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THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF AFRICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION

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ABSTRACT

Even after more than fifty years of independence, corruption remains one of the most important obstacles to the improvement of the human condition in Africa. In recognition of corruption’s role in poverty and underdevelopment in Africa, African countries have adopted the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption to serve as a legal tool to fight corruption and its deleterious effects on development efforts in the continent. Additionally, African countries have become Signatory Parties to other anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, with the expectation that these conventions will help them in their efforts to deal effectively and fully with this important development constraint. This paper argues that the success of any anti-corruption scheme in Africa will be determined, to a great extent, by the strength, efficiency, and efficacy of national institutional and judicial frameworks. Thus, the most important first step in effectively dealing with corruption in Africa must be the reconstruction and reconstitution of the post-colonial state through democratic constitution making to provide each country with institutional and judicial systems that adequately constrain civil servants and politicians and prevent them from carrying out their duties arbitrarily and capriciously and from behaving with impunity.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Africa is the only part of the world which, since the 1960s, has been regressing economically.  

Significant research has been devoted to uncovering the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. The bulk of these studies have blamed continued poverty in Africa on several
endemic factors, including (1) military coups d’état; (2) destructive ethnic mobilization, which has resulted in the massacre of many people, destroyed national economic infrastructures and disrupted most wealth-creating activities; ³ (3) excessive population growth; (4) natural disasters, which include prolonged droughts, locusts, and floods; (5) high external and often unmanageable debt; (6) dependence on the industrial market economies of the West for development and food aid; (7) excessive exploitation of the region’s natural resources, which is often accompanied by agro-ecological degradation; and (8) political and bureaucratic corruption.⁴

Some scholars have argued that a more effective way to study and appreciate the dilemmas of underdevelopment in Africa is to recognize that poor economic performance in the continent has both external and internal dimensions.⁵ The external causes of Africa’s development crisis, according to these scholars, include “an international exchange system which often does not function to the advantage of primary product-exporters, . . . the deflationary economic policies followed by the industrial North, notably a strong dollar and high interest rates, [which] have serious ‘ripple’ effects in poor countries which are saddled with large debts.”⁶ These views were made in the 1980s and since then, economic conditions in many of the market economies of the

³ For example, in 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered by the Interahamwe militia. In fact, in April 1994, as many as 50,000 people were massacred in one location—the Murambi technical school in southern Rwanda. The killers were so efficient at carrying out their heinous crimes that in only 100 days, they had killed as many as 800,000 of their fellow citizens. Nicki Hitchcott, Writing on Bones: Commemorating Genocide in Boubacar Boris Diop’s Murambi, 40 RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES 48 (2009).
⁴ See generally Ergas, supra note 2.
⁵ Id. at 303-304.
⁶ Id. Few African countries have been able to successfully escape the patterns of economic activity imposed on them by colonialism—during the colonial period, as Europeans annexed African lands and created colonies, the latter were structured to serve as producers of primary commodities for export to the metropolitan economies. Today, even after more than fifty years of independence, most African countries continue to depend on the export of primary commodities for most of their foreign exchange earnings and on their former colonizers for both export and import trade. Despite the proliferation of economic integration schemes throughout the continent, intra-African trade remains insignificant, as most African countries continue to prefer trade with their former colonizers. See generally AFRICA AT THE CROSSROADS: BETWEEN REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (John Mukum Mbaku & Suresh Chandra Saxena eds., 2003).
industrial North have changed significantly, including, for example, a relatively weak dollar. Nevertheless, many African countries continue to struggle with huge, dollar-denominated external debts and, in order to secure favorable debt-servicing terms from the international donor community, the debtor-countries have been forced to subordinate national policies to conditionalities mandated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  

The internal causes of poverty in the continent, which significantly outweigh the external ones, include “excessive state control of the economy, massive and pervasive corruption, merciless exploitation of the peasantry, and ethnic violence verging on genocide.”  

Additionally, some scholars have argued that poverty and underdevelopment in Africa is due to mistakes in policy design and implementation made by individuals who, although honest and well-meaning, were either totally incompetent or ill-equipped to perform the task of managing modern and complex economies. As a matter of fact, by the mid-1970s, many students of African political economy were calling for concerted efforts to be made to bring into the African public services individuals who were well-educated and had acquired the skills necessary to manage a complex bureaucracy. These new crop of bureaucrats was also expected to be highly disciplined, ethical, and possess a high level of personal integrity so that they could more

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7 In order for African and other developing countries to qualify for additional lending from either the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) or Western public and private financial institutions, the prospective borrower must agree to implement a basket of reforms which include, but are not limited to, elimination of most public subsidies, devaluation of the national currency, deregulation of the trade sector, and more reliance on markets for the allocation of resources. See generally F. Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy (1989); 50 Years is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (K. Danaher ed., 1994) & C. Baylies, ‘Political Conditionality’ and Democratization, 22 Review of African Political Economy 321 (1995).


effectively fight bureaucratic corruption and in the process, improve governance and the allocation of resources.\textsuperscript{10}

By the late 1980s, it had become obvious, even to casual observers, that the policies African policymakers were implementing to deal with poverty and deprivation were not working. In fact, at this time, more than two-thirds of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa were no longer able to meet their public obligations and were eventually forced to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions for financial aid.\textsuperscript{11} Today, virtually all of these countries continue to struggle with extremely high levels of external debt, poor economic performance, and local populations that are not able to meet even their basic needs.\textsuperscript{12} Like most students of African political economy, I see “deep-rooted” and endemic corruption as one of, if not, the most “serious contemporary developmental challenges facing the continent” today.\textsuperscript{13} As argued by Adama Deing, a scholar who was chosen by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU)\textsuperscript{14} to analyze the impact of corruption on the legal, political and economic spheres in Africa, “corruption and impunity are antithetical to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the enemy of the principle of good governance.”\textsuperscript{15} Recognizing the critical role played by corruption in political and economic underdevelopment in the continent, the AU adopted the African Union Convention on

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{} Mbaku, \textit{supra} note 9 at 2-3.
\bibitem{} The World Bank and the International Monetary Funds (called Bretton Woods institutions, after the town in New Hampshire (USA) where the Bretton Woods Agreements, which established these multilateral institutions, were deliberated upon and signed in 1944). \textit{See} UNDP, \textit{HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT} 2000 (2000).
\bibitem{} \textit{See} J. E. \textit{Stepanek}, \textit{Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field} (1999) for a stimulating treatment of Africa’s failure to develop. A more recent treatment can be found in \textit{Todd J. Moss, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: MAKING SENSE OF THE ISSUES AND ACTORS} (2007).
\end{thebibliography}
Preventing and Combating Corruption in Maputo, Mozambique, on July 11, 2003.\textsuperscript{16} While the AU Convention has many objectives, the overriding one is the desire by the Signatory States to minimize corruption’s extremely negative impact on the creation of the wealth that the continent needs very urgently to fight poverty and improve the living standards of a restless population.\textsuperscript{17}

The AU Convention, of course, is not the first effort made by Africans to deal with their development problems. Among earlier efforts at a unified approach toward resolving the continent’s multifarious development problems, including corruption, are The Lagos Plan of Action and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which, unfortunately, have not met the expectations of the designers.\textsuperscript{18} As will be argued in this paper, while the entry into force of the AU Convention is a critical milestone in the efforts of the AU to chart a new path for poverty alleviation and development in Africa, the AU Convention’s success in curbing corruption and providing the wherewithal for sustained economic growth and development will be determined, to a great extent, by how well individual African countries are able to undertake necessary institutional reforms to provide laws and institutions that are capable of effectively constraining civil servants and politicians and preventing them from engaging in the various forms of political opportunism (including corruption and rent seeking) that have become major


\textsuperscript{17} See the AU Convention, supra note 16, at Art. 2.

\textsuperscript{18} The now defunct and abandoned Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was designed in 1981 by the OAU with the main objective of making significant improvements in the living standards of Africans by the year 2000. The LPA was really never implemented because of a litany of problems, the most important of which was the lack of financing. NEPAD was established in July 2001 as a development initiative of the OAU with the following as its main objectives: (1) eradicate poverty; (2) put all African countries, individually and as a group, on the path to sustainable economic growth and development; (4) halt the marginalization of Africa in global affairs; (5) significantly improve women’s participation in political and economic governance; and (6) integrate Africa into the global marketplace under conditions in which Africa would participate gainfully in global trade. The NEPAD document can be found at http://www.nepad.org/. For a rigorous critique of NEPAD, see generally John Mukum Mbaku, \textit{NEPAD and Prospects for Development in Africa}, 41 \textit{INTERNATIONAL STUDIES} 387 (2004) & Kempe Ronald Hope, \textit{From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development}, 101 \textit{AFRICAN AFFAIRS} 387 (2002).
constraints to entrepreneurial activities and wealth creation. For, the task of curbing corruption in the African economies, as in any other economy, rests squarely on domestic institutions and the bureaucrats who manage them. As will be argued in this paper, international law can complement Africa’s anti-corruption effort by helping African countries (1) extradite suspects who have fled abroad to avoid domestic prosecution; (2) recover proceeds of corrupt transactions that have been “invested” overseas; and (3) constrain the ability of transnational business executives to bribe African policymakers.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION

A. An Overview and Impact of Corruption on African Economies

Several definitions have been advanced in the social science literature for corruption. In a 1967 study of corruption and its impact on political development, Professor J. S. Nye defined corruption as,

[b]ehavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).

Other scholars argue that an effective definition of corruption, one that is policy relevant, must be couched in terms of the public interest. Carl J. Friedrich, for example, states that,

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[t]he pattern of corruption may therefore be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards, such as the expectation of a job in the future, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the reward and thereby damage the group or organization to which the functionary belongs, specifically the government.21

In Africa, most people see corruption primarily in terms of political opportunism by civil servants and politicians—opportunism, as used here, involves a series of extra-legal behaviors by the country’s ruling elites, which impose significant costs on public and private transactions and limit, and in some cases, stunt, political, social and economic development. Specifically, corruption is seen in terms of (1) the illegal appropriation of public resources by civil servants and politicians; (2) illegal taxation of private-sector economic activities; (3) nepotism; (4) embezzlement of common resources; (5) privatization of one’s public office in order to use it to extract extra-legal income and other benefits for the office holder; and (6) capricious and arbitrary enforcement of state regulations.22

B. Impact of Corruption on African Societies

While there may be a disagreement as to the most effective way to define corruption, scholars are virtually agreed on corruption’s impact on the African economies.23 It has been argued that except for HIV/AIDS, corruption remains “one of the most insidious things to attack African societies since the 1960s.”24 First, corruption can provide perverse incentives in the public sector

21 Id. at 15.
23 See generally CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY-CASE STUDIES (Kempe R. Hope, Sr. & B. Chikulo eds., 2000) (detailing the extremely negative impact of corruption on political, social and economic development in several African countries).
and make it virtually impossible for civil servants and politicians to perform their jobs effectively and efficiently. For example, in a study of Cameroon, Professor Nantang Jua determined that corruption severely distorts the costs of procuring necessary supplies for government departments. For example, if a government office needs reams of paper for its copier, and it is determined that the paper will cost, say, 5 million francs CFA (FCFA) when purchased in the open market, then the bureau chief will authorize an order for the paper to be purchased, but at a price of 10 million CFA. The surplus of 5 million CFA over the market price will be shared between the bureau chief, the store’s accountant and the store owner.

Second, corruption forces the public to pay twice for public goods and services. For example, in Cameroon, individuals who go to public hospitals for service, are often asked by the staff to pay bribes before service can be rendered. Patients who refuse or are unable to pay the requested bribes are either not provided any service or are granted inferior and/or ineffective service. Yet, many of these individuals have already paid the taxes used to fund these public institutions.

Third, corruption significantly increases the cost of maintaining a public sector and hence, places a heavy burden on the local economy. In fact, Africa’s public sectors are often described as “bloated,” highly inefficient, parasitic, and generally unproductive. The government sector

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26 The franc CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) is Cameroon’s currency. At the current exchange rate (as of October 16, 2009), one U.S. dollar is equal to FCFA 440.
27 Jua, supra note 25, at 165. To frustrate the efforts of the media to successfully investigate and report on their illegal activities or to make it very difficult for state prosecutors to take successful legal action against them, the three principals in this extra-legal transaction will share the ill-gotten gains with their co-workers. For example, in Cameroon, it is quite common for civil servants who receive bribes or “earn” extra-legal income through various illegal schemes, including the one described here, to share the proceeds of these activities with their subordinates and bosses, as well as other influential individuals in the political jurisdiction of which they are part, including high-ranking police officers, magistrates, other judicial officers, and various politicians. See generally Jua, supra note 25 & Charles M. Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: Insights on Consequences and Control, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM CASE-STUDIES 234 (Kempe R. Hope, Sr. & B. Chikulo eds., 2000).
28 See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 24, at 103; Jua, supra note 25, at 162-70 & Fombad, supra note 27, at 234-60.
29 Mbaku, supra note 24, at 105. These bureaucracies consume an enormous amount of resources and provide society with services that do not only fail to foster the national welfare but actually impede private exchange, effectively stunting the creation of wealth. In fact, in designing and implementing public policies, civil servants in
consumes enormous amounts of scare resources and contributes virtually no value-added to national development.\textsuperscript{30}

Fourth, corruption can make it very difficult for the country to make effective and efficient use of its human capital. For example, when bureau managers make hiring or promotion decisions, they may refuse to seek out the most qualified individuals, but instead prefer individuals who can help them and their bureaus maximize revenues from bribes and other forms of corruption.\textsuperscript{31} The outcome of such an approach to promotion and recruitment is that “efficient rent seekers and not people who are skilled at serving the public” will be allowed to rise to the top of the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{32}

Fifth, in economies pervaded by corruption, it may become quite difficult or virtually impossible to “cultivate a professional, efficient, competent, and responsive civil service,” one that can carry out, in an efficient and equitable way, the state’s domestic development agenda.\textsuperscript{33} Here, hiring decisions will not be made based on candidates’ qualifications, education and skills, and the potential to serve the public effectively, but on such non-job related factors as the candidate’s political connections and potential for helping the bureau maximize its income from corruption.\textsuperscript{34} In such economies, “competence, hard work, integrity and experience” are not desired qualities in a worker.\textsuperscript{35} Instead, “subservience and loyalty” usually emerge as the most desirable qualities in public employees. In fact, in a study of the civil service in Zambia, M.

\begin{flushleft}
\textit{many African economies often prefer policies, which although they are extremely inefficient and impose significant costs on society, allow them to garner for themselves, significant extra-legal income.}\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id. Throughout Africa, many government sectors, as presently constituted, are considered major constraints to genuine economic development. Hence, there is a push by many donors and multilateral organizations (e.g., the World Bank and the IMF) for a restructuring of the post-colonial state to provide each country with more effective institutional and judicial systems. See generally Socio-Political Scaffolding and the Construction of Change, infra note 218.}\textsuperscript{31} Mbaku, \textit{supra} note 24, at 105. \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Id. at 105-106. See also Szefetl, infra note 36, at 169-70.}\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Id. at 106.}\end{flushleft}
Szeftel determined that junior civil servants intentionally avoided employing generally accepted criteria for evaluating public enterprises in an effort not to offend their superiors. By engaging in such unprofessional conduct, they pleased their supervisors, ensured that they were promoted and granted bigger compensation packages, but in the process helped the country adopt perverse policies, which seriously damaged the country’s prospects for effective poverty alleviation.  

Sixth, corruption can distort international trade flows and make it difficult for the country to attract the foreign investment that it needs to supplement domestic efforts at capital formation. As has been argued by Professor Tatah Mentan, corruption enhances the activities of trans-border drug dealers and transnational terrorists. Countries with corrupt, opportunistic and weak bureaucracies offer these terrorists the opportunity to “capture” and utilize domestic financial institutions to bring their “working capital” into the legitimate global financial system and thus, make it possible for them to finance their operations throughout the world.

Finally, high levels of venality in the public sector can force citizens, who are already skeptical about the effectiveness of a highly fractionalized state, to loose respect for and interest in the government and its various organs. Throughout Africa today, most people struggle to meet their basic needs. Yet, a select group of civil servants and politicians, as well as some politically dominant business operatives in these extremely poor countries, are able to maintain living standards that are comparable to those of the rich and famous in the industrial market economies of the West, thanks to the engagement of these African elites in corruption and other

37 Mbaku, supra note 24, at 107.
38 TATAH MENTAN, DILEMMAS OF WEAK STATES: AFRICAN AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004) (arguing that corruption can make it relatively easy for drug dealers to capture local financial institutions and use them to launder their illegal profits and for transnational terrorist groups to use these institutions to transmit money to their operators world-wide).
39 Id. & Mbaku, supra note 24, at 107.
40 Mbaku, supra note 24, at 108.
forms of political opportunism. Depending on the nature of national laws and institutions, top
civil servants and politicians in many African countries may be able to misappropriate resources
earmarked for public goods and services for their own private use. By being able to “prostitute”
their public offices, many civil servants and politicians maintain relatively decadent lifestyles
while their fellow citizens continue to swelter in poverty and deprivation.\textsuperscript{41} Hence, dealing
effectively with corruption is a most urgent public policy priority in virtually all African
countries.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF CORRUPTION

A. Introduction

The most important recent development in the struggle against corruption in Africa is the fact
that policymakers in many countries around the world are gradually recognizing corruption’s
global reach and are willing to engage in cooperative efforts to cleanup corruption and minimize
its impact on political and economic development.\textsuperscript{42} This renewed effort to harmonize the global
“war” against corruption is evidenced in the fact that during the last few years, several
international and regional conventions against corruption have been concluded.\textsuperscript{43}

Why this sudden interest in combating corruption at the international level, an interest that
has significant implications for the struggle against corruption in Africa? First, critical changes in
the global political economy during 1989-1991 (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as
of many authoritarian regimes in Africa) reduced the tolerance of many ordinary citizens,
especially Africans who had been oppressed by many years of colonialism and post-

\textsuperscript{41} Id.
\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 117.
\textsuperscript{43} These include, The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, The UN Convention
Against Corruption, The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Council of Europe’s Corruption and Criminal Law Convention, and the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption.
independence dictatorships, “for incompetence, malfeasance, and venality in the public sector.”

As argued by some Africanist scholars, since the late 1980s, the balance of power in most countries, including those in Africa, has been shifting in favor of more transparency and accountability in the public sectors.

Second, after the Cold War ended, economic interdependence increased significantly—greater levels of economic integration have made certain that high levels of corruption, for example, in Nigeria, can have deleterious effects not only on the Nigerian economy, but also on other economies in Africa and around the world. Third, tremendous improvements in communication and information technology have radically changed the international financial architecture and in the process, enhanced the ability of Africa’s corrupt civil servants and bureaucrats to hide the proceeds of their corrupt activities. In fact, the emergence of electronic forms of money transfer has made it quite easy for corrupt officials to transfer their ill-gotten gains to safe havens in the Caribbean and Western Europe. Businesses and individuals seeking to bribe government officials in order to secure or retain business no longer have to truck into the offices of these officials heavy suitcases full of money and risk being photographed by an inquisitive newspaper reporter—bribes can now be made through electronic transfers.

Fourth, until recently, many European countries did not only fail to outlaw the bribery of foreign officials by their corporations operating abroad, but actually allowed a tax deduction for such payments. Corruption threatens not only African economies, but also the maintenance of

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44 Mbaku, supra note 24, at 117-118.
46 Among the fraud schemes listed on the FBI’s website as among those to look at for because of their global impact are the Nigerian Letter or 419 Fraud. See http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htm (last visited on December 15, 2009).
47 In 1994, the OECD put forth its first official effort to fight the bribery of foreign public officials in business transactions. In its 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions, the OECD directed its members to use domestic law to combat international corruption, specifically that associated with the bribery of public
the multilateral trading system that is critical to global peace and prosperity. A fully functioning, competitive and viable global economy cannot be maintained if some players can gain a comparative advantage, not by innovation and managerial expertise, but through the payment of bribes to national regulators. Thus, companies located in countries that prohibit corruption would be placed at a competitive disadvantage—in fact, before the OECD enacted the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions, U.S.-based multinational companies, which since 1977, have been prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other federal laws from bribing foreign officials, had been complaining that they could not compete effectively against their European counterparts in securing foreign contracts because many European companies were not only legally allowed to pay bribes to foreign public officials but were granted tax credit for such payments.48

B. The International Community Recognizes Corruption as a Major Development Constraint

Even before the events of September 11, 2001 made evident the role of corruption in the financing of transnational terrorism, many countries had already recognized corruption as an important and insidious force in other trans-border criminal activities. In fact, in 1988, more than 100 countries signed the UN Convention Against Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and pledged to “criminalize money laundering, improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to track the activities of money launderers, and take part in the global effort to fight international drug trafficking.”49 As the last decade of the twentieth century began, the political and economic systems of many developed industrial countries were threatened by corruption-
related scandals. For example, as the international community was meeting in Naples, Italy in 1994, to examine ways to increase their cooperation in the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and various forms of cross-border criminal activities, their host, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, was under investigation for corruption.\(^{50}\)

In recent years, many governmental and non-governmental organizations, especially in the developed countries, have become interested in fighting global corruption. For example, since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has developed and implemented several anti-corruption schemes, many of which are binding on recipients of U.S. aid, in an effort to enhance the performance and viability of its projects, especially in Africa and other parts of the developing world.\(^{51}\)

In 2004, Freedom House, a New York-based non-governmental organization that tracks and studies civil liberties and political rights around the world, completed an analysis of government performance in the areas of civil liberties, rule of law, anti-corruption and transparency, and accountability and public voice in thirty countries, which were struggling to transition from authoritarian to democratic governance.\(^{52}\) Since then, Freedom House has taken an active role in the fight against corruption and has made recommendations to the global community on how to effectively combat corruption.\(^{53}\)

Perhaps, one of the most visible (and arguably, one of the most effective) NGOs involved in the war against global corruption is the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI).\(^{54}\) Since its founding in 1993, it has successfully established national chapters in many countries, including

\(^{50}\) See Los Angeles Times (November 24, 1994).
\(^{51}\) For a review of the USAID’s anticorruption effort, see generally USAID, A HANDBOOK ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION (1999).
\(^{52}\) Freedom House, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS, 2004: A SURVEY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 2 (2004). Among the group of countries studied were Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
\(^{53}\) Id. at 12.
\(^{54}\) Information about TI can be found at http://www.transparency.org/.
those in Africa. TI produces and distributes many materials to help national governments, businesses and civil society fight corruption. One of its most important publications is the *TI Source Book*, which provides policymakers with practical tools (e.g., sources of information on local corruption) to fight corruption.55

The United Nations has also become involved in the anti-corruption movement. In 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted the *UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions* and in it, called for all member countries to take action domestically and to cooperate with each other to fight all forms of corruption, bribery and other related illegal activities associated with international business transactions.56 In 2000, the so-called Millennium Assembly of the General Assembly of the UN adopted the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime—the convention is considered a legally binding instrument and commits each signatory state to criminalize the following offenses associated with transnational organized crime: money laundering; corruption; obstruction of justice; and participation in an organized criminal organization.57 Recognizing, however, that it was necessary to have a legal instrument against global corruption that was separate from the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN General Assembly adopted a Convention Against Corruption in 2003 and specifically targeted (1) bribery of public officials; (2) money laundering involving public funds; (3) fraud involving public procurement; and (4) embezzlement of public funds.58 The Convention, which will be discussed later in this paper,

56 UNITED NATIONS, *UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION AGAINST CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS* (1997).
57 UNITED NATIONS, *UN CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME* (2000). This convention has since been supplemented by two protocols—*THE PROTOCOL AGAINST THE SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS* (which deals with organized criminal groups that smuggle migrants) & *THE PROTOCOL AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS* (which deals with modern slavery).
emphasized four instruments for fighting corruption—(1) criminalization; (2) prevention; (3) international cooperation; and (4) asset recovery.  

Many countries and regional organizations have also contributed to the war against global corruption. One of the most important contributions is the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which was first enacted in 1977 and has since gone through many amendments. In 2003, the African Union (AU) adopted its Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption at Maputo, Mozambique. In the following sections, I will examine various international legal instruments used to fight global corruption. Given the critical role played by the United States and its enormous economy in global trade and politics, in addition to the fact that U.S. appeals court decisions have a significant impact on international law, as well as on national legal systems around the world, I will specifically examine the United States’ FCPA. In addition, I will take a look at the UN Convention on Corruption and show how these international legal instruments can enhance the ability of Africa’s national legal systems, working within the AU Convention, to deal effectively with domestic, as well as transnational corruption. Finally, I will advance the argument that the most efficient and sustainable way for African countries to fight corruption is for each country to provide itself with an efficient and fully functioning institutional and judicial system. The latter should serve as the foundation for}

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59 Id.
60 The FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.
61 The United States has one of the most important of the world’s economies, both in terms of trade and national output. In 2007, for example, of total world output of U.S. $54,347,038 million, the U.S. economy accounted for $13,811,200 million (or 25%) of that amount. The nearest competitor to the United States is Japan, which in 2007 had a gross domestic product of $4,376,705 million (or 8% of global output). In terms of trade, the United States accounted for as much as 11% of global trade (exports plus imports) in 2007. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 356-57, 358-59 (2009).
62 For example, the decision of the U.S. Appeals Court for the Second Circuit in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) established the legal foundation for the enforcement of international human rights in U.S. courts and in the process, significantly enhanced international law.
the cooperation and mutual legal assistance that these countries need to deal effectively with corruption.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

A. Introduction

In the mid-1970s, the United States was embroiled in a corruption scandal63 that would eventually lead to the resignation of Richard Nixon as President of the United States. The Watergate Affair rekindled the interest of many scholars in the study of political corruption.64 One important benefit of the Nixon corruption scandal is that congressional investigation of the Watergate Affair provided the foundation for U.S. officials to look at efforts by U.S.-based multinational companies to corrupt foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain business. During the SEC’s investigation, over 400 U.S. corporations admitted that they had made “questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties.”65

The SEC’s investigation revealed a problem that was global in nature and one that threatened to seriously damage the international trading system. Dealing effectively with it called for a

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63 The so-called Watergate Affair began with the arrest of five men suspected of breaking into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1972.
64 See generally the influential study, L. BERG, H. HAHN & J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1976) (defining political corruption as behavior by private or public individuals, which “violates and undermines the norms of the system of public order which is deemed indispensable for the maintenance of political democracy.” Id. at 3). For a more recent treatment of the corrupt abuse of political power by the Nixon administration, see generally ANTHONY SUMMERS, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER: THE SECRET WORLD OF RICHARD NIXON (2000).
coordinated international effort. U.S. authorities, however, soon realized that the efforts of most countries and international organizations in respect of the war on corruption at this time were limited to “declarations and condemnations.” Beginning in the Spring of 1976, several U.S. lawmakers introduced bills that eventually resulted in the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). The FCPA was the first legislative effort in the United States to make it a crime to bribe foreign public officials.

Other international legal instruments designed to combat international corruption include the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the UN’s Convention Against Corruption. This time in Africa was one of radical and significantly transformative change. South Africa’s infamous apartheid system had been dismantled and many of the continent’s post-independence authoritarian regimes had collapsed, giving way to continent-wide constitutional conferences to provide each country with more effective governance systems. Part of Africa’s transition to democratic governance

66 Schroth, supra note 65 at 597.
67 Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 697. For example, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) both passed resolutions, whose provisions did not have the force of law. See UN General Assembly, Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved, G. A. Res. 3514, U.N. GAOR, 30th Session, Supp. No. 34, UN Doc. A/10034 (1975); OAS, Behavior of Transnational Enterprises Operating in the Region and Need for a Code of Conduct to be Observed by Such Enterprises, July 10, 1975, 14 I. L. M. 1326 (1975). See also Schroth, supra note 68, at 593.
69 Id. at 359.
70 U.S. corporations, which were now subject to the FCPA, were partly responsible for forcing Congress to “lobby” the OECD to enact its anti-corruption convention in order to “level” the field within which business had to compete for foreign contracts. See Posadas, supra note 67, at 376. The U.S. Department of Commerce determined that between 1993 and 1996, U.S.-based multinational companies “lost an estimated $100 billion from differences in the regulation of international corrupt practices.” Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at fn 40. See also Richard Lawrence, U.S. Anti-Corruption Drive Pays, J. COMM. (Newark), Jun. 20, 1996, at 1A. Note that at this time, in many OECD countries, the bribery of public officials in order to obtain and retain business was not only legal, but companies engaging in the practice could derive significant tax benefits from their governments. See Posadas, supra note 67, at 376.
involved finding ways to deal effectively with one of the most perverse institutions in the continent, and a major constraint to social, economic and political development, corruption. Thus, as part of the continent’s effort to improve governance, the Assembly of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1998 expressed its interest in designing and adopting a convention on combating corruption. The OAU’s efforts were eventually brought to fruition by the African Union (the successor organization to the OAU) with the adoption of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in Maputo, Mozambique on July 10-12, 2003.

B. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

The FCPA was designed by Congress to regulate the way U.S. corporations carry out their business transactions outside the country. Specifically, the statute was designed to combat corrupt practices in international business transactions involving U.S. firms. The FCPA consists of two important components: (1) compliance; and (2) penalties—civil or criminal. The “compliance” component sets legal standards for transactors to provide information about their transactions (“record-keeping standards”) and the “penalties” component criminalizes certain international trade practices. The standards established by the FCPA apply to certain categories of natural and legal persons, who are designated as follows: (1) “issuers,” “domestic concerns,” and “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns.” The term “issuer” is not

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75 See LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE, at 2.
76 See generally FCPA, §§ 78dd-1, et seq.
77 Id. at §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
78 Id. at § 78dd-1.
79 Id. at § 78dd-2.
defined in the FCPA. However, based on how it is used in the statute, it is clear that it refers to legal persons or corporations, which have “a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.” The FCPA, however, provides a definition for “domestic concern,” which is

(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.

The category “persons other than issuers and domestic concerns” covers “any person other than an issuer that is subject to section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or a domestic concern” who undertakes international trade transactions while in the territory of the United States, regardless of the means used to carry out those transactions.

Only “issuers” are required by the FCPA to keep records of their transactions abroad. An issuer is required to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” In addition, each issuer must establish and maintain an internal accounting system that provides “reasonable assurances that—(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles

80 Id. at § 78dd-3.
81 Id. § 78dd-1(a). This definition has been confirmed in judicial interpretations. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 762-63 (5th Cir. 2004). In addition, the Lay-Person’s Guide to FCPA, jointly issued by the U.S. Departments of Justice & Commerce, confirms this definition of “issuer.”
82 Id. at § 78dd-2(h)(1).
83 Id. at § 78dd-3(a).
84 Note that “territory of the United States” includes the 50 states and U.S. territories, possessions and commonwealths.
85 FCPA, § 78m(b)(2)(A).
or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets.”\footnote{Id. at § 78m(b)(2)(B).} An issuer who fails to comply with these regulations is subject to civil and criminal penalties.\footnote{Id. at § 78ff. Notice that stiffer fines, including imprisonment of up to 20 years, may be imposed for willful violations, and false and misleading statements. § 78ff(a).}

Unlike the provisions that prescribe record keeping, which apply only to “issuers,” the provisions of the FCPA that criminalize international corruption apply to all three categories of natural or legal persons.\footnote{The three categories are: (1) issuers (§ 78dd-1); (2) domestic concerns (§ 78dd-2); and (3) persons other than issuers and domestic concerns (§ 78dd-3). Despite the fact that the prohibitions relating to each class of persons are codified in different sections of the statute, these are identical.} The FCPA contains many substantive provisions. Perhaps, the most important, in terms of curbing global corruption, is the one that defines illegal conduct by any of the three categories of natural or legal persons: “It shall be unlawful . . . to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of value.”\footnote{This provision appears in all three sections of the statute that apply to the three categories of natural and legal persons. See §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).}

In order to offend this provision, the offending party must make the offer, payment, or promise to pay to any one of three categories of persons—(1) foreign officials; (2) foreign political party, or candidate for foreign political office; and (3) third persons who might serve as an intermediary with the knowledge that “all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office.”\footnote{See FCPA §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).}
The FCPA is designed to minimize corruption in international business transactions. Hence, in order for penalties to attach, payments, offers, or promises made by any of the defined categories of natural or legal persons must be for the purposes of:

(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.\textsuperscript{91}

Enforcement of the provisions of the FCPA is the responsibility of the SEC and the U.S. Attorney General. While the enforcement of violations of FCPA provisions by the SEC is limited to civil penalties and instances in which securities\textsuperscript{92} are involved, the Attorney General has broader powers to enforce violations of the FCPA. Specifically, the Attorney General is empowered to issue opinions,\textsuperscript{93} as well as guidelines,\textsuperscript{94} seek injunctive relief,\textsuperscript{95} “administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, other documents which the Attorney General deems relevant or material to such investigation.”\textsuperscript{96} Most important from the point of view of fighting global corruption is the fact that the U.S. Attorney General can criminally prosecute any party alleged to have violated any of

\textsuperscript{91}FCPA § 78dd-1(a)(2).
\textsuperscript{92}The term “security,” as used in the FCPA, is defined by the Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1) (As Amended P.L. 111-72, Approved Oct. 13, 2009).
\textsuperscript{93}FCPA, § 78dd-1(e).
\textsuperscript{94}Id. at 78dd-1(d).
\textsuperscript{95}Id. at 78dd-2(d).
\textsuperscript{96}Id.
the provisions of the FCPA.\textsuperscript{97} In addition to civil and criminal action, the government may also bar any person or firm found to have violated the FCPA from engaging in any type of business with the U.S. Government,\textsuperscript{98} rule such natural or legal person ineligible to receive an export license,\textsuperscript{99} bar or suspend (through the SEC) such persons from the securities business,\textsuperscript{100} disqualify such persons from participating in foreign investment programs underwritten by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),\textsuperscript{101} and bar any payments made in violation of the FCPA from being considered as business expenses deductible under U.S. tax laws.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{C. United Nations Convention Against Corruption}

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has as its main objective, the elimination of corruption in order to enhance the efficient and effective management of “public affairs and public property.”\textsuperscript{103} Specifically, the UNCAC aims:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(a)] To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively;
  \item[(b)] To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery;
  \item[(c)] To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{itemize}

The UNCAC was designed to serve as a comprehensive international legal instrument against corruption and hence, its seventy-one articles deal with virtually all aspects of corruption and

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Id.} at §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE, supra} note 65, at 4.
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, supra} note 57, at ART. 1.
\textsuperscript{104} Id.
cover both the demand for and supply of corruption.\footnote{Id. at ARTICLES 1-71.} Nevertheless, it can be shown that the UNCAC’s main emphasis is on “prevention,” “criminalization,” and “enforcement.” Recognizing that global corruption cannot be effectively combated without the help and cooperation of national legal systems, the UNCAC imposes mandatory duties on States Parties—they must develop and implement effective anti-corruption policies. Specifically, each State Party shall, “in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.”\footnote{Id. at ART. 5(1).}

The UNCAC recognizes the fact that in many countries, an important problem associated with fighting corruption is the fact that quite often, national legal systems do not adequately constrain counteracting agencies (e.g., the police and the judiciary). Hence, the UNCAC specifically requires States Parties to “take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules with respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary.”\footnote{Id. at ART. 11(1).} For example, studies of corruption in several African countries show that civil servants, who include judges, other judicial officers, and the police, are among some of the most corrupt public servants in these countries.\footnote{See generally Mbaku, supra note 24 & CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 23.}

The UNCAC also recognizes that efforts at corruption control cannot be successful without the participation of civil society. Thus, the convention specifically calls for States Parties to enhance the ability of civil society, grass-roots organizations, as well as other non-governmental organizations, to participate fully and effectively in combating corruption. Part of the effort to enhance private-sector participation in corruption control requires national governments to
To further strengthen the national government’s ability to fight corruption, the UNCAC criminalizes certain practices, whether committed in the private or public sectors. These include bribery, extra-legal or illicit enrichment, embezzlement, and “prostitution” of one’s public office.¹¹⁰

A very important part of the UNCAC is international cooperation in the fight against corruption. The Convention provides specific guidelines that deal with substantive and procedural issues associated with the various aspects of fighting global corruption. The most important of these include (1) extraditions,¹¹¹ (2) mutual assistance in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings.¹¹²

One of the most important consequences of grand corruption in Africa is that much of the money illegally appropriated by civil servants and politicians is usually deposited in numbered accounts in foreign banks. Thus, the UNCAC’s emphasis on asset recovery is very important for many poor countries, whose corrupt and opportunistic leaders have illegally appropriated national financial resources and have either deposited them in foreign banks or have used them to purchase foreign real property.¹¹³ Article 51 states specifically that “[t]he return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a fundamental principle of this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.”¹¹⁴ In fact, asset recovery was considered so critical and fundamental an issue that the States Parties devoted

¹⁰⁹ UNCAC, ARTICLES 10 & 13.
¹¹⁰ Id. at ARTICLES 15-23. Here, prostitution of one’s office involves influence peddling or where civil servants sell the functions of their office to the public for pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits. The rewards are considered extra-legal enrichment and subject to sanction under most national laws.
¹¹¹ Id. at ART. 44.
¹¹² Id. at ART. 46.
¹¹³ Id. at ART. 51.
¹¹⁴ Id.
an entire chapter of the Convention (Chapter V, Articles 51-59) to dealing with it.\textsuperscript{115}

The UNCAC provides detailed procedures on how States Parties can initiate action in the courts of a State Party where the illegally obtained assets are currently located in order to recover them.\textsuperscript{116} The UNCAC also establishes a Conference of the States Parties to the Convention “to improve the capacity of and cooperation between States Parties to achieve the objectives set forth in this Convention and to promote and review its implementation.”\textsuperscript{117} The Conference is expected to review, on a periodical basis, the extent to which States Parties are implementing the UNCAC and to make recommendations for improving the Convention’s role in combating global corruption.\textsuperscript{118}

The UNCAC, of course, is an international agreement entered into voluntarily by the majority of the world’s sovereign nations, with the aim of tackling one of the most intractable development constraints of this century—corruption. Nevertheless, it is important to realize, especially in the case of Africa, that while many countries may be willing to cooperate fully in the global fight against corruption, they may not be able to do so either because ruling elites in these countries are the direct beneficiaries of the “corruption enterprise,” national institutions (e.g., the police and the judiciary) are simply incapable of functioning as effective counteracting agencies, or countries fear that international cooperation against corruption involves surrender of a certain level of national sovereignty. Where the national government is considered by most people as illegitimate,\textsuperscript{119} it is not likely that civil society will cooperate with such a government in the fight against corruption. As will be argued later in this paper, it not likely that a regime that enjoys little or no domestic legitimacy and hence, must struggle on a daily basis to hold on

\textsuperscript{115} Id. at CHAPTER V, ARTICLES 51-59.
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at ARTICLES 53-59.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at ART. 63(1).
\textsuperscript{118} Id. at ART. 63(4)(e)-(f).
\textsuperscript{119} This is quite often the case where a government has come to power through a military coup d’état or through other extra-constitutional process (e.g., a rigged election).
to power, can cooperate effectively with other governments to fight corruption.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, it is necessary that legal and governance structures in these countries first be strengthened in order to enhance their ability to contribute positively to the struggle against global corruption.\textsuperscript{121}

\textbf{D. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption}

The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption is one of the latest of the regional legal instruments for fighting transnational corruption\textsuperscript{122} and is based on principles, which the States Parties believe undergird governance in the continent in the twenty-first century. Such principles include “\[r\]espect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance.”\textsuperscript{123} As is evident from the tone of the Convention’s preamble, the States Parties were alarmed by corruption’s deleterious effects on “political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States,” as well as by corruption’s “devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African peoples.”\textsuperscript{124}

Taking the principles mentioned above into consideration and cognizant of the need to arrest corruption’s pernicious impact on African societies, the AU Convention places emphasis on three critical aspects of the war against venality in the continent: (1) prevention, (2) criminalization, and (3) international cooperation.\textsuperscript{125} These provisions impose certain duties on both the public and private sectors. With respect to fighting corruption in the public sector, States Parties “commit themselves to: 1. Require all or designated public officials to declare their assets at the time of assumption of office during and after their term of office in the public service. 2.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} See generally Mbaku, supra note 24, at 344-47.
\item \textsuperscript{121} In the case of Africa, Mbaku examines the many ways in which African countries can reconstruct and reconstitute their states in order to provide themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain civil servants and politicians and enhance the fight against corruption. See Mbaku, supra note 24, at 152-95.
\item \textsuperscript{122} The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (African Union Convention), supra note 16.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Id. at ART. 3(1).
\item \textsuperscript{124} Id. at PREAMBLE.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Id. at ARTICLES 4-24.
\end{itemize}
Create an internal committee or a similar body mandated to establish a code of conduct and to monitor its implementation, and sensitize and train public officials on matters of ethics.”

Virtually all the provisions begin with “State[s] Parties commit themselves to” or “State[s] Parties undertake to” and hence, are stated in a non-mandatory manner.

With regard to the private sector,

State[s] Parties undertake to: 1. Adopt legislative and other measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption and related offences committed in and by agents of the private sector. 2. Establish mechanisms to encourage participation by the private sector in the fight against unfair competition, respect of the tender procedures and property rights. 3. Adopt such other measures as may be necessary to prevent companies from paying bribes to win tenders.

The AU Convention makes allowance for the participation of civil society and its organizations (e.g., the private media) in combating corruption. Civil society is expected to serve as a check on the exercise of government agency. Specifically, civil society and its organizations are expected to “hold governments to the highest level of transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.”

The AU Convention’s criminalization provisions are designed specifically to define “acts of corruption and related offenses,” establish jurisdiction, and enumerate numerous criminal

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126 Id. at ART. 7(1)-(2).
127 Id.
128 Id. at ARTICLES 11 & 12.
129 Compare to the FCPA’s frequent of the word “shall,” as in “No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls . . .” FCPA § 78m(b)(5).
130 Id. at ART. 11(1).
131 Id. at ART. 12.
132 Id. at ART. 12(2).
133 Id. at ART. 4(1).
134 Id. at ART. 13.
offenses that are associated with and implicate corruption.\textsuperscript{135} For example, acts of corruption include, “the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions.”\textsuperscript{136} Note that the AU Convention criminalizes both the demand for and supply of corruption, and in addition, also criminalizes “any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official or any other person for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party.”\textsuperscript{137}

The AU Convention is greatly concerned about the misuse of public office for private gain and hence, criminalizes any behavior by a public official that involves the wielding of undue influence—that is conduct related to all the offenses discussed earlier.\textsuperscript{138} For example, the AU Convention criminalizes,

\begin{quote}
the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at ART. 4.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} at ART. 4(1)(a).
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at ART. 4(1)(c).
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.} at ART. 4(1)(f).
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.}
Other conducts criminalized by the AU Convention include illicit enrichment,\(^{140}\) concealment of one’s ill-gotten gains,\(^{141}\) and participation in various inchoate crimes, which include conspiracy and attempt.\(^{142}\) The AU Convention devotes an entire article\(^{143}\) to “laundering the proceeds of corruption” and defines laundering as:

> The conversion, transfer or disposal of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action.\(^{144}\)

The AU Convention is designed to cover corrupt behavior committed by anybody, whether that behavior takes place in the public or private sectors.\(^{145}\) A “public official” is “any official or employee of the State or its agencies including those who have been selected, appointed or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State at any level of its hierarchy.”\(^{146}\)

The “enforcement” component of the AU Convention consists of two sub-parts—a domestic component and an international component. Within the domestic arena, the AU Convention mandates not only the general improvement of each State Party’s legal system but the passage of legislation to give effect to the provisions of the AU Convention—that is, to the obligations that the States Parties have assumed under the Convention.\(^{147}\) It is important to note that while some of the provisions use “permissive language” and hence are not mandatory, other use mandatory

\(^{140}\) Id. at ART. 4(1)(g). “Illicit enrichment” is defined as “the significant increase in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her income.” Id. at ART. 1.

\(^{141}\) Id. at ART. 4(1)(h).

\(^{142}\) Id. at ART. 4(1)(i).

\(^{143}\) Id. at ART. 6.

\(^{144}\) Id. at ART. 6(a).

\(^{145}\) See generally ARTICLES 4 & 11 of the AU CONVENTION.

\(^{146}\) Id. at ART. 1.

\(^{147}\) See, e.g., Id. at ARTICLES 5-6.
language.\footnote{For example, Article 6 states as follows: “States Parties \textit{shall} adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences” (emphasis added). Article 5, on the other hand, uses the language “State Parties \textit{undertake} to” (emphasis added).} For purposes of effective enforcement of measures against corruption, the AU Convention makes it mandatory for States Parties to “adopt such legislative and other measures to give effect to the right of access to any information that is required to assist in the fight against corruption and related offenses.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at ART. 9.} The role of civil society and its organizations—notably, the media—is also emphasized.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at ART. 12.}

To enhance legitimacy of the enforcement process and improve its acceptance by the people, the AU Convention reiterates “the need for due process for anyone accused of committing any offense” and requires that all individuals accused of corruption-related offenses be granted a “fair trial in accordance with recognized principles of human rights.”\footnote{Snider & Kidane, \textit{supra} note 13, at 715.} Specifically, “[s]ubject to domestic law, any person alleged to have committed acts of corruption and related offences shall receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings in accordance with the minimum guarantees contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and any other relevant international human rights instrument recognized by the concerned States Parties.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at ART. 14.}

Although the struggle to minimize corruption in the African economies will, invariably, depend, to a great extent, on domestic efforts, the international dimension should not be discounted. For, most of the civil servants and politicians who accumulate assets through corrupt means in Africa usually “invest” those ill-gotten gains in foreign banks and financial institutions.\footnote{See generally Mbaku, \textit{supra} note 24, at 96-97 & VICTOR T. LEVINE, \textsc{Political Corruption: The Ghanaian Case} (1975) (arguing that most of the assets accumulated by African ruling elites through corruption are usually invested abroad).} Thus, provisions on extradition,\footnote{\textit{Id.} at ART. 15.} confiscation and seizure of the proceeds and

\begin{itemize}
\item[148] For example, Article 6 states as follows: “States Parties \textit{shall} adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences” (emphasis added). Article 5, on the other hand, uses the language “State Parties \textit{undertake} to” (emphasis added).
\item[149] \textit{Id.} at ART. 9.
\item[150] \textit{Id.} at ART. 12.
\item[151] Snider & Kidane, \textit{supra} note 13, at 715.
\item[152] \textit{Id.} at ART. 14.
\item[153] See generally Mbaku, \textit{supra} note 24, at 96-97 & VICTOR T. LEVINE, \textsc{Political Corruption: The Ghanaian Case} (1975) (arguing that most of the assets accumulated by African ruling elites through corruption are usually invested abroad).
\item[154] \textit{Id.} at ART. 15.
\end{itemize}
instrumentalities of corruption, and mutual legal assistance are quite critical to the continent’s fight against transnational corruption.

Cooperation at the international level extends to signatories and non-signatories alike. This provision of the AU Convention is designed to make sure that offending parties do not escape justice by fleeing to non-signatory countries. For purposes of “cooperation and mutual legal assistance,” each State Party must designate a national authority who will be responsible for receiving requests for assistance and cooperation as indicated in the Convention. Also in relation to international cooperation, the AU is to establish an Advisory Board consisting of eleven independent members, whose job it is to monitor the implementation and proper functioning of the Convention.

V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS

In this section, I will attempt to undertake a comparative analysis of the AU Convention with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UN Convention Against Corruption. The analysis will be divided into three sections dealing with (a) substantive provisions; (b) procedural provisions; and (c) others.

A. The Conventions’ Substantive Provisions

The primary objective of all three legal instruments is to minimize corruption. However, while the UNCAC and the AU Convention deal with corruption in its broadest meaning, the FCPA

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155 Id. at ART. 16. See also ART. 17, which mandates that States Parties not use their bank secrecy rules to frustrate the efforts of other States Parties which are attempting to gather information necessary to prosecute alleged criminal offenses associated with corruption or recover assets, which have been accumulated through engagement in illegal activities. However, this article also mandates that the “[r]equesting State shall not use any information received that is protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than the proceedings for which that information was requested, unless with the consent of the Requested State Party.” Id. at ART. 17(2).
156 Id. at ART. 18.
157 Id. at ART. 19(3).
158 Id. at ART. 18(1)-(2).
159 Each member will serve in his or her personal capacity. Id. at ART. 22(3).
160 Id. at ART. 22(5)(a)-(i). The AU Convention, however, fails to deal effectively with the issue of sanctions against States Parties, which violate provisions of the convention.
aims to “make it unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign issuers of securities, to make a corrupt payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.” The FCPA aims to achieve its objectives by mandating record-keeping standards for “issuers” of securities and empowering the U.S. Department of Justice and the SEC to impose civil and criminal penalties on any party that does not comply with these standards. Thus, while the FCPA is concerned primarily with trying to improve the efficiency of the international trading regime, both the UNCAC and the African Union focus primarily on efforts to minimize the deleterious effects of corruption on social, political and economic development.

Unlike the FCPA and the UNCAC, the AU Convention views corruption as an important constraint to economic and political development and considers the successful combating of corruption as critical to development and good governance. As argued by Snider and Kidane, the AU Convention “takes a rights and good governance approach to the problem of corruption.” First, in the “Objectives,” the AU Convention’s first objective is “[t]o promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offenses in the public and private sectors.” Second, another objective of the Convention is to “[p]romote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as

161 LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE, supra note 65, at 2.
162 Id. at §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
163 See generally AFRICAN UNION CONVENTION and UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, supra notes 16 & 57 respectively.
164 See generally AFRICAN UNION CONVENTION, supra note 16, at ARTICLES 2 & 3.
165 Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 717.
166 AU CONVENTION, supra note 16, at ART. 2.
167 Id. at ART. 2(1).
well as civil and political rights.”168 Third, the States Parties to the Convention “undertake to abide” by the principle of “[r]espect for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.”169 Finally, the Convention calls for “[t]ransparency and accountability in the management of public affairs” and the “[p]romotion of social justice to ensure balanced socio-economic development.”170

1. The Conventions’ Main Mechanisms For Combating Corruption

All three conventions (FCPA, UNCAC and AU Convention) focus on private-sector activities, which contribute to corruption. The most important provisions, which these conventions have designed to fight corruption can be grouped into two categories: (a) the accounting and record-keeping provisions; and (b) the anti-bribery provisions.

(a) The Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions

The FCPA imposes on “issuers” record-keeping requirements—“[e]very issuer . . . shall. . . make and keep books, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls.”171 Under the FCPA, the “accounting and record-keeping” provisions tend to be lesser known than the anti-bribery provisions. Yet, the accounting and record-keeping provisions “constitute a more potent mechanism that has implications far greater than simply deterring improper payments to foreign officials.”172 In addition to the fact that

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168 Id. at ART. 2(4). As is made evident in other parts of the Convention, one of the most important of the obstacles mentioned in this section is “corruption,” which must be eradicated in order to enhance the ability of Africans to enjoy their civil, political, and economic rights.
169 Id. at ART. 3(2).
170 Id. at ART. 3(3)-(4). See also Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 717.
171 FCPA, supra note 60, § 78m(b)(2).
accounting and record-keeping provisions affect the global operations of all issuers,\textsuperscript{173} “including their majority-owned foreign subsidiaries and their officers, directors, employees, and agents acting on behalf of an issuer,”\textsuperscript{174} the provisions also “directly affect domestic practices, including practices wholly unrelated to the making of improper inducements in foreign settings.”\textsuperscript{175} An entity that violates the accounting and record-keeping provisions (e.g., maintaining inaccurate or falsified records or failing to provide adequate internal accounting controls) may be subject to criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{176}

Unlike the FCPA, which focuses on the private sector, the AU Convention places emphasis on the public sector and advises States Parties to “[a]dopt legislative and other measures to create, maintain and strengthen internal accounting, auditing and follow-up systems, in particular, in the public income, custom and tax receipts, expenditures and procedures for hiring, procurement and management of public goods and services.”\textsuperscript{177} Additional AU Convention measures for combating corruption, all geared toward the public sector, include the requirement that public officials declare their assets, develop codes of conduct, and establish “disciplinary measures and investigation procedures in corruption and related offenses.”\textsuperscript{178}

In addition to the fact that most of the AU Convention’s provisions are not stated in mandatory language, the Convention does not provide any deterrence or penal scheme, instead, leaving the penalizing process to the States Parties. This represents a significant weakness of the AU Convention, especially given the fact that few African countries have been able, since

\textsuperscript{173} An issuer is defined as any legal persons or corporations, which have “a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). See also Deming, supra note 172, at 8.
\textsuperscript{174} Deming, supra note 172, at 21.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{176} 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)-(5). Criminal liability only attaches for those who “knowingly falsify” records or “knowingly circumvent” a system of internal accounting controls. See also Deming, supra note 172, at 43.
\textsuperscript{177} AU CONVENTION, supra note 16, at ART. 5(4). The AU Convention’s Article 11, which deals with the private sector, does not expressly impose any accounting and record-keeping requirements on private entities operating in member states.
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Id.} at ART. 7.
independence, to undertake the types of institutional reforms that can produce laws and institutions capable of adequately and effectively combating corruption and other forms of political opportunism.\textsuperscript{179}

Unlike the AU Convention, the UNCAC provides a comprehensive set of provisions for the prevention of corruption in both the private and public sectors.\textsuperscript{180} Given the fact that most of the signatories to the AU Convention are also signatories to the UNCAC, the hope is that the UNCAC will fill in the gaps left by the AU Convention, which include the imposition of sanctions on violators.\textsuperscript{181} The UNCAC, for example, specifically requires each State Party to “take measures . . . to prevent corruption involving the private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures.”\textsuperscript{182} Since the AU Convention leaves the matter of compliance and penalties to the discretion of States Parties, and given the continent’s checkered past with institutional reforms, it is highly unlikely that many of these countries will be able to muster the political will and, to a certain extent, the resources needed, to undertake the institutional reforms necessary to establish fully functioning schemes against corruption.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{179} For a review of the literature on the failure of African countries to engage in effective and democratic constitutional reforms to provide themselves with institutional arrangements capable of fully and effectively constraining civil servants and politicians and hence, minimizing corruption in the public sector, see generally Mbaku, supra note 24. See also Victor T. LeVine, The Rise and Fall of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 THE JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 181 (1997) (arguing that most of the post-independence constitutional reforms in West Africa created institutions, which enhanced the ability of civil servants and politicians to exploit their public positions, through corruption, rent seeking, and other forms of opportunism, for private gain).

\textsuperscript{180} UNCAC, supra note 57, at Chapter II. The UNCAC devotes an entire chapter to preventive measures.

\textsuperscript{181} Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 718.

\textsuperscript{182} UCAC, supra note 57, at ART. 12(1).

\textsuperscript{183} Professor Charles Manga Fombad, in a study of corruption in Cameroon, concluded that “[t]he nonchalance of the political leadership is probably the most serious obstacle that exists to the fight against corruption.” Fombad, supra note 27, at 253. The AU Convention recognizes the important part played by the private/independent media in the fight against corruption. However, throughout the continent, the private press continues to be one of the most oppressed and marginalized civil society organization. As a consequence, the media have not been able to
(b) The Anti-Bribery Provisions

The anti-bribery provisions criminalize certain conduct and omissions and are the most substantive measures against transnational corruption contained in the FCPA, UNCAC and AU Conventions. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit “an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value” by an issuer.\(^{184}\) Hence, the FCPA focuses primarily on the supply side of the corrupt transaction. The UNCAC and the AU Convention, on the other hand, deal with both demand and supply sides of corrupt transactions.\(^{185}\) While the AU Convention prohibitions extend to “the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions,”\(^{186}\) the provision does not apply to “authorizations,” a loophole that could seriously limit the effectiveness of the AU Convention as a legal instrument against corruption.

Only the UNCAC expressly provides, in its definition of offenses, an intent requirement.\(^{187}\) In all the provisions dealing with “criminalization and law enforcement,” the UNCAC uses the expression “when committed intentionally” throughout in the definition of criminal acts.\(^{188}\) Nevertheless, the UNCAC does not expressly define the type of mens rea that is required for conviction. Knowledge and purpose, however, are anticipated.\(^{189}\)


\(^{185}\) See generally UCAC, supra note 57 & AU CONVENTION, supra note 16.

\(^{186}\) AU CONVENTION, supra note 16, at ART. 4(1)(b).

\(^{187}\) UNCAC, supra note 57, at ART. 15.

\(^{188}\) See generally UNCAC, supra note 57, at Chapter III. See also Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 720.

\(^{189}\) Snider & Kindane, supra note 13, at 720.
The FCPA’s reference to a mens rea requirement is covered by frequent references to “knowingly” and “corruptly” in the Act’s provisions. For example, “[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).” 190 The SEC, which plays a coordinate role, together with the Department of Justice, in enforcing the FCPA, identified four categories of illegal or illicit payments that U.S. entities were making at the time Congress was considering enacting the 1977 FCPA. 191 One of those categories is payments “made with the intent to assist the company in obtaining or retaining government contracts.” 192 In U.S. v. Kay, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that “Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage.” 193 The FCPA, thus, anticipates an intent element.

In the AU Convention’s criminalization of corruption provisions, however, no reference is made to a requirement of mens rea; instead, this requirement is left to the discretion of individual States Parties, which are expected to insert it in legislation implementing the Convention and its provisions. As argued by Professors Thomas R. Snider and Won Kidane, “consistently and completely omit[ting] any reference to a mens rea requirement” and leaving it “for the State[s] Parties’ own decisions in their domestic jurisdictions . . . could result in inconsistent application of the criminalization provisions of the AU Convention and may have profound effect on the

190 15 U.S. § 78m(b)(5), (g)(1).
192 Id. at 25-27 (emphasis added). See also Kay, 459 F.3d at 748.
193 Kay, 359 F.3d at 755.
actual content of the assumed obligations.” While it is possible that African countries seeking to enact national legislation to implement the AU Convention can design national laws that incorporate a mens rea requirement, it is difficult for one to be optimistic given a post-independence history characterized by mostly opportunistic institutional reforms.

Professors Snider and Kidane suggest that African countries “could make use of the already developed jurisprudence of the FCPA, including the definition of mens rea offered under Liebo.” In a continent still trying to recover from a long history of violent exploitation through foreign-imposed governance structures, one needs to treat such advise with caution. Combating corruption effectively requires strong, viable and sustainable institutions, especially those that are “locally-focused and complement already existing local structures for conflict resolution and the solving of problems.” So that the African peoples can see their national laws and institutions as tools and instruments for organizing their lives and hence, accept and support them, the compacting of any anti-corruption rules must be undertaken through a

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194 Snider & Kidane, supra note 13, at 722.
195 Democratic constitution making, a process that can allow an African country to produce the types of institutional arrangements that effectively constrain civil servants and politicians and prevent them from engaging in corruption, rent seeking and other forms of political opportunism, such as occurred in South Africa in the early 1990s, is a rarity in Africa. In fact, during the last 50 years, most African countries have undertaken only opportunistic institutional reforms, which have produced laws and institutions that stunt entrepreneurship and wealth creation, but enhance the ability of ruling elites to monopolize the supply of legislation. In post-independence Africa, South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional exercise is a rare experience in democratic constitutional making. For a review of how opportunism on the part of Africa’s post-independence political elite has contributed to increased levels of venality in the continent, see Mbaku, supra note 24. See also LeVine, supra note 179.
197 Many formal institutions in the African countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, are essentially those that were imposed by the European countries that colonized these countries. For example, in addition to the French language, the constitutions of most francophone countries in Africa are copies of the constitution of the Fifth French republic. See generally LeVine, supra note 179 and VICTOR T. LEVINE, THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE (1964) (arguing that the first constitution of the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration, which gained independence on January 1, 1960 and took the name La République du Cameroun, was a copy of the constitution of the Fifth French Republic (1958)).
198 Mbaku, supra note 24, at 186.
democratic process—one in which all relevant stakeholders are provided the facilities to participate fully and effectively in constitution making.  

VI. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE CORRUPTION CLEANUPS IN AFRICA

In this section, I draw on the experiences of Nigeria and Cameroon to show that the success of any anti-corruption scheme, even one agreed upon by many countries, depends, to a great extent, on the effectiveness of each country’s domestic laws and institutions. Thus, while international and regional conventions such as the UNCAC and the AU Convention are important, the main focus for fighting corruption in Africa must be placed on making certain that each country provides itself with an effective and fully functioning legal system, particularly one that is capable of adequately constraining civil servants and politicians and preventing them from engaging in political opportunism. The main argument goes as follows: First, each African country must engage in state reconstruction to provide itself with new and more relevant laws and institutions—such a reform process should produce an institutional and judicial system that adequately constrains state custodians, provides entrepreneurs with incentive structures that encourage and enhance wealth creation, promotes the peaceful coexistence of each country’s

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199 For a review of the literature, see generally Mbaku, supra note 24.
200 The success of the FCPA in combating the bribery of foreign public officials by U.S. companies derives, inter alia, from the fact that the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have been given broad statutory powers to prosecute natural and legal persons accused of violating any provisions of the FCPA. Both the SEC and the DOJ have exercised these powers quite effectively, as evidenced by the several legal actions taken against offending parties. See generally U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) & U.S. v. King, 2003 WL 22938694 (8th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the success of the FCPA as a legal tool for fighting global corruption derives from the fact that it is supported by an effective and fully functioning legal system.
201 See generally Stepanek, supra note 12 (arguing that underdevelopment and poverty in Africa can be explained by the lack of strong and viable laws and institutions, especially those capable of dealing effectively with political opportunism).
202 State custodians refer to civil servants and politicians.
203 Incentive structures in most African countries today actually discourage the creation and wealth, forcing citizens to depend, instead, on government transfers, most of which are derived from foreign aid and other remittances. See generally Mbaku, supra note 24 & Stepanek, supra note 12.
diverse population groups, and minimizes corruption. Second, each country should employ the mechanisms provided by the AU Convention, the UNCAC and other international conventions to complement domestic anti-corruption efforts and significantly enhance its ability to reach suspected violators and their “ill-gotten gains” through extradition and asset recovery. Finally, each country should establish mechanisms to enhance international cooperation, and where necessary, mutual legal assistance (including mutual assistance in investigations and the gathering of data on corruption), to deal with issues such as extradition, recovery of misappropriated assets, jurisdiction (as it relates to the prosecution of alleged violators) and choice of laws.

A. Domestic Institutional and Judicial Frameworks as Keys to Effective Anti-Corruption Strategies: Lessons from Cameroon and Nigeria for the AU Convention

Corruption flourishes and eventually becomes endemic in polities with poorly-developed, non-viable and weak institutional arrangements. This is the case in Cameroon and Nigeria, where colonially-imposed institutional arrangements, all of which were primarily “structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation,” continue to provide the basic foundation for national legal systems. In countries with well-developed institutional and judicial frameworks, allegations of corruption against any natural or judicial persons are usually investigated thoroughly and prosecuted and if the accused are found guilty, sanctions are imposed as

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204 For a discussion of how a poorly-developed set of laws and institutions, specifically, a weak and ineffective legal system, destroys peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups, provides perverse incentives, which discourage and stunt entrepreneurial activities and generally discourage economic growth and development, see Olufemi Taiwo, Of Citizens and Citizenship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 55 (Okon Akiba ed., 2004).

205 Both the AU Convention and the UNCAC emphasize the need for international cooperation and the AU Convention has provisions that deal with “cooperation and mutual legal assistance.” See UNCAC, supra note 58 & AU Convention, supra note 16, at ART. 18.

206 While the UNCAC and the AU Convention allude to some of these issues, implementation is left to the discretion of the States Parties. See, e.g., AU Convention, supra note 16, at ART. 18.

207 See generally Fombad, supra note 27, at 246.


209 See also Fombad, supra note 27, at 246.
mandated by law. In Nigeria and Cameroon, allegations of corruption are usually dismissed as either harmless rumors or political gossip initiated by disgruntled members of the opposition.

In both Nigeria and Cameroon, journalists who have dared investigate high-ranking officials accused of corruption (the so-called “untouchables”) have been threatened, harassed, and prosecuted under extremely harsh draconian laws and sentenced to long prison terms and their assets seized.

The key to an effective anti-corruption strategy, as has been argued in this paper, is a set of formal laws and institutions, which adequately constrain the state. In the case of Cameroon and Nigeria, and in fact of other former European colonies in Africa, for these institutional mechanisms to function effectively, they must be locally-focused—that is, they must be created through a bottom-up, inclusive and participatory process. Each country’s relevant stakeholders must be provided the facilities to participate fully and effectively in the creation of these institutions.

1. Formal Structures to Constrain the Behavior of State Custodians

An important legacy of colonialism was the exploitative and despotic nature of governance. Many African countries, including Cameroon and Nigeria, inherited that approach to governance and have continued to exercise it with impunity. According to Fombad,

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210 Successful prosecutions of cases of political and bureaucratic corruption in the United States are too numerous to mention. Note, however, that the Watergate Affair is one of the most important manifestations of the effectiveness of the U.S. judicial system against political corruption—the case led to the resignation of President Nixon. See Berg, et al., supra note 64.

211 Fombad, supra note 27, at 246.

212 For Cameroon, see Fombad, supra note 27 and Lyombe Eko, Hear All Evil, See All Evil, Rail Against All Evil: LE MESSAGER and the Journalism of Resistance in Cameroon, in THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 123 (2004). For Nigeria, see Erero & Oladoyin, supra note 217 and Mbaku, supra note 218.

213 Cameroon’s first constitution, for example, was a “modified” version of the constitution of the French Fifth Republic. Although there have been several amendments, the constitution, which is a foundation for all of the country’s legal institutions, remains essentially a French creation, with virtually no participation from Cameroonians or consideration of their interests and values. See generally THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 197.

214 Fatton, supra note 208.
“[o]ne of the most enduring legacies of Cameroon’s predominantly French legal heritage is the absence of any respect for the rule of law. There was never any constitutional measure designed to prevent arbitrary government as was found in most former British colonies.”215 In Nigeria, however, whatever constitutional measures were left behind by the departing British were destroyed shortly after independence in 1960, when the military overthrew the government and ruled by decree until 1999. Although Nigeria is today ruled by a constitution, the latter was not developed through a democratic process. Instead, the constitution was developed secretly by the military in 1999 as part of the agreement for it to leave office and surrender the apparatus of government to a civilian regime.216

2. Competencies of the Various Branches of Government

One of the most important contributions of American constitutionalism to modern governance is judicial review.217 The latter, along with the doctrine of separation of powers, can help African countries minimize the tendency of their leaders to behave in arbitrary and tyrannical ways.218 While the constitutions of both countries address the issue of separation of powers, these constitutions fail to provide the tools needed for this important doctrine to function effectively and fully in either country. For example, in Cameroon, “[c]onstitutional supremacy and the attempted separation of powers is compromised by the creation of an ‘imperial president

215 Fombad, supra note 27, at 246.
216 The military overthrew the government of Nigeria’s First Republic in 1966, accusing it of high levels of corruption, thuggery, financial malfeasance, and self-enrichment at the expense of the general population. In an address to the nation, one of the coup leaders, Major C. Kaduna Nzeogwu, promised a restless and skeptical population that the military would quickly clean up corruption, restore respectability and integrity to the civil service and return to the barracks. Not only did the military develop into one of the most corrupt institutions in the country, but it also prolonged its stay in power until 1999 when it was chased out by post-Cold War pro-democracy riots.
of the Republic’ who has the powers to manipulate the legislature and the judiciary freely.” 219 Hence, it is virtually impossible for the judiciary and the legislature to serve as an effective check on the executive branch.

3. Independence of the Judiciary

In the fight against corruption, no domestic institution has more significance than the judiciary. Unfortunately, judiciary systems in both Cameroon and Nigeria are unable to function effectively as anti-corruption instruments because of the lack of independence. Both countries do not enjoy a history or tradition of judicial independence, hence, whatever independence the judiciary has is based on constitutional provisions and any other statutory guarantees.

Cameroon’s constitution states that “Judicial Power shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers,” 220 but then goes on to declare that “The President of the Republic shall guarantee the independence of judicial power. He shall appoint members of the bench and for the legal department.” 221 The practice in Cameroon, and indeed, in Nigeria, is not judicial independence. Judiciaries in both countries, due primarily to the structures of their constitutions and to the absence of a tradition and history of judicial independence, have become effective tools for the executive branch to control and dominate governance and engage, with impunity, in various forms of opportunism for personal benefit. 222

Many countries have been able to pull themselves out of corruption and moral decay and engage in productive activities, which have generated for them the wealth that they need to deal with poverty and material deprivation. As is the case with many of today’s developed countries,

219 Fombad, supra note 27, at 247.
220 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, ART. 37(2).
221 Id. at ART. 37(3).
222 As research by Professor Charles Manga Fombad has shown, the president used the judiciary effectively to win elections in 1996 and 1997. For example, prior to these elections, a presidential decree was issued doubling the salaries of judicial officers. Salaries of Supreme Court judges, whose job it is to certify the results of each election, including the presidential election, were increased by almost 200 percent, in addition to a bundle of various perks and privileges. See Fombad, supra note 27, at 247-48.
the ability to achieve such “miraculous” results requires decisive action to establish institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state and effectively prevent its custodians from engaging in political opportunism.

**VII. Conclusion**

After more than fifty years of independence, corruption continues to prevent Africans from creating the wealth that they need to deal effectively with endemic poverty. Hence, corruption is today, one of the most important obstacles to economic development in Africa.

In recognition of the critical part played by corruption in poverty and underdevelopment, African countries have developed and adopted the AU Convention to serve as a legal tool to combat corruption and its deleterious impact on their development efforts. In addition, the African countries have also become parties to other anti-corruption conventions (e.g., the UNCAC) and hope that statutes in the developed countries (e.g., the United States’ FCPA), which criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials, will help them in their efforts to deal effectively with this major development constraint. As I have argued in this paper, the success of any anti-corruption scheme in the continent will be determined, to a great extent, by the strength and efficacy of national institutional and judicial frameworks. Hence, the most important first step in fighting corruption in Africa must be state reconstruction to provide each country with effective and fully functioning institutional and judicial systems—those that adequately constrain civil servants and politicians and prevent them from performing their jobs in an arbitrarily and capricious manner and from behaving with impunity.

Of course, international laws such as the UNCAC, as well as statutes in the developed countries that are designed specifically to regulate the conduct of global trade (e.g., the FCPA of the United States), should complement the domestic efforts of African countries and significantly
enhance the ability of the latter to deal with corruption. Thus, while international legal instruments, such as the UNCAC may be able to help Africa in its fight against corruption, the quality of each African country’s legal system remains the critical element in the anti-corruption movement.