Some Perspectives on Balkan Migration Patterns (with Particular Reference to Yugoslavia)

Joel Halpern
Migration and Urbanization
The comparative science of anthropology grows as members of previously non-participating cultures come to share in the gathering and interpretation of data, the building of theory. The IXth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, held in Chicago in 1973, brought together the most widely representative group of scientists and scholars that has ever met to advance our discipline. We learn objectivity by studying other peoples, gain insight by the studies that others make of us and achieve responsibility by applying the results to our rapidly changing, evolving world. Each volume in this series brings together significant contributions by men and women concerned with some aspect of a science that is increasingly complex, vital and related to the future.

MARGARET MEAD
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Some Perspectives on Balkan Migration Patterns (with Particular Reference to Yugoslavia)

JOEL M. HALPERN

To understand fully the meaning of contemporary population movements a view of the past is essential. In the period after World War II in the Balkans, mass population movements within countries have been influenced particularly by urban industrial developments. These reflect a delayed process when compared with Western Europe. Within the past decade and a half there has also been a movement of workers from the Balkan countries with open borders — Greece and Yugoslavia — to the labor-deficit countries of Western Europe. These population movements relate not only to altered individual social and economic value systems, but also to questions of ethnic identity. We are too close to these events to delineate them in a comprehensive manner, as both processes are ongoing. However, we can gain needed perspective by viewing them in the context of earlier mass movements, whether unique or regular movements.

Some of the variables that must be taken into account in discussing migration patterns are: individual life span, sex, and familial and kin affiliations; economic and occupational factors; governments actions; and such historical factors as war and revolution. Migration simply means passing from one place to another, or moving from one place of residence to another. In its broadest interpretation, it could refer to a trip of almost any kind, particularly one repeated with a certain kind of regularity. A more restricted and useful meaning of the term, and one that will be employed here, is either a change of residence without immediate intention to return to the former home (thus eliminating casual travel for personal-kin reasons or occasional occupation-related trips) or a regularized pattern of movement for a specific purpose (i.e. daily, weekly, or seasonal movements related to employment). This paper examines the
origins of migratory movements in a Balkan context and, in so doing, raises questions about the kinds of values associated with residential and occupational stability or mobility from a long-term perspective. It is not the intention here to suggest that a simplistic categorization is possible with respect to the attachment of long-term values either to stability or to mobility. Rather it is to suggest that motivations for mobility and movement are not simply conditioned by perceived economic opportunity; indeed, they are perceived through a cultural screen in which conditioned historical perspectives play a key role.

A specific historical perspective may be useful in understanding the development of migration patterns. The region of Sumadija in central Serbia provides an example related to factors of ethnic identity and national history. Here a complicated series of advancing and retreating movements has occurred in the historically recent past.

As a result of Turkish conquests Sumadija was depopulated after the fifteenth century, when ancestors of the present population sought refuge in the Dinaric uplands to the south. Depopulation was virtually total. A traveler in the region in the second decade of the sixteenth century wrote that Sumadija was completely deserted, whereas a traveler through the same area a century earlier had written about seeing many towns and villages (Stoianovich 1967:28–29; Halpern 1967a: 9–11; Drobnjakovic 1932). In the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, when the area had a dense cover of oak forest, it began to be repopulated (Popovic 1950). Those who then came to Sumadija from the Dinaric mountain regions were pioneers clearing the land and building log houses (Kojic 1949).

This migration experience is vital in defining the social structure of contemporary villages in Sumadija. The men of any village community are able to trace individual descent to the ancestor who originally settled there, established the patrilineal descent group, and gave rise to the family name (Halpern 1967a: 23, 150–161). Contemporary village neighborhoods are also based on this original pattern of settlement (Halpern 1956:323, Table 58). Historic migrations of this type are of such great importance in defining traditional settlement patterns and state territorial boundaries that a school of analysis concerned with tracing migrations developed in Serbian ethnology. Such migrations also occurred in great measure somewhat prior to the emergence of the Serbian state in the nineteenth century. Studies based on them formed some of the background to memoranda presented at the peace conference at Versailles after World War I, when the Yugoslav state was established. In sum, this group migration for political-economic reasons is of historic importance.

Once settled in new homes, the inhabitants modified the tribal-lineage organization they had brought with them from the Dinaric mountains. They established large extended family units (zadrugas) in which all adult males had a right to inherit.

Such units were ideally adapted to the mixed economy of livestock raising, subsistence farming, and local crafts that developed. However, many of the men soon became involved in two other types of activities which took them from their homes. The first was for economic reasons and had a degree of regularity; the second was irregular and was related to war and revolution.

The zadruga, in addition to being a unit adapted to agriculture and extensive livestock herding, was also a trading unit. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries an extensive trade developed in acorn-fattened pigs, brought by peasants to Austrian traders. Oxen and cattle were driven to Turkish-controlled areas in Bosnia. (Warriner 1965:287-288, 299, 301; Auty 1963). Because there were a number of adult males in the relatively large zadruga households, the periodic absence of a member or even several members did not drastically upset the household agricultural economy. This flexibility in structural organization was subsequently used by the Austro-Hungarian government in recruiting zadruga households to the frontier areas with the Turks. Here men were able to go on regular service in these military colonies and their households were able to continue to be productive.

The bands of hajduks [brigands] that roamed the Balkans in Turkish times could in a sense be considered seasonal migrants, because their activities did tend to have a seasonal focus. The relationship of these hajduks to the existing settled zadrugas is not clear. Some sources claim that the true brigands rejected kin ties, but this does not appear to be the case in Cvijic (1918a) and in more detailed form in Cvijic (1918b). Earlier, Cvijic had initiated an anthropological-geographical series of monographs (Cvijic 1902), which traced the origins and migratory movements of populations of particular regions.

1 The Serbian scholar Jovan Cvijic stated that patterns of migrations were intimately linked with the development of national consciousness after the destruction of the medieval Serbian state at the Battle of Kosovo. This view is presented in summary form

2 The principles of nationality played a vital role in defining the borders of the new Yugoslav state. It was intended that the basis of the frontiers would be “ethnographic.” See Lederer (1963:93, 126–128), who specifically refers to the participation of Cvijic and other Yugoslav ethnologists.

3 Hammel (1968: 13–38) gives a summary of zadruga structure.

4 Rothenberg (1966) describes how this extended family unit fitted into the military organization of the Hapsburg frontier with the Ottomans.
case with Cossack bands in the Ukraine. The distinctions between brigandage, political struggle against the Turkish oppressor, and commercial activities do not always appear clear-cut. (Nor is the interlinking of these activities peculiar to the Balkans, as the New World struggle between the Spanish and the English bears out.) In the Balkan context the importance of mobility for at least certain groups of men in all three types of activity, however intermixed, is clear.

Thus in the Balkans brigandage, crafts, and trade have long been involved with patterns of temporary or permanent migration in the course of villagers’ attempts to better themselves economically. Often those most active in these occupations have been villagers who lived in mountainous areas where agriculture was marginal and who already were accustomed to a partially mobile existence because of the requirements of seeking pastures for their flocks. Stoianovich (1960:276) comments on these relationships:

The Greek and Vlach highland inhabitants of Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia present another example of the “free” but “wretched” who make fortunes. The pastoral folk of these highlands obtained a livelihood from five principal occupations: the men were herdsmen, brigands, seasonal migratory workers and mercenary soldiers, and muleteers, while the women were skilled weavers. The [people] of the Pindus often did not dwell in a fixed place throughout the year. Seeking green pastures, they climbed the mountains in summer and descended into the lowlands and approached the sea in winter. Since small numbers of individuals can supervise large herds, men tended to become superfluous. Men unable to earn a living through the exercise of economic functions consequently turned to banditry... The expansion of towns in the sixteenth century subsequently opened other occupations to the pastoral rural folk. Younger sons and men who lacked herds or the urge to highway robbery de­ parted from their homes for a season or a year to work as pecalbari or semi­ skilled and unskilled laborers in distant towns, even in the Ottoman capital.

He goes on to state:

The availability of raw-material surpluses — wool, cheese, and skins — and craft products, the migratory habits of the men and their intimate knowledge of the difficult routes, their special privileges, which allowed them to bear arms, persuaded a portion of the pastoral folk to become carriers and traders of goods.

5 Hobsbawn defines the hajduk as an insurrectionary, one who became part of a recognized social group and “a more ambitious, permanent and institutionalized challenge to official authority than the scattering of Robin Hoods... which emerged from any normal peasant society” (1969:60). But he maintains that they were primarily a voluntary group detached from kin ties and not a normal social unit. By contrast, Edwards defines a hajduk as a brigand, but an individual who is considered a national hero and glorified in the epic ballads (1969:225). The latter definition does not seem to exclude family ties.

Around 1800 it was observed that the Balkan merchants in Hungary were often “from the most wretched villages of Macedonia and other parts of Turkey.” By contrast, those peasants in the most prosperous villages were either bound to the soil or worked for landlords (Stoianovich 1960:277).

For the premodern period the historian Braudel (1972) depicts the seasonal rhythm involved in migrations in the Mediterranean area. He cites St. George’s Day in April and St. Demetrius’s Day at the end of October as the times of the migratory activity. These were the two occasions on which an apprentice entered the service of a master. In April migratory craftsmen left for distant areas, laborers hired themselves out, and the brigands came together. In October the Ottoman armies ceased their campaigns, laborers and craftsmen returned home, shepherds and their flocks left the mountain pastures for the plains, and the highwaymen disbanded (Stoianovich 1967:66-67).

In the 1930’s the Yugoslav-American writer Louis Adamic found the pecalba tradition functioning in Macedonia in approximately the same sense that Stoianovich described it for the premodern period:

The village of Galichnik — nearly three thousand feet above sea-level in the barren and not easily accessible mountains... is a village of grass widows. For approximately eleven months out of the year, no men — aside from a priest or two and a few octo- and ono-genarians — live in the hundred-odd homes... Their husbands and oldest sons (if more than fifteen years of age) are scattered over Central and Western Europe, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the north coast of Africa, parts of Asia Minor, Russia, and the United States, where, during the building seasons, they work at highly specialized trades of masonry, stonecutting, wood-carving, cabinet-making...

...Once a year, between the 1st and 15th of July, most of the men return from the big world. Those working in Europe, in Asia Minor, or in North Africa get home yearly; those in America and the distant parts of Russia return but every two or three years... the communal wedding day, when all the couples married that year are wedded simultaneously... occurs on July 12th. When we were there, sixteen couples entered matrimony. All the bridesgrooms were from Galichnik. All but two were regular pecalbari. The other two were sheeplemen whose flocks’ grazing-ground was several hours distant from the village... (Adamic 1934:115-124).

Closely paralleling this journalistic account are more recent descriptions of pecalba elicited from villagers in southern Macedonia in the early 1960’s. Their accounts stress the importance of kin and village ties.

6 This abbreviated account of approximately forty years ago has taken on a distinct historic flavor. According to a current comment (1973) by a Macedonian scholar, the village is now largely abandoned and most of the former inhabitants have migrated to towns.
Ethnic determinants — Orthodox villagers work in Belgrade and Muslim villagers serve as intermediaries with Turkish officials — are also emphasized.

As a result of earlier Turkish conquests, the society that developed in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Serbia lacked a native ruling class. The Turks and other foreigners lived in the towns, and the Serbs dominated the countryside (Vucinich 1962: 597–616). The more prosperous zadrugas which engaged in extensive trade also came to political prominence, and it was from this group that the leadership of the early nineteenth century Serbian revolts against the Turks was derived. During this period there was no organized military recruitment as such; rather the local village and district headmen enlisted men, probably with a degree of coercion, to fight against the Turks (see Edwards 1969).

Contrasting with the individual, kin-linked, economically motivated pecalba migratory movements are those involuntary movements linked to state requirements or governmental conflicts, war, and revolution. With the growth of the Serbian state during the nineteenth century, an organized militia developed, and the obligatory military service introduced in 1883 required a term of service for all men twenty years of age. This continues to the present time, and therefore all able-bodied village men serve a period of time in the army, during which they are often posted to distant parts of the country and mix with men of other ethnic origins. All the periodic struggles, two world wars, and their associated conflicts, have resulted in mobilization and periods of conflict in which men were absent from home for years at a time. Although the Serbs and Yugoslavia were ultimately victorious in both world wars, large numbers of men were taken prisoners and as a result traveled extensively. Many men recalled these involuntary migrations as life’s most exciting experience. Often villagers were influenced by the period of imprisonment in the more technologically advanced countries of Austria and Germany and returned to their villages with new ideas that contributed to subsequent innovations.

A man in his seventies recalls:

I first served in the army in 1914. I was taken as a young man into the army

when the Germans invaded our country. The president of the village took a group of us by ox-cart to a town near Valjevo, where we trained for three months… After we succeeded in throwing the Germans [Hapsburg armies] out of Serbia in 1914, we went to the Bulgarian frontier. There, when the Austrians and Germans invaded again in 1915 we were defeated. King Peter returned to Salonica and I was taken prisoner by the Germans. But in 1916 I was interned in Czechoslovakia where I worked in a factory. Later I was sent to work for a farmer in Hungary. There I worked as a peasant. In most ways it was like here. But I was impressed by their use of scythes. Here before the war we used sickles to cut wheat. Our people thought that cutting wheat with a scythe would scatter it. They used to grab a few stalks of wheat and cut them. It took many people 10 to 15 days to cut the wheat. I told my father, “Let’s go reap the wheat.” He said that it would scatter. I said it wouldn’t. So this is the way we changed (Halpern and Halpern 1972: 65).

Combined with these experiences of discovery as prisoners is the generally strong positive feeling about military service and pride in one’s history and ethnicity. This tradition is reinforced by folk epics, dating back to Turkish times, that speak of heroic, although sometimes futile, overt resistance to the Turkish conquest.

While war-related travel could be beneficial, the obvious suffering should not be overlooked. The Serbian historian Dragoljub Jovanovic describes the enforced migrations within Serbia of World War I:

The most clear-cut impression of the Serbian campaign is the motley, pitiful spectacle of the bezanija, that endless, disorderly flight of fugitives muffled to the eyes, old women, children, on foot or in wooden carts patiently drawn by emaciated and exhausted oxen, driving in front of them some cattle and carrying on their backs or under their arms some chattels, the number and importance of which grew less with every stage of this removal which was always beginning again and never coming to an end (quoted in Stoianovich 1967).

Similar experiences occurred in World War II. One of the consequences of wartime bombing of cities was an inverse, although clearly temporary, migration of city people to the countryside. Also, because of problems in security and food distribution, many city people felt that they could better survive in the countryside (Rayner 1957). The struggle in Yugoslavia during World War II, both a civil war and a fight against the German invaders, involved enormous population movements of the fighting forces as well as of the affected civilian populations. There are certain parallels to World War I and in certain respects the activities of the guerrillas are reminiscent of the struggle against the Turks in the nine-

7 See Sređ 1909:80–92. This article also makes the point that the army had its origins in hajduk bands, which were of key importance in initiating the First Revolt against the Turks in 1804. Certainly it is possible to see a degree of continuity between the role of the hajduks and the subsequent bureaucratization and regularization of military service, in that both involved absences of adult males from the village. Army duty was, of course, universal, compulsory, and of a specified time limit, while hajduk activity was the antithesis.

8 Rayner was an Englishwoman married to a Serb in prewar Beograd who wrote of her experiences in a village outside the capital.
teenth century, in that both were waged to a significant extent from forest and mountain strongholds.9

Another direct consequence of World War II in Yugoslavia and the coming to power of a communist government was that many of the defeated forces sought political refuge abroad. These, then, are what might be called forced historic migrations, some of them having major long-term effects. This was particularly true, for example, for two ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. The ethnic Germans, who had been settled in Yugoslavia in an organized manner by the Hapsburgs several centuries previously, sided with the invading Germans and retreated with them. Many of the Yugoslav Jews who survived the occupiers' attempts at extermination moved to

Coming to power of a communist government was that many of the long-term effects. This was particularly true, for example, for two ethnic might be called forced historic migrations, some of them having major
terms, although that is not their main focus. There are also individual studies by Matica Srpska in Novi Sad during the period 1957–1964. These include monographs on the settlement of Croats, Montenegrins, and Macedonians in the Vojvodina, as well as some analysis of resettlement, connected with initial land reforms in the area, which took place after the First World War.

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their homeland to fight the Turks, while at the same time retaining positive images of their life in America (Cary 1960:49, 101, 108). For these Montenegrins, as for the pecalbari from Galichnik, the descent to the "plains" was represented not only by Balkan valleys and the Mediterranean world of the sixteenth century, but in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by North America as well. The mountain-plains dichotomy is not totally extinct even in our time: after the Czech invasion in 1968, it was widely reported that the Yugoslav army was considering withdrawal from the Danubian plains to the mountains in the event of a possible Russian invasion.

The greatest population movements in Yugoslav history have occurred since the postwar period. Yet the historically defined patterns of movement from mountain to plains — kin-linked, regionally affiliated, ethnically associated, economically motivated with political overtones, and influenced by governmental activity — remain important. The enormously complex postwar movements, which can be summarized here only briefly, can be viewed under a number of general categories. First, there is the overall pattern of rural depopulation and urban growth viewed within both a Yugoslav and a general European context. Second, there is migration viewed strictly in spatial terms, as daily movement from a village or small community to a job in a town or larger city. Third, there is seasonal or long-term migration to towns or urban centers within Yugoslavia. And fourth, there is short- and long-term migration of Yugoslavs abroad.

With regard to the general pattern of rural depopulation and urban growth, basic statistical data help to provide overall perspective. Between 1921 and 1961, the percentage of the agricultural population of Yugoslavia declined from 79 to 49, while the total population increased from 12,500,000 to approximately 16,000,000 in the same period. Within an agriculturally based population of 9,170,000, approximately 1,306,000 commuted to jobs off the farm in 1960. Significantly, between 1949 and 1960, some 2,162,000 Yugoslavs migrated from rural to urban areas. This means that almost 19 percent of the total population either had moved from villages or was working outside villages by the beginning of the 1960's.12

By 1970 the agricultural population had declined to 42 percent of the population, half of what it had been in 1890. If the situation is viewed, not specifically in terms of a rural to urban migration, but rather in terms of a shift out of agriculture as a primary occupation, with its implied large-scale daily commuting, by 1961, 2,848,000 persons had abandoned agriculture as a primary source of income in the postwar period. From 1961 to 1970 an additional 1,550,000 did so, making a grand total of almost 4,500,000. At the same time, Yugoslavia has not become highly urbanized, as almost 59 percent of the population still lives in settlements of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. This, however, does not take into account the pattern of daily commuting to work in larger towns. This labor force of peasant-workers amounted to approximately 1,400,00 in 1970. In addition, it is estimated that there are approximately 1,500,000 Yugoslav emigrants abroad (although this figure does appear high), in addition to the 1,000,000 or so workers who are now considered to be temporarily residents abroad (Livada 1972: 127–142).

Putting aside the horrors of World War II with its approximately 3,000,000 casualties, actual war-induced population movements seem relatively small when contrasted with the magnitude of peaceful postwar movements.

In terms of overall patterns of migration, the contemporary daily pattern of the peasant-worker is one of the most important in Yugoslavia. It is very much a compromise situation for all concerned. For the worker himself, who must rise early in the morning, struggle with commuting by bicycle, bus, train, or foot through all kinds of weather, and then return to farm his land in the afternoon, it is a compromise between the security of wages and the security of independent subsistence. Wages are often felt to be comparatively low in unskilled or semiskilled jobs, but this is offset to a significant extent by social benefits in the form of paid vacations, pensions, provision for disability, and especially in the largely free medical care available to the worker and his family. For the private peasant such benefits are either not available or open to only a limited extent.

To work at two demanding jobs is most tiring and frequently tends to detract from the quality of work performed in both situations. At home it means that the worker's wife has to assume a larger share of the agricultural work than was formerly the case in larger extended rural families, when the wife did mostly household chores, child care, and relatively light agricultural work. Today women sometimes tend the major livestock and even do such heavy work as plowing and harrowing, which they formerly performed only in wartime or emergency situations. On the other hand, there are now fewer children to care for because of a reduced birth rate and the children are getting an education. There is improved agricultural machinery, a better diet to sustain work, and superior medical care available in case of traumatic accidents. Home produce is

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12 Some basic background data is given in Halpern (1967b: 356–381).
also an important supplement to wages, a cushion against inflation and other insecurities.

From the point of view of management and general state policy, it may be considered more desirable to incorporate the worker fully into the productive process, including participation in the system of self-management so important to the Yugoslav socialist system. But the commuting peasant-worker makes fewer demands on the system although he has, in effect, a double job. Urban communities already straining to accommodate the influx of postwar migrants do not have to provide housing, schooling, and other urban amenities for the peasant-worker and his family, who continue to reside in the village. The provision of bus service and usable roads, for example, cannot be considered unreasonable social overhead because these have clear benefits to those who are primarily farmers as well. Medical facilities have to be built to serve the general population in any case. There may also be some side benefits in that larger numbers of dependents, particularly elderly relatives, are more easily supported and even gainfully employed in a rural setting. In addition, minor children are less likely to be social and law enforcement problems in rural areas, where they usually have chores to do and appear to be subject to more traditional familial authority. This is not to say that rural Yugoslavia does not have many problems, ranging from questions of agricultural productivity to underemployment to the status of elderly couples whose children have moved to town.13 However, when viewed on a broad, comparative basis, the Yugoslav situation of migrant workers can be seen as positive: none of the more highly industrialized states of the West (least of all the United States, with its frustrated commuters, central city ethnic conflicts, and agricultural migrant populations living in debased conditions), or the East, for that matter, have successfully solved the twentieth century problems of urbanization and industrialization.

Some conflicts in the role of the peasant-worker as seen from a village perspective are evident in the following accounts. The first is from a mid-aged villager in the vicinity of Zagreb in the early 1960's:

For the past eight years I have worked in a factory in Zagreb. Every day I travel to work by train and return home in the afternoon. I leave for work at 6:30 in the morning and return at 3:00 and then often help my parents in the fields. I would like to move to the city and work there and also find a job for my wife, but I have old parents and a son who goes to school here...

13 There is a significant literature on peasant-workers in Yugoslavia. For a bibliography of Serbo-Croatian sources see Livada 1972: 248-260. For English-language sources see Halpern and Halpern (1972:149-152) and Simic (1973:167-174).

I want my son to obtain a university education, for since I could not get academic training he at least should have it. If I had other children I would not let a single one work the land. There is no future in farming (Halpern 1967c: 116-117).

In 1969 a Slovenian villager commented on his situation:

We work in the factory so that we can continue to hold onto the land, and we hold onto the land because no one knows what is sure. It may be hell but we still hold on. If we did not have the factory, life would be bad. Now at least the young people live well, but the old ones suffer because they have so much work. It used to be that the old could stop working and the young could take over, but now the old must work the land while the young go to the factory.

Said another:

Yes, you are right, but it is exhausting for the young also, for they both cultivate and work in the factory. It is all right while the old are here to help, but when they are alone and we are — how can they do it? (Winner 1971:108).

There are a number of significant differences between the households of the peasant-workers and those of the full-time agriculturalists. According to the agricultural census of 1969, the number of farms with peasant-workers increased by approximately 10 percent over 1960. According to a 1968 survey, those farms with part-time workers were larger in terms of number of household members than were farms with full-time agriculturalists (5.5 to 4.6). However, the former had less land, on the average 3.8 hectares, than did full-time farmers, with 4.8 hectares. In addition, those farms with peasant-workers had less desirable holdings from the point of view of land quality; they tended to sell land more frequently than did the full-time farmers; and their labor force was composed to a larger extent of women, the aged, and children. They also had less agricultural equipment and were oriented more toward home consumption and less toward marketing produce than were the full-time agriculturalists. As for standard of living, the peasant-worker households tended to invest more in building new homes, repairing old ones, and purchasing furniture, and to spend more for recreation. Puljiz (1972:127-142), a Yugoslav observer, sees the development of the village-based peasant-worker as a consequence of the economic needs of the poor peasantry and their struggle for income parity. He also feels that many of the present peasant-worker holdings will not be maintained into the next generation because the children will continue to choose nonagricultural occupations, probably outside the village.

The major migratory step, of course, has been the permanent move to a town or city from a village. There has been intercity migration as well,
but it has not been as significant in demographic, economic, social, or cultural terms as the migration from rural to urban areas. This is not something that began in Yugoslavia only after World War I. A major development of the nineteenth century was the replacement by the South Slavs of the Turkish, Greek, and other ethnic groups in the cities. This was particularly marked in Serbia and was related to the gradual acquisition of independence from the Turks, for at the beginning of the nineteenth century cities in the Balkans were populated almost exclusively by foreigners. This view is summarized by the Serbian chronicler Vuk Karadzic, writing at the beginning of the nineteenth century:

Among the Serbian people there are no people other than peasants. (Those few Serbs who do live in towns as tradesmen — virtually only shopkeepers — and craftsmen, are called townspeople. Since they dress as Turks and live according to Turkish customs, and since during revolts and wars they either shut themselves up with the Turks in cities or run away to Germany [presumably across the Danube to Austrian territory], not only can they not be counted among the Serbs, but the Serbs despise them. Serbs, as peasants, live only from their land and livestock (quoted in Halpern and Halpern 1972: 12).

Vuk concludes that even though there are a few who are traders, their home life is like that of other peasants.

But there was an ambivalence about the city. In their language peasants saw their own way of life as crni svet [dark world], while the big, wide world was beli svet [white world]. The city, of course, was Beograd [White City]. The city was in a sense a center of oppression under the Turks, because the origins of the First Revolt go back to a redress of grievances rather than an absolute desire for independence. An eighteenth century Turkish administrator in Beograd, Hadji Mustafa-pasha, who was regarded as a just ruler, was called “Mother of the Serbs” (Edwards 1969: xiii). After successful insurrections against subsequent Turkish rulers, who were much harsher in the period 1818–1836, some 10,000 Serbian peasants left their villages to settle in towns (Stoianovich 1970: 109). But during the nineteenth century, both Beograd and Zagreb grew relatively slowly, neither having reached 100,000 by the first decade of the twentieth century. 14 In the past sixty years Beograd has grown from 90,000 to 1,200,00 in 1971, and Zagreb from 80,000 to 602,000. Despite this impressive growth, Yugoslavia remains proportionately one of the least urbanized countries in Europe, with 35 percent of its population in urban centers. (Rumania has 39 percent and Bulgaria 48 percent, while England and Sweden have 79 percent and 77 percent respectively.) Partly this is a matter of definition. The urban population of Yugoslavia has grown by over 80 percent in the period 1953–1971, while the overall population has grown by only about 20 percent (Ginic 1971: 25–41). Thus the formalized percentage of urbanization conceals the dynamics of the growth of the nonagricultural sector of the economy, which is already dominant. 15

The rural to urban migration process within Yugoslavia follows a number of distinct paths. One important way has been through education. In the recent past, relatively few children who managed to go beyond the eighth-grade village school remained in the village. 16 A second way has been through job mobility of more mature individuals who might move to a nearby town or a large city, depending on how the opportunities were structured.

The prevailing opinion among a number of foreign anthropologists who have studied rural to urban migration in Yugoslavia is that the kin network has formed a kind of bridge that can operate successfully in both directions. It is often through kin or fellow villagers that initial educational and job opportunities are perceived and that advancement, up to a point, is obtained. Frequently a young villager attending a high school or specialized trade school stays with relatives in town. As partial compensation the relatives may be supplied with food from the family farm. Fellow villagers who have settled in a town are often helpful, especially if native associations are reinforced by common descent or affinal ties. The village home remains a place where city grandchildren can visit grandparents during summer vacations. The village can provide a place of refuge and in certain instances a place of retirement. Retirement in the village is particularly feasible where the village is located in an area attractive to tourism and therefore to other kinds of supporting development. In most cases it appears that initial departure from the village is a one-way avenue with occasional return visits to relatives and for vacations. Sometimes these vacations include helping with the harvest.

14 Beograd had a population of some 25,000 in 1867, which increased to 35,000 in 1884 and 90,000 in 1910. Zagreb had 20,000 in 1869, 30,000 in 1880, and 80,000 in 1910. See Halpern (1965: 172).

15 See, for example, discussion of the definition of “rural” and “urban” in the Yugoslav context by Halpern (1969: 323–329).

16 Some case study data from a rural community provide insight. In the Serbian village of Orasac, surveys were taken from 1962 to 1965 by the district school authorities among the eighth-grade graduating class of the village school to determine occupational preferences. Boys overwhelmingly wanted to be skilled workers of various types, while a few wanted professional careers. In 1966 it was possible to get follow-up information on half of those surveyed. Among the thirty-one boys in the sample, twelve had learned or were learning a trade, ten were continuing their schooling, and nine were farming, at least for the time being. Among the thirty-eight girls, almost all went on further in school, while three had jobs and three remained at home (Halpern 1967a: 341–315).
If the move is to a nearby market town, the relationships may continue to be close. Often village parents help to provide a son (or sometimes a daughter) with building materials for a new house he is constructing for his own family in the town’s suburbs. Baric characterizes Yugoslavia as a “kinship” society and says that rights and obligations among kin are viewed as having greater force there than in English society. Because the family farm is viewed as a holiday residence, a source of supplemental food, a place to send children for vacations or other reasons, and a locus of security, it cannot be viewed primarily as a firm or business (Baric 1967a:266-267). Baric also notes that kin links are vital in helping to find housing in the city and that such links are essential in a society that relies more on personal communication than on formal written communication (Baric 1967b: 12–13).

Such attitudes are, of course, not unique to Yugoslavia or to Eastern Europe, and favoritism to kin seems to exist in all societies, even in those sometimes termed post-industrial. However, certain shared features of East European societies have resulted in a post-revolutionary mass movement of rural folk to urban centers. The values that these people carry with them, including a kinship orientation, take on broad cultural dimensions and result in what some observers have called the ruralization of the town or the peasantization of the city (Halpern 1967d:34–35).

The Polish sociologist Galeski has suggested certain analytical categories. He views the prewar peasantry as a substantially undifferentiated stratum of small family farmers that has, in the postwar period, broken into four differentiated groups: (1) small-scale landholders who have remained in the village; (2) peasant-workers who, as we have described, live on their holdings and commute to town; (3) worker-peasants who live in town but bring to the urban setting value complexes derived from the rural setting; and (4) bureaucrats. Industrialization, urbanization, and the centralization of all European socialist societies, even if done on a regional republic basis as in Yugoslavia, have resulted in a tremendous expansion of the civil service. In most of Eastern Europe, because the old ruling strata have been excluded (and often in part have emigrated) and because the working and middle classes were small, the new administrative class has had to come from the peasantry. This has been particularly true in Yugoslavia. Many of the postwar administrators came to their positions through their service with the Partisan forces, experience which, however heroic, did not necessarily qualify them for complex administrative tasks. It is only now, a quarter of a century after the war, that this class is gradually passing into retirement; the succeeding generation, some of peasant origin and some the children of Partisans and others who moved to town immediately after the war, is now becoming important. The point is that the administrative cadre is of peasant origin, particularly at the lower levels. This bureaucracy shares many values with the peasantry from which it originated. Industrialization on a regional basis, which was conceived as amalgamating the peasantry into the post-war industrial process, is approved. Corruption, too, unites peasant and bureaucrat in an alliance of kin and personal ties and strengthens resistance to the depersonalization of administration and justice. Such considerations are particularly important in a state where the commercial sector is socialized and in effect part of the state apparatus (Galeski 1972, summarized in Simons 1973). In Yugoslavia there have been vigorous efforts to keep the two apart through the role of enterprise Workers’ Councils, the distinction between social property and state property, and the differentiation of both of these from private ownership, which is restricted.

Changes in cultural values and large-scale categories provide a useful overview, but these are made comprehensible only in terms of specific cases. Bette Denich (1970:133–148) has used structured interviews...
carried out in 1965–1966 on a sample of 200 people who migrated after World War II from villages to Titovo Uzice in western Serbia, a town that has undergone intensive industrialization and a fourfold population increase since the end of the war. Immediately after the war, labor was recruited by governmental directive for work on large-scale construction projects. People came to work in town from the surrounding mountain villages, following an old pattern of interaction with the lowland area. After 1949 migration to town was not officially mandated but left to individual option. At that point, kin-linked networks played an important role, a role exemplified by the use of such terms as veze i posnanstvo [connections and acquaintanceship]. Both the relationships between people of equal status and the asymmetrical ties between those of unequal power were stressed. A more powerful member of a kin or friendship dyad within a network could bestow protekcija (patronage); this was done by political officials and industrial managers.

As mentioned above, patronage was often dispensed by ex-Partisans, producing a situation that exemplifies Galeski’s concept of the peasantization of the bureaucracy. Such activities did result in much subsequent criticism of the party structure by those at the top, who were concerned with ideology and the overall functioning of the state apparatus, as well as by those who might not receive favors at a particular time. The need to rely on network contacts was emphasized in terms of access to scarce goods, to some extent to jobs, and particularly to housing and later to educational opportunities for one’s children.

Denich includes not only kin in her analysis of migrant networks but also workmates, neighbors, schoolmates, and migrants from the same village. She depicts consanguineal kin and affines as minor in terms of urban friendship. However, kin ties are regularly reinforced — half her sample stated that they visited their native villages at least once a month. Denich also believes that the initial material success of migrants reinforces the desire of others to leave and that a primary motivation is not economic necessity but rather the general attractions of urban life, which overwhelm the allegiance to family farm and succession, even when the migrating son is the last child at home. A conclusion drawn from her study is that the significant degree of orderliness in the fast-paced growth of Uzice and comparable Yugoslav towns relates, at least partly, to the use by migrants of social networks that also carry information to the

villages, encouraging new groups to leave. In this and other respects the migrant acts as a culture broker.

In another study, approached from a broad cultural, historical, and social perspective, Hammel (1969a) traces the origins and development of kin ties, mainly in Montenegro and Serbia, from medieval times to the present. His survey combines ecological, psychological, and historical explanations that argue for the continuity of kinship relations into the period of industrialization. The viability of the family core is emphasized. Rather than being weakened by the growth of mining and industry in rural areas, kin ties are strengthened, as when employed sons contribute cash to meet family needs. Family and kin units are not destroyed by the upheavals and rapid mobility of industrialization but serve as “the orienting thread and conduit of mobility.” According to Hammel, more important than any theoretical or systematic notions of how an industrial society should work is the question of how it must work when people move into a strange cultural environment. There is a need to trust someone to show the way. “Who better,” asks Hammel, “than an uncle?” He also notes that these ties can be maintained because the movement has been carried out within a relatively small geographic area.

Changes in urban culture are rapidly transmitted to the village “in knowledge if not in fact,” so that modernization and industrialization do not realize their potential to divide the nation. Hammel cites a central dilemma in the overt conflict between modernization and a sense of national identity: “How can one damn the idiocy of rural life when that life is the cradle of national consciousness?” (Hammel 1969a).

Many city-bound migrants cannot wait to shake the village mud from their boots, and for those who remain in the village, agriculture is viewed as a very low-status occupation, essentially one of last resort (Halpern 1967b) (although this may be subject to change in the 1970’s because job opportunities have decreased). The recent migrant of village origin may wish strongly to disassociate himself from village life in an overt sense and may strive for an education as a means of entering a non-manual occupation far removed from toil in the fields, but he does not, in so doing, cut his ties to the past. Factors in the peasantization of the city bring about basic changes from the elite nature of the pre-industrial city, where, in the limited growth period of the nineteenth century, each successive group of village migrants looked down upon the new arrivals. Moreover, the postwar movements to the town from the village have overwhelmed the incipient working-class ideology that was at the core of the Communist party’s historic perspective. The new cities, like Novi Beograd, with their burgeoning new suburbs of high-rise apartments,
have overwhelmed everyone’s perceptions. Just as historic landmarks take on increased importance, so kin ties take on great importance, particularly in initial generations in the city. In investigating kin ties in Belgrade, Hammel found that among the workers surveyed, kin were more important than friends, with linkages specified largely in agnatic terms. The important family assets remain within the control of men. “The maps in peoples’ heads really are the last thing to go.”

In another study of Belgrade, Hammel (1969b) calls attention to the importance of the military as a channel of mobility. This phenomenon, obviously difficult to study yet of great importance, recalls Braudel’s comments about the Albanians, with whom the Montenegrins share adjoining mountainous territory — the latter have been the proto-typical military officers of the Yugoslav army up to and including the postwar period. The position of the Partisans as a new elite in postwar Yugoslav society has already been mentioned.

However, background, education, and personal connections continue to be important even in a postwar era of great opportunities, one in which Horatio Alger-type stories abound. Hammel concludes:

What is most impressive about the evidence is the way in which the raw forces of economic change have shaped the general outlines of mobility, and the way in which impersonal and universal accidents of date of birth, class or origin, ordinal rank in a sibling set... predict the average mobility of segments of the population (1969b:91).

From the perspective of his study, Hammel believes that the population is under the influence of impersonal restraints, “in the grip of historical forces beyond the control and even the understanding of the population” (1969b:91). (One might add that these sometimes elude the analyst as well.)

A most comprehensive description of long-distance migration and permanent resettlement is Simic’s (1973) study of Belgrade. Both Simic and Halpern have spoken of the peasantization of Belgrade, one from the point of view of the arriving migrant, the other from the perspective of the sending village. Halpern has also discussed the villager’s influence on the small town. Simic cites case histories of those who have left the poverty of villages and found relative fulfillment in the city, or at least greater opportunity there. Halpern cites autobiographies that relate past rural poverty, narrations of those who have seen the world beyond the village and returned, and even some who have achieved modest prosperity

Within a rural context, as well as those who have migrated to the nearby market town and those who leave the village daily to gain a living outside. The conclusions to Simic’s Beograd study parallel in many respects those of the Halperns’ most recent study of the Serbian village of Orasac.

Simic comments that it was the remarkable expansion of the economy in the postwar period that made the journey of the peasant migrant possible. He sees the peasantization of Beograd as having affected all levels of society and points out that even the old intelligentsia and aristocracy had ties with the peasantry. Given the specific history of Serbian society in the nineteenth century, this is readily understandable. The migrant encounters in Beograd a cultural situation that bears considerable resemblance, ethnically and linguistically, to what he left in the village.

Simic views the urbanization process in terms of a series of events, with a succession of spatial relocations set in motion by the initial decision of an individual, usually a male, to leave the village. Motivations include personal reasons as well as those external to the individual. Important variables are not only the pattern of inheritance, limited land, and restricted educational and employment opportunities, but also the desire for the greater stimulation, variety, and degree of individual expression offered in the city. Simic stresses this. The important kin ties are also reflected in perceptions of others, and thus a person may be called “Montenegrin” even if he came to Beograd as an infant and has little or no firsthand knowledge of his ancestral home. The transformation of the migrant is seen by Simic as economic rather than socio-cultural, with rural-urban exchange continuing to function across kin lines but conditioned by a number of variables: the nearness of the village, the precise nature of the kin relationships, the degree of prosperity of the particular rural community, the affective quality of the existing interpersonal relationships, and the degree of alienation from village norms.

Often, Simic postulates, the migrant may see himself as an urban component of the rural household, with the ties that he maintains with his village or origin acting as a kind of insurance policy against possible failure in the city. The ties linking the urban and rural components of society act as important communication links and help to promote integration of rural and urban norms as well as further movement out of the village. The positive nature of these integrative mechanisms in the Yugoslav context is furthered by the fact that migration usually takes place within a republic or within a cultural area. There is very little movement between culturally different republics; e.g. between Slovenia
and Macedonia, to cite an extreme case, or even between Croatia and Serbia.\textsuperscript{22}

This is not to say that there are no discontinuities or ethnic conflicts inherent in the urbanization process. A very common observation in Belgrade is that Albanian migrants from the Kosovo Autonomous Region of Serbia, the center of the Albanian ethnic group, perform some of the least desirable jobs in the capital (e.g. collecting garbage and carting wood and lignite for heating). The highly successful Serbian commercial film \textit{The Feather Collector} gives a view of life as experienced by another low-status ethnic group, the Gypsies. Several scenes follow a young Gypsy girl from a plains village north of the capital on her trip to Belgrade in search of work. She is told bluntly by a Gypsy in the city that she has a choice of either working as a trash collector and rag trader or being a prostitute. Her search for help in a series of Gypsy neighborhoods is seen against the background of the modern city, with posters announcing bathing beauty contests and glamorous television programs, a culture she does not share. Some Gypsies have achieved success through the stereotyped role of entertainer and in other ways, but there is no question that traditional kinds of discrimination exist, despite the demolition of the old Gypsy quarter of Belgrade.

Migration abroad or to great distances has existed since the time of Greek trading colonies in Dalmatia. In medieval times migrations occurred within the Mediterranean area and involved both coastal seamen and mountaineers. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw

\textsuperscript{22} The matter is complex because of overlapping border areas in such multiethnic areas as the Vojvodina, an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. According to the 1961 census, of some 660,000 migrants recorded who moved between republics, very few made long-distance moves. Macedonians and Montenegrins tend to go to Serbia. From Bosnia ethnic Serbs move mainly to Serbia and ethnic Croats mainly to Croatia. Slovenians who cross republic borders go mainly to Croatia. Croats move mainly to Croatia from Bosnia and Serbia. These data are set forth in great detail in a publication of the Institut Drustvenih Nauka (1971:214-215, Table 30).

There also seems to be a trend toward greater ethnic homogeneity in certain areas. Between 1961 and 1971 the proportion of Albanians in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo has risen from 67 to 74 percent while the relative number of Serbs has declined from 23 to 18 percent. This obviously has involved migrations and is related to what was called, in the late 1960's, the national re-awakening of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. The Albanian presence is related to an earlier series of migrations subsequent to Ottoman occupation, when Serbs moved north out of this area and across the Danube. These developments are clearly linked to the growing economic inequality and accompanying political functions in such areas as Kosovo and the other more developed areas in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. All areas have developed in the postwar period, but the gap has increased. (See also Singleton 1973: 281–304.)

\textbf{pecalbari} as well as migrations both temporary and permanent to North America, as exemplified by some of the Montenegrins about whom Cary wrote.\textsuperscript{23}

Much of the migration of the approximately 1,000,000 Yugoslavs who are currently abroad has been to Western Europe.\textsuperscript{24} Interestingly, some of these Yugoslav workers are returning to Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{23} Migrations to the United States can only be touched on in this survey, which focuses on continuity within Yugoslavia. There does not seem to be any detailed literature on returnees from North America as a specific group. Two useful sources for Yugoslavs in the United States are Govorchin (1961) and more recently Colakovic (1970). Migration to North America has been on a comparatively small scale, with respect to both the numbers of other immigrant groups who came to the United States and the migratory movements within Yugoslavia. Between 1908 and 1923, statistics indicate that 105,000 Bulgarian, Serbian and Montenegrin immigrants arrived; approximately 89 percent of these eventually returned. A higher proportion of Croats and Slovenes stayed, 226,000 making the trip and 51 percent of these eventually returning. By contrast the Dalmatian, Bosnian, and Herzegovinian (probably mainly Dalmatian) migrants, who numbered 31,000, had a return rate of only 29 percent.

Clearly, the \textit{pecalbari} tradition was very strong in southern regions, which were the least developed economically. The cultural differences were also greatest, and this migration appears to have been overwhelmingly male at first (Colakovic 1970:85, Table 5–14). Of 1,000,000 immigrants recorded in the period 1899–1913, only 147,000 were Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; of that number, 76,000 were Slovenes from the most highly developed area in Yugoslavia and also the smallest of the major ethnic groups (Govorchin 1961:335). There was also a significant post-war migration. Between 1946 and 1968 some 66,000 persons were admitted from Yugoslavia as refugees and displaced persons. Of this number, 16,000 were ethnic Germans (Colakovic 1970:112). The post-war group had somewhat different settlement patterns, most going to the United States, Ohio, New Jersey, California, and Illinois, particularly to the metropolitan areas of New York City, Chicago, and Cleveland, the destinations of two-thirds of the immigrants. Relatively few settled in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Minnesota, Montana, or Colorado and went into the mining and steel industries, as formerly (1970:113). The movement to the United States, in both the pre- and post-war periods, has evidently been smaller than the recent temporary or permanent movement to Western Europe. The early movements to the United States, both temporary and permanent, in the period 1899-1913 (Colakovic 1970:150), touched on in this survey, which focuses on continuity within Yugoslavia. Between 1908 and 1923, statistics indicate that 105,000 Bulgarian, Serbian and Montenegrin immigrants arrived; approximately 89 percent of these eventually returned. A higher proportion of Croats and Slovenes stayed, 226,000 making the trip and 51 percent of these eventually returning. By contrast the Dalmatian, Bosnian, and Herzegovinian (probably mainly Dalmatian) migrants, who numbered 31,000, had a return rate of only 29 percent. (See Bajcic 1972:20).

\textsuperscript{24} A recent Yugoslav publication gives the figure of 800,000 Yugoslavs temporarily employed abroad, of whom some 470,000 are in West Germany, 120,000 in Austria, 60–70,000 in France, more than 30,000 in Sweden, about 30,000 in Switzerland, and some 10,000 in Belgium (Vujovic 1972:12). These figures contrast with the 672,000 listed in \textit{Yugoslav Survey} (February, 1972) articles and cited as being derived from the 1971 census (Bajcic 1972:17–31; Nikolic 1972:1–16).
of this movement has along been very traditional patterns. Lockwood (1970), in a study of a Muslim village community and marketing patterns in a town in Bosnia, discusses migrant agricultural workers, who approximate patterns noted in a historic framework by such scholars as Cvič (1918b:408–413) and Tomasevich (1955:436). For western Bosnia, Lockwood states that migration to Austria began about 1960. The first workers went from the more accessible areas of Livno, Duvna, Kupres and subsequently from the area of Skoplje Polje, which Lockwood studied. This migration began in the mid-sixties as other workers from western Bosnia began to push on to better jobs in West Germany and Sweden. Those who go to Austria travel in groups and usually stay from three to six months. The entrance permit is a negotiable commodity, and in order to raise the money a potential migrant worker may sell some of his livestock. Despite the many difficulties, the lure is great because of the wage differential. Some save their money to invest in land and livestock when they return home, while others bring home material gifts. The inventory of consumer goods in relatively marginal agricultural villages has increased as a consequence.

This type of migrant labor is contrasted with temporary labor from the same region that goes to more prosperous and highly industrialized areas within Yugoslavia. Such seasonal domestic migrations, e.g. to work in the cornfields of the fertile Vojvodina Plain, began in 1945 as an organized government effort but have since continued on the basis of voluntary association.

The longer-term migrations outside Yugoslavia usually involve men only, although increasingly families go too. Such movements, naturally, increase the adjustment problem for the migrant worker and his family and for the receiving society. The impact of the presence of foreign workers, even in the tens of thousands (small numbers by American, English, or French standards), looms very large in the ethnically homogeneous and relatively small-scale societies of Scandinavia and Holland. While those countries project what is sometimes thought to be a "liberal" image with regard to political and social policies, the presence of numbers of southern Europeans, whose accustomed way of life is very different, can easily provoke outcries with decidedly racist overtones, especially given the ultimately provincial nature of those societies as concerns their internal affairs. These problems are, of course, also present in the larger-scale societies of Germany and France and even in multiethnic Switzerland.

From many points of view, the shorter-term migration, in which firm family ties and a strong intention to return to Yugoslavia are maintained, is perhaps in the most bearable situation. Even if the migrant and his family experience discrimination and live in substandard housing, their ability to save for the building of a new house or to acquire capital for a small-scale enterprise based on new trade skills is key. So are the remittances to relatives who remain at home. These remittances now constitute a significant part of Yugoslavia's foreign exchange earnings.

The nature of individual and family adjustment is of vital importance, and outside appearances can be misleading. During a stay in a small community in southern Germany, I became fairly well acquainted with a Yugoslav migrant family. The household was relatively large, reflecting extended family patterns common at home. The family originated from the relatively prosperous area of Slavonia (Croatia) and had retained its village home, to which the family members planned to return. The worker and his wife were in their mid-forties; with them were their eldest son and his wife, both in their early twenties, and two younger sons, ages eighteen and twelve. They were later joined by the man's mother-in-law. All worked except the daughter-in-law, the younger sons, and the mother-in-law. From an outside (host country) view, they presented its average length is about 3 years, with a lower limit of 1 year and an upper limit of 5 years. It is not clear, however, how individuals are counted if they return home on a vacation after having quit one job in a foreign country and then go abroad again to another job. The census figures give the average length of employment abroad as 2.4 years. About 100,000 individuals are recorded as having been abroad longer than 5 years, and 20,000 longer than 10 years, with a low rate of return. From 1965 to 1971, only 80,000 are listed as having returned.

A comprehensive study in Sweden (Meurle and Andric 1971) clearly indicates that this movement is a very recent phenomenon. Yugoslav migrants in Sweden increased from slightly over 100 in 1950 to 1,300 in 1960, but by 1967 they had increased to 22,500 and by 1969 they had increased to 28,300. Approximately half are in the twenty-six-to-thirty-five age group, but significantly, 44 percent are women, many of these probably dependents, as 72 percent of the migrants are married. Some 73 percent were in mining and factory work, predominately the latter, as over half lived in or near large cities. Migration is seen as positive by both the employee and the employer, because it entails a foreign language, housing, social interaction with Swedes in general, and relationships to employer and fellow employees.

Remittances totaled some $870,000,000 in 1972, up from $96,000,000 in 1966 and $500,000,000 in 1970 (Hoffman 1973).

Croatia, which has 22 percent of the total Yugoslav population, contributed 33 percent of those working abroad, while Serbia, with 41 percent of the population, contributed 30 percent of the foreign workers. (Begtic 1972:17–31) This seems to be an old pattern reflected in century immigration to America.
socially undesirable aspects and multiple problems. They lived in one of the poorest houses in town. This was partly because of discrimination, but from their point of view, it minimized rent and at the same time allowed all of them to be together. The father was a skilled mason, worked successively at several jobs, and was not infrequently in conflict with his employers. The eldest son had a diverse job history in Germany, and he, too, had trouble holding a job. The mother had steady work although she was ill. The local inhabitants held strongly negative feelings toward these people. The family itself, although beset with problems and full of conflict over changing roles, still remained faithful to its goal of returning home. Because of frequent bus service to Yugoslavia, occasional trips home for the purchase of land and the construction of a house did not present problems.

The younger members of the family were very impressed by the German standard of living, and a few tentative friendships with young German workers were formed by the two older sons. All working members of the family were learning new skills. But clearly this family did not share the local passion for sobriety, neatness, and orderliness.29

Although minor in terms of total emigration, the Yugoslav “brain drain” has been significant.30 Yugoslav architects in Paris, engineers in Switzerland, and doctors in the United States are not rare.31 Their adaptation is, of course, drastically different from that of semi-skilled workers. Given the high desirability of their skills, their prosperity is assured in most cases. Their standard of living is high, but here, too, conflicts of adjustment arise. The experience of an ophthalmologist in Switzerland illustrates some of the contradictions. Both the eye doctor and his wife, an obstetrician, had easily found employment in a medium-sized Swiss town, and their two children were enrolled in local schools. Both husband and wife had post-graduate training in North America in addition to their professional educations and early work experiences in Yugoslavia.

30 Only 1 percent (a total of 6,900) are listed as having had university training; almost all of them come from Croatia (3,000) and Serbia (2,700) (Begtic 1972: 24). These figures would seem to be rather conservative and possibly reflect only those who have gone to work through official channels, probably a minority of those actually working abroad.

31 There are more than 100 medical doctors of Yugoslav origin in the New York City area alone, most having come since World War II and now permanent residents or United States citizens.
a number of local people, were killed. Unlike both the permanent and the temporary economic migrants, who were concerned either with establishing a new life and community or with saving and remittances at home, political exiles have been preoccupied with the reconstruction of past history and what might have been. In a sense this is similar to the epics that recreate the Serbs' defeat by the Turks in the fourteenth century in the laments of Kosovo, but it takes place in a foreign land and by means of printed matter with limited circulation. These émigré political groups are divided politically as well as ethnically, so that among Serbs and Croats there are separate groups embracing a range of political viewpoints.

The large-scale movement of Yugoslav workers to Western Europe reflects the unique experience of a socialist state that opened its borders not only to foreign tourists but also, in the early 1960's, to its own citizens. There has been great concern about the outflow of youthful labor, and it appears that restrictive measures are being considered. This movement abroad has, of course, been smaller in scale than the rural to urban movement within Yugoslavia; from all points of view, the latter has been the most important migratory movement in Yugoslav history and the one with the most far-reaching consequences.

The Balkans in general and Yugoslavia in particular have long had a mobile population, although it is difficult to measure such matters on an absolute scale. Barring the catastrophe of another war and what appears to be the likely slowing down of the movement abroad, through restrictive measures from the Yugoslav government or increasingly attractive opportunities within Yugoslavia, the question arises as to whether the Yugoslav population will now enjoy a greater stability. Will the most significant moves in the future be for summer vacations or for short-term recreational travel, study, and work abroad? That is, once a villager has moved to a republic capital, perhaps via a provincial staging area, are other moves likely? As indicated, large-scale movement across republic lines does not appear very likely, although from this point of view Serbia and Montenegro constitute one area, and Croats residing in Bosnia often move to Zagreb. Job opportunities may influence succeeding generations to shift, for example, from Beograd to Nis or from Novi Sad to a smaller town, although there is great resistance to this because of the perceived concentration of amenities in the larger places. Large-scale mobility on the American pattern does not appear likely because of ethnic differences. Suburbanization in a planned context does, however, indicate certain kinds of moves. Thus, Novi Beograd, across the river from the main city, has more easily available housing, as do a number of growing satellite communities but these are primarily housing areas with some limited services.

With the increasing spread of amenities, it is not inconceivable that in another generation small towns may again become attractive as job opportunities become more restricted in the cities. This has already begun to happen, and there has been some movement of technically trained personnel, e.g. for staffing factories in small centers. Beyond these considerations, there is the question of the long-term attractiveness of large population centers. Yugoslav cities are still relatively small by New York, Tokyo, or London standards, but as cultural centers they are preeminent, on the pattern of Moscow or Paris.

As in the past, it seems likely that there will be a continuing dialectic between the supra-individual and personal factors. The context will change, but long-term stability need not be a future condition any more than it has been in the past. If one considers the dynamism of a society as a positive asset, then a certain degree of migratory movement can be seen as a convenient way of aiding in the resolution of future social problems, inevitable as long as change and conflict, preferably within limits, remain a part of human culture.

In conclusion there are at least two key matters to consider. First, there is the complexity of relationships between migration and mobility. The latter term can refer to a complex of changes involving spatial, economic, cultural, social, and class or class-like dimensions, and can overlap with various kinds of migration experiences. Of great importance, as has been stressed here, is the time dimension in viewing such matters.

Second, and much more speculative, is the question of migration and mobility with respect to the changing dynamic of rural-urban relationships and the evolving nature of cities in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. This is linked in part to the future of the peasantry, the ultimate reservoir of past migration and also the ultimate reference point for measurement.

Several kinds of historically based generalizations emerge from the data presented. There can be limited spatial migration without innovation; such migration is necessary to the maintenance of the social structure. This type of migration is best illustrated by the movement of

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82 President Tito has remarked on the absence of 300,000 men of military age, "enough to man three whole armies." Some 60,000 Yugoslav children abroad with their parents attend Western schools and are being assimilated into the societies in which they live; this is viewed with concern. Although some 400,000 Yugoslavs are said to be looking for work within the country, and remittances are said to be approaching the billion-dollar-a-year mark, there is concern that more than half of the 1,000,000 workers have gone abroad through private channels and not through government offices. Tighter restrictions are said to be contemplated (Anderson 1973:5).
women at marriage, most frequently from one village to another relatively nearby. This process has continued up to the present. More important from the point of view of change have been the social-ecological shifts conditioned by historical factors. As noted above, the Ottoman invasions of the Balkans forced a considerable portion of the population up into the mountains and gave a new lease on life to tribal and zadruga organizations. This was related to the destruction of the medieval Serbian state and its associated class structures and gave rise to a relatively homogeneous peasantry with strong pastoral specialization and a closely linked national church.

A third pattern is that of circular migration; this results in economic change but with a more restricted sociocultural change component, i.e. the village of origin remains the ultimate reference point and a place to which to return. This has characterized the pecalba tradition for the past several centuries and has continued to modern times. It marked the late nineteenth and early twentieth century migrations to America, with their high rates of return to native villages. Some of these migrants stayed away long enough to qualify for American social security benefits and often returned to their native villages several times before final retirement there. The “Americans” described by Cary are of this group. The experiences of the hajduks, the more recent and more limited experiences of those in military service, and the unplanned experiences of prisoners-of-war also followed this circular pattern. Villagers who worked for a time as apprentices or in service-related occupations (e.g. waiters), as common laborers on construction, or as seasonal migrant farm laborers fit into this classification. The contemporary peasant-worker falls in part in this category, although he is a daily or weekly commuter, and the secondary sociocultural impact is greater by virtue of the continuing daily contact.

Permanent migration, with its accompanying social, cultural, economic, and class changes, is distinct. Here socioeconomic mobility is combined with migration. In the pre-industrial period these opportunities were restricted essentially to the state service and involved military, administrative, and religious careers, in both Hapsburg and Ottoman areas. Individuals could rise spectacularly, but large groups could not. Trade and crafts provided some opportunities, but these were also limited.

In addition, there are large group movements resulting from political change and, within the last generation, related to political and ideological factors. After the successful revolts in Serbia in the nineteenth century, there was movement to towns to replace the departing foreigners and to fill the opening positions in the state administration and commercial ventures, the latter often linked to political activity, particularly at the level of the new elite. (The founders of two rival dynasties in Serbia, one of which ruled Yugoslavia until World War II, were both of peasant origin and were both engaged in trade.) Related to this type of movement were the population transfers during and immediately after the war, many of them involuntary, some voluntary, but all connected with the politics of war and revolution.

But most important of all has been the postwar decline in the peasantry as the majority reference group and its related ideological eclipse as a conceptual embodiment of valued national characteristics. The village has also become less important as a place of return in the context of the massive rural to urban migrations. These have been mostly within Yugoslavia, but beginning in the 1960’s, they have also been abroad. Yugoslavia, like other Mediterranean nations — Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain — sends her surplus or underemployed rural and urban labor to Western and Northern Europe. But socialist Yugoslavia has given certain of these movements a singular twist. Restrictions on the ownership of land and machinery in the private agriculture sector have been a factor there. The role of the worker was initially glorified and has continued to be stressed. In addition, there has been concern with the class role of the migrant as a worker in the socialized ownership sector. Accompanying this trend has been great emphasis on education as a channel of mobility.

Although the rural-urban gap has narrowed, most migrants do not seem to return to the village. Greater equality seems to have been a consequence of this massive shift out of the villages. The massive migrations of the twenty-five-year postwar period have obviously been a unique historical process that cannot be repeated, although movement can continue at a reduced rate because there are still potential rural migrants. The process does contain within it forces for a new dialectic based on the nature of the future opportunity structure, in which access to advanced training and education obviously will be a factor. Peasant origins will probably be less important as a frame of reference. Although many Yugoslav scholars have questioned the extent of the opportunities for socioeconomic mobility in mass migration, it seems clear that future mobility opportunities will be somewhat more restricted, in part because the major migratory moves have already been made.

The fate of children will be determined to some extent by the path taken by their parents. Movement from peasant to professional, managerial to
bureaucratic elite will not be open to as many, nor will movement from peasant to skilled or semiskilled worker be possible for as many. The children of workers will probably be able to become professionals or managers in an urban area (mobility without migration), but the restrictions are already evident. Citing limitations, however, does not in any way minimize the profound changes that have taken place in the past quarter-century, changes that have clearly involved more migration and mobility than in any previous period in Yugoslav history.

A final question is the relationship, or perhaps more accurately stated, the series of relationships between migration and mobility and what has been called the nationalities question. There is a sizable literature on the subject, although most of it does not bear on the interrelationships defined above. The prominent Yugoslav scholar Branko Horvat (1969) suggests that the overall rapid urbanization of the population in the postwar period has created a climate of insecurity which in turn has led to the intensification of nationalist feelings. He maintains that individuals have felt isolated. 34

This would seem to be at variance with the findings of anthropologists who have stressed the role of kinship and friendship networks in the migration and urbanization processes. Suvar (1972[1971]) depicts the political managers, the "so-called humanistic intellectuals," and increasingly the students as preoccupied with this problem of nationality, in contrast to the workers and peasants, who are engaged in "the minimum struggle for existence." A number of writers have remarked that increasing nationalist and also religious identification is related not only to the social traumas associated with the general process of modernization, but also to a certain disillusionment with the initial promises of Yugoslav socialism, in Suvar's words "an ideology which destroyed everything old and stable and projected quick happiness." 35

It is not possible to relate the crucial question of the role of nationalism, on which the future of the Yugoslav state rests, in any simple way to a carry-over of rural or small-community values into an urban milieu.

Suvar maintains that the peasantry has disintegrated and at the same time a "modern" urban population has failed to emerge:

About four million peasants moved to the city, but as many still have nowhere to move but can no longer live in the traditional conditions of village life, which are more stable and limited. 36

From the perspective of an outsider, this would seem to overstate the case, for change and migration have not been restricted to the postwar period. In addition to kinship networks, ties to villages have remained and there is much movement back and forth. Undoubtedly, as Suvar points out, the struggle for professions, careers, and income under conditions in which there is a great deal less than full employment will be a real one. As Horvat (1972) puts it, "The number of those who are abroad or who are unemployed today already approaches the number employed in all of Yugoslav industry." (Horvat gives this number as 1.2 million, which is not far from the 1.5 million in manufacturing: a total of 3.9 million were employed in the social sector in 1971.)

The question of allocation of limited resources is a crucial one, clearly related to ties of identity which, although redefined, have strong historical bases. However, because migration patterns have by and large followed republic lines (and have not, as in the American case, involved massive relocation of ethnic and racial groups in new areas), migration did not create the historical consciousness, nor did it pose direct confrontations on a major scale because of geographic proximity in an urban context. Nationalist consciousness seems to be an urban phenomenon primarily articulated by professional intellectuals within Yugoslavia as well by 35

démigré groups residing abroad, including those with and without a clearly defined political ideology for or against socialist Yugoslavia.

34 Horvat (1969) defines a "hierarchy of social groups," although he states that existing research is inadequate. He lists six groups: (1) government political figures, economic and other leaders who have the highest incomes and prestige and who make the most important social decisions; (2) intellectual workers, those of a technological economic sub-group, upper-echelon bureaucrats, and the humanist intelligentsia; (3) routine office workers or white-collar workers; (4) highly skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers, including peasant-workers; (5) artisans; and (6) peasants. As indicative of mobility problems, he cites data showing that workers' children have only one-ninth the chance and peasants' children one-twentieth the chance of attaining the leadership category that children born to families within that group possess (Horvat 1969: 147-149). However, by implication he does see continued significant mobility between the social groups he defines. He sees an intensive exodus of 2 percent per year, although most of it does not bear on the interrelationships defined above. The prominent Yugoslav scholar Branko Horvat (1969) suggests that the overall rapid urbanization of the population in the postwar period has created a climate of insecurity which in turn has led to the intensification of nationalist feelings. He maintains that individuals have felt isolated. 34

The Yugoslav problem needs to be seen in a broader European and perhaps world context. Within Europe there is great population movement: Southern Europeans migrate to work in Northern Europe, and Northern Europeans vacation in Southern Europe. Despite these movements and the growth of regional economic units in Eastern and Western Europe, local nationalisms thrive both on a national level and within the country. In the United Kingdom and Belgium, the Industrial Revolution developed early, and there is an old established working class within an urban framework predating this century.

Yet Yugoslavia’s six republics and associated regions do represent historically and politically defined interest groups, with official ideological sanction within a multi-national state, whose economic possibilities are finite. Modernization as a generalized process is partly responsible for our quandary because it implies completion, just as migration implies a fixed goal. It is unlikely that in the near future Yugoslavs of various nationalities will move between republics the way Americans cross state or regional lines. However, there is no reason to assume that the predominantly rural to urban migration of the past quarter-century is the end of a historical process and implies a future stability with respect to population movement.

In the nineteenth century national consciousness among South Slav intellectuals in a largely rural society developed with respect to the domination of foreign powers; now it is developing with respect to one another in a society in which a peasant population, in a formal occupational sense, is now a minority. In the nineteenth century national identity focused on the idealized characteristics of a peasant society; today it stresses articulated, urban-focused economic needs and, to a degree, a shared historical past. The conceptualization of cultural continuity can have conservative ideological overtones, but the projection of future change, in which cultural inheritances will function in new ways, leaves open the question of whether population mobility will cease with this generation in Yugoslavia.

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