Devolution, Fiscal Federalism, and Changing Patterns of Municipal Revenues: The Mismatch between Theory and RealityJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory
AbstractTheories of fiscal federalism, such as those propounded by Musgrave, Tiebout, and Brennan and Buchanan, prescribe assignment of revenue sources among federal, state, and local governments. In this article, we demonstrate that the recent diversification of municipal revenue sources in response to devolutionary forces does not follow the expectations of the fiscal federalism theories. Our analysis suggests that the use of an institutional approach to the study of fiscal federalism would help to reduce the mismatch between theory and reality.
Citation InformationDale Krane, Carol Ebdon and John R. Bartle. "Devolution, Fiscal Federalism, and Changing Patterns of Municipal Revenues: The Mismatch between Theory and Reality" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Vol. 14 Iss. 4 (2004) p. 513 - 533
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/john_bartle/29/