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Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive AGreement
Michigan Law Review (2001)
  • John C Yoo, University of California, Berkeley
This article develops a theory explaining the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreement, an alternatve to treaties. The puzzle is that our nation continues to use treaties at all, since congressional-executive agreements need only recieve simple legislative majorities for their approval. This article argues that in order to maintain the Constitution's balance between executive and legislative powers, congressional-executive agreements have been used in areas of Congress's Article I, Section powers, and that treaties continue to be used in areas where cooperation between the executive and legislative branches is necessary, or where the subject lies outside of Congress's enumerated powers.
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Citation Information
John C Yoo. "Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive AGreement" Michigan Law Review Vol. 99 (2001)
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