Espionage and the Optimal Standard of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Program in Maritime SecurityEuropean Journal of Operational Research (Forthcoming) (2017)
We examine the design of a trusted trader program in the U.S. known as C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism). For this, we consider a game between the government, an importer and a terrorist group. The government provides maritime security using three policies: (i) Standard of the C-TPAT program, that is, the degree of security of the supply chain that is required of a member, (ii) Quality of intelligence about the terrorist group, and (iii) Inspection of Cargo. In equilibrium, the government sets the standard of the C-TPAT program at a level that minimizes congestion. However, the optimal espionage expenditure is less than the level that minimizes congestion. We also endogenously determine the membership size of the C-TPAT program and show that it depends non-monotonically on policies such as the standard of the program or the quality of intelligence. Finally, we examine the impact of parametric changes on these policies.
- OR in Defense,
- Homeland Security,
- Public Policy,
- Planning: Government
Citation InformationAniruddha Bagchi and Jomon Aliyas Paul. "Espionage and the Optimal Standard of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Program in Maritime Security" European Journal of Operational Research (Forthcoming) (2017)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jomonaliyas_paul/41/