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"'Toy' Presses and the Rise of Fugitive U.S. Government Documents"

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**Introduction**

The World Wide Web (Web) has been a mixed blessing for government publication. The Web makes government documents ubiquitous, thereby allowing citizens unprecedented access. Unlike their printed counterparts, Web documents are not subject to the delays and costs associated with printing, nor do they subject citizens to the inconvenience of identifying and traveling to the nearest depository library. Further, the Web allows government to trim printing expenditures from the federal budget.

As Tocqueville might well have anticipated, the U.S. government has abandoned the practice of printing documents and attached itself to Web publishing in a precipitous way, content with realizing the immediate gains that this technology offers, while remaining largely indifferent to (or unmindful of) the far reaching consequences of its actions. The Web surely affords government an economical method of publication, but only at the expense of taxpayers who wish (or need) to have printed documents. It is they who bear the cost of printing. The Web just as surely has enriched the political process by expanding access to government information exponentially. But the Web exacts a high price for the ubiquity that it offers. As surely and as effortlessly as the Web makes government documents omnipresent, it may as easily render them irretrievably lost. With
a click or keystroke, nearsighted government administrators may obliterate documents perceived as having exceeded their shelf life.

As Tocqueville noted 150 years ago, the U.S. government suffers from myopia and is largely blind to its history. There is little evidence to suggest that government has grown in solicitude toward the history that underpins its institutions and policies. In the hands of such a polity, which cares little for its past, the Web is a publishing tool that seriously endangers the historical record of the U.S. federal government.

Web documents tend to live only so long as they serve the immediate needs of the issuing agency and its specialized constituency. Published in no tangible format, they are here today and gone tomorrow. Those who work extensively with U.S. government documents are too familiar with this vanishing act. In this publishing environment, preserving Web documents will depend on the willingness of all governmental institutions to cooperate in a comprehensive archival undertaking. Yet the road to interagency cooperation is littered with the broken spirits of those who entertain dreams of establishing coherence in U.S. public policy. Even matters of supreme national importance fail to inspire one agency to coordinate its activities with another, as the events surrounding September 11, 2001 sadly demonstrate. A similar intransigence has impeded every effort designed to coordinate the publishing activities of the U.S. federal government. Indeed, an exasperated Senator Hubert Humphrey compared his efforts to effect such coordination in the 1960s with “trying to resolve the Berlin problem” [1].

During the Great War, less capable legislators than Humphrey easily tamed the publishing activities of executive agencies. How did the executive branch arrive at its
independence, an independence that grew so fierce as to become utterly unmanageable? The answer lies largely in the development of technology.

**Background**

In the decades leading up to the World Wide Web, an unsophisticated but no less portentous technology shaped the publishing activities of the executive branch. Around the time of the Wilson Administration, small offset presses began making their appearance in the executive establishments of government. In these “toy presses” agencies found the means to evade a censorious Congress, as well as every statute, rule, or regulation that they considered burdensome. Though not nearly so extraordinary as the World Wide Web, the multigraph and multilith were nearly as pernicious in their effect of diminishing the historical record of the U.S. federal government.

In its campaign to silence the Creel Committee and undermine the Wilson administration, Congress neglected to fully arm its JCP. The printing act of 1919 failed to bring under congressional control those documents that the departments produced on their small offset presses. In 1920 Congress attempted to steer the multigraph, mimeograpah, and other such office machines within the purview of the JCP. Congress passed, but President Wilson rejected, H.R. 12610. Section eight of this bill proposed to give the JCP regulatory power over “mimeographing, multigraphing, and other processes used for the duplication of typewritten matter…” Unlike the Presidents of the late nineteenth century, Wilson refused to surrender to Congress functions that he perceived as rightfully belonging to the executive branch [2].
Wilson's veto challenged the right of Congress to control what he regarded as the purely administrative function of printing. It also served to protect from legislative encroachment an entire field of printing, which the departments preferred to call “processing” [3]. In 1921 the Republican Congress favored the Harding administration by shifting some of its publishing authority to the Bureau of the Budget. The JCP retreated and the departments enjoyed an extended period of autonomy. Encountering little resistance, many departments and bureaus acquired these offset presses, around which full-fledged printing establishments arose. The departments preferred to call these “duplicating” plants.

‘Processing” and “duplicating” became keywords in this executive agency subterfuge to skirt the printing laws of 1895 and 1919 that designated the GPO as the authorized printing establishment. Government agencies simply asserted that the offset press was not a printing but a duplicating machine that processed rather than printed, thereby exempting the documents produced on these machines from the printing statutes. No overseer challenged this pretense to departmental autonomy. The newly created Bureau of the Budget (BOB) demonstrated no desire to regulate these offset presses; the JCP neglected to enforce the printing statutes; and the GPO failed to generate sufficient political clout. The consequences of this inaction became manifest in the 1930s.

The Rise of Offset Presses in the Executive Departments
The departments began to acquire offset printing presses in the early 1900s. The Printing Investigation Commission of 1910 reported a total of 232 rotaprint, mimeograph, and multigraph machines in all government establishments [4]. The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC) quickly distinguished itself as the undisputed champion of departmental processing, not only for its prodigious output but also for its complete disregard for the statutes and regulations that governed printing. BFDC administrator O. P. Austin purchased a multigraph, abandoned (almost altogether) the GPO, resisted proposals that sought to centralize printing in other divisions, and even lobbied to assume the functions of Public Printer for the Department of Commerce [5]. Austin may have been oblivious to the existence of Samuel Donnelly, the legally appointed Public Printer, who resided in the GPO.

By 1920 the JCP counted 486 offset presses in the District of Columbia alone [6]. Two years later the Permanent Departmental Conference on Printing acknowledged the usefulness of these machines but advised against using them as "regular printing plants, inasmuch as the expense of...multigraphing in large quantities exceeds the cost of printing, and for the further reason that this method of printing large numbers of blank forms and various publications is an evasion of the printing laws." The Permanent Conference recommended that departments use these machines only to produce strictly administrative documents, such as circulars and form letters [7]. The BOB failed to act on this recommendation. The departments, according to Public Printer George Carter, disregarded it altogether. In 1926 Carter reported that agency “duplicating” plants, “which are really printing offices under another name,” produced “vast quantities of more, or less pretentious publications,” and consumed “2,200,000 pounds of paper” [8].
The following year the Superintendent of Documents conducted a study and concluded that much material produced on these offset presses was not of the ephemeral kind, as the departments contended, but "embraced well-defined series, periodicals, and reports, which are of permanent value and would seem of sufficient importance to justify printing." Because the GPO had not printed these materials, depository libraries failed to receive them, the Superintendent of Documents further noted, which thereby impaired access to, and compromised the preservation of, these important documents [9].

By 1932 Carter observed departments acquiring folding and gathering machines, power paper cutters, type casting machines, the kind of heavy equipment associated with a fully-fashioned printing plant. Carter cited the Agriculture and Commerce departments as the most egregious offenders and alleged that the capacity and prowess of their duplicating sections rivaled his own U.S. Government Printing Office [10].

**Agency Publications as Propaganda**

Technology allowed executive agencies to take an independent tack. What impelled them to pursue such a course, as opposed to following the authorized channels of government publication?

The Great Depression, like the Great War and like other national exigencies, stimulated the executive branch to expand further [11]. President Franklin Roosevelt created many new agencies and implemented a number of provocative measures to combat the social and economic ills attendant to the collapse of 1929.
Furthermore, FDR used government, even more avidly than had Wilson, to educate citizens on the virtues of his programs. Never before had a chief executive sought so steadfastly to inform the people on matters of public policy. FDR conceived the Presidency “as the most important clearing house for exchange of information and ideas, of facts and ideals, affecting the general welfare” [12]. Roosevelt equipped these new departments with offices of information and strengthened such offices as already existed in the older, established agencies. To promote his policy initiatives, Roosevelt, like Wilson, employed professional newspapermen to serve as publicity experts. Thus, an avalanche of publicity accompanied the New Deal.

By 1936, the Roosevelt administration had established 82 offices of information and publication, directed by "a host of little Creels," [13] according to Stanley High, a critic who would later join the administration as a speech writer for President Roosevelt [14]. It may well have been that a number of these "little Creels" received the personal endorsement of their namesake, the master publicist and father of departmental publicity. At one point, George Creel offered to serve the Roosevelt administration as something of a talent scout [15].

FDR’s administration expanded the federal establishment; it developed contentious policies; and it had a penchant for publicity. It, therefore, combined the elements certain to subject its publications to the unrelenting hostility of its enemies in Congress.

In Congress, criticism came from familiar sources. A seasoned critic of departmental publishing, Representative Harold Knutson (D-Minnesota), who had sharpened his skills on the Wilson administration, calculated that the publications that
emanated from the Roosevelt administration in 1937 "would have filled a train 12 miles long," the sole purpose of which sought to "justify the administration and the galloping hounds of waste" [16].

Representative J. Parnell Thomas (R-New Jersey), perhaps the harshest of the congressional critics, calculated with similar precision that all of these publications would fill 1,750 railroad cars [17]. Preferring conventional units of measure, Representative Bert Lord (R-Pennsylvania) declared that "now there are 8 pounds of this publicity for every man, woman, and child in the Nation" [18]. When asked how much money such emergency agencies as the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) expended on printing, JCP Chairman Walter Lambeth replied, "If the gentleman will get me the assistance of Solomon and Hercules, who cleansed the Augean stable, I may be able to answer the question" [19]. Denouncing departmental printing as "one of the most grave wastes of Government money," Representative James Scrugham (D-Nevada) stated that "every waste basket I have ever known anything about has had from 1 to 5 or 10 of those government bulletins in it every day, and they are never looked at" [20].

Knutson and other critics condemned the whole of government publication as publicity. They failed to acknowledge differences between press releases and such solid publications as "soil surveys" or "mining safety handbooks," which were patently non-partisan and which clearly added to scientific knowledge and contributed to the public's health and well-being. Apart from Representative James Mead (D-New York) and a few others, Congress refused to separate the wheat from the chaff, to distinguish the substantive from the superfluous [21]. It preferred to seize upon the ridiculous, citing
such federally produced titles as "The Love Life of the Bull Frog," and "An Essay on Kissing," holding these up as samples representative of government publication. Yet, as a contemporary authority had astutely pointed out, even those notorious vessels of departmental publicity, "press releases," were of “primary importance to all students of government affairs,” and “indispensable in tracing the development of policies.” Even the worst of these, he rightly noted, “have their value in reflecting the character of the organization that issues them” [22].

Few congressmen remarked on the value of departmental documents in forming the historical and scientific record of the federal government. They were more likely to share the sentiments of Representative Fritz Lanham (D-Texas), who charged that "much of our appropriation that is intended to give employment and relief is being diverted to printing and advertising agencies" [23].

Even more sensational charges issued from the conservative press. In the American Mercury Gordon Carroll asserted that Roosevelt's publicity machine had surpassed in insidiousness even those of "Messrs. Goebbels and Stalin," that Roosevelt had "Hitlerized his constituents," and that the Department of Labor issued documents that told "of how business would boom overnight if all the capitalist bosses were strangled and Dr. Roosevelt took charge" [24]. Among what he described as "a ceaseless stream of gaudy magazines from Uncle Sam's presses," Carroll singled out a number of titles that he thought demonstrated Roosevelt's desire to communize the United States. Rural Electrification News was one such journal, according to Carroll, that portrayed "private industry as a merciless exploiter of the poor" and bureaucratic government as "the key to Utopia." Carroll asserted that Indians At Work was devoted to collectivizing Native
Americans. In the pages of Labor Information Bulletin and the Monthly Labor Review, “Wall Street Bosses were regularly taken for a ride,” according to Carroll [25].

Like Carroll, Lawrence Sullivan saw no difference between the publishing activities of the Roosevelt administration and the heavy-handed methods used to manage public opinion in the dictatorships of Germany and Italy. Sullivan implored the federal government to "reestablish honest public documents" [26].

In an attempt to capture the method, manner, and underlying purpose of criticisms such as these, T. Swann Harding, who served Roosevelt's "publicity machine" as an editor in the Department of Agriculture, offered the following: “It consists, first, in acquiring a prejudice and the belief that they [publicity activities] are all conceived in sin and born in iniquity; second, in ignoring the vast differences between the information methods of the various departments; and third, in selecting with relative disregard for accuracy what appear to be apt examples to illustrate the thesis that government departments should carry on no information work at all” [27].

Attempting to verify the charges of the critics, the Washington Daily News gathered and evaluated one week's worth of federal documents. The paper collected 30 pounds of publications issued by 10 cabinet departments and 34 independent agencies. Of that week's collection, the paper reported that its staff, even "the most jaundiced anti-administration eye" among them, identified only 30 documents as propaganda and described the remainder "as coldly factual, objective, and devoid of coloration as a phone book" [28].
An Unresponsive Congress

Though Gordon Carroll’s charges may have been ridiculous, the idea, asserted repeatedly in Congress, that all government publication was propaganda had a chilling effect on appropriations. Was government printing a public scandal, imposing an enormous burden on the federal budget? Was printing of such major expense that it precluded the government from "getting within a gunshot of a balanced budget" [29]? According to some who had studied the issue, the answer was plainly no.

Composed primarily of cabinet-level department heads, the U.S. National Resources Committee reported in 1938 on the issue of federal research. The committee concluded, "research has never been a large factor in the expenditures of the Federal Government and still remains insignificant in the work of many Government agencies." While some industrial concerns and many universities expended from six to 25 percent of their budgets on research, the federal government spent only 1.4 percent of its 1937 budget on research, and a mere 1.2 percent in 1938 [30]. The National Resources Committee further noted that Congress failed to provide funds sufficient to print what little research had been done. Worse yet, for these meager funds research manuscripts had to compete with, and were often abandoned in favor of, less worthy but time-sensitive printing jobs. Departments consigned many manuscripts to oblivion, "an anonymous grave in a Government filing cabinet," where they waited five or six years to be printed, if they were printed at all [31].

Even before the Great Depression and the economy measures that the federal government imposed upon itself in 1932, the departments complained of inadequate
funds for printing. For the period covering 1924-1929, Congress increased by $5,000,000 the funds available to the Department of Agriculture for research, yet failed to increase funds available for printing. This resulted in an arrearage of manuscripts that by 1929 would have required $833,055 to print [32].

The 1932 Economy Act (PL 72-212), which established a ceiling of $800,000 for the whole of executive branch printing and which, somewhat mystifyingly, Public Printer George Carter favored, added to the backlog of manuscripts. Throughout the 1930s, the appropriations committees held funds for printing at very near the 1932 level. Under the parsimony of Congress, unprinted manuscripts began to accumulate in large numbers. Even those bureaus which served the cause of science and which tended to issue documents unlikely to be construed as political suffered severe cuts and often were unable to report their findings. By 1937, the Division of Geodesy of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey had accumulated $75,000 in unpublished manuscripts, but had only a $3,300 allotment for printing [33]. The Smithsonian Institution had piled-up $60,000 worth of unpublished manuscripts, including a large number that issued from its highly regarded Bureau of American Ethnology [34]. In 1934 the Bureau of Mines had a printing allotment of $37,000 but had already accumulated $120,000 of unprinted manuscripts [35]. The following year the Bureau was unable to print half of its 54 technical reports; and by 1938 the dollar amount of unpublished manuscripts in the Bureau of Mines had swollen to $153,400 [36], a development that Bureau of Mines Director John Finch denounced as "an accumulative evil" [37]. To print just one title, The Minerals Yearbook, the Bureau of Mines expended from one-third to one-half of its
meager allotment [38]. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce received less money for printing in 1937 than it had received 24 years earlier [39].

Like most of his counterparts, Bureau of Mines Director John Finch took seriously the reportorial responsibilities that Congress had imposed on his and most other government bureaus. Congress thoroughly confounded him by its unwillingness to provide the means by which his bureau could carry out its responsibilities. To a succession of unyielding Congresses, Finch pleaded for an increase in his printing allotment, which in 1937 represented only 3.4 percent of his working fund. Regarding this as an "absurd relation" between funds for research and funds for printing, Finch tried but failed to get a minimum working balance of five percent [40].

Petroleum industry representatives also failed to move Congress. They tried to demonstrate how the fortunes of the oil industry, as well as the wealth of the nation, were linked inextricably to the publishing activities of the Bureau of Mines. J. D. Collett, President of the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, spoke of a revolutionary new method which the Bureau of Mines had developed for testing gas wells but which the Bureau had not been able to publish. "Everybody in our area, Collett told a House committee, "with those high pressure wells out there, would like to have the benefit of that report—it is very, very important" [41].

Russell Brown, General Counsel for the Independent Petroleum Association of America, extolled Bureau of Mines Bulletin Number 200, J.H. Wiggins' *Evaporation Losses of Petroleum in the Mid-Continent Field*. Brown asserted that this document "has probably prevented loss of petroleum of monetary value greater than all appropriations made to the Bureau of Mines for oil and gas investigations in its entire history" [42]. By
failing to provide adequate funds for printing, Congress was "killing the goose that lays the golden egg," according to Brown [43].

The Department of Agriculture suffered as well, according to Milton Eisenhower, Chief of the Office of Information. Debilitated by the Great Depression, drought, and dust storms the American farmer increasingly depended on the scientific studies of the Department of Agriculture. Federal scientists prepared pioneering works on controlling insects, conserving the soil, and on other topics key to reviving the farm sector. Yet, with ever-greater demands placed upon its original research, the Department of Agriculture, like the Bureau of Mines, was increasingly unable to deliver its product to the GPO. Because of inadequate funds, the department sent 33 percent fewer manuscripts to the GPO in 1934 than it had the preceding year [44]. In the mid-1930s the Bureau of Agricultural Economics expended 80 percent of its printing allotment on job forms, leaving only $3,000 for statistical, technical, popular, and regulatory publications [45]. The Bureau of Plant Industry, the "Department's largest research unit," which required $40,000 for printing, received only $25,600. Insufficient funds precluded the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine from printing most of its technical bulletins on the Life-Studies of Insects, the consequences of which Eisenhower tried to explain to an uninterested congressional committee:

A scientist conducts and completes a study of the life history of a certain insect; an understanding of that life history is essential to subsequent control of operations. Now, if the scientist prepares the manuscript and puts it on the shelf, very few people in the world would have the information developed in that study. Necessary control operations may therefore be hampered. We conceive that our first duty, after a scientist completes a basic study, is to issue a technical bulletin on the subject and distribute it to other scientists, even before we step the information down into popular form [46].
In 1936, Eisenhower reported that the Bureau of Soils and Chemistry was four years behind in publishing soil surveys, "in greater demand now than in any previous period," and that the department was unable to record such fundamental research results as "the effect of light on promoting rancidity." Thus, the refrain of Milton Eisenhower, repeated annually to an unconcerned Congress was that:

These publications should be the culmination of research itself. Yet throughout the scientific staff...there is a growing discouragement of the failure to have valuable results see the light of day. It is bad economy to jeopardize far-flung and costly fundamental research because of our inability to pay a small percentage of such total cost for printing [47].

By 1937, the Department of Agriculture had accumulated 481 technical and 276 popular unprinted manuscripts that required $592,400 to print [48].

**Publishing on the Outside**

Congress did not want to kill the goose; it simply preferred that the goose lay her eggs at someone else's expense. As Congress abandoned the publishing activities of the departments, business and industry rescued some projects vital to their interests. The American Gas Association paid for the printing of a number of Bureau of Mines reports pertaining to crude oils [49]. To receive trade statistics more promptly, The Rubber Association of America purchased additional offset printing equipment for the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce [50]. To further reduce the backlog of unpublished manuscripts, the departments published a large number of reports in non-governmental technical journals. The economy measures of 1932 did not precipitate but clearly
stimulated the practice of publishing departmental manuscripts in commercial and society journals. As early as 1929, the Department of Agriculture had published 762 manuscripts in private journals [51]. In 1936, the Bureau of Mines submitted at least 220 reports, "which should have been printed by the Government," to scientific societies and technical journals [52]. That same year the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Chemistry and Soils published 288 technical reports in non-governmental sources [53]. By 1936, Milton Eisenhower concluded that commercial and society journals published nearly half of all manuscripts prepared in the Department of Agriculture [54].

Two investigative bodies, the Brookings Institute that Congress commissioned in 1937, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Printing (ICOP) that President Roosevelt formed in 1938, studied the issues surrounding government publication. Each body strongly recommended the continued practice of publishing through non-governmental avenues [55]. The prospect of having to publish in non-governmental journals, which tended to condense and thereby diminish the value of their reports, dispirited federal authors of the 1930s. Very much unlike federal authors of today, who prefer to have their work published in prestigious private journals, these federal investigators clung to government publication essentially for the reasons that John Wesley Powell and A. C. True had articulated fifty years earlier. The National Resource Committee found that federal authors disfavored private journals because it was “difficult, if not impossible, to earmark these publications as coming from the Bureau, which seriously handicaps Bureau morale,” and “it orients the staff toward the technical societies and technical editors who take the place of the supervisory staff in passing on the quality” of their work [56].
Creative Accounting

Confronted with an unsympathetic Congress, and presented with the unsatisfactory alternative of publishing in non-governmental journals, the departments increasingly abandoned the authorized channels of publication and relied on their own presses. In addition to the parsimony of Congress, other factors prompted the departments to do so. One factor had to do with the manner in which Congress appropriated, and the Budget Office allotted, money for printing. Congress clearly segregated and severely limited appropriations for printing but imposed no such hardships on accounts that departments quite artfully dipped into to pay for what they imaginatively called "processing."

Even before they had felt the weight of the 1932 economy measures, departments had drawn from a number of miscellaneous accounts to pay for the printing that they themselves did. From "general operating expenses," "travel," "salaries," "miscellaneous expenses," and other accounts that greatly perplexed congressional overseers, the departments drew however much they desired to pay for their processing. In 1932, Public Printer Carter determined that beyond the $12,000,000 that Congress appropriated for printing, the departments expended an additional $2,000,000, drawn from over 80 miscellaneous appropriations, to operate their offset presses [57]. Through such accounting maneuvers the departments foiled legislative attempts to inhibit the publishing activities of the executive branch. The irony and utter failure of this congressional
strategy, which produced quite the opposite effect, was not lost on Public Printer August
Giegengack.

Criticisms of the type and volume of printed matter being sent out and
efforts by the Appropriations Committees to limit that matter by reducing
the printing appropriations are very definitely increasing the type of
material you are trying to reduce, for the reason that every cut in a printing
appropriation is forcing the departments to do more bootleg printing, or
printing on their so-called duplicating machines. The result is that the
departments turn to other appropriations over which there is no control or
limitation from the printing standpoint. This in effect takes work from the
GPO and places it in the departmental printing and duplicating plants. In
my honest opinion the law would not be violated to the extent it is today
by the departments were it not for the fact that their regular printing
appropriations are inadequate to meet their actual requirements [58].

Public Printers Carter and Giegengack denounced the practice of using funds
other than those specifically earmarked for printing, but the Brookings Institute
sanctioned it. Arguing that printing "was an operating expense as much as expenditures
for lead pencils, salaries, or furniture," Brookings advised Congress to abolish the
practice of having printing a separate budget item with fixed limits in favor of adding
printing appropriations to the account for operating expenses [59]. Yet, Congress
persisted in having a separate budget item for printing, thus continuing, according to
Robert Clark, himself an administrator of a departmental printing plant "to make a game
out of the item--if the item is too small to do the job the agency uses other funds to buy
office printing machines (if necessary) and still other funds to "process" it" [60].

Speed and Economy
The departments perceived that offset printing offered the additional advantages of speed and economy. For many years the departments had alleged that the GPO was unable to print work cheaply and deliver it promptly. The departments have regarded the printing statutes of 1895 and 1919, which required that all printing be done in the GPO, as impediments to efficient and economical administration. In the 1930s the Public Printer punished such old-line agencies as Commerce and Agriculture when he subordinated their printing jobs to those of the newly established emergency agencies. Created to address the social ills caused by the Great Depression and endowed with plentiful and relatively unrestricted funds for printing, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) routinely paid the 20 percent surcharge that the GPO exacted for rush work, while the old-line agencies were scarcely able to pay the regular rates. Milton Eisenhower reported that it was not uncommon for the GPO to receive from the emergency agencies as many as 10,000 separate jobs, which moved to the head of the line, while the old-line agencies bogged down in the printing logjam [61]. Such non-emergency administrators as Eisenhower and Joseph Gelbman, himself a former employee of the GPO, resented the favored status that the emergency agencies enjoyed at the GPO.

We send a job down there in June and we get delivery in December. All the pushing in the world does not do a bit of good, because the emergency jobs come first. And there was a 50 percent additional charge, which the present public printer has reduced to 20 percent. But when the Federal Housing or the N.R.A. or any other of these emergency agencies want work done, they have the presidential power behind them to get it done first, which the old-line agencies have not got, and they have just to take their turn and wait [62].
The departments found, at least by their own reckoning, that they could produce the work not only more quickly but also more cheaply than the GPO, despite the new and more equitable price schedule that Public Printer Giegengack implemented in October, 1937. The GPO’s new scale of prices, established along commercial lines, more accurately reflected the actual cost of each job. Yet, as Giegengack himself acknowledged, the new price scale favored straight line work and long press runs, and penalized work that required much composition and short press runs [63]. The truly prolific publishers, such as Agriculture and Commerce, which had generously equipped their printing plants, produced most of the penalized work. Rather than attract more business, Giegengack may unwittingly have stimulated even more work for the departmental printing plants. According to the administrative assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, the new scale of prices had impinged further on his department and compelled it to rely even more heavily on offset presses:

Our appropriations for printing and binding have been considerably affected by the changes in rates of charges for the reason that some 70 percent of our expenditure for printing is for a class of work the principal cost of which is type composition, and for this operation the Public Printer has stated there has been an increase. Some of our bureaus have adopted the offset method of reproduction for several of their publications. These savings effected have permitted the issuance of reports which otherwise, for lack of printing funds, would have been consigned to the files [64].

Despite GPO’s new price schedule, and in some cases because of it, the departments claimed that their duplicating plants afforded a far more economical method of publication. By processing rather than printing at the GPO, the Department of Commerce boasted that it saved as much as $108,000 per month; the Department of the Treasury saved $89,250 annually by processing its Supply Schedule. On one job alone,
the Farm Credit Administration claimed that it had saved $80,000 [65]. Budget Officer Earl Sechrest of the Federal Power Commission told Congress that the cost of duplicating, compared with the cost of printing at the GPO, was "very, very nominal," and that if Congress required the Commission to have its engineering reports printed, the cost would be "prohibitive" [66].

Thomas McKeon, Publications Chief of the Department of Commerce and also a member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Printing (ICOP), claimed that processing was 50 to 80 percent cheaper than printing at the GPO [67]. Another member of the ICOP and Chief of the Printing Division of the Social Security Board, Justin A. Shook, asserted that the cost of GPO printing was three times greater than the cost of departmental processing [68]. Editor of the Natural Resources Board Lloyd George asserted emphatically that processing eased the burden of taxpayers. Or were these purported savings an example of false economy? Agencies had no mechanism, and clearly no enthusiasm, for distributing processed documents widely. Unlike documents printed at the GPO, which potentially reached all taxpayers through GPO’s network of depository libraries, processed documents reached audiences no larger than the agency’s specialized constituency [69].

Besides economy, offset printing in the departmental plants, much like the World Wide Web of today, provided the kind of dispatch that the GPO was scarcely able to provide. David White, whose Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation had sold offset presses to the executive departments since 1907, described a number of circumstances under which his departmental clients demanded speed from, and absolute control over, their printing equipment. Crop estimates, treasury financial statements, diplomatic
communications, schedules covering contracted items, and most Department of Justice
documents were all such cases, according to White, "where it is necessary for the
administrative officer to have complete control of his equipment" [70].

Combining the attributes of speed, economy, and control, the small offset press,
when operated by the issuing agency, expedited the business of the executive
departments. This was quite unlike the logjam at the Printing Office, where manuscripts
languished, caught up in the GPO's "two periods of lost motion," which Secretary of
Commerce Daniel Roper described as "the period of time between the submittal of
manuscript and the receipt of proof, and also the time between the final approval of proof
and the delivery of completed work." These two periods of lost motion, according to
Roper, "interfered seriously with the proper functioning of our various bureaus" [71]. The
Department of the Treasury complained that the GPO required four months to complete
jobs that it used to deliver within 30 days [72].

In an effort to determine the amount of time that the GPO expended in completing
a typical printing job, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) conducted a time motion study. It
traced the many stages, and estimated the amount of time required for each, as a typical
job of 1,000 copies on ordinary white bond paper "wend its way through the mazes of the
GPO." The study assumed not that the job would have been shelved for two or three
months, as it likely would have been, but that the GPO was free to handle the job upon
receiving it. After the GPO had received, estimated, delivered and invoiced it, and after
the issuing agency had subjected it to further procedures, the typical GPO job, the BOB
concluded, consumed from four to 10 hours. The BOB determined that a departmental
printing plant could have completed the same job in less than 30 minutes [73]. According to Milton Eisenhower, the Department of Agriculture “sometimes needs 30 minute service-and that is not unusual. It would take a messenger that long to drive a car to the Government Printing Office, even if the Government provided a car for him, which it would not” [74].

**Extent of Departmental Duplicating.**

Based on incomplete data collected from the departments, the JCP reported in 1937 that executive branch duplicating plants operated at least 600 offset presses and contained such printing accessories as monotype keyboards, casters, cutting, stitching, sealing, drilling, folding, and similar machines. The Public Printer valued these assets at over $1,000,000 [75]. Departmental printing plants experienced even more impressive growth in the early 1940s. From 1941-1943, federal agencies purchased 10,114 offset presses valued at slightly less than 12,000,000 [76]. In 1944 Robert Clark declared that "there have been built up printing plants within agencies which, in inventory value, amount to more as a total than the entire investment in the huge centralized GPO" [77].

Robert Clark issued his landmark report on government publication in 1944. There is considerable irony in noting that this important document suffered a fate similar to the processed documents that it addressed. Produced on a multilith machine in the Office for Emergency Management, Clark’s report is known to exist only in College Park, Maryland. Probably no more than a handful of administrators ever received this
report. Today it is available only to those researchers who are able to unearth it from the National Archives and Records Administration [78].

The continued development of the multilith machine fostered the growth of departmental duplicating plants. By the early 1930s the multilith eclipsed the multigraph as the offset printing machine of choice. Easier and safer to operate than the German rototprint, the multilith quickly became an established fact in the departments. Like most of his colleagues, Milton Eisenhower refused to acknowledge the multilith as a printing machine, but he did concede “that the multilith process nevertheless does lend itself to use for many jobs that would ordinarily be printed,” and that “danger lies in the temptation to overwork this machine” [79].

No department succumbed so completely to this temptation as the Department of Commerce. Its Duplicating Section simply could not get enough of these machines to accommodate the work that continually came its way. In 1935 the Duplicating Section of the Department of Commerce operated three multilith machines continuously, 24 hours per day. Yet three machines failed to keep pace with growing demands. The Bureau of the Census required 2,500 copies of a 2,700 page job. This job alone, according to A. S. Chadwick, Chief of the Duplicating Section, required 65 days of continuous machine time. Beyond which, the Duplicating Section, and curiously enough not the GPO, faced the task of producing the Agricultural Census, to which Chadwick feared he would have to devote entirely one of his multilith machines [80].

By early 1936, Chadwick's Duplicating Section had accumulated five multilith machines, geared them to produce an astounding 7,400 impressions (printed pages) per hour, and continued to run them 24 hours per day, yet they still found it
impossible to keep current with orders for multilith work...We have been looking forward for some time to a let up in the volume of work, but have given up all hope. The cost of printing and the time required for delivery of work is no doubt responsible for much of the work being done in the Department. The constant use of present equipment, night and day, is very hard on the machines, and will naturally advance the time of replacements [81].

A. S. Chadwick generated the kind of monthly production figures that may have inspired the envy (and undoubtedly the displeasure) of August Giegengack, the legally appointed Public Printer. In one month alone, November, 1935, Chadwick's Duplicating Section produced nearly 10,000,000 impressions on three multilith machines [82]. For fiscal year 1937-38 his Duplicating Section produced, on average, 3,534,328 mimeograph, multigraph, and multilith impressions per month for the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce; 1,219,461 for the Bureau of the Census; and 990,487 for the Bureau of Air Commerce [83]. During the 11 week period of April 1 to June 15, 1935, an average of 35 employees of the Duplicating Section devoted a total of 16,431 hours to work submitted by the Bureau of the Census; during the same 11 week period, an average of 45 employees of the Duplicating Section devoted a total of 20,406 hours to work submitted by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce [84].

The departments turned to their offset presses for the sake of speed and economy. Yet, the duplicating sections accepted many jobs that the GPO could have printed much more economically. For these toy presses generated savings only when used for small jobs with short runs, according to Robert Clark, whose 1944 report not only acknowledged the achievements but also exposed the failings of the departmental duplicating plants. Clark suggested that the small offset press was used most
economically on jobs that called for 6,000 impressions daily. But the chiefs of the duplicating sections who, paradoxically, were as eager to boost their production figures as they were to achieve economies, routinely worked these machines beyond the point at which they generated savings. Clark discovered that it was not uncommon for an operator to produce daily, on one machine, 30,000 impressions, that would have taken only one hour to produce on one of the larger GPO presses [85]. Clark further revealed that the departmental printing plants were producing monthly over 175 million long-run impressions, "which cost five times as much as they would on proper equipment, and they take weeks to produce as against hours on larger presses" [86]. An experienced printer who left the commercial field to join one of the agency printing plants described how he felt about these misguided practices

I'm ashamed to show you the jobs we are running in our shop. Our equipment is splendid for small jobs but the big majority of our work could be cheaply and quickly produced on a big press. We spend weeks under frantic and futile pressure completing work which should take only a few hours...My wife asked me how I'm getting along working for the Government. I told her that she could answer that question if she could imagine herself making sails with her sewing machine. I've begged for a large press or permission to send the large jobs to the GPO, but nothing happens and I'm still making sails with domestic sewing machines [87].

Government publication proliferated during the 1930s and 1940s but only a small fraction of documents ever reached the general public, a development that the American Library Association described as "an unprecedented crisis in the publication and distribution of United States documents" [88]. Though impossible to determine just how many documents evaded depository libraries, the evidence suggests that the numbers were considerable.
Not intending to distribute but hoping at least to record the processed documents in the Monthly Catalog, Superintendent of Documents Alton Tisdel called for and received a list of 1,300 such documents that the departments issued during a period of only 30 days, November, 1935. Though seemingly comprehensive, this list, according to Tisdel and the Public Printer, only scratched the surface [89]. Of the 35 documents that the Bureau of Mines issued in December, 1937, only 12 were printed at the GPO [90]. According to one observer, the emergency agencies sent only one manuscript to the GPO for every three that they processed [91]. More startling perhaps were the results of a study that Leroy Charles Merritt conducted. Of the 2,603 government documents that Merritt indefatigably pursued and identified as having been published during the month of January, 1939, nearly two-fifths were printed in the departmental duplicating plants. During that month, the Department of Commerce issued 778 documents, only 100 of which were printed at the GPO; and only half of the Department of Agriculture's 330 publications were printed at the GPO [92].

Character of Processed Documents

Did these processed documents, as Milton Eisenhower routinely asserted, consist entirely of either ephemeral materials that "should not be dignified by printing," or such interdepartmental materials as job forms that the departments were not required to send to the GPO? Sidney Morgan, Eisenhower's counterpart in the Tariff Commission, insisted that "only the preliminary and preparatory or informal documents" of the Commission were produced in the departmental printing plant, and that the Commission sent all
"formal printing" to the GPO [93]. Robert Clark’s significant report on government publication belied these assertions. In further sharp contrast with these sworn statements, there arrived on the desks of a few Congressmen, the handsomely produced and painstakingly indexed research monograph, *Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation*, about which there was nothing informal or preparatory. Produced on a multilith machine in the printing plant of the Works Progress Administration, *Landlord and Tenant* clearly demonstrated not only the capabilities of the small offset press, but also the kind of documents that eluded depository libraries and, in turn, the general public [94].

Also belying the public statements of departmental officials was the list of 1,300 fugitive documents for the month of November, 1935, which included, according to Superintendent of Documents Tisdel, "periodicals, bibliographies, indexes, reports of operations, statistical statements, and miscellaneous pamphlets of importance." Tisdel added that:

> If you ask an issuing office what determines the character of work that is to be processed, undoubtedly you would receive the reply that material duplicated in this manner is usually temporary in character and consists of press and radio releases and statistical statements that are in advance of those printed in their regular publications. This of course we know is not exactly true, since we have tangible evidence of many more important publications of a permanent character that come out in some form other than regular printing [95].

**Resistance**

The executive departments were not unfettered in their freedom to operate their offset duplicating plants. Public Printer Giegengack, for one, offered as much resistance
as his diminished position commanded. What Milton Eisenhower and Sydney Morgan euphemistically called "processing," the Public Printer denounced as "bootleg printing."

Geigengack waged a campaign to dispel the myth of the offset press as somehow distinct from the letter presses of the GPO. Yet, Geigengack slipped once in 1935 and hurt his cause when he declared that the multilith process "is not really printing, it is a substitute for printing" [96]. Giegengack later explained that he was commenting not on the capabilities of the multilith but on the poor craftsmanship of its operators, and that “my feeling toward it was about the same as it would be toward a third baseman at a baseball game with three men on the bases and who let a grounder roll between his legs. I'd know it was baseball, but I'd be inclined to shout that it was not, and might add that it was a darn poor substitute” [97].

Geigengack also challenged the departments' claim that they could print more cheaply than the GPO. According to Giegengack, the savings that departments purported to achieve derived from their failure to factor in such costs as heat, light, and depreciation on machinery, all of which factors the GPO included. In 1935, Acting Comptroller General R.N. Elliot confirmed Giegengack's charge of false savings. Elliot investigated the accounting procedures of the District of Columbia printing plant and reported that the plant included few such cost factors, making it impossible to compare its costs with those of the GPO [98].

Geigengack singled out agency printing plants as primarily responsible for driving up prices at the GPO. As departmental duplicating plants absorbed increasing amounts of the government’s printing, Giegengack argued, they added to the GPO’s overhead and compelled it to raise prices on other printing jobs. Yet another investigator vindicated
Giegengack’s claims. Much to the delight of Giegengack, Special Inspector Engineer of
the Department of the Treasury Henry Hunter reported very favorably on the prices and
general operating practices of the GPO, and he acknowledged that departments added to
the GPO’s costs by diverting work from it. [99].

The International Typographical Union (ITU) joined with and perhaps even
prodded the Public Printer in this struggle to direct more work to the GPO. The oldest
and one of the most militant unions in North America, the ITU had a history of high
achievement, a history of not capitulating to management, but of holding firm and
winning extraordinary victories for its constituency of printers, who traditionally have
been regarded as the elite of the skilled craftsmen [100]. 1,400 GPO employees held ITU
membership, including Giegengack and the Assistant Public Printer [101].

In many instances, the ITU successfully resisted new methods of printing, such as
the teletypewriter, until it established jurisdiction over them [102]. Though the ITU
exercised jurisdiction over letterpress printing, the predominant method of printing in the
GPO, its authority did not extend to the offset method, which was clearly on the rise and
around which "the future prosperity of the printing industry will center" [103]. As a
result, commercial printing establishments in general, and the executive departments of
government in particular, were free to hire unskilled clerks at substandard wages to
operate the multilith and the multigraph.

As the executive establishments embraced offset presses, skilled craftsmen
derided them as “dangerous toys” and denounced them as a “disgraceful menace to the
legitimate printing industry” [104]. Many letterpress printers and pressmen feared the
offset press, particularly large offset presses which, as some suggested, required the
mastery of new and difficult skills and perhaps even required advanced courses in chemistry [105]. The small offset presses, such as those that the executive departments operated, presented a problem of a different kind. Rather than requiring sophisticated skills, they required virtually no skill at all. The success of the multilith, according to one of its manufacturers, owed to the "simplicity of the Multilith process which makes its use possible by Multilith operators and not journeymen lithographers" [106]. The Civil Service Commission required skilled letterpress pressmen to have completed an apprenticeship of four years, in addition to having served one year as a journeyman pressman. By contrast, it required of multilith operators to have only three months experience and the ability to "stand on their feet the required time" [107]. David White of the Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation claimed that he had trained unskilled government workers to use the multigraph in three weeks [108]. The skilled letterpress printers of the GPO vigorously opposed the use of offset printing equipment in government establishments and warned that their continued use "threatened to flood the printing trades with incompetent craftsmen, thus proving a detriment to established working conditions and wage scales throughout the nation" [109].

These competing elements--skilled as opposed to unskilled printers, letterpress as opposed to offset printing--converged in April, 1938, when the Washington Planograph Company and the GPO battled over the printing of patent specifications for the U.S. Patent Office [110]. A non-union shop, the Planograph Company sought a contract to print the patent specifications using a newly developed method of offset printing. The Planograph Company contended that the GPO clung to traditional methods of printing and resisted new and more economical methods, such as the one that it proposed. The
company promised that it could save the government $100,000 annually. The Public Printer and the ITU argued that the offset method of printing was untested, that it produced an inferior product, that unskilled clerks presided over offset presses, and that the purported savings, even if possible, would be lost because the GPO would have to raise its prices on other printing jobs. Giegengack further argued that he, as much as anyone, was an agent of progress and not the obscurantist that the Washington Planograph Company portrayed him to be. He revealed that he and his experts were developing a method of printing superior to the one proposed by the Washington Planograph Company and that he doubted "that any more can be done to develop, test, or try out new printing methods than the GPO is now doing or planning to do" [111].

The Washington Planograph Company convinced Patents Commissioner Conway Coe but failed to persuade the JCP. The printing of the patent specifications remained with the GPO. Though the GPO and the union prevailed, few additional triumphs followed. The Printing Office scored a small victory, but the executive departments and their offset presses had clearly won the war.

CONCLUSION

The Comptroller General provided the only additional checks on processed agency documents. He infrequently refused to pay for duplicating equipment. On August 3, 1936 Acting Comptroller General R. N. Elliot refused to approve an expenditure for printing equipment that the Federal Power Commission requested. The ITU celebrated this decision (A-74715), mistakenly thinking that it would serve to shut down departmental duplicating plants and reclaim much of this printing for the skilled
printers of the GPO. Such was not the case. For the comptroller did not, as the ITU imagined, prohibit the purchase of these machines. Elliot maintained that it was perfectly legal for the departments to purchase these machines, so long as they used them for duplicating and not for printing. As for the many questionable cases that frequently arose, Elliot instructed the departments to decide in favor of sending the work to the GPO [112]. Yet, as the BOB confirmed, the departments continued to decide most such questionable cases in favor of their own presses [113].

Giegengack could have influenced policy through GPO’s representative on the Interdepartmental Committee on Printing (ICOP), had the deck not been stacked against him. For not only the ardent advocates, but also the liberal practitioners of departmental processing, sat on this committee. Composed of such men as Virgil Almond, Thomas McKeon, Milton Eisenhower, and Sydney Morgan, the ICOP held a decidedly permissive view of departmental processing. To the GPO, the ICOP conceded that only the GPO should operate machines that required skilled or journeymen printers. As for those machines that required little or no skill, which included most, if not all, of the small offset presses, “the committee believes that the types of processing equipment which do not require the services of skilled or journeymen tradesmen, that produce material, up to certain quantities, more cheaply than printing, and that produce material more speedily than printing should be operated in the agencies to the end of speeding the public business and lessening its cost” [114]. In effect, the ICOP gave departments the unbridled use of their multigraph and multilith machines. The ICOP further recommended that processing activities be coordinated through, and supervised by, not the GPO but the parent agencies [115].
Even when the ICOP appeared to prohibit the departments from using certain kinds of printing equipment, it reversed itself and demonstrated just how permissive its prohibitions actually were. Such was the case when the ICOP ostensibly banned the use of binding, sewing, and trimming equipment, without which the departments could have completed only the most rudimentary of printing jobs. Such a ban could have forced the departments to send more printing to the GPO; however, Sydney Morgan emphasized that the committee had no intention of prohibiting the use of the trimming and sewing machines already in use. It simply intended to "bar types of bookbinding of a professional character" [116]. As for what constituted "professional bookbinding," the departments were free to decide for themselves.

It was one thing for a committee composed primarily of departmental printing officials to erode the authority of the Public Printer. It was quite another for Congress to encourage the departments to subvert the printing statutes. Gushing with enthusiasm for the offset printing methods that the Bureau of the Census employed, Representative Robert Bacon (R-New York) encouraged other bureaus of the Department of Commerce, including the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, to do the same [117]. Little did he know that he was preaching to the choir.

Even the Public Printer's natural ally, the JCP, had forsaken him. Prominent JCP member Senator Carl Hayden concluded, as had Woodrow Wilson, that the printing committee exceeded its constitutional powers and had no business regulating what he described as "certain purely executive functions" [118]. In discussing the issues that surrounded departmental duplicating plants, Hayden and some of his Senate colleagues concluded that "antiquated laws do not permit the government to take advantage of
modern developments in the printing arts field,” and that “grave handicaps are imposed on the efficient operation of the executive departments and establishments because of delays in securing necessary printed material from the GPO” [119].

Finally, Hayden and his colleagues recommended that processed documents should be distributed not by the GPO but by the issuing agency, and that the authority for determining "what shall be printed and where it shall be printed" should rest neither with the Public Printer nor the JCP but with the Bureau of the Budget [120].

When Robert Clark revisited these issues in the early 1940s he discovered that the departmental printing plants were busier than they had ever been and that, however valuable to the efficient and economical administration of the executive branch, they were fraught with abuse and mismanagement. To boost their production figures and win praise from their superiors, the chiefs of duplicating sections accepted enormous jobs that could have been printed more economically on the larger presses of the GPO. Clark argued that such abuses could have been prevented had the GPO been permitted to supervise these plants. So, rather than recommend, as so many others had before him, to further divest the GPO of its authority, Clark suggested that the Printing Office be empowered. Taking Wilson's conviction and Hayden's sentiments to a logical conclusion, Clark recommended that the GPO be transferred from the legislative to the executive branch of government [121].

Nearly everyone, except for those connected with the departmental printing plants, agreed that offset presses were machines that printed, and that it was therefore illegal for the departments to operate them. On his side the Public Printer had the printing statutes, but these really did not matter. Deprived of sufficient congressional will to
modernize and enforce them, the printing statutes simply collapsed and gave way to the
inexorable forces of technical advancement. The offset printing press became ensconced
in the executive departments, its value widely acknowledged, its use largely unrestricted,
and its product mostly unavailable to the general public. As a result, much of the
historical record of the federal government for this period was lost, not somewhere in
cyberspace, as may be the case today, but in the file cabinets of the executive
departments, in the archives of the major newspapers, and in the homes of those whose
names appeared on specialized mailing lists.
Notes


3. According to Superintendent of Documents Alton Tisdel, The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce was the first to use the word "processed" to describe the product of offset presses. See: Alton P. Tisdel, "Processed Material and Depository Libraries," *Papers Presented at the 1936 Conference of the American Library Association* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1936), 36.


5. O. P. Austin, Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to Chief Clerk, Department of Commerce and Labor, July 31, 1911, File 6911/ to 69914/4, Box No. 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. See also:
The Coordinating Committee to Julius Klein, Director of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, April 23, 1924, File 6911/ to 69914/4, Box No. 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. The BFDC served as the center for all processing of the Department of Commerce until 1932, when the Department decided to consolidate all "duplicating activities" into one central section under the Office of the Secretary, Division of Publications, despite the fact that the BFDC continued to account for 75 percent of all Commerce Department processing. See: "Report on the Consolidation of Duplicating Work in the Department of Commerce," August 9, 1932, File 6911/ to 69914/4, Box No. 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


13. Stanley High, "You Can't Beat the Government," *Saturday Evening Post* 
(November, 1937), 6.


15. George Creel to Charles West, Under Secretary of the Interior, January 19, 1938, 
File 1, Box No. 2, Record Group 48, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

16. U.S. Congress, House, Harold Knutson, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., *Congressional Record* 

17. U.S. Congress, House, J. Parnell Thomas, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., *Congressional Record* 
vol. 83, pt. 9, Appendix, 887.

18. U.S. Congress, House, Bert Lord, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., *Congressional Record* 
(28 February 1938), vol. 83, pt. 2, 2545.

19. U.S. Congress, House, J. Walter Lambeth, 75th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 
(6 July 1937), vol. 81, pt. 6, 6848.


21. For Mead's statement in support of departmental printing, see: *Congressional Record* 
(3 February 1938), vol. 83, pt. 9, Appendix, 433.

22. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, "The Present Crisis in Publication and Distribution of United


could be examined by researchers. (Telephone conversation with David Barna, February 3, 1993).


43. Committee on Appropriations, *Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1936*, 44.


Virgil Almond, Chair of the Interdepartment Committee and Chief Investigator for the Bureau of the Budget, recommended that the departments should always consider first the possibility of having their manuscripts published on the outside, and for those manuscripts that required printing by the government, Almond directed the departments to minimize the number of pages, illustrations, and tables. See: Virgil Almond to Daniel Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget, October 3, 1937, File 82, Record Group 51, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


63. August Giegengack to Daniel Bell, October 15, 1937, File 52, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

64. M. Kerlin, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, to R. H. Herrell, Administrative Assistant to the Public Printer, August 2, 1938, File 70515/5, Box 285, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


68. Justin A. Shook to Virgil Almond, March 23, 1938, File 84, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

69. Lloyd George to Virgil Almond, March 22, 1938, File 84, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


71. Daniel Roper to George Carter, May 18, 1934, File 70515/5 to 16, Box 285, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, DC.

72. Administrative Assistant to the Secretary, Treasury Department, to Virgil Almond, February 3, 1939, File (39.27), Subject Files of the Director, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


78. See note number 60 for a complete citation to Clark’s report.

79. Milton Eisenhower to Bureau Chiefs and Editors, August 20, 1936, File 42, Records

Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

80. H. R. Stutsman to M. Kerlin, 1935, File 6911/1to 69914/4, Box 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

81. Thomas McKeon to E.W. Libbey, January 3, 1936, File 6911/1to 69914/4, Box 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

82. McKeon to Libbey, January 3, 1936.

83. *Employees Required in Duplicating, Department of Commerce, for the Fiscal Year 1938-1939* File 6911/1to 69914/4, Box 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

84. Thomas McKeon to E.W. Libbey, June 28, 1935, File 6911/1to 69914/4, Box 271, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


90. List of Multigraphed, Mimeographed, or Printed Publications of the Bureau of Mines Issued During December 1937, File 4, Correspondence and Related Records of Division of Information, Record Group 48, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


92. Leroy Charles Merritt, Research Assistant, Graduate Library School, University of Chicago, "United States Government: Author, Publisher, Printer," File (39.27), Subject Files of the Director, 1939-1946, Box 72, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


94. The Works Progress Administration reported that it produced 12,500 copies of Landlord and Tenant at a cost of $3,833, compared with the GPO's estimated cost of $6,800. See: Daniel Bell to Senator Carl Hayden, File 82, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. The De Capo Press considered Landlord and Tenant of sufficient importance to reprint it.


96. Committee on Appropriations, Legislative Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1936 15 April 1935, 293.

98. Committee on Appropriations, *Legislative Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1936*, 293.


106. David E. White, Sales Agent, Multigraph Division of the Addressograph-Multigraph Co., "Memorandum," May 1, 1939, File (39.27), Subject Files of the Director, 1939-1946, Box 72, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
107. David E. White, Sales Agent, Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation, "Memorandum," November 18, 1938, File (39.27) Subject Files of the Director, 1939-1946, Box 72, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


111. Giegengack to J. Walter Lambeth, Chair, JCP, undated, File 53, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


113 "Printing and Duplicating Work of Departments and Independent Establishments, February 3, 1937."
114 Interdepartmental Committee on Printing, "Preliminary Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Printing," 10 February 1940, 64, File 70515/12, Box 286, Record Group 40, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


116 Sydney Morgan to Virgil Almond, undated, File 85, Records Regarding the General Administration of the Federal Government, 1921-1939, Record Group 51, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.


120 Bulkley to Bell, "Summary of Discussion Among," December 13, 1937.