Article
A Note on First-Price Sealed-Bid Cattle Auctions in the Presence of Captive Supplies
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Document Type
Article
Disciplines
Publication Version
Published Version
Publication Date
12-1-2015
DOI
10.1017/s1068280500005098
Abstract
The authors present an analytical model of a ϐirst-price sealed-bid cattle auction in which a spot and coordinated markets are interconnected. The model reveals that the conventional wisdom that market coordination negatively affects the bid price in the spot market is an oversimpliϐication. The relationships between key market variables impact bids and bid shading in complex ways. While captive supplies can lead to lower spot prices, the price reductions do not necessarily stem from an increase in market power due to contracting. The model emphasizes the importance of several variables for future empirical studies.
Copyright Owner
Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association
Copyright Date
2015
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Citation Information
John M. Crespi and Tian Xia. "A Note on First-Price Sealed-Bid Cattle Auctions in the Presence of Captive Supplies" Agricultural and Resource Economics Review Vol. 44 Iss. 3 (2015) p. 340 - 345 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/john-crespi/4/
This article is from Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2015, 44(3); 340-345. DOI: 10.1017/s1068280500005098. Posted with permission.