western nations. Western approaches to Japan came in the late 1700s when Russia requested trade relations with Hokkaido in 1778 and 1792, then in Nagasaki in 1804. British ships requesting trade or supplies were also regularly turned away, as was a private American-British attempt to open relations in 1837. In spite of these precedents, the shogunate relaxed the exclusionary edicts in 1842, but why? Because Japan was well aware of the changing situation in the region and recognized that these changes could not be ignored. Relaxing the edicts was one step in an attempted negotiated reentry into the expanding world-system.

What was the seachange that occurred between 1837 and 1842? Most salient for the Japanese were the Opium Wars in China. The lessons of Chinese weakness and Western strength were not lost on Japan. China's defeat in the Opium Wars from 1839 to 1842 served as shock to the Japanese shogunate; the opening of new Chinese ports meant: more Western vessels in Asian seas, and more pressure on Japan. Information concerning Western military capabilities, science, and industry filtered into Japan through the Dutch, and America also began to take an increased interest in Japan.

American whalers first entered the Pacific in the 1790s, largely concurrent with the sea otter fur trade, and were pushing into new fisheries off Japan's east coast by the 1830s. The American whaling industry peaked between 1835 and 1855, with no fewer than 722 of the world's 900 whaling vessels being American. Some of the remainder were expatriate Nantucketers operating out of various "home" ports. The vast majority fished the Pacific Ocean, and Japan's refusal to allow safe harbor became an important political rallying point in the United States (Dudden 1992:14).

The United States tried to open contact in 1846, when the American naval vessels Columbia and Vincennes, commanded by Commodore James Biddle, visited Tokyo Bay. There they were "suddenly surrounded by nearly one hundred war vessels, rudely towed out to sea, and expelled" (Dudden 1992:17–18). The acquisition of California in 1848 increased American activity in the Pacific and bolstered interest in Nagasaki, since it offered a convenient coaling stop just 500 miles from Shanghai for ships traveling from San Francisco. So even though Japan rebuffed the American attempt to open relations as recently as 1846, the Japanese were well aware that their isolation was going to come to an end. They were still attempting to limit contacts and control what access would be permitted (Hane 1972; Dudden 1992; Schirokauer 1989).

With America hoping to make the North Pacific Ocean a "vast American lake," Japan was seen as part of the bridge to the riches of the Far East. The financial means of building this bridge was provided by trading and whaling. Further, many Americans were convinced that Japan would soon be pried open by either the British or Russians, effectively blocking American prospects. Expansionist interests in the United States, particularly those supported by New England's whaling industry, were in favor of establishing a permanent naval force in the western Pacific to strengthen the American position. Commodore Perry's expedition of 1853–1854 was a natural progression of America's plan for establishing a permanent presence in the Far East (Dudden 1991:16–17). Perry was well versed in the culture and history of feudal Japan and knew that an agreement would take time to make. Nevertheless, he was disappointed when the Japanese rejected President Fillmore's treaty for American commerce and "international tenets of behavior including diplomatic relations and the rescue of shipwrecked seamen" (Dudden 1991:18). Perry, in turn, rejected a Japanese offer of joint trading rights with the Dutch in Nagasaki, promising to return for the desired treaty. In February of 1854 Perry returned to Tokyo Bay, and fearing that the British or French may have preempted him, commanded an impressive squadron of eleven warships, including three steam-powered frigates.

Perry's original squadron of 1853 consisted of four "blackships"—so named for their black hulls. There appears to be some discrepancy regarding the actual composition of the 1854 force, however. Hane (1972:248) only
mentions “eight ‘blacksips’” but no steam frigates, Dudden (1991:18) describes the force as “ten warships featuring three steam driven frigates,” while Schirokauer (1989:416) describes the force as “eleven ships, three of them steam frigates.” Seeking additional confirmation leads to further confusion, as Takekoshi (1967:289) states that “The fleet consisted of nine warships in all.” Evidently, even this historical tidbit is reeding into the realm of myth. Still, it illustrates the tendency of fact to rather quickly become blurred, especially over historic and geographic distance.

The product of Perry’s visit was the Treaty of Kanagawa, signed on March 31, 1854. The treaty was a limited first step toward opening Japan to the full range of American interests. It provided protection for American castaways and opened the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate for coaling and provisioning, with consular offices to be located there. The treaty also established most-favored-nation status, but held no guarantee of commencing actual trade. This undertaking was left to the American consul, Townsend Harris, who arrived in 1856. By 1858 Harris achieved the desired trade treaty and Japan opened more ports, agreed to a schedule of tariffs and freedom of trade. The floodgates were now breached, and another round of treaties with the Dutch, Russians, British, and French followed. In the end, Japan’s situation mirrored that of China: the treaties opened more ports, provided for most-favored-nation treatment, established the practice of extraterritoriality for Westerners, and eroded Japan’s tariff autonomy. This resulted in low import duties. Trade in bulk commenced (Schirokauer 1989:415–417; Dudden 1992:18–20).

With the advent of bulk trade, the post-opening period and the Meiji Restoration (1868) are essentially Japan becoming peripheralized into the world-economy. This was followed by rapid assimilation and change, which is well documented in the literature on the emergence of “modern” Japan. However, as this is actual “peripheralization” in terms of the world-economy, the incorporation process and any ability to resist it is essentially over. This bodes ill for anyone concerned with the creeping and insidious nature of globalization: resistance may be undertaken, but the rising tide of the world-economy inevitably tops the seawalls of isolation. Once a region is “hooked” into the world-economy via trade, the flags of domination soon follow.

III. Incorporation and Protoglobalization

There is no question that the history of the West’s interaction with Japan is a long affair. The process of incorporation is similarly lengthy. As a point of departure, where do we normally begin a discussion of Japanese incorporation? While seemingly innocuous, this question lies at the heart of earlier visions of incorporation, which is a bit of a problem. Perhaps the easier way to approach this is to first ask, when was Japan not part of the world-system? Was Japan in the periphery prior to Japanese seclusion in the mid-seventeenth century? Traditionally, the answer appears to be no.

The lack of inclusion is based on the distinction between the European world-economy’s external arena and its periphery. To clarify, “in 1600 Portugal traded with the central African kingdom of Monomotapa as well as with Japan. Yet it would be prima facie hard to argue that either Monomotapa or Japan were part of the world-economy at that time” (Wallerstein 1974:301). In contrast, Brazil, or at least parts of Brazil, and the other American colonies were included in the world-economy: “Nevertheless, the Americas inside, and the East Indies outside, or at least so we contend” (1974:301). Why? Because the “external arena of a world-economy consists of those other world-systems with which a given world-economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of preciosities, what was sometimes called the ‘rich trades’” (1974:302). It is precisely because the East was involved in trade that had high value that it gets excluded.

Yet are preciosities the only export of Japan? Actually, no. Japan also produced silver, and here is where the question becomes stickier. There appears to be a double standard for the treatment of bullion; on one hand it is used as a mechanism for incorporation in the Americas, yet the bullion flows out of Japan were not considered incorporative. Why? “The production of gold and silver as a commodity made the Americas a peripheral area of the European world-economy insofar as this commodity was essential to the operation of this world-economy, and it was essential to the extent that it was used as money” (Wallerstein 1980:109, emphasis in original). If all the bullion merely flowed out of the Americas to Asia, the Americas would have been just another external arena. The use of some of it as currency apparently makes the difference. Yet if one is considering the end-use of bullion as money as a defining characteristic, then this should be an argument for a much earlier date of incorporation for West Africa.

Apparently, it is because Europe exerted political control over the production of currency that makes the real difference. Europe not just used the bullion as currency, but they “sent settlers to control the area of the Americas politically and to supervise the economic operations, and they imported labor as well. In short, they incorporated the Americas into their world-economy” (Wallerstein 1980:109). Again, West Africa is the primary source of the “imported labor” (i.e., slaves) used in this “incorporated” arena. The key here is the “political control” involved, not the end use or the bullion flows; the end use of some bullion as money is epiphenomenal.
If none of the bullion were used as currency in Europe, the Americas would still be considered incorporated, because Europe controlled the production and the system is defined exclusively in terms of European political control. Consider the case where this element is missing: West Africa. The source of labor is the same, there is organized extraction of the bullion (in this case gold), the bullion is used as currency in Europe, yet the economic operations are not politically supervised by Europe, and hence the region is claimed to be external, at least for Wallerstein's conception.

But again, what of Japan's production of bullion in context of Europe? Europe certainly profited from the trade in Japanese silver, but as a commodity it flowed into China to offset the European consumption of Asian production. To summarize:

Already at the end of the fifteenth century before Portugal was in the picture, Europe probably consumed a quarter of Asia's production; and to meet the increased demand of Europe, Asian production doubled over the course of the century. In return, what Asia principally got from Europe was bullion, silver, and gold. The silver came largely from the Americas and Japan. The gold seems largely to have come as first from West Africa. (Wallerstein 1974:329)

Even with the arrival of Portugal and the further development of the Japanese trade, the increase in profits was the result of the intermediary carrying trade, consisting of the exchange of silver for Chinese commodities, primarily raw silk. Thus, exclusion is based on the double premise of trade being primarily precocities and the fact that the bullion involved did not pass through Europe. But again, the question becomes a political one, not economic. Because European relations with Asian states were undertaken in a context favorable to and established by the Asian nations (from approximately 1500 to 1800), the Europeans were there "on sufferance," which provides "one fundamental sense in which Asia was not part of the world-economy at this time" (Wallerstein 1974:330). Again, one is presented with the overly narrow conception of the world-economy as solely European, thus neglecting the agency of actors outside of Europe, such as Japan.

Furthermore, the timing of Japan's voluntary seclusion allows us to potentially overlook a subsidiary concern with the Japanese bullion issue: the growing importance of Japanese copper in the world-economy. Demand for copper in the world-economy at the start of the seventeenth century was fueled by two sources: its relatively new use as currency and its use in the production of various brass and bronze goods. The use of pure copper as coinage is tied directly to the financial strains of Castile, which led Philip III's Spanish government "to authorize in 1599 a vellon coinage of pure copper. Thus began the great Spanish inflation, born of the fact that 'the temptation to make money out of money proved to be too strong for a perennially bankrupt government'" (Wallerstein 1980:204–205). Other nations followed suit and issued copper coinage, thus further stimulating the world demand for copper. For example, "there was the Kipper-und Wipperzeit in the Germanies from 1621 to 1623 and an extensive French copper coinage from 1607 to 1621. Sweden itself sent [sic] on a copper-silver standard in 1625" (Wallerstein 1980:205). Other than bullion and coinage, copper was "needed for the kettles and brassware produced in Holland; and since the mid-fifteenth century, it had been used for bronze cannon founding. Bronze cannon, which gave way to iron cannon in the course of the seventeenth century, was at the height of its use in 1600" (Wallerstein 1980:205). Thus, copper was very much at the heart of the European economy, serving as currency, bullion, and as a key ingredient in bronze and brass products.

It is in this environment that Japanese copper should be considered. Demand was such that copper production became the engine of development for Sweden, as Gustavus Adolphus (r. 1611–1632) was able to create a fairly successful royal monopoly in copper and iron. Swedish copper output increased, "Sweden rapidly became Europe's leading producer, and copper mining became the key economic activity of Sweden" (1980:205). While Swedish copper is identified as the strongest link between its economic development and political expansion, eventually "it would eventually be challenged by Japanese copper, which first appeared on the Amsterdam market in 1623, but whether the competition was significant before 1650 is a matter of controversy" (1980:205, f192). By 1619 Gustavus Adolphus created the Swedish Trading Company to market Swedish copper, though the company was dissolved in 1627 when the world market in copper suddenly fell, possibly manipulated by Dutch capitalists. Wallerstein (1980:206) explains:

We do know that the Trip firm, a major investor in Swedish copper, also had links with the VOC (Dutch East India Company), which ordered copper from Japan in 1624. Trip purchased the whole of the VOC's Japanese copper imports in 1626 and 1627. We also know that the Trips after 1627 granted new loans to the Swedes, again repayable in copper, and hence recreating the Amsterdam copper staple.

Was monopolizing Japanese copper a central act in this ploy to manipulate global markets? Was Japanese supply sufficient to glut the market, drive prices down, and bankrupt the Swedish Trading Company? If so, this provides an
additional argument for the significance of Japanese copper as a commodity central to the world-economy of Europe. While the fact that Japanese copper was even being traded on the Amsterdam market should raise some questions regarding Japan's relationship to the European world-economy, this point is somewhat obviated by Japan's self-imposed seclusion in 1639.

Yet Japanese copper continued to flow from the trade port of Nagasaki, via Chinese and Dutch traders. For example, in 1741 the total amount of copper sent to Nagasaki in one year was fixed between 4,000,000 and 4,500,000 kin.\(^9\) Of this, 3,000,000 kin were allocated to Chinese ships, and the "amount of trade to be done by the Dutch shall be restricted to the cargoes of two ships of a value of 3,000 kwamme of silver, for which 1,500,000 kin of copper shall be given in one year" (Takekoshi 1967b:149).\(^10\) Even when "closed," the port of Nagasaki was officially shipping nearly 1,000 tons of copper to market in Amsterdam, double that to China. This says nothing of the smuggling that occurred through the samurai pirates, when the "Tokugawa Shogunate tried hard to restrict the volume of trade at Nagasaki by means of Government ordinance, smuggling increased enormously, and entirely neutralized the efforts of Edo, besides being highly profitable to the smugglers" (Takekoshi 1967b:177). The exchange rate at Nagasaki was fixed, which allowed for tremendous profit internationally (Takekoshi 1967b:178). Wallerstein is aware of the difference in exchange, and that this is largely why bullion flowed to the Far East. Silver went eastward because it was profitable; circa 1680–1703, "silver-gold ratios of the time were 17:1 in Spanish America, 15:1 in Europe, 12:1 in India, and 9:1 in Japan" (Wallerstein 1980:108, f197). Even when Japan was trying to remain isolated, it continued to be a relevant part of the world-economy. Copper is only one good that serves to illustrate this point, and which promises a beneficial avenue for future research.

So returning to the task at hand: when did Japan become an incorporated part of the international system? Most scholars would say after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, if not later. Obviously, the process started much earlier. To get a feel for the procedural shifts and how they relate to each other, we turn to the typography of incorporation as a means of identifying key signaling events and to clarify the complex processes involved (fig. 5.1).

Japan cannot be addressed in isolation; it was historically part of the Chinese world-economy and must be treated as such. Thus, the story of Japanese incorporation is similar to that of Abyssinian incorporation; both must be understood in the context of their wider systems coming into contact with the expanding European system. So the initial grooming process of Japan lies in its ongoing relationship with China. This relationship forms the basis for Japanese identity and foreign relations, and Japan was essentially a semiperipheral nation in the Chinese world-system prior to European encroachment. Only with the reports of Marco Polo did Japan even begin to move out of the zone of ignorance into the information network of the European system.

Because of the strength of Japan as an independent polity and its position within an extant system, once contact is made incorporation across the various "networks of interaction" is quite rapid. Why? Because the system being contacted already encompasses all the individual networks (IN, PGN, PMN, BGN). On contact, the transition across network membranes is temporally and geographically compressed and easier to accomplish, though individual actors within the system being contacted will necessarily exist at different relative positions within the system. Japan was in such a situation, in context of European expansion into the Chinese world-system.

Japan managed to exist on the fringe of the intersection of the Euro-Chinese information networks; it is during this period that Japan was "adrift" in the Pacific Ocean cartographically. Japan then rapidly moved into the European external arena as trade with China increased, and this process accelerated with the shipwreck of sailors in 1543 and subsequent proselytizing by the Jesuits in 1549. As interaction increased, trade grew, and social and economic transitional changes were felt throughout Japan. This demarcated Japan's shift toward nominal incorporation, and two characteristics of this shift raised considerable concern within Japan: religion and guns. Both represented a shift in political power away from established patterns: the church posed the possibility of a competing secular power base more worrisome than its spiritual message, and the influx of firearms meant that even a minimally trained peasant could kill a samurai, not to mention the disturbing potential of an entire army consisting of commoners. It is at
this juncture that the Japanese polity takes action and increases its regulation over foreign trade, eventually leading to the closure of Japan in 1639.

Why? One answer is simply that it had the capacity to do so. Japan as a state was strong enough to make the decision at that point in time. Of course, this strength is relative. If the incorporation process had continued, the relative position of the Japanese government may have been insufficient to stem the tide of foreign trade. Yet, recognizing the destabilizing impact that vast number of firearms presented to the sociocultural hierarchy of the country, coupled with the similarly destabilizing impact of Christianity, led to a clear conclusion for the Tokugawa regime: limit the disease by preventing more infection. Because Japan had a centralized political authority, they were able to enact the policy of seclusion. Even so, trade continued under the aegis of the Emperor, and smuggling via the wakō pirates continued to be a problem beyond even imperial control. Plainly, state capacity is a critical variable in the ability to resist or otherwise manage the forces of incorporation and globalization.

The period of seclusion offered Japan a brief respite from the transitional pressures of incorporation, but the process did not simply end. Instead, even though Japan withdrew, the greater Chinese world-system was being drawn ever more tightly into the European world-economy. These changes were transmitted slowly into Japan. The most obvious symptom of this is the process of information diffusion exemplified by the Dutch. Pressure to open Japan—which was primarily of an economic, imperially competitive, nature—grew to the point that even Japanese officials recognized that they could no longer maintain their policy of total isolation. The arrival of Perry in 1853 preempted the Japanese decision-making process. The decision to reengage, prompted by systemic economic concerns and competition, was made for the Japanese. No longer was capacity of the Japanese state sufficient to maintain isolation. Thus, the arrival of Perry is an obvious signaling event. It was a symptom, not a cause; the sequela associated with the growth of the European world-economy and its absorption of the Chinese system, marking the effective incorporation of Japan.

The remainder of the drama is well known. Most scholars correlate the emergence of "modern" Japan with the Meiji Restoration in 1868 or the posttransition military victories in China (1895) or over Russia (1905). So while the incorporation of Japan is usually considered as occurring in the latter half of the nineteenth or early twentieth century, this overlooks the tremendous amount of activity that came before. Far from being social and economic alterations that merely enable incorporation and peripheralization, these preoccurrences are in fact necessary preconditions of the grooming process, allowing incorporation to proceed.

To use a bad analogy, incorporation is rather like a prom date. Concentrating on the later aspects of incorporation is like concentrating on the last half of the prom and the postevent activities; it ignores the months of anticipation, preparation, choosing of regalia, families taking photos, and pre-dance dinner. Incorporation is a complex process, one which has been defined exclusively in terms of European interests and one whose important initial stages are drastically undertheorized. The theoretical emphasis appears to be on the payoff for the expanding system, not for what happens to make that payoff occur, or even what makes it worthwhile.

What does this description of Japanese incorporation have to offer as far as progressing the debate about globalization, but also in terms of refining existing forms of analysis? First, for all practical purposes, the "globalization" of Japan is a process that began with Japanese assimilation into the Chinese world-system. Social, cultural, economic, and political outcomes all mirror "modern" problems associated with globalization. For example, transnational financial concerns are reflected in bullion flows of copper and silver, as well as the importation of millions of Chinese coins into Japan. The notion of a globalized "McCulture" is also well represented with Japan's assimilation of Chinese culture through language, philosophy, and religion. Artistic influences are seen in painting and literature, and defining "social" activities like the tea ceremony are also framed by cross-cultural contact. Economic sectoral disturbances, such as the replacement of indigenous Japanese producers with cheaper Chinese cotton, the importation of Korean labor for weaving, and the adaptation of Korean porcelain production techniques, each echo modern concerns with outsourcing, labor mobility, and even intellectual property rights. Problems with pirates, smuggling, and the international arms trade are equally timeless, regardless of the era in question.

From a very basic perspective, the same processes and problems have always been present in the international system. Japan is interesting, however, because it was able to temporarily delay the process of incorporation during the Tokugawa period. The lesson to learn is that resistance to encroachment seems to be temporary, at best. Strong state structures are required to negotiate any degree of systemic "externality." Can one remain untouched by "globalization"? How can governments manage the negative impacts, while encouraging positive interactions? Can we accurately view incorporation as globalization? The transition from the zone of ignorance as proteoglobalization? What is the role of individual agency in the expansion of the international system, and how do individuals matter? These are all issues that are explored in greater detail in the concluding chapter.