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Yugoslav Peasant Society in Transition, Stability in Change

Joel Halpern

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YUGOSLAV PEASANT SOCIETY IN TRANSITION— STABILITY IN CHANGE*

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In order to place Yugoslav peasant culture in broad perspective it is necessary to formulate a conceptual evolutionary scheme for the analysis of recent change. Peasant may be defined as a sub-culture of which the essential feature is a territorial based relationship between familial units either nuclear or extended and the land they cultivate mainly with their own labor. This relationship has continuity through time. The term peasant also implies the association of these familial units in political, social and economic units called villages. All members of this society need not practice agriculture as their primary occupation nor need they reside continuously in the village as long as their main social and economic ties remain there. Migration of individuals or family groups is possible from one peasant community to another. The peasant is also a member of a national state to which he must contribute services, in labor, in kind or in cash, and from which he receives as a minimum some form of protection of his life and property against external and internal threats.

Obviously the variation within this framework has been tremendous. Particularly significant has been the great variation in the peasant-state relationship ranging from minimum regulation where the state required only that its demand for taxes, labor and military service be met, to situations where many details of internal village organization and family relationships were centrally regulated.

It is axiomatic to say that we are going through a universal technological revolution which has everywhere been accepted, most often with enthusiasm. Accompanying these changes has been an absolutely increasing role of the central government. The

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ultimate implication of these changes is that peasant sub-culture has become a technological anachronism, a situation that is potential in most areas, actual in others. These developments make essential the basic reformulation of peasant culture, if not its potential elimination. A logical consequence is that the state, for perhaps the first time in history, has begun to value the peasant's mind more than his back, soliciting his active support rather than merely passive compliance. The principal reason these developments have remained more potential than actual has been the limited industrial and organizational abilities of the states concerned, often combined with finite natural resources and limited capital.

The peasants themselves share the view, consciously or not, that their sub-culture is destined for basic reformulation or termination in that farming as a positively desirable way of life and the village as a place of future residence are seen by relatively few as ideal objectives (although there is much rationalization, since the opportunity for choice often exists only for a minority). It may be that the most far-reaching changes are now occurring in village societies, so that for future sources of traditional behavior one may have to look more in the towns than in villages. Various urban groups, government officials and peasants all appear to agree that it is the peasants who require the most basic change in order for the state to modernize. It is the peasant's technology, health and education which are viewed as needing more change than that of the urbanite. If adequate housing, jobs and other facilities were available in urban areas doubtless rural depopulation would be even greater than it has been. In a sense the urban-oriented young peasant is potentially more on the way to a dynamic future than his urban counterpart because he has explicitly rejected his past. He also may have more loyalty to the state if it is the state which has helped make his mobility possible. Coming from a homogeneous sub-culture he may be less knowledgeable and perhaps less tolerant of existing conflicting urban sub-cultures. A city-bound peasant youth may have rejected his religious background as superstition and be less understanding of the conservative town dweller who does not let urban atheistic trends interfere with his beliefs. Village and town are both changing,

but it would appear that the changes in the village are more fundamental to the future of its sub-culture (reformulation) than those which have been occurring in urban areas (modification), giving rise to the greater future potentiality for conservatism in long-range terms in the latter, although in the short range it may be the villages which are the more traditional.

This may be the case with regard to concepts of regional ethnicity. In Yugoslavia the national state which developed after the first World War was unable to establish any lasting sense of unity among the various groups. Generally speaking it is not the objective, observable differences which are significant but rather the self-images of the urban intellectuals and political leadership. Matters of social structure, dress, food, housing and agricultural economy so crucial in identifying variations among peasant sub-cultures are of little utility in classifying urban groupings. Even currently existing value patterns and attitudes are often similar, that is, they share more in common with urbanites in other areas although formal religious and various idealized patterns remain. This is particularly true when they are compared with the peasant culture from which they have originated or to which they are related. It is in such a situation that the self-image is vital and a felt need exists to maximize it. By contrast, the peasant living in a basically homogeneous cultural environment tends to be less self-conscious about his ethnic identity. For him his ethnicity is a fact of life; for the urbanite it is frequently a matter of self-conscious creation and assertion. With the increasing impact of a universal technology on urban life this is especially apparent. Nevertheless, distinctiveness in urban cultures remains, particularly in those areas with long and deeply felt historical traditions, most clearly manifested in the ways in which the historically existing patterns of urban life have become interwoven with industrialization and the accompanying modernization process. In certain ways this is a minor factor when compared to the elaborately different patterns of peasant cultures, but it is one of long-term stability.

The foregoing is suggested by developments in Yugoslavia. Like a number of other countries, Yugoslavia is a multi-national state, the very name meaning Land of the South Slavs. The Communist government has explicitly recognized existing national differences,

with six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro). The largest, Serbia, has two autonomous areas: the Vojvodina, which contains Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Romanian minority groups among others, and the Kosmet, which is populated mainly by Albanians, most of whom are Moslem. The Slovenes and Croats are Catholic. The Serbs, Montenegrins and most Macedonians are Orthodox. Many Moslems live in Bosnia. There are significant Albanian and Turkish groups in Macedonia who are Moslem. In Serbia and Macedonia are sizeable Gypsy groups. Slovenes and Croats use the Latin alphabet. Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins employ the Cyrillic. Bosnia, situated in the middle, uses both. Slovene and Macedonian are separate languages, the former largely unintelligible with Serbo-Croat, the main language of Yugoslavia (there are a number of vocabulary and accent differences between Serbian and Croatian but no problem in mutual comprehension). Macedonian has become an official language only since the end of World War II (Bulgarians claim it is a dialect of their language, as do nationalistic Serbs, but its independent status has been legally defined by the post-war Yugoslav government).

Official ethnic distinctions for census purposes tend to confuse more than they clarify. For example, in the 1931 census the term Yugoslav was employed for both Serbs and Croats, but this forced superficial unity was subsequently dropped, and in the post-war period the designations of the newly-formed republics were used (except in the case of Bosnia where Catholics generally declared themselves as Croats and Orthodox as Serbs, with the Moslem segment of the population listing themselves mainly as undeclared). Albanians in the Kosmet and some Moslem Macedonians appear to have shifted their nationality to Turkish in certain cases in the hope of emigrating (knowledge of the Turkish language evidently not being required). There are 85,000 Gypsies listed in the 1953 census, but many authorities believe the actual number to be higher since many declared themselves as Serbs or Macedonians.

As far as settlements are concerned, there are large numbers of Serb and mixed Serb-Croat villages in Croatia despite the massacre of Serbs living in Croatia during the time of the last war by the Fascist-led Ustaši composed mainly of Croats. The Vojvodina,

populated mainly by Serbs and the minority groups mentioned above, also has villages of Croatian origin. Since the war many Croats and Montenegrins have come to the area to occupy villages deserted by the former German minority. Historically, there has also been much migration within Yugoslavia, the ancestors of many Serbs having come from Montenegro and Hercegovina. Unlike the pre-war situation specific ethnic groups are now recognized, with elementary schools and sometimes high schools in their own languages as well as publishing houses in certain cases. On the university level only Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedonian are used, raising interesting problems in language learning (in an extreme case an Albanian from Macedonia may attend a local Albanian elementary school and go on to a Macedonian speaking high school and a Serbian university). Serbo-Croat is the only language used in the army, so that male villagers of non-Serbo-Croat groups are usually bilingual to a certain extent. The term Yugoslav refers mainly to a concept of national citizenship (in the last census only a relatively few list themselves as Yugoslav). Children of ethnically mixed marriages generally are declared as belonging to the father's group, especially in the case of boys.

The ethnic question is, of course, less complex in rural areas, where intermarriage has been more restricted. The three most easily identifiable factors are native language, religion and geographical residence. With regard to villagers there can be added clearly definable sub-ethnic differences in house type, village pattern, costume and agricultural technology, which can only in part be attributed to differences in geographical factors.

In addition social structures and customary observances vary. The characteristic Balkan extended family, the *zadruga*, occurs among all major groups excluding Slovenes but including Albanians and all Moslems. On the other hand the feast day of the patron saint, the *slava*, inherited in the male line, is limited to the Orthodox Slavs. Political regulations are also significant. Before the war Macedonia was known as South Serbia, and inhabitants were required to use the Serbian suffix *ić* with their surnames, while today the preferred Macedonian *ski* form is added.

Some Orthodox Macedonians, while formally declaring themselves as Macedonians, feel that they are basically Serbs, as do

Montenegrins. Conversely, when Macedonian, Montenegrin or even Bosnian Orthodox individuals of peasant origin migrate to Belgrade (the capital of Serbia as well as the national capital) their children and often grandchildren as well are still referred to as "Macedonians," "Montenegrins" or "Bosnians" despite the fact that they may be, in addition, of ethnically mixed marriages.

Each group has associated stereotypes (Serbs are emotionally untrustworthy but outgoing and hospitable; Montenegrins are heroic, prefer to direct rather than work; Macedonians are backward but have wonderful songs and dances; Slovenes and Croats are clannish, unemotional, hardworking). Most resentment seems to be directed toward the Slovenes, Slovenia being the most homogeneous republic, with the highest degree of industrialization and best standard of living in all Yugoslavia.

Another point of division is based on differing historic traditions. Croats and Slovenes tend to some extent to venerate their background in terms of former association with the European Austro-Hungarian Empire and look down upon those "Balkan" areas which were under Turkish rule. "Almost 500 years under the Turks" is offered as the pat explanation for underdevelopment by inhabitants of those areas which were part of the Ottoman Empire.

Much has been written on Yugoslav nationality problems but almost always from the political rather than the cultural viewpoint. The various distinctions are hard to sum up in terms like nationality or even ethnic group. Peasant-urbanite or village-town dichotomy is likewise not clearly definable. The customary assumption is that peasants live in villages and urbanites in towns and that towns are larger than villages. In Yugoslavia this can be very variable. For example, many Vojvodina villages are large (populations of 5,000 to 10,000 are not uncommon), while the sixth largest city of Yugoslavia, Subotica, which is also in the Vojvodina, has a significant proportion of its population engaged in peasant agriculture. Some of the inhabitants commute to their fields often ten or fifteen miles from the city proper (through land reforms following the first World War large estates were virtually eliminated, and although rural indebtedness and small fragmented holdings have been problems, large concentrations of town-based agricultural laborers such as are found in many countries have

not existed in Yugoslavia). On the other hand many towns in mountainous Montenegro and Hercegovina are considerably smaller than Vojvodina villages. Because of the great geographical and accompanying ecological differentiation between the productive and densely settled Pannonian Plain and the pastoral mountain areas it is therefore impossible to use a quantitative measure for the term urban.

Placed in historical perspective as well as in the contemporary Yugoslav context, peasant above all implies family farming as a way of life, only secondarily for income, even though this may be vital. Equally it implies conceptual if not constant physical presence in a community where relationships are based primarily on kinship and close patterns of association and interaction in a combination of cooperative and competitive situations. The Yugoslav government has clearly stated that it considers peasant farming a technological and social anachronism to be eliminated as soon as feasible. However, conscious of its conspicuous failure in 1948-1950 it does not intend to force the issue of collectivization, though it does what it can, however, to further the process by indirect subsidies to state farms, limitation of peasant holdings to ten hectares of arable land and high taxes on private farming.

The farmers feel strongly their "archaic" status and see no future in their way of life. In investigations by this writer in various areas of Yugoslavia not a single young peasant between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five was found who said he wanted to be a farmer or had originally chosen farming because he liked the life. There were some, often workers who commuted to outside jobs, who said they liked village life but not farming.

In Yugoslavia's universities and institutes the low status of the agricultural faculties is evident. Village students aspire to be skilled workers "as Tito was" or to serve in the armed forces or, less frequently, to become professionals—engineers, doctors, teachers—but almost none express an interest in working in agriculture, livestock-breeding or fishing. To remain in the village as a farmer or herdsman is felt to be a confession of failure, although that failure might be rationalized. These sentiments remain constant or are even increased as the possibility of permanent residence in the cities has become more difficult. Following the initial period of industrialization many less workers have been re-

quired, as Yugoslav factories have begun to be automated. In some cases workers have been laid off. Many factory managers acknowledge that plants are overstaffed. There is much under-employment of workers in industry and in the lower echelons of government bureaucracy in general. This situation has stepped up emphasis on education, and peasant parents have been consistently willing to make great sacrifices for their children "to get them out of the village." Many students go to almost any lengths to avoid returning. As one student of peasant origin expressed it, "I would rather be an usher in a Belgrade theatre than a high-school teacher in the town near my native village."

Considering the changes which have occurred since the war it is important to take a close look at the process by which a peasant becomes an urbanite. Having already defined the peasant, we can now define the urbanite as one whose primary focus of activity, both occupational and social, is in the town. He is salaried (civil servants and state employees working in rural areas are in this sense urban, provided they do not work in the community of their birth; this would include teachers, priests, agronomists, medical technicians, clerks and railroad workers). In a communist state the number of people living primarily on their income from property is very small, although there are a number of older people who rent out rooms to supplement pensions. Self-employed craftsmen and mechanics are few, and with continuing government restrictions the number is decreasing. The urbanite usually has a greater degree of formal education (being a productive farmer, even in terms of peasant technology, requires training and skill, but the learning process is informal and traditional). The urbanite tends to have somewhat fewer kin ties (not an absolute difference, this varies more between ethnic areas than between village and city) and to be more secular in his interests. Perhaps most important, he does not feel that his life needs radical alteration. His discontent focuses on the quantitative aspects of his life, e.g., more income, rather than on the qualitative (learning new behavior patterns). If urbanization is interpreted as meaning innovations originating in the cities these affect the whole population but more basically the peasant; that is, the peasant sub-culture is entering on a series of irreversible changes, and the urbanization of the villages involves more qualitative

changes than the impact of these changes on the urban dweller whose life is continuously modified but not radically altered. However, a significant ongoing process which has to date received little attention is that of the peasantization of the town. Its very existence is an indication that the process is to a degree reciprocal.

The impact of urban-derived pressures for change is indicated by the status of two important transitional groups: the peasant-worker (member of a state enterprise and not an individual who works for cash, either seasonal or part-time, within the context of the village community) and the student of peasant origin. Workers' wages are low, even by Yugoslav standards. In 1961-62 they ranged from a minimum of approximately 10,000 dinars a month to a maximum of 20,000 (\$13-\$26 at official exchange rates) including benefits such as allotments for children. The social benefits are, however, highly valued. These include pensions, free medical care and in certain cases loans for house construction or assignments of apartments at minimum rentals.

The most common situation is one where the worker lives in his village and commutes daily to the factory. He may do this on foot, by bicycle or, rarely, by motorbike, bus or train. Sometimes a larger enterprise engaged in heavy manufacturing operates a special subsidized bus service. It is not unusual for the peasant to commute more than fifteen miles each way, a significant distance considering the poor roads and hard winters. If bus service is available it may take a walk of an hour or two to the bus stop, not an easy job when the snow is deep or when autumn and spring rains turn village footpaths to muddy bogs.

Many factories were begun after the second World War in areas of Yugoslavia which had no previous industrial tradition. The work force was recruited from the peasantry, most of whom were unskilled and had on the average four years of schooling. It is not surprising the machinery depreciated rapidly and that such enterprises were often unprofitable in their first years; it is a significant achievement that they have become productive at all. Even their limited success is testimony to the strong learning motivation of the working forces. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has paid a price for this development. Success has not always been unqualified, and Tito has been compelled to remark about "political factories." There are growing indications that future invest-

ments will go most strongly to those areas in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia where the industrial tradition is more developed.

During their period of employment many peasant workers have gained considerable skill and have moved to the town, often aided materially by the enterprise. This is particularly true in the smaller towns where land for building is easily available. This move to town becomes psychologically important when the worker finally sells his land in the village, a process usually long-delayed even though the size of the holding is small and economically insignificant.

The peasant commuter is usually enmeshed in a conflicting situation. He wishes to work and at the same time operate his small farm. In the pre-war period and earlier, when a member of a peasant household went to work in a nearby town or even went off to a distant city for considerable periods the matter was not as crucial as it is today. Then the *zadruga* was much more functional, and the loss of his labor less keenly felt. A brother, cousin or physically mature son could take over most of his chores. During the past few decades there has been increasing fragmentation of *zadrugas* and accompanying division of land. Where formerly ten household members living on ten to twelve hectares was common, today the usual pattern is a nuclear family, often with an aged parent incapable of full-time labor, on a few hectares. On a national basis, the precise relationships are difficult to clarify. In addition to regional variation the unequal distribution of land has also been a factor, so that before the war those families on small plots often hired themselves out as agricultural laborers. Many of these or their children have become industrial workers. But industrial work is full-time, while agricultural labor is seasonal and usually part-time. Because of the declining prestige of agriculture and the decreasing value of land and its products many peasants with relatively large holdings (above five hectares) have also gone into industry.

Much of the burden has fallen on the younger women, who have children and distaff duties to attend to in addition to the new farm chores, such as feeding and watering the livestock, formerly done by the men. The major agricultural tasks such as plowing, in many cases with cows or oxen, reaping and threshing, are extremely difficult for them because of the non-mechanized

technology and necessity for sheer physical strength, and when women alone must perform this work the strain is great and quality low.

Labor-saving machinery is unknown in most parts of rural Yugoslavia. A man's salary is spent to a limited extent in buying food or hiring part-time agricultural labor, but mainly to purchase clothing, build a new home, pay for electrification, purchase a radio or occasionally aid a son or, less often, a daughter to pursue studies. Investment in equipment or facilities for the farm usually has a lower priority. No tractors are privately owned, but the local state farm's equipment can be hired for plowing one's land, a relatively expensive although an increasingly common practice. Peasants own no equipment such as milking machines or trucks, so that private farming requires essentially as much physical labor in production, processing and marketing as it did before the war.

Since factory working hours are usually from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., Monday through Saturday, there is some time left for chores after the peasant-worker comes home. However, to get to the job at 6 it is often necessary to get up at 4 at the latest and sometimes earlier. Arriving back in the village at 3 or 4 in the afternoon a worker hardly feels refreshed. Obviously the strain shows up in performance on the job. The conflict becomes even greater at seasons of peak agricultural work, especially at harvest time. At this time "epidemics" break out; often workers eat various things to simulate fever, and factory production is seriously affected. As far as this writer is aware, extreme compulsion, i.e., the use of police or army units, is not resorted to, but factory managers are quite frank about the problem, claiming that a main motivation for absence is that on a per diem basis it costs more for the peasant to hire farm labor than the amount he loses by not appearing on the job. The solution most often proposed by management is to apply pressure on the worker to make the big move to the town.

There are also those peasants who leave their family in the village and return to them weekly or monthly. In this category would be included the increasing numbers who, following a pre-war pattern, have gone abroad for a year or two to work, mainly to West Germany (before the first World War many, especially

from Dalmatia, Montenegro and Macedonia, went for temporary periods to the United States).

In addition the peasant may commute from his home in order to participate in special seasonal work in road building or construction in the nearby market town.

In other cases of migration the pattern is based on ethnic and geographic factors. Classic temporary migrations are those of large numbers of Albanians who come to Belgrade from the Kosmet to cut and haul wood and cart lignite, a very important job since wood and lignite coal are the main heating and cooking fuels, and those of Macedonian construction workers who go to work on projects in all parts of Yugoslavia, returning home when the job is completed. More or less permanent migrations of the same nature include men from a particular region in Dalmatia who appear to have monopolized the trade of push-cart porter in Belgrade, transporting luggage and small loads from the railroad station and other strategic points in the city, as well as Macedonians in Belgrade and other Serbian towns who formerly operated small restaurants and still work as waiters, and Albanian pastrycooks who have penetrated permanently into rural communities in Slovenia and the Vojvodina.

The growing towns in the region of Šumadija, central Serbia, illustrate some of the complexities involved in the transition from village to town. This region has been industrialized only since the war. In addition to the new factories, apartment houses and state stores, a striking feature of the towns is the large and growing number of new, private homes on the outskirts. Built in the same style as new village homes, these are for the most part residences of families who have moved there from surrounding villages. The men are urban workers in the sense that they are permanently employed in a local factory, but cultural and social ties with the village are strong.

Not only outward appearance but household furnishings are similar to those one sees in the village. The kitchen, with its wood stove, is the focal point of the home. It is the only heated room, and most household activities take place here; the other rooms are used only for sleeping. Invariably a bed in the kitchen is used by an older relative or by young children. The so-called guest room is set aside, as in the village, to display choice items of

handiwork, and the walls are adorned with photographs of relatives, dominated by large portraits of ancestors. There is electricity, albeit sporadic, a radio and perhaps a phonograph. There is no indoor plumbing, the water supply coming from a well or less often from a shared outside tap. Chickens wander in and out of the kitchen, and in the bare courtyard a pig may be kept, although attempts have been made to ban pigs within town limits. Behind the dwelling there may be a small vegetable garden and a few fruit trees.

The owners of such homes emphatically say that they could not think of "living with strangers" (living in an apartment house) even if an apartment were available, despite the fact that the multiple dwellings usually have piped water in the kitchen and tile stoves for heating in all rooms.

During his annual vacation the worker usually uses his time to improve his new house and yard, a process which takes a good many years. As in the villages, a house is often constructed over a period of years, with kitchen and perhaps one sleeping room ready when the family moves in, additional refinements finished gradually as funds and time are available. Not infrequently the worker receives considerable help from his village relatives, in the actual labor of construction as well as in the use of peasant carts for the transport of bricks and cement. He is usually provided, by his or his wife's parents, with wine, *rakija* (plum brandy), cheese, eggs, fruit and occasionally chicken and meat. In turn, he usually repays these gifts by helping in the village on weekends or during his vacation. The food brought by a parent and the ability to provide for one's children in this manner is a source of pride, and it would be incorrect to say that the labor and gifts are repaid in a precisely formulated way. The ties that bind remain close, and mutual obligations are strongly felt. When a parent in the village dies the surviving parent often moves in with the married child in town. There are also informal reciprocal relationships between a brother who has remained on the land and the worker in town.

Often a worker is a member of the Party, and his permanent establishment in the town, especially if it is in a clerical or minor administrative position, is facilitated by his former activity in the village Party cell which enabled him to establish useful connec-

tions. Such an individual is generally more concerned with the larger world than are his contemporaries in the village. In some cases he is anxious to continue his schooling. Another looks forward to the day when he can buy a car and take his family to Dalmatia to see the sea, but desires for an electric stove, television set or other luxury items postpone this daydream. If there are school-age children in the family the wife does not work. A family such as this exhibits strong satisfaction in its successful achievement of having "left the village mud behind." To the outside observer the contrast is sometimes more implicit than real since the streets and courtyards of these new neighborhoods are unpaved. But there is strong optimism that in time paving too will be done ("It's in the Plan").

A different type of change can be noted in Slovenia. In the area of Alpine valleys near the Austrian border, which has one of the highest standards of living in all Yugoslavia, the transition from peasant to worker occurs in more clear-cut fashion, even within the village. Unlike in other areas of Yugoslavia, the *zadruga* has not existed in recent times. Kin ties do exist, but emphasis has been mainly on the nuclear family. This situation, combined with the fact that relative to other parts of Yugoslavia a high degree of industrialization and modernization developed under Austrian rule, gives rural life here a unique quality for Yugoslavia. Electrification is virtually universal, piped water is common, and well-maintained roads connect villages. Ownership of small cars, especially the Fiat 600 (produced under license in Yugoslavia), is widespread, there are many motorcycles, and some villages even have auto clubs. Bus transportation is efficient. With the town easily accessible it is not surprising that many workers of rural origin choose to build their homes in villages, often only a short commuting distance from the factory. In contrast to the homes of workers in central Serbia, these in Slovenia have more amenities and are of more solid construction. Some even have attached garages. Each house is surrounded by a fenced-in plot, usually with a small lawn, flower garden and tiny vegetable patch. While the price of privately-owned farm land has dropped in recent years, the cost of land for house sites in new sections of these Slovene villages has risen markedly.

The strongly individualistic character of Slovene society appears

to make it possible for these workers to concentrate on their jobs and family lives without necessary involvement in village-oriented activities. This emphasis on the individual and not on the group does not seem to have resulted from industrialization, but has long been present in rural life here. For example, servants, both male and female, have traditionally been part of Slovene rural life. Their equivalent exists today in terms of the transitional peasant-worker status. Workers of both sexes of rural origin who have been unable to find housing in town often board out in nearby villages. In return for room and board they help with the agricultural chores when they get home in the afternoon. There exist, too, in these villages many unattached people, either older persons or men or women in the prime of life. Often they are boarders. Such a situation is inconceivable in the Orthodox and Moslem parts of Yugoslavia where kin ties predominate, and it is not too common in Croatia (this is particularly true of single women who would not cause a stir in Ljubljana or even in a small town like Kranj, while a woman dining alone in a Belgrade restaurant is a rare sight).

The concept of urbanization implying increasing stress on the nuclear family does not seem to have particular emphasis in this area. One feature that Slovenia does share with the rest of the country, however, is the downgrading of agriculture as an occupation. Here it is found in a more advanced form, that is, not only do many younger people go to work in factories, but Slovene village youth shun agricultural labor to the extent that the expanding state farms of Slovenia must bring in farm workers from outside, usually from Croatia. (There seems to be a pattern in agricultural labor, the work falling to a relatively deprived group. To cite a similar case from a contrasting ethnic and ecological area, in parts of Montenegro there is inadequate labor to mow the hay which is of crucial importance as livestock feed and constitutes one of the principal crops. During the mowing period laborers are brought in from the more backward Sandjak region. Analogous developments are occurring in Macedonia.)

A significant index of the impact of industrialization and the extent of modernization is the price of land. Some of the most valuable agricultural land in Yugoslavia is also the cheapest. In parts of the Vojvodina, particularly in the Srem region, peasants

who have become workers offer the government their land in order to avoid paying taxes. In rocky and infertile areas of Dalmatia and Macedonia small fragments of land bring much higher prices.

Closely paralleling these changes is the partial reverse of the pre-war situation vis-à-vis the relative status of the peasant and the worker. In Slovenia those peasants who went to work in factories in the period between the world wars were looked down upon by their fellow villagers. To be a prosperous farmer was considered a point of pride within the village community. It would be an exaggeration to say that this attitude no longer exists in Slovenia, although in other areas it still holds fairly strongly. In all Yugoslavia before the war a main focal point of peasant thinking was the acquisition of more land. To increase one's holdings was a pathway to status in the village, and the *zadruga* as it existed in Serbia and other areas was compatible with this aim. A clear division of labor was established, and the land was cultivated intensively. During the slack season various kinds of temporary wage labor could be sought, and some money was saved thereby, but the main savings came in the form of restricted consumption. Thus corn bread was eaten every day and wheat bread only on holidays. Today wheat consumption is much higher, and the tendency is for the peasant to consume more since there is less incentive to save to invest in land. (This shift partially explains why before the war Yugoslavia exported wheat and today tremendous amounts of wheat are obtained from the United States. The greatest amounts of wheat were marketed by the larger land holders who are the ones who have been most affected by the land reform).

The reformulation of peasant society, however, proceeds slowly. Status differences are in the process of being modified, but many traditional attitudes remain. This was dramatically illustrated by a murder which took place in the Serbian village studied by the writer. A poor young man fell in love with a girl from a prosperous household. Although an ambitious and accomplished mechanic, he had difficulty living down the reputation of his shiftless father who had mistreated a series of wives. The girl's mother, a widow, raised no objections to the presents the youth lavished on her daughter. When he proposed marriage, the moth-

er mocked him with references to his background, and the girl was made to refuse his offer. Infuriated, he knifed the girl when he saw her alone in a meadow. Although found guilty, the court sentenced him to a relatively short term in prison.

To many older people village life continues to have a strong appeal, dating from a romanticized past (which, however, did have a cultural integration that no longer exists). There is a selective return to the village by old pensioners who have completed their working lives. These range from Dalmatian and Montenegrin ex-emigrants from the United States whose monthly social security checks represent a small fortune, to those individuals living on small pensions who must supplement their income from their gardens and domestic animals. In some cases the pensioners have never left home but have commuted to jobs at a nearby railroad station or mine. A few are wounded veterans with partial disabilities. Most of them do at least a little farm work on their own small parcel of land and, as one Serb elder put it, "We gather at the *kafana*, drink a little rakija and slowly wait for death." As in the case of the wages of the peasant-workers, the pensioner's income tends to contribute to the stability of the rural community. Government funds thus indirectly help in some cases to retain a type of semi-subsistence agriculture and provide the funds for new house construction in villages. Not infrequently a pensioner is supported by his son, and the money is occasionally used for investment in farm buildings or electrification. Sometimes surplus funds are used for money-lending on a modest scale, although this is obviously done in a discreet manner.

Among those who have continued to derive their income primarily from agriculture there has been a trend toward specialization, particularly noticeable around the larger cities. Of the many new peasant homes in certain villages near Belgrade it is said that they were built with salad—that is, from the profits of marketing lettuce and other vegetables in the Belgrade open markets. The early morning trains to Zagreb are filled with peasants, and the roads leading to the Croatian capital clogged with cyclists, all bringing fresh milk to the city. Every city and town in the country has a daily market and weekly fair at which the peasants sell produce, and a large city like Belgrade has many such markets in different sections of town. The state stores and state-operated stalls

in the open markets are unable to cope with the demand, and in addition their products are felt to be inferior. The Belgrade housewife accustomed to personally selecting her purchases much prefers to pay a few dinars more at a peasant's stall for the privilege of pinching tomatoes and hefting eggs.

Many peasants avoid the markets and have special customers to whom they regularly bring cheese and eggs. These relationships have a degree of permanence, often persisting over decades. New customers are obtained by personal recommendation, but the number is limited by the individual peasant's productivity. In some cases a villager acts as middleman for several of his neighbors. Even this procedure is limited, for the peasant is restricted by law to what he can carry on his back. Further regulations were enforced at the end of 1961, when peasant carts were no longer permitted to enter the city limits of Belgrade. There does not appear to be sex specialization in the role of these peasant merchants, except that for bulkier items transported long distances obviously men can carry more. Some journey as many as fifty miles each way by train to sell produce to special customers, a system which is extremely inefficient on all counts but does, nevertheless, result in a better net profit than marketing the same produce nearer the village.

The government is aware of this situation, and the conclusion seems to be that not only does agriculture in general have a low priority in the scheme of development but also that a communist state sees no point in aiding private agriculture even indirectly, the hope being that it will gradually wither away and the excess population become absorbed into industry and other occupations, with all cultivation eventually turned over to state farms. This process of purposeful reformulation of peasant culture is, naturally, an extremely long-term one, particularly since the process is seen as a voluntary one though coercion exists in the form of various kinds of indirect economic pressures. Some government leaders have stated that they expect this to occur in twenty-five to fifty years.

It would be incorrect to say that peasant agriculture has been completely stagnant. Through government cooperatives improved varieties of crops, such as an Italian type of wheat, and better livestock, including more productive breeds of hogs, sheep and

poultry, have been introduced. As mentioned, tractors belonging to the state farm or cooperative have on occasion been hired by the private farmer. State farms in many areas are not primarily concerned with further expansion even though they could easily purchase additional land, but rather with consolidation of holdings and attempts to perfect organizational structure and methods of cultivation. Recently their per hectare yields in major crops such as wheat have begun to exceed those of the private cultivator. Their indirect subsidization by the state has been an important factor since the state farms can afford large quantities of artificial fertilizer which the private peasant cannot.

Not surprisingly, many foreigners unable to speak the language conclude after driving through the countryside (especially if they have previously had the opportunity to view vast stretches of collective farms in other parts of Eastern Europe) that little has changed and that the small farms and fragmented fields are not what one expects to see in a communist country. Despite the significant degree of building that has gone on in rural areas, it is true that much sense of tradition remains. Architecture and in many places costumes retain much of their earlier regional distinctiveness. The bright, tinted whitewashed houses in the dusty line-villages of the Vojvodina, the steep-roofed, wood-shingle homes on the Bosnian slopes and the rough-hewn limestone homes along the coast in Dalmatia have a special uniqueness, as do robust Slovak women in their multi-layered swishing skirts, Moslems with their tasseled fezes and prayer beads, Albanians in skin-tight white felt leggings, Macedonian maidens in quilted tunics and wildly colorful wool aprons. Still a most ordinary sight is a Serbian woman placidly spinning wool from a distaff while prodding her cow along a village lane, a Macedonian driving his horse around an outdoor threshing-floor of beaten earth, a Hercegovinian filling handmade water casks and strapping them onto his donkey, while women cart sacks of manure to fields a mile or two away. Within sight of Zagreb roam Bosnian shepherds moving north with collective flocks, and near Belgrade there are still Gypsies leading toothless bears by nose-rings. In all small towns are potters, blacksmiths, candlestick-makers, rope-makers, tailors specializing in the local peasant costume, wheelwrights and many other craftsmen who cater to peasant trade. At rural fairs it is

still possible to buy enough items to fill a small museum, and although styles have become modified many traditional home crafts such as weaving continue up to the present day.

Not only is the tourist from Western Europe pleased (tourism has become a major industry in many parts of Yugoslavia and a significant source of foreign exchange), but local ethnographers, of whom there are several hundred, continue to have a rich field for study of material culture and customs. There is, of course, considerable regional variation. In Slovenia peasant costumes are now a receding memory, resurrected along with folk dances and certain annual customs at professionally organized events. To a certain extent this is also true in parts of Croatia, but in other areas the distinctive outward manifestations of peasant culture are barely beginning to wane.

Much analysis of changes occurring in East European peasant culture has been distorted because of the political bias of the observers. On one hand there is the concept of the "socialist" transformation of agriculture in particular or the countryside in general, so that by definition many of the problems inherent in capitalist states do not apply; on the other there is the viewpoint of the émigré or conservative foreign observer that despite the political propaganda of the town the peasant remains basically unchanged in his beliefs and values. One may view the separate conclusions of these groups as right in certain respects, wrong in others and in at least one fundamental sense immaterial. Certain changes occurring in Yugoslavia are part of a universal non-reversible process that would take place regardless of the political form of government; however, although the process of reformulation of peasant culture is universal certain specific aspects can be traced to Yugoslavia's particular political system. Further, the process of reformulation of peasant and modification of urban sub-cultures takes time, and it is not possible to channel the precise direction.

It is, however, possible to fruitfully use seemingly conflicting themes in analysis of change in peasant culture. Thus village life is simultaneously cooperative and competitive, cooperative in the workings of the household and to a lesser extent among households of the same lineages and competitive between households and lineage groups. Similarly, change and stability are important

themes in the process of urbanization. Change is exemplified by the basic reformulation of peasant culture and the re-orientation of the man/land relationship. Stability is evidenced in the use of kin ties in urbanization. For a number of reasons it is possible that various types of kin ties in the village may become less functional, but the rural-urban ties may be strengthened.

It seems probable that kinship has the potentiality to remain more important in a country like Yugoslavia than, for example, the Soviet Union or the United States. Yugoslavia is above all a small country, and beyond that is the fact that most migration to towns takes place within the limits of the republic or general cultural-religious area. Slovene villagers go to Ljubljana and other Slovene towns; Croats and some Bosnians go to Zagreb, never to Ljubljana; Montenegrins and Macedonians go to their own provincial capitals or to Belgrade or other Serbian towns. These relationships are true not only of workers but of students as well. In the Soviet Union when workers go from Minsk to Alma Ata sheer physical distance precludes much contact with home (and even in the United States, with its excellent communications facilities, the individual who has migrated from East Coast to West must often sever many ties, for financial reasons if for no other). By contrast, in Yugoslavia, notwithstanding her relatively crude transportation facilities (which on a national scale are neither fast nor convenient but which are, however, inexpensive with several kinds of discounts available) at no time can a person be more than two days' journey distant from his home. Usually it is a matter of less than a day. Travel is all the more frequent because of traditions of hospitality in urban as well as rural areas.

Another important factor is that since the period of consolidation immediately following World War II there have been no large-scale purges of government personnel such as occurred in the Soviet Union during the thirties or even in other East European countries as a result of "Titoism" following Yugoslavia's break with the USSR in 1948. In fact there has been considerable stability despite some movement of individuals in and out of the Party. Here again kinship ties function and have often played a role in influencing careers.

For students as well, rural-urban movement is facilitated by kin

ties. Once a peasant child completes the elementary school in his village and his parents wish him to continue his schooling, it is usually necessary for him to move to a town. In some instances boarding facilities exist, but more commonly the pupil stays with a relative, usually a member of the extended family who has migrated to the town. If it is a close relative no payment is expected. If the relationship is more distant reimbursement may be partially in cash and partly in contributions of food, wine and rakija from the farm. A young man seeking work outside the village often follows this same pattern, and his relatives will help him find a position in addition to providing him a place to live.

A close, dependent relationship is maintained even when the peasant son or daughter in town is in the late teens or early twenties. The student or young worker invariably returns home on all vacations, and in turn a parent visits the town as often as possible, always with gifts of home-prepared food. The parent-child relationship is sustained long after physical maturity.

A university student of peasant origin in his twenties (a student rarely completes his undergraduate work by age twenty-two) continues to expect material support from home if at all possible, and the parents continue to feel a strong obligation. There is no concept of being on one's own as soon as possible. This situation is related not only to kin ties but to the difficulties in finding part-time employment, and thus a student's progress is usually closely linked to the amount of parental help forthcoming, since a place to sleep and food to eat are fundamental problems. Dormitories are badly overcrowded and the meals at student mensas inadequate. Various scholarships available appear to discriminate against students from villages, more going to children of administrative personnel and workers. At best such stipends usually cover but a minor part of expenses.

When a peasant comes to town to sell produce he usually takes this opportunity to visit with relatives. If medical attention is necessary or some legal affairs must be attended to he may stay with them for a prolonged period. In the villages a family commonly shares a single room, and in all urban areas there is a shortage of housing. People are used to crowding and sleeping together. For two adults of the same sex to share a single bed is not usually regarded as a hardship at home, in a dormitory or,

occasionally, even in a hospital, so that there is almost always room to put up another guest.

In the summer the situation is reversed, when many town dwellers go to their village relatives "to enjoy the fresh air." Grandchildren visit grandparents for months at a time. Men who have moved to the city as children twenty or thirty years previously will continue to send their wives and children each summer to their native village and to welcome distant cousins whenever they arrive in the city. During the summer a good proportion of the people in Macedonian and Montenegrin villages consists of relatives who have come on vacation.

Most Orthodox and Moslem Yugoslavs are very much aware of the precise origin of their parents, grandparents and often great-grandparents. Tracing lineage is particularly important among Montenegrins and is, in fact, a way of introducing oneself to a fellow Montenegrin. Establishing a common acquaintance and then analyzing the degree of kinship is a means of determining the degree of mutual trust. The historical influences are clear. In those areas formerly ruled by the Turks and in independent Montenegro the Orthodox population was overwhelmingly rural, and even today Yugoslavia as a whole is still relatively little urbanized when compared to other European countries.

The rural-urban distinction is most noticeable in those cities where ties with the village remain strongest. In Belgrade, Skoplje and Titograd the great majority of the population is at most two to three generations removed from the village, and almost all have relatives in rural areas. Here there is felt to be a real problem in adjustment for peasant migrants, the men known for overspending and the women for overdressing.

In the older urban centers in Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia and the Vojvodina the peasant adapting to town life is a less visible social phenomenon, and the kin ties are less binding. In part the readily asserted excuse of Turkish rule appears applicable—in the eastern and southern parts of Yugoslavia being an urbanite is an achievement, involving a consciously felt new way of life, while in the northern and western areas it is primarily a matter of learning new skills and changing one's job. As one Serb intellectual expressed it, "We had to fight with our hoes and swords; they

fought with pens and petitions." It is easy to set up a dichotomy and say that in the western area there is a tendency for the individual to feel more self-assured in that he is aware of the limitations of his role within a long-established institutional framework, while in the former Ottoman area there is a lack of self-confidence, greater reliance on kin ties and a tendency to fall back on emotional reactions. Characteristically, in those places where no written records have been kept or where those few that existed have been destroyed, there is an active folk memory and an ability to trace descent over a number of generations, while in those areas where the historical record is long the individual's awareness of his own specific family history is limited.

In the Orthodox areas urban culture has emerged out of the peasant society during the past century, while in other parts of the country the urban sub-culture has been constantly present although changing in composition and organization. This is clearly revealed in the nature of Yugoslav cities. One type, epitomized by Belgrade and also clearly seen in many smaller Serbian towns such as Niš has what might be called a disappearing past and a vital present. The Turks left no enduring urban monuments nor concepts of town as such, and the few preserved wood and plaster houses and mosques provide no basis for the foundation of a modern city. Another type is caught in the embrace of its past and is seeking to harmonize it with the present. The crowded central bazaar of Sarajevo is an obstacle to city planners, but parts of it have been left, at best as a quaint reminder of the past and as a tourist attraction. In Zagreb and Ljubljana the town squares and public buildings of the Austrian period are a reproach to some modern developments and a challenge to planners, while the town walls serve as points of departure for expansion.

The Turks engendered, mainly indirectly, local autonomy and national self-consciousness; the Austro-Hungarian Empire fostered respect for administration, law and order but stressed passive acceptance rather than participation. Yugoslavia has attempted to balance these traditions with a degree of increasingly active but controlled participation in the state, particularly with respect to increasing industrial development, with a growing technically educated group whose role must be active. Industrialization requires enthusiasm in the application of intelligence. This is not a

passive process, but technology also requires guidance and control. In the development of the contemporary Yugoslav state these two traditions have supplemented each other and in certain ways have blended, but many aspects of their local urban manifestations have remained relatively stable. To understand the nature of stability and change involved in urbanization it is necessary to put into perspective the rural or village components of Yugoslav culture. Related to the differences in administrative techniques of the former empires is the basic nature of village organization itself, aspects of which have carried over into the present day. We have seen that on the village level in Slovenia and Croatia one finds numerous examples of non-kin based institutions and relationships (in this regard there were important differences between the Austrian and Turkish land-holding systems, but these are today only memories). The most significant ties in rural Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro clearly remain bonds of kinship. Organizations such as are found in the western areas (soccer teams, volunteer fire brigades, political clubs, hunters' associations) never developed in the Orthodox areas. The lineage and accompanying phenomena such as the blood feud have most clearly persisted among the Albanians and Montenegrins and in some cases Macedonians. True friendships are formed by extending the kin bond via adoption, blood-brotherhood and godparenthood. Although feuding has not taken place in recent times among the Serbs, the lineage remains vital. It is the primary basis for village neighborhoods and for patterns of cooperation in work and social functions. Even graveyards are segregated on this basis. It is still possible for a villager to say of another, "How can one be friends with someone who is not a relative?" In a society such as this servants or lodgers do not exist, since they are either assimilated into kin bonds or leave. Isolation and dependence on public charity does not occur. Illegitimacy is a family disgrace, and kin pressures can be applied to remedy the situation. Unmarried adults exist only as individuals who are defective in some way. Formally, the role of women is clearly subordinate. All of these patterns are being modified in both rural and urban areas but still characterize those parts of the country which were under Turkish rule.

Not only is the industrial tradition older in the western areas, and the cities themselves more adaptable to the needs of an ex-

panding technology without being completely redesigned, but also the existing types of social systems in rural areas have facilitated urbanization. Peasantization of the towns is not clearly noticeable here because there has been more continuity in rural-urban values. In his novel *The Bridge on the Drina* the Yugoslav writer Ivo Andrić presents an excellent description of the impact of Austrian administration on a small Moslem town in Bosnia. He discusses the ways in which the "web of laws" of the Austrian occupation affected everything in the lives of the people and how the new rulers proceeded to change not only the external appearance of the town but the total pattern of living. Nothing was overlooked, from the surveying of land to the investigation of drainage ditches and the census of livestock. At first the inhabitants reacted to these measures as to some crazy and incomprehensible game, and only later came to recognize their true significance. Such searching and probing was unknown in the non-Austrian parts of Yugoslavia, in essence until after the last war. By contrast, there exist for Croatia records from the eighteenth century in which every room in every village cottage was measured and evaluated for tax purposes, where permissions were required for grazing swine in the forest and where the obligations of the peasants to the state were minutely set forth.

Urban life is different in the various parts of Yugoslavia. The head of the Republic of Montenegro does not conduct state business under a tree in the courtyard of his palace as his predecessors the prince-bishops allegedly did, but he does often join some of the men sitting in the cafe of the main hotel in Titograd to discuss provincial affairs. Women appear unescorted in Zagreb without attracting the attention they would in areas to the east. Slovenia's urban private housing, suicide patterns and illegitimacy rates more closely approximate those of adjacent Austria than of Croatia. In the cities older people are apt to know Italian in Dalmatia, German in Slovenia and Turkish in Skoplje.

Most significant are the stronger links with the village and the continuing mutual obligations with a larger group of kin which play so much stronger a role in shaping the life of an urban Serb or Macedonian than of a Croat or Slovene.

In addition to existing cultural differences the unequal effects of industrialization are indicative of the enduring nature of re-

gional differences. Macedonian villagers are beginning to buy bicycles while Slovene villagers are thinking in terms of motorcycles or small cars. Montenegrins are acquiring their first radios while Croats are getting television sets. All this, however, should not obscure the really significant changes which have occurred in the transition of the whole of Yugoslav society in less than two decades. A number of trends seem evident, and an attempt has been made to describe them here, but it would be rash to project them rigidly into the future in this rapidly evolving society.

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