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Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
  • John N. WILLIAMS, Singapore Management University
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Journal Article
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I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.
Taylor and Francis
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
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Citation Information
John N. WILLIAMS. "Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion" Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 74 Iss. 1 (1996) p. 135 - 149 ISSN: 0004-8402
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