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Article
Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining
Cornell Law Review (2011)
  • John C Yoo, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.
Keywords
  • treaties,
  • international agreements,
  • foreign relations,
  • President,
  • Senate,
  • bargaining
Disciplines
Publication Date
Fall 2011
Citation Information
John C Yoo. "Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining" Cornell Law Review Vol. 97 Iss. 1 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/johnyoo/55/