University of Massachusetts Amherst

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The Changing Village Community

Joel Halpern

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The Changing Village Community

JOEL M. HALPERN

MODERNIZATION OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES SERIES

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**The
Changing
Village
Community**

JOEL M. HALPERN University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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Modernization of Traditional Societies Series

The twentieth century will be called many things by future historians—the Age of Global War, perhaps, the Age of Mass Society, the Age of the Psychoanalytic Revolution, to name a few possibilities. One name that historians certainly will not fail to give our century is the Age of the New Nation. For, evidently, the convulsive emergence of the colonies into independence and their subsequent struggle to join the ranks of the prosperous, powerful, and peaceful is the most remarkable revolution of our time. Taking the world as a whole, men are now preoccupied with no subject more than they are with the travail of the New Nations.

The world of the social sciences has been studying the pace of social change in these newly emergent areas, and from time to time has been engaging in technical assistance and even in the giving of advice on high levels of social strategy. Little of this effort has reached publicly accessible form. Though technical treatises abound, and isolated, journalistic reports of distinctly exotic countries are not wanting, college curricula have scarcely reflected either the scientific endeavors or the world-wide revolutions in technology and in political affairs.

This series on “Modernization of Traditional Societies” is designed to inform scholars, students, and citizens about the way quiet places have come alive, and to introduce at long last materials on the contemporary character of

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

developing areas into college curricula for the thought leaders of the near future. To these ends we have assembled experts over the range of the social sciences and over the range of the areas of the underdeveloped and newly developing sections of the earth that were once troublesome only to themselves.

We are proud to be participants in this series, and proud to offer each of its volumes to the literate world, with the hope that that world may increase, prosper, think, and decide wisely.

WILBERT E. MOORE

NEIL J. SMELSER

The Changing Village Community presents some general ideas about contemporary change in rural areas and offers concrete examples of changes in specific village communities throughout the world.

No attempt is made to cover all geographic areas or all points of view. On the contrary, attention is focused on case studies and developments in a few countries, in order to raise certain questions about the nature and possible future significance of contemporary trends. A general way of looking at these developments is suggested.

Firsthand contact with non-English speaking villagers on a meaningful level is a more common personal experience nowadays, thanks to the Peace Corps and other similar efforts, so that the subject matter dealt with here may no longer be considered exotic. Regardless of whether or not one has had this personal experience, the discerning reader may have some reservations about the interpretations suggested, but it is hoped that he will have none about the importance of trying to understand the meaning in the changes taking place in the lives of village people, both for their sake and for our own.

We are all influenced in our writings by personal experience and particularly by the settings of our intellectual development.

My own experiences in a country that has undergone a successful communist revolution, Yugoslavia, and in another in the throes of politically motivated warfare, Laos, have

PREFACE

without question strongly influenced my predilection for thinking in terms of drastic change; my training as a cultural anthropologist, including as it does an emphasis on prehistory, has, at the same time, conditioned me to take a long view so that communist and non-communist countries are seen as facing comparable problems although the solutions they offer may differ greatly.

The community studies used as examples have been selected primarily because they emphasize a view of change over time. No comprehensive survey of community studies as such is attempted in the following pages. They are used merely as a means to gaining a close-up picture of the changing village. Where possible and pertinent, studies written by scholars about their own countries have been used. These represent only a way of approaching the complexities of village life in an analytical fashion and are not rigidly objective descriptions. Methods and themes of analysis change over time reflecting as they do the changing foci of professional interests in the rapidly evolving social sciences. A great deal also depends on the individual observer and the culture from which he comes. In terms of restudies it is also worth bearing in mind that the observer himself is subject to change. The selection of India, China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States as the four primary examples is based on the important changes that have taken place in these countries as well as on the contrasts they provide from cultural, economic, and political points of view. Further, their importance for their own sake on the world scene is obvious. Comprehensive analysis of the rural manifestations of these complex civilizations is not attempted; rather it is intended to suggest some implications that changes within the village setting raise—for the communities themselves, their nations, and the world.

The transformations taking place in rural societies, representing as they perhaps do, the most fundamental change in human socioeconomic patterns since the neolithic, are regarded as *not* being soluble by any specific ideology or sets of ideologies; rather, the comprehensiveness of approach required transcends contemporary political and ideological conflicts. A primary objective of this book is to touch on crucial issues and to examine briefly their implications and the possible consequences of programs designed to resolve them. Hopefully, questions are raised that may provide some help in conceptualizing the future of rural peoples.

Some of the thoughts presented here were discussed with Professors Conrad Arensberg, Everett Hughes, Alex Inkeles, Demitri Shimkin, and Ezra Vogel. I am grateful for their critical comments. Also appreciated were suggestions made by the editors of this series, Professors Wilbert E. Moore and Neil J. Smelser. I wish to thank Betty Griffin, who typed the manuscript and Rose S. Kerewsky, who prepared the index. My greatest debt is to my wife, Barbara Kerewsky Halpern, for her constant concern with villagers as people.

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separable. It is hypothesized that these changes are as important for the future of man as were the domestication of plants and animals in the neolithic—the agricultural revolution; the development of cities with associated class and occupational hierarchies, writing, and metallurgy—the urban revolution; and the growth of objectifiable knowledge and the related extension of technology involving the replacement of human and animal power with machines using inanimate sources of energy—the scientific and industrial (or power) revolution.

Since the application of intelligence and energy are cumulative, future change has the certainty (assuming avoidance of major war) to surpass past efforts. Although aspects of the past are selectively revered, the problems created by man's existence are seen as resolved by future action. In no sphere of life is this clearer than in technology and its applications.

The demonstrable superiority, in a technological sense, of mechanical over human and animal power is transforming agriculture from a way of life into a modern occupation. Technical procedures are being substituted for hereditary folk methods. Income and status are increasingly based on skills and machines that must be acquired outside the context of extended kin and neighborhood units, just as production is becoming primarily for the market and not for home consumption. Simultaneously less labor is being required, and the alternatives to inward-focused rural living become more apparent to village people.

ELIMINATION OF RURAL-URBAN DISTINCTIONS

One of the characteristics of the modern political state appears to be the attempt to eliminate the distinctions between urban and rural life. One apparent consequence is the mass exodus from rural areas and the entry of technology into the countryside.

It is possible to conceive of the export of trained technicians, skills, and products to villages and the incorporation of rural people into town life as resulting in the simultaneous peasantization of cities and the urbanization of villages. The inconclusive results of present programs seem to indicate that what is actually taking place is the creation of totally new kinds of units, which are neither urban nor rural in the old meaning of the terms. These terms do, however, serve to point up the general phenomenon that the major social and cultural adjustments must be made by rural people because the urbanization of villages is viewed conventionally as progress, and migrations to cities are seen primarily as creating social problems. It seems clear that people, whether in towns or in villages, do not wish to be hungry, illiterate, impoverished,

or ill. Although these conditions are not exclusively rural or urban they tend to be considered more characteristic of traditional life in villages where a peasant was dependent primarily on his own resources in gaining a living from the land. In cities, however, such problems were not ascribed to nature or fate but to the incompetence or misfortune of those at the bottom of society.

Modern science and technology have made primary dependence on a man-land relationship within a village community increasingly unnecessary. Competing ideologies and government systems agree on this point as do village people throughout the world. It is the village people who are providing the force behind movements to more fully include them in a national system based on modern technology.

THE RURAL REVOLUTION AS A SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The rural revolution is a fundamental social transformation in the history of man. It requires new kinds of political institutions to oversee the massive investment to rearrange living and working patterns on a worldwide scale. Modern medical and health measures make greater survival and longer life possible, but limitation of family size requires individual decisions. Voluntary restriction of procreation is closely tied

FIGURE 1

Contemporary technology has made untenable primary dependence on a man-land relationship focused entirely within the village community. A scene near Bangalore, India.

to actually achieved or anticipated future benefits not available within the context of the traditional village community. The dynamics of the rural revolution make radical transformation inevitable. A vital question is not whether peaceful solutions can be found but how much violence and coercion will be involved. The forms of the resolution of the rural revolution can only be guessed. This volume attempts to examine briefly the background and initial stages. Specific examples from various nations are used. Individual village communities are described, especially those that have been studied over time.

Although occupational change with the movement of people away from reliance on agriculture as a primary source of income will obviously have an impact on village life, it does not necessarily follow that these people migrate to towns, although this often occurs. They may remain in the village and commute to new jobs in a nearby town or work in a factory located in a predominantly rural area. They may even retain their land and farm it with the help of relatives, as a subsidiary occupation, becoming so-called peasant-workers. Or they may leave the village for varying lengths of time, returning periodically to their families. The temporary and frequently prolonged absence of men, combined with the decline in the large extended family, has placed a greater burden on women. They are now obliged to do more work on the land in addition to their normal duties.

Demographic and Ecological Background

In addition to the shift out of agriculture, smaller settlements, predominantly villages, are almost everywhere growing at a slower rate, especially when compared to large cities. In the cases of Mexico, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia, for example, in each case the total population has been increasing at annual rates of 2.7, 3.1, and 1.3 per cent respectively; their cities of 100,000 and over have been growing at rates of 6.7, 7.3, and 4.0 per cent, while their settlements of 10,000 and under have been increasing at 1.8, .9, and .7 per cent.¹ Even the smaller rate of growth in rural areas increases the pressure on limited land resources, and where small scale ownership prevails, leads to an increasing fragmentation of land. Kingsley Davis cites this dilemma faced by the developing nations: "If they do not substantially step up the exodus from rural areas, these areas will be swamped with underemployed farmers. If they do step up the exodus, the cities will grow at a disastrous rate."² There can be little doubt that the latter trend is increasing.

¹ *Compendium of Social Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1963), pp. 86-90.

² Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," *Scientific American* (September 1965), p. 51.

In one Egyptian village where the population has more than doubled in the last fifty years, despite some migration to the cities, land is so scarce that the average family holding is now less than $\frac{3}{4}$ of an acre, causing village housing to push upward rather than outward. Such villages "resemble city-slums, incongruously set in the midst of fields and canals."³

On a global scale a little more than 1.25 acres of arable land was available per person in 1955. The United States was considerably more fortunate in this basic resource with 2.8 acres per person. Approximately 2.25 acres were in permanent pasture for each person in the world and about 3.8 acres per person in the United States. If the American population rises to 400 million in the year 2000, the amount of arable land will drop to 1.16 acres per person, or less than the 1955 world average. On the world scene the increase to 6,280 million will reduce the amount of arable land available to slightly more than one-half acre. Some new land will be brought under cultivation, but other land will be lost through erosion and salting up while buildings and roads will occupy much more land than today.⁴ Population growth may taper off, yields per acre may increase, the seas may be more fully exploited, and edible food may be produced from presently inedible materials in the long run, but the short term prospects, while not absolutely disastrous, are certainly very serious.⁵

Man-land ratios alone do not tell us too much about the severity of population pressures on the land and the overall extent of socioeconomic development. South Korea, with 11,185 people per 1,000 hectares of agricultural land, and Mexico, with 296 per 1,000 hectares, have severe problems of socioeconomic development despite the 36:1 man-land ratio; on the other hand, Japan, with 7,563 per 1,000 hectares, is more developed economically than Turkey (483 per 1,000 hectares), despite the great disparity in man to land ratios.⁶ A key factor is the type of agriculture. Intensive rice cultivation characteristic for Japan and South Korea can support very dense populations, while corn and wheat cultivation, as in the U.S.S.R. and Canada, require much more extensive land use. Even in these latter countries there are enormous

³ John B. Adams, "Culture and Conflict in an Egyptian Village," *American Anthropologist*, 59, No. 2 (1957), 228-29.

⁴ Ralph W. Phillips, "Feeding 6,280 Million," in *Food: The Yearbook of Agriculture*, 1959 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 671-72.

⁵ Rose Frisch, "World Food Supplies, 1934-1963," in *World War on Hunger*, Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 41-51.

⁶ Bruce M. Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 146-47.

variations in the population that can be supported by a single farmer, depending on the technology used. The contrasts between Japan and Taiwan on the one hand and India and Indonesia on the other are obvious. Wealth combined with per cent of population in agriculture as reflected in gross national product per capita (1957 figures in U.S. dollars) lend more perspective here: China and India are linked together at \$73 per capita and contrast with Japan at \$306 and Indonesia at \$131; on the lowest level are Laos at \$50 and Nepal at \$45.⁷ None of these figures can tell us much about the quality of village life except in the crudest way. Although standards of living in rural areas of Japan are higher than in Laos or Nepal, the farmer in Laos may be in a better position in terms of diet than his counterpart in India because gross national product figures naturally include industry, and since Laos and Nepal substantially lack industrial development, their overall figures are lower. Further, the extent of consumption in a primarily subsistence economy is difficult to estimate. There is also great variation among rural populations even in such a small country as Laos. In that landlocked country, where the overwhelming majority of the population lives off the land, densities range from seven per square mile for a tribal people in the mountainous north to seventy-seven for the Mekong River Plain with an average of twenty per square mile for the country as a whole.⁸

A Taiwanese Example

The case of a Taiwanese whose farm of 1.08 hectares is the primary support for a four-generation family of ten members illustrates the difficulty of equating rural population density to arable land and then drawing conclusions about standards of living or levels of aspiration. Supplementary income is obtained from the salary of a son who is a schoolteacher in the village. His income amounted to a little less than one-fourth of the total household income. On this farm the land is divided into three parcels a few minutes apart on which two crops of rice are raised. During peak seasons Chen, the farmer, hires labor; his son is busy teaching, his parents are too old to work, and his grandchildren are too young. In addition, Chen, who is fifty-three, spends much time on village affairs. He completed primary school, his son was graduated from high school, and he is determined to send his grandson to college. On his small plots, vegetables are also raised in addition to rotation of particular land parcels. The input of labor is very large (five times as much

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-57.

⁸ Joel M. Halpern, *Economy and Society of Laos*, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph No. 5 (1964), Table I.

as used in rice production in California), and artificial fertilizer is used extensively. Both rice and vegetables are marketed. Chen owns the land and his brick house, which includes three bedrooms, a kitchen, living room, and guest room and outside the courtyard a barn and storage buildings. The household has a radio, phonograph, and sewing machine. Farm implements consist of a plow, sprayer, and thresher in addition to simpler tools and a water buffalo. Chen's total production in 1960 amounted to approximately 8,300 kilos of unhulled rice, 530 of wheat, 3,300 of sweet potatoes, 2,600 of peas, and some two tons each of radishes and scallions. Sales were sufficient to purchase pork, clothing, and other necessities with a significant amount of savings for investment in the farm. Impressive as these accomplishments are on a dwarf holding it is interesting to speculate about the future. About 150 years ago Chen's ancestors came to Taiwan from Fukien in southern China and after twenty years moved to Hsien District where the family has remained. At that time the family holdings amounted to twenty-three hectares, but the size of the holdings has been progressively reduced through inheritance. Should more than one of the four grandchildren inherit the land the ultimate possibilities of division would seem to have been reached.⁹

A Sumatran Example

Although wholly comparable data are not available, it is interesting to compare Chen to Hasan, a farmer in Sumatra. Like the former, Hasan, with eight hectares, is an exemplary cultivator making maximum use of his opportunities, the normal farm size in his area being one hectare. He lives in a region where Dutch estates grew tobacco on land leased from local sultans. Each household head was permitted .6 hectare for yearly rice needs when the land was not used for tobacco cultivation or lying fallow. Hasan, forty-seven, and his wife have four children ranging from eighteen to eight years. Their house, built in 1956, is expected to last at least twenty-five years. It has a cement floor, wooden walls, and five rooms. The land is divided into twelve parcels, including the house site. Unlike Chen's land, which is within easy walking distance, Hasan has two parcels of rice land seven kilometers distant, and three more parcels two or more kilometers away. He reaches them by bicycle but hopes eventually to consolidate his holdings. About 1.4 hectares is irrigated and used exclusively for wet rice. Some of his land is rented out, and he receives one-third of the crop. Neither he nor his wife have

⁹ Yu-chu Hsu, "A Case Study of a Farm at Ching-Shui, Taichung, Taiwan, The Republic of China, 1960" (New York: Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs Paper, November, 1962).

any formal modern education, but both studied at a Moslem religious school. Hasan taught himself to read and write. His wife remains illiterate. His daughters are both in high school and hope to become primary school teachers, and the father hopes that his sons, now in primary school, will stay with farming. One of his reasons for expanding his holdings is to provide support for his sons as full-time farmers. Although his landholdings are above average, Hasan has no draft animal. He is not able to do double cropping because of inadequate rainfall in the dry season; he does not use fertilizer. In addition to rice he raises durian, coconuts, and bamboo and plans to plant rubber trees. He grows no vegetables but raises some chickens, selling both chickens and eggs. He and his wife spend time in handicrafts and trading when he is not otherwise occupied during the rice harvest. He prefers trading to farming. Almost all his thatch, bamboo, and durian, and forty per cent of his rice is sold.¹⁰ Like Chen, he uses wage labor for heavy cultivating.

Despite the great difference in size, the investment in capital equipment is apparently much less in Sumatra than in Taiwan. In Taiwan farm size cannot be readily expanded, while in Sumatra land can be cleared from the jungle. However, the land is much less productive. On one hectare the Taiwanese farmer obtains 4,300 kilos in the first crop and 4,000 in the second. On approximately two hectares the Sumatran farmer obtains a total of 4,400 kilos in one crop. No far-reaching comparisons between Indonesia and Taiwan are intended, but by viewing the production of these two farmers we readily see some of the complexities in comparing village people by general statistical measures. Aside from the economic factors, it is worth taking a close look at the aspirations of Hasan's daughters and the achievement of Chen's son. Although education is usually viewed as an abstract good, bringing enlightenment and "cultural" progress, it also seems to be an important way of utilizing excess labor, especially in a country such as Indonesia where modern attitudes are spreading without much industrial development. Perhaps even more significant is Chen's attitude; the desire for higher education for his grandchildren seems to imply that he sees no future for them in farming, either on his own land or by purchasing other plots.

¹⁰ David H. Penny, "Case Study of a Farm in East Sumatra" (New York: Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs Paper, March, 1963).

To understand the problems of population growth in rural areas we need to examine specific village communities. In this way it is possible to see how population changes affect individuals and their families.

TEPOZTLÁN, A MEXICAN VILLAGE

For example in Tepoztlán, a well-studied small community of Nahuatl origin south of Mexico City, despite past declines, in the two decades between 1921 and 1940 the population of 2,156 increased by about half, and subsequent growth over a shorter period exceeded the previous increase by fifty per cent, reaching a total of 4,800 in 1957.¹ Spanish has largely replaced Nahuatl although about half the villagers are still bilingual.

This population growth is also reflected in the increasingly intensive patterns of land use. In Tepoztlán even house sites are getting smaller because of division for inheritance. Hundreds of families in this village are now compelled to earn their living from hillside hoe culture and charcoal burning, both of which are destructive of the natural environment through erosion.²

Here is a situation of expanding population in an area with a limited land, traditional

¹ Oscar Lewis, *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), pp. 26-29, and *Tepoztlán: Village in Mexico* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1960), p. 96.

² Lewis (1951), *op. cit.*, pp. 126, 128.

CHAPTER TWO

The Rural Problem Illustrated: A Mexican Village and a Serbian Village

technology, and low productivity. The people have, however, intelligently used the resources available to them. For example, they use crop rotation where possible and do some terracing. Better irrigation, insect control, and cheap fertilizer were seen as possibilities for ameliorating agricultural problems. As aspirations rose, movement to the city increased although most of the youth appeared to fear the outside world. Because of the finite possibilities inherent in their natural setting, the instability of Mexican politics, three centuries of colonial status, and the unplanned nature of urban economic influences, the Tepoztecs seemed to be "living with problems rather than solving them, of constantly adjusting to difficulties rather than eliminating them."³

In the mid 1940's the villagers wanted to attend school and to have better food and clothing, yet the investigator felt that in many respects their general outlook more closely approached sixteenth-century Spain and pre-Columbian Mexico than the contemporary world. By 1956 piped water, paved roads, and electricity had not yet come to the village, but some houses had kerosene stoves and gasoline lamps, young people wore modern, store-bought clothes, and shops sold canned goods. Perhaps most important, the economic problem of agriculture was temporarily bypassed by the development of nonagricultural sources of income. Significantly none of these relate to indigenous industrial development. The *bracero* movement, in which Mexicans are temporarily imported for farm labor into the United States, involved fewer than thirty men from Tepoztlán in 1948, but by 1957 over 600 had been *braceros* for from a month and a half to more than a year. Consequently there has been a shortage of agricultural labor in the village and a temporary solution to the agrarian problem. Their earnings have been spent on consumer goods and improved housing and on the purchase of land and livestock. The village has also become a tourist colony, and some local people have been employed in building homes. Others have become involved with the tourist trade in jobs such as domestics and caretakers.

From 1944 to 1956 the number of people in nonagricultural occupations had grown from 273 to 565. In 1944 some 70 per cent of those engaged in nonagricultural occupations also farmed, but by 1956 the comparable figure was 25 per cent. Employment in services, transportation, and the civil service, specifically education, has been very marked, e.g., bus line employees rose from 22 to 35, barbers from 15 to 22, butchers from 15 to 32, and storekeepers from 20 to 64; the number of teachers rose from 21 to 101, 70 of them now teaching in other rural areas. At the same time certain traditional occupations have either declined or disappeared.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

Educational facilities have expanded; school enrollment grew from 750 in 1950 to over 900 in 1956. A high school was opened in 1950, and some graduates go on to the university in Mexico City. Bus travel is now so common that some peasants commute to their fields. Radios have increased from three or four in 1943 to 80 in 1956, owned mostly by people under 40. There is also a local movie.⁴

As Tepoztlán moves further into the modern world, it is leaving behind its Indian language, many of its Indian customs, its local autonomy and the collective forms of pre-Hispanic times. . . . With improved means of communication, greater faith in technology, greater dependence on a money economy and outside jobs, increasing occupational specialization, and a desire for a higher level of living, a change has come about also in the character of the people. . . . Tepoztecanas are now less suspicious, less withdrawn, and more concerned with personal development.⁵

There are serious problems, however. For example where formerly village teachers were in short supply, now there is a shortage of teaching jobs, which raises the question of careers to be pursued by graduates of the local high school. On the other hand the bracero movement places a significant part of the Tepoztlán economy in a dependent relationship to the United States farm economy and American immigration laws. American unions, by opposing employment of braceros on farms in the United States, now influence rural development in Mexico. Tourism is perhaps a more stable development but here, too, there is a degree of dependence on an external, foreign economy. Equally significant is the fact that the lowest socioeconomic group (approximately sixty-five per cent of the population) has benefited least from these changes. This group has, in fact, become poorer. Charcoal production has been prohibited by the government, and the people affected have been unwilling or unable to take jobs in the cities or to become braceros. They get less schooling and maintain traditional ways in large part because these are cheaper. In contrast, a middle group of professionals, white-collar workers, artisans, and shopkeepers has doubled in size and now constitutes a quarter of the population. This group is developing distinctly different interests and orientations from the poorer farmers.

Young people have been observed to be more restless, with a desire to leave the village for broader opportunities. Material success is now valued more and there is less desire to conceal wealth. The community is not in any simple or automatic sense a microcosm of the nation, but

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 448 and Lewis (1960), *op. cit.*, pp. 95-103.

⁵ Lewis (1960), *op. cit.*, p. 103. Copyright © 1960 by Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

some of the problems of Tepoztlán clearly have a larger focus. It is possible that developments such as those taking place in Tepoztlán may increase future pressure for drastic change rather than minimize it. Pressures for change may result from such conditions as: the extent to which the fruits of progress are disproportionately shared; the desire for a career outside the village with its uncertainty of realization; dissatisfaction with and the increasing lack of relevance of traditional values; a potentially overloaded civil service; lack of a viable economic base; increasing literacy, and the spread of radio. All of these developments make for a closer tying together of the village with the policies of the national state. Although the potentials for greater cooperation are evident, there is the possibility for greater conflict, the seeking of fast solutions so that all can enjoy modern material abundance. The situation presents a trial for democratic forms of government as they have existed in Mexico.

ORAŠAC, A SERBIAN VILLAGE

To a degree similar kinds of change have been observed in Yugoslavia, in the Serbian village of Orašac. Both Tepoztlán and Orašac have a common location in the center of their respective countries, about sixty miles south of their national capitals, with rail and road connections. But their differences are even more important. Tepoztlán was conquered by Cortés in 1521 (the same year Belgrade fell to the Turks). Orašac was established in an area of virgin oak forests toward the end of the eighteenth century by migrants from mountain areas who came down from their refuges as Turkish power declined. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and up to World War II, Orašac experienced a consistent population growth. In this relatively brief period the oak forest was largely cut over, and the economy shifted from one emphasizing pigs grazed on acorns to cultivation of grains. During the nineteenth century there was little emigration, and land fragmentation proceeded apace. Like Mexico, Serbia went through a colonial experience, and independence was achieved after a long period of successive struggles.

The structural nature of the Ottoman Empire was very different from the Spanish. Thus the Turkish conquest of Serbia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries resulted in the destruction of the local elite and only the peasantry remained. The Serbs were allowed to retain their village level institutions including their church, while the administration and cities passed into Turkish hands. An ultimately successful revolt led by a prosperous pig breeder and trader from a village near Orašac at

the beginning of the nineteenth century led ultimately to the establishment of a Serbian state with the new urban, governing, merchant, and artisan groups recruited principally from the local peasantry. The Karadjordjević dynasty, which ruled with interruptions up to World War II, traced its descent to the pig trader Karadjordje.

Differences in size of landholdings existed, and some peasants became prosperous, loaned money, and became involved in trade. Up to the 1940's there was a serious problem of peasant indebtedness with much hostility on the part of the rural population to the town merchants and resentment of the venality of public officials, but there was no aristocracy and no large landed estates.

Although Orašac is only about 150 years old, pressures on the land have built up rapidly; and there has been a shift from a primary reliance on livestock raising to more intensive land use by plow agriculture. The amount of land under cultivation has more than doubled (at the expense of forest and pasture) in the past sixty years.⁶ At the same time for the most important crop, wheat, yields per hectare have remained about the same until recently; even granting overall gains in productivity, the pressures on the land are readily apparent. Accompanying these ecological changes has been a deliberate and successful attempt to limit birth rate, largely through voluntary control and induced abortions. The present population density seems to represent about the maximum the land can support under present methods of cultivation.

By contrast, in Mexico following the Spanish conquest one ruling group replaced another, and it was only during the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 that a beginning was made in altering class structure. Although the Mexican Revolution brought about important changes, it did not alter Mexican society to the extent that the Communist Partisan victory at the end of World War II changed Yugoslav society. These historical factors have played a strong role in shaping change in Tepoztlán and Orašac, although local resource factors have also been important. In Orašac certain initial changes were shaped by the presence of a lignite mine in the village and marble quarries nearby, and there has been increasing employment at the firebrick and electric porcelain factories in the nearby market town. Orašac has no counterpart to the large number of people employed in commerce and services found at Tepoztlán, nor is there any migratory wage labor. In 1953, with a population of 2,180, or somewhat less than half that of Tepoztlán, there were 104 miners, 41 pensioners, 30 skilled industrial workers, 19 unskilled

⁶ Joel M. Halpern, *Social and Cultural Change in a Serbian Village* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 140, 151.

FIGURE 2

In rapidly changing peasant societies different forms of technology can coexist. Modern combines belonging to the cooperative farm, an old-fashioned, privately-owned mechanical reaper, and a villager reaping with a scythe, Orašac, Serbia.

industrial workers, but a total of only 17 clerical and service workers, including village officials, schoolteachers, and the local priest.

Consumer goods and services are much scarcer in Orašac than in Tepoztlán. In the 1950's Orašac was served by one bus a day, and factory workers and miners commuted to their jobs on foot or by bicycle. By 1955 most houses in the village had electricity. An eight-year school was run by nine teachers, all of whom had come from outside the village. A marked feature of Orašac youth, in part motivated by education, in part by government restrictions on private agriculture holdings (none over ten hectares), has been a profoundly negative attitude toward agriculture as an occupation, with almost all youth aspiring to careers outside the village or at least an industrial job in the nearby town. This shift became even sharper when the lignite mine closed down in 1962. This local source of cash income had enhanced the stability of the village, since it had enabled some villagers to have a cash income and at the same time, with the help of their extended families, to work the land. Status has markedly altered from the period before World War II, when prosperous cultivators often also loaned out money and employed poorer villagers. Their place has been taken by the skilled industrial workers, many of whom continue to work their land with the help of their wives and parents. Many of the younger men remaining in the village as farmers are apt to be only sons, and an increasing number of households are composed exclusively of old or middle-aged people. This development has taken place even though the right of private farming is guaranteed under the Yugoslav constitution. As Yugoslav factories become increasingly efficient and automated, they will have less place for unskilled village youth. A political revolution and subsequent industrialization has by no means solved Orašac's problems.

Secularization has different meanings in both communities. Religion, as both a set of beliefs and group of practices, may have become less important in both communities, in part due to official policies. Secular weddings have become more popular, even among Orašani who live solely from farming, and in Tepoztlán church weddings have become more expensive and elaborate, reflecting urban middle class patterns.⁷

CHANGE AND INDIVIDUALS

A vital factor in assessing transformations within the village community is the way local individuals assess changes that have taken place

⁷ Lewis (1960), *op. cit.*, p. 101.

within their lifetimes. Of course, we cannot rigidly compare the comments of Pedro Martínez, a Tepoztlán farmer, with those of several Orašac villagers, nor can we compare in any definitive way Tepoztlán and Orašac (to say nothing of Mexico and Yugoslavia); nevertheless, we can gain some insight into the meaning of change by looking at the differing ways in which discrete historical patterns of experience are evaluated.

A Tepoztecán Comments

In summing up his life experience Pedro Martínez comments:

At one time, I believed in a lot of things . . . now I believe in nothing. I wanted to see my village improve but with the passage of time I am convinced that it can't be done and no matter how saintly a public official may be when he takes office, he will accomplish nothing. Now I realize that in my village no one understands. We are blindfolded! All of us! Partly because of lack of culture, partly because of lack of unity and partly because of poverty. Perhaps there are some who have a bit of wisdom, but so what! What is the good of my having ideas if I am a poor man? I cannot do a thing!

. . . The new generation in my village has opened its eyes to other things but not to politics. When one talks about what is good for the *municipio* or for them, the young people don't come around to listen. . . .

The peasants are ignorant and more than a little stupid. And if one gets to know something, right off he tries to exploit the poor, the ones who are at the bottom.⁸

These are not the comments of a passive man but one who within his lifetime has changed from an Indian to a mestizo way of life and has been involved in Catholicism, in the Mexican Revolution (from 1910-1920) supporting the peasant leader Zapata, in village politics, and in religious evangelism. As a result of the revolution the village regained the use of their communal lands, and the socioeconomic structure of the village was modified. Although it brought about changes and certain inequalities became less severe, poverty continues to exist as do marked social and economic distinctions. It appears that the Mexican Revolution has been something of a compromise. Apparently the church and large landowners have yielded somewhat and the peasants have gained. But as Pedro Martínez's comments show, there has also been bitter disappointment.

⁸ Oscar Lewis, *Pedro Martínez: A Mexican Peasant and His Family* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1964), pp. 454-55. Reprinted by permission.

Yugoslav Patterns

In contrast, the Yugoslav Revolution represented a total political victory. The old order was basically destroyed by the Germans, and the well-organized communist-led Partisans moved into the gap. Royalist supporters among Serb peasants (Chetniks) were totally defeated; the survivors fled abroad, were eliminated, or were rendered politically impotent. Unlike in Mexico, totally open discussion is not possible in Yugoslavia, so it is harder to judge the attitudes of the villagers toward change. As most Yugoslavs freely acknowledge today, however, the victory of the Communist Revolution did not thereby solve all social problems. Even more importantly it did not solve the problems of ethnic conflict (in a sense, competing states within a state) that occur, but in a different way, in Mexico. The villagers of Tepoztlán are losing their Indian distinctiveness and becoming mestizos or more fully Mexicans, part of the national state. In Yugoslavia there can at present be no question of the Serb villagers becoming Yugoslavs. They have always been Serbs and remain so; by setting up republics and autonomous regions within Yugoslavia the communist planners have conceived of their country in multi-ethnic terms. In Tepoztlán both a trend and an ultimate objective appears to be fuller incorporation within an essentially unified national state. In Yugoslavia multi-ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity is a fact of existence. Outside of this basic pattern of difference there are many features common to both subcultures, which have been identified as classic peasant values: "a love of the land, a reverence for nature, a strong belief in the intrinsic good of agricultural labor, and a restraint on individual self-seeking in favor of family and community."⁹

Orašac farmers, like those in Tepoztlán, are authoritarian, suspicious, concrete-minded, and ambivalent in their attitudes toward city people. The Serbs of Orašac are also poor, although becoming less so. It would be pointless to attempt to decide who is poorer or richer although comparable objective indices such as yields per acre, calories consumed per day, and years of schooling could presumably be assembled. Even more significant is the fact that the vicissitudes Pedro experienced—social disorganization, sharp class cleavages, and certain specific traits of the culture of poverty such as the abandonment of women and children and a feeling of alienation—either do not exist in Orašac or are minor factors in the total society.

The Serbs of Orašac have endured the full effects of two world wars

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.

including a bitter civil war that saw neighbors and sometimes relatives slaughtering each other in a most brutal manner. Orašac was spared none of the horrors, and a section of the village was burned. As in Tepoztlán, poverty, hunger, ignorance, disease, suspicion, suffering, cruelty, and corruption have been a part of Orašac. To some extent so are fear, envy, and distrust in interpersonal relations. But there are also certain characteristics assertively present in Orašac: pride, faith, optimism, directness, and a national self-consciousness coexisting with a sense of inferiority.

ATTITUDES OF SERB VILLAGERS

Despite a bitter past there is no fear of the future but eager anticipation of it. One continuously hears these remarks in the village: "Look at us working with our hands, without machines, like Stone Age men. . . . But a man must work. . . . Remember we have been five hundred years under the Turks and since then there has been a war with every new generation. . . . Give us twenty years without war and we'll turn our region into a Little America."

This contrasts with some of what has been written elsewhere on European peasants. The Serb attitudes reflect elements of Slav ethos, an early twentieth-century immigrant view of America, and the more recent future-oriented communist ideology, as well as the particular pioneering experience of the settlers of Orašac.¹⁰

These sentiments, however, contradict those of most youth (and many of their parents as well) who see careers outside agriculture as a way of "getting out of the mud," literally and figuratively. Younger villagers, particularly those who have been lucky to get a minor bureaucratic job, often opportunistically become Party members, using these ties to obtain jobs in town and move out of the village. In a larger sense these attitudes can be reconciled in terms of a desire for change both within and outside the village.

Some of the varying attitudes toward change are summed up in the concluding sections of autobiographies obtained from men in their sixties and seventies. Working together with his brothers in an extended family unit, one household head built up a relatively large holding (25 hectares) and considerable social status as a prosperous farmer. He was active in pre-war politics and concludes the account of his life:

¹⁰ Joel M. Halpern, "Farming as a Way of Life: Yugoslav Peasant Attitudes," in *Proceedings of the Conference on Soviet and East European Agriculture*, ed. Jerzy Karcz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

After the Second World War, I was given a bigger [compulsory] quota than I could fill and was asked to pay more taxes than I could manage. So I was sentenced to four years in prison but stayed only four months. I then returned home, but our land had been sold to pay expenses.¹¹

A retired miner who is a Party member sums up his account:

After the Liberation a lot of effort has been made in behalf of workers in building homes for them and on cultural matters. Today the miners are their own masters; the surplus belongs only to them, and they share it at the end of the year.¹²

A more balanced account combining optimism and fatalism and more representative of the complexities of the peasant ethos concludes:

After the German occupation troops came the war turned to guerrilla fighting. There were about five different groups in Yugoslavia, all armed, all fighting, all killing. My son was a Partisan. He fought as a good, courageous, and brave soldier. He was wounded but stuck it out to the end. He is a miner. My other son was sent by the mine to attend a course to become a mechanic. He finished the course and got a diploma as a skilled worker. . . . Today he has left all this and has become a good peasant, helping me work the land. And I, an old man now, work a little, drink a little brandy, and slowly wait for death.¹³

Succinctly put, some of the key ingredients of the rural revolution are: a growing total population, increasingly intensive exploitation of limited land and other natural resources within the confines of the village community, progressively increasing migration to towns and especially to large cities and/or movement into non-agricultural occupations, increase in literacy, education and training, and development of services in rural areas, along with a commitment to some minimum of social and economic growth. All this involves an increasingly closer integration of rural peoples into the modern nation-state. They begin to lose their distinctive characteristics, and with their massive incorporation into the evolving city, they form new social units and alter the nature of urban life in ways still only partially discernible.

¹¹ Joel M. Halpern, *A Serbian Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 211. Reprinted by permission.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

These changes in the village community form the basis of the rural revolution. Having briefly looked at something of the nature of changes taking place in specific villages, it is now appropriate to examine the meaning of the term in a broader historical and theoretical context before returning to a consideration on the village level.

The rural revolution was commented upon almost two centuries ago:

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay:
Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade;
A breath can make them, as a breath has made;
But a bold peasantry, their country's pride,
When once destroyed, can never be supplied.

In a note of dedication of his poem "The Deserted Village," Oliver Goldsmith remarked that some questioned his view of the depopulation of the countryside, and he countered by asserting, ". . . I sincerely believe what I have written . . .

I have taken all possible pains, in my country excursions, for these four or five years past, to be certain of what I allege."¹

Although the poet's moral implications taken in a modern analytical context are perhaps debatable, his basic observations and conclusions are not. About a hundred years later, in 1867, Karl Marx discussed

¹ "The Deserted Village" (originally published 1770), in *The Poems and Plays of Oliver Goldsmith* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910), pp. 21, 24.

CHAPTER THREE

The Meaning of Revolution

in *Capital* the implications of the changes observed earlier and remarked, "In the sphere of agriculture, modern industry has a more revolutionary effect than elsewhere, for this reason, that it annihilates the peasant, that bulwark of the old society, and replaces him by the wage-labourer." In his discussion of "Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land," he details the enclosure movement and associated measures in highly emotional but seemingly sympathetic terms with regard to their impact on the rural population.

Marx's comments on peasants as "agricultural property muck" have, of course, been well publicized.² Related is his statement in *The Communist Manifesto*: "The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life."³

Regardless of the attitude we take toward Marx or toward the lamentations of Goldsmith, it is clear from the perspective of an additional century that in the United Kingdom, where less than five per cent of the total population is involved in agriculture, the current condition was not achieved without a drastic impact on the existing social fabric. It has been estimated that in the beginning of the eighteenth century not more than a fifth of the population lived in towns, yet by the latter part of that century, when Goldsmith wrote, approximately half were urban. This movement was due not only to the development of urban industry at the expense of the earlier cottage production but also to the related policy of enclosures, which by 1801 had affected more than three million acres.⁴

ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF REVOLUTION

In public discussion the word revolution has been used broadly. In anthropology its use has been rather restricted. At a symposium commemorating the centennial of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, there is a familiar reference to the food-producing revolution about 7,000 B.C. and the linked emergence of village life. Later came the urban revolution and its associated state formation, based in part on the development of metallurgy and writing. Clyde Kluckhohn refers to these as critical

² For example see Leopold Schwarzschild, *The Red Prussian* (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1948), p. 136.

³ In *Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings by Karl Marx*, ed. Max Eastman (New York: Modern Library, 1932), p. 325.

⁴ W. E. Lunt, *History of England* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1946), pp. 568-69.

breakthroughs in human cultural evolution "sometimes called 'revolutions' in prehistory and history." Leslie White notes that the concept of revolution as applied to culture change is useful but should not be used indiscriminately. He further states that we lack an adequate taxonomy of revolutions and that we should distinguish major revolutions from minor ones that are merely aspects of a larger revolutionary change in culture. He cites two of importance in connection with his ideas of the thermodynamic nature of sociocultural systems, i.e., the agricultural revolution, which consisted of harnessing solar energy in the form of domesticated animals and plants, followed by the power revolution using coal and petroleum, this latter having begun in the eighteenth century and having not yet fully run its course.⁵

Some archeologists are also sceptical about using the term revolution for a development that, although fundamental to human society, was slow and haphazard compared to what occurred subsequently but extremely rapid when measured against what preceded it. Recent finds, notably those at Jericho, demonstrate how urban society with complex buildings developed at the beginning of the Neolithic, and a combination of hunting and agriculture soon yielded to an economy in which agriculture predominated. There are certain characteristics that developments in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Asia Minor, India, and China have in common, namely, communities that were permanent, literate, and technologically inventive, based on the cultivation of plants and domestication of animals, developing into the precursors of modern urban societies. Nevertheless, it is felt that the term revolution should not conceal the diverse paths of development, which did not share any common set of social, ecological, and technological factors.⁶ Diversity is also true of the circumstances under which the rural revolution occurs, but a universal technology and the compressed time period make the term perhaps more pertinent in the latter context.

In his *Anthropology*, Kroeber devotes a section to revolution, amplifying the seventh and eighth standard dictionary definitions ("complete or drastic change of any kind" and "overthrow of a government . . . or social system, with another taking its place") to "change suddenly precipitated, with more or less violence, affecting a considerable total portion of a culture, and due to an accumulation of arrears, or lag, in pro-

⁵ Sol Tax and Charles Callender, eds., *Evolution After Darwin*, Vol. III, *Issues in Evolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 225-29. See also V. Gordon Childe, *Man Makes Himself* (New York: New American Library, 1951).

⁶ See Grahame Clark and Stuart Piggot, *Prehistoric Societies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965), pp. 23, 157.

gressive change.”⁷ In a discussion of this topic another anthropologist points out that if a violent revolution succeeds, the leaders try as soon as possible to re-establish order through government and that the innovations they attempt are limited by the previous experience of the leaders, since they are men reared in a particular cultural tradition. Sometimes innovations are discarded as, for example, in the cases of the French and Russian revolutions.⁸

There is a vast literature on the subject of revolution and many contemporary articles make frequent use of the word, but this use is relatively recent. Like anthropologists, but for somewhat different reasons, American sociologists have tended not to focus on “drastic and massive social changes and extreme forms of social action.” This is perhaps in part because they have been so involved in specific investigations with limited professional objectives. (A significant example is the fact that the dynamic drive for full equality of the American Negro was not anticipated to any extent in the social science literature.)⁹

Particularly applicable to the meaning of the rural revolution is the concept of marginality with respect to the structure of political power and social prestige. Rural people in the developing countries may be today’s most significant marginal group. In some respects their position and attitudes as well resemble those of a discriminated against minority. In areas such as Latin America and southeast Asia there are often ethnic differences between dominant urban groups and people in the countryside. However, villagers are numerically important, often the overwhelming majority of the population, play a vital economic role, and are increasingly better informed. It nevertheless appears unlikely that leadership will emerge directly from the village as such, but well-organized, urban-led groups relying to a great degree on rural manpower can seize power effectively, as in the cases of China and Yugoslavia. (Admittedly, in these instances the previous destruction of the political and particularly the administrative fabric by Japan and Germany paved the way.)

What are some of the fundamental bases of the rural revolution? It is primarily a non-political transformation made possible by the potentiality for universal affluence engendered by the expansion in scientific and technical knowledge, with related developments in industry and

⁷ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1948), pp. 408-11.

⁸ John J. Honigsmann, *The World of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1959), p. 191.

⁹ Everett C. Hughes, “Race Relations and Sociological Imagination,” *American Sociological Review*, 28, No. 6 (1963), 879, 890.

trade that followed the emergence of the Renaissance in western Europe. These developments have also involved new political conceptions of society, which made the wide sharing of potential benefits a desired objective. Specifically this included the ideas that economic progress was a worthwhile goal and that the benefits of such progress should be widely distributed and ultimately that the hierarchical and economic distinctions between rural and urban areas should cease to exist. Implicit in these ideas, and later explicitly formulated, was the concept that people should strive both individually and collectively to better their economic conditions.

One important source of such change was the rise of a commercial class in western European cities (as distinct from those of Asia). In the former, landed property ceased to be the ultimate economic value, and so capital was freed for purposes of commercial and industrial development, thus making profit dependent on human imagination and ingenuity and not on the fixed universe of returns from the land. "The cities of western Europe have been, at least since the high Middle Ages, centers of intellectual ferment; of economic change; and thus, in time, of opposition to the central authority. They became rebels in nearly every aspect of their institutional life."¹⁰ Growing trade and manufacturing provided the economic bases of the new power of cities. By contrast, the peasant revolts growing out of desperation and oriented to the limitations inherent in traditional agriculture demanded the reinstatement of the pre-existing status quo. In China, cities were well developed and appeared to have been more numerous than in Europe (until the nineteenth century). Ten to fifteen per cent of the total Chinese population lived in cities of over 10,000, which were basically administration centers. Trading towns were often separate entities. The most outstanding example is Shanghai, which did not come to a position of prominence until taken over by western commercial interests. The main business of the city was "administration and exploitation of the countryside."¹¹

The ability to rely on irrigated rice agriculture, with its centralized control and rich yield, provided the bureaucracy a solid economic base, and reduced the potential role of commercial groups. The pressure on land, significant even in Han times, acted as a barrier to the growth of trade, since investment in land gave high returns with a minimum of

¹⁰ Rhoads Murphey, "The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe and China," in P. L. Wagner and M. W. Mikesell, eds., *Readings in Cultural Geography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 331.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 333-35.

risk. Other forms of investment were much more at the mercy of the government. Many important trade goods were government monopolies. This tended to minimize possibilities for innovation, or at least widespread use of innovations. Seen from a worldwide perspective, there is much to support the view that the conservative city functioning primarily as an administrative center and concerned with controlled exactions from farmers and preservation of an orderly society and hierarchy, may have been the much more widespread form, with the commercial city of western Europe the exception. The changing role of specific urban groups is certainly one component of what is usually called modernization.

PEASANT REVOLTS

The rural revolution is a modern phenomenon and is clearly differentiated from the various peasant revolts that sought their objectives wholly within the context of a traditional rural society, manifesting primarily a desire to be free of what the peasant considered to be onerous obligations. Ironically, but perhaps logically, in these backward-looking movements there was reconstructed, at least symbolically, the patterns of the very government the peasantry was revolting against.

A good example of this genre is the manifesto of Emelian Ivanovitch Pugachev, a Don Cossack and leader of a peasant revolt on the Volga (1773-74). He constituted himself the new Czar, and his companions adopted analogous titles of lesser figures in the hierarchy. His proclamation is a caricature of an official government document. It simultaneously proclaims liberation and religious virtue while negating measures necessary to the functioning of the nation-state:

"By the grace of God We, Peter the Third, Emperor and Autocrat of all Russia, etc. etc. etc.

Be it known to everyone.

By Our monarchical and paternal grace by this decree we grant that all previous peasants and those subjugated to the *pomeshchiki* [landowners] are faithful slaves of Our own crown, and We reward them with the ancient cross and prayer, and beards, and with liberty and freedom, and make them Cossacks for eternity, without demanding conscription, or the head tax or any other taxes in money; and rewarding them with ownership of lands, forests, hay fields, fishing rights, and salt lakes, and without purchase and without *obrok* [feudal dues]; and We free all those previously treated abusively by the nobles and the venal city judges who imposed taxes and burdens on the

peasants and all people. And we wish you salvation of your souls and a peaceful life in this world. . . ." ¹²

Like most peasant revolts this one soon collapsed. Pugachev was defeated, brought to Moscow in an iron cage, and executed in 1775.

An earlier example was the revolt in Croatia (Yugoslavia) in 1573, led by a freeholder, Matija Gubec, with the slogan "For the Old Rights," which appears to refer to older, less burdensome obligations. The revolt was apparently set off by the attempt of the feudal lords to increase their serfs' obligations and reduce their rights. Abolition of serfdom and the founding of a peasant government in Zagreb, the main city, were the objectives of the revolt. This government was to be responsible directly to the Emperor, whom they looked upon as their protector from the abuses of the local feudal lords. They also desired equality of all groups and no exclusions in taxation and military service. This outbreak was crushed in several weeks, after some 6,000 peasants were killed and many villages burned. ¹³ Matija Gubec was accused of proclaiming himself a "peasant King" and was "crowned" with a red-hot iron crown in the main square in Zagreb. The lot of the peasants worsened after this revolt, as was the case in the Cossack attempt.

It is hard for the peasant in pre-modern societies to conceive of alternative forms of state organization. This is one reason the stereotype of the benevolence of the king or emperor is so persuasive.

"Thus the embittered subject, who is permanently exposed to such propaganda, cannot well strive for the creation of a new and less despotic order. He and others who feel as he does may withdraw to the mountains. They may kill some local officials. They may defeat the government's men in armed conflict. They may even overthrow a tottering dynasty. But eventually they will only revive—and rejuvenate—the agromanageial despotism whose incompetent representatives they eliminated. The heroes of China's famous bandit novel, the *Shui-hu Ch'uan*, could think of nothing better to do than to set up on their rebel island a miniature version of the very bureaucratic hierarchy which they were so fiercely combating." ¹⁴

In England one of the leaders of the 1381 Uprisings is reported to have expressed the group's objectives as: ". . . everything shall be in

¹² Quoted in "The Economic Demands of the Popular Masses in the Peasant War of 1773-1774," in *A History of Russian Economic Thought, Ninth through Eighteenth Centuries*, John M. Letiche, ed., trans. from Russian edition ed. by A. I. Pashkov (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 540-41. Reprinted by permission.

¹³ Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 67-68.

¹⁴ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 135. Reprinted by permission.

common; there shall be neither vassal nor lord and all distinction levelled. . . . They have handsome seats and manors, when we must brave the wind and rain in our labours in the field; but it is from our labour that they have wherewith to support their pomp.”¹⁵ This revolt was put down in a relatively tactful manner, but despite a seeming compromise in which royal charters for the reduction of rents were issued, the movement was a failure and conditions continued much as before.

The theme of equality recurs in a different context in nineteenth-century peasant society. In Sicily, a peasant woman from a village near Palermo, interviewed at the time of a rural uprising in 1893, expressed ideas similar to those of the fourteenth-century Englishman. “We want everybody to work, as we work. There should no longer be either rich or poor. All should have bread for themselves and for their children. We should all be equal.” She said that although she and her five children had one room and many *signori* had palaces, she did not want to simply divide lands and houses but “to share with justice what was produced.” She felt that if people did not share fairly the guilty ones should be punished. When asked the attitudes of the local priests her reply was that Jesus was a true Socialist.¹⁶

It is doubtful that this woman had any definite knowledge of the theoretical tenets of nineteenth century socialism. In the nineteenth century articulated alternatives to the restoration of a version of the status quo began to penetrate rural areas. It was possible for rural people to conceive of a village functioning on the basis of consensus and using this system as a means of sharing their produce. Cities, however, cannot be operated in this manner; they require some sort of bureaucratic organization. Equality in the nation-state can never be the kind of joint cooperation that is an integral part of the face-to-face village community. Utopian ideals do not seem to have been part of the objectives of urban mobs, in contrast to revolts in rural areas.¹⁷

An anarchic situation can be endured in subsistence-oriented villages, never in the cities. The case of the initial period of the Russian Revolution is a clear illustration (see Chapter Seven). The ideals of most peasant revolts conceive of a leveling off of society and equalization of minimum standards, unlike the modern urban ideal for the sharing of increasing abundance derived from a developing technology. This is a

¹⁵ G. M. Trevelyan, *England in the Age of Wycliffe* (London: 1919), p. 197, cited in W. E. Lunt, *History of England*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1946), p. 244.

¹⁶ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 183.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

principal component of the rural revolution, which is motivated in part by the vision of a future abundance provided by a highly organized and productive society in which the growing of food and fiber come to occupy a progressively less important although essential role in the total national economy. This is in contrast to the former situation in which villagers tended to resist technological innovation, feeling that such change could only be harmful, disturbing to their traditional patterns of cultivation, which provided their sole source of security.

Some writers have suggested that the most impoverished portions of the population are too much concerned with their daily survival to be involved in revolts, but rather it is those who have contacts outside their own areas through trade, or military service and so have a basis for comparison and become receptive to ideas that lead to dissatisfaction.¹⁸ An example in the pre-industrial period is the case of the Serb peasant and pig trader who began the successful revolt against the Turkish occupiers that led to the ultimate establishment of what was in effect a Serbian peasant state. Although fellow Serbs who had achieved an education in neighboring Austria-Hungary were asked to help in the new administration, inevitably many administrative forms were borrowed from their former Turkish rulers. Once successful, these ex-peasants began to imitate their former conquerors in such matters as dress, which they had previously been forbidden. Until World War I Serbia remained primarily a nation of small landholders. Such examples of successful peasant revolts leading to the establishment of national states are rare, (although some similarities with neighboring Bulgaria and certain aspects of Irish history come to mind).

The more common pattern has been a restricted and usually unsuccessful attempt to protest increased taxes as in the English, French, and German rural uprisings as well as in Japan during the Tokugawa period. The need for increased taxes was often due to the changing status of the lesser nobility as in France in 1358 and Germany in 1525 when the landowners had acquired a taste for the pleasures of life in the developing towns. Another case, in more recent times, has been the seeming imminence of land reform as in nineteenth century Russia and in Peru today.¹⁹ These sporadic and usually limited outbreaks are, of course, clearly distinct from farmers' strikes as in the United States in the 1930's or France in the post-war period. They are the activities of political pressure groups who, although they may feel forced to use extreme methods, are recognized and organized political entities. Appeals to

¹⁸ Henry A. Landsberger, "A Framework for the Study of Peasant Movements" (School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1966), mimeographed, pp. 19, 22.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 25.

rural populations for political support and the emergence of political parties, especially those basing their support on the peasantry, as in eastern Europe between the two World Wars, are linked to the emergence of the rural revolution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The concept of the rural revolution as used here is distinct from those delimited rural revolts seeking the amelioration of conditions or from those rare ones that are politically successful, as in Serbia. The reference is rather to a complex of sociocultural changes that have been occurring for the past two centuries in all parts of the world, although at varying rates, regardless of the type of political system. These changes or the force latent in their potentiality have been utilized by specific political movements such as communism. Because of the universal agreement on at least the ideal goals involved, i.e., the future full incorporation into an urban-focused society and a sharing of its benefits, most rural pressures arise from the failure to attain these goals. Among peasants there is little sign today of jacqueries whose objective is to restore the "old rights" of past social systems. Nor does there appear to be any great arising of millenarian leaders promising fulfillment through recapturing an idyllic past by magical or supernatural means.

TRIBAL REVOLTS

An important exception are certain of the tribal peoples of the Americas, Oceania, and Asia whose cultures perhaps inevitably and tragically face extinction. In these cases there is the proliferation of cargo cults and nativistic movements. It should be stressed that not all of these groups are inward focusing and self-destructive as is the case of a number of American Indian groups. An illustration of the kinds of transformations that tribal people are undergoing is provided by the Meo of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. Pushed constantly southward by the expanding Chinese, they have in their retreat to the hills abandoned plow agriculture. Inhabiting mountaintops and practicing slash-and-burn agriculture, they are known for their cultivation of opium. In recent years a number have become formally educated, some becoming communists, others Christians, and now in truly civilized fashion they murder each other with mortars and artillery. Some are on the central committee of the Lao Communist Party, others are field grade officers in the Royal Lao Army, and many more are hapless refugees in the lowlands, possibly never to return to their upland homes free of state supervision. Many are eager to settle permanently in the lowlands, practice irrigated rice agriculture, and enjoy state services in education and health. Today many have shed their silver neck rings, sashes, pigtails,

and caps, and have learned foreign languages and modified their patriarchal family structures. There are Meo autonomous areas in North Vietnam and China where the Stalinist concept of centrally directed cultural content (only superficially Meo in form) applies.

In 1919, during the period of French rule, the Meo leader of a revolt sought millenarian solutions to the problems of his people. According to the official French account,

. . . he sent emissaries whose mission it was to devote themselves to secret propaganda among the Meo groupings of Upper Laos in favor of a king who, "accomplishing the will of heaven was to bring them happiness, peace and prosperity."

This king was said to have fallen from the sky and was summoning all Meo to revolt and form a kingdom. They were to march against their enemies and build their king a palace. Although such myths are by no means extinct today, they lack their former appeal among the Meo, although some less favored groups find similar ones still attractive, picturing their messiah as bringing them the goods of the modern world through supernatural means.²⁰

On Manus in Melanesia the inhabitants desiring to participate in full in the white man's world ". . . pitched the old into the sea. Shell money, dogs' teeth, mourning costumes, grass skirts, dancing spears, baskets covered with rubber gum, pottery, all went crashing into the lagoon." The people then set up modern institutions such as a school, although the teacher had only two years of education. They were impatient to wait for the government to act.²¹

In both these examples the people are becoming modern by reformulating their own cultures in a way fundamentally different from peasant peoples who as a result of the rural revolution are modifying their own subcultures.

Peasant values may be maladaptive in an industrial and urban setting, but tribal values, especially those of hunters and gatherers and horticulturists, are almost totally incompatible with the modern nation state. Only those in geographically marginal areas such as the Eskimo or in some cases those practicing intensive cultivation such as the Pueblo Indians can survive with any significant portion of their culture intact. Excluded from consideration here are the nomadic peoples of central

²⁰ Joel M. Halpern, *Government, Politics and Social Structure in Laos: A Study of Tradition and Innovation*, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph No. 4 (1964), pp. 75-76.

²¹ Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old, Cultural Transformation, Manus, 1928-1953* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1956), pp. 236, 310.

Asia, most notably the Mongols, who have their own state. Although plow agriculture is usually a significant component of the definition of peasant culture, the African peoples south of the Sahara present special problems, and are not discussed here.²² Peasants can seek fuller incorporation in their great tradition, tribal peoples must accept, indeed embrace, a completely foreign tradition.

The rural revolution as defined here is distinct from political revolutions as such, but there are close interrelations in that one aspect of the rural revolution is the voluntary mass migration seeking a better life in towns, while another is the rising expectation for improved living conditions and better income among those who remain in the countryside. To realize such possibilities there must be some political innovation and economic development on the national level. One writer has hypothesized that when these new opportunities are frustrated after an initial period of development political revolution may result. By contrast, "When it is a choice between losing their chains or their lives, people will choose to keep their chains." In Russia the number of rural outbreaks increased dramatically after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Here hopes had been raised and then frustrated, for the peasants now had to buy or rent their land. In Rhode Island Dorr's Rebellion of 1842 occurred when workers left their farms and migrated to work in the new textile mills and became committed to city life. When a depression hit them they did not have farms to which they could return.²³ This kind of situation is crucial in evaluating the potential violence implicit in the rural revolution and is directly pertinent to the problems of Negro ghettos in American cities. The possibility of a return to the land does appear to provide something of a temporary safety valve in coping with the pressures generated by the rural revolution. Its relative absence in England after the Enclosures may have been a factor in causing the acute situation which so impressed Marx. This possibility is largely absent in the United States, but its presence in those countries with predominantly peasant agriculture may ease the total transformation.

MARXISM AND COMMUNISM

A scholar concerned with communist history analyzes an important aspect of the rural revolution, seeing its completion as a precondition

²² For an analysis of this question see L. A. Fallers, "Are African Cultivators to Be Called 'Peasants?'" *Current Anthropology* (April 1961), pp. 108-10.

²³ James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27, No. 1 (February 1962), 5-19.

for the establishment of true communist society. "The city and the countryside, two ways of life clashing—neither of them in itself complete and adequate to the requirements of modern life—both of them having to undergo changes and amalgamation before socialism can be established. Such is the message of Marxism."²⁴ It is, of course, precisely these changes and the process of amalgamation that are of central interest to us here. In the light of Marx's comments on the brutalizing of farm labor and the evictions from the land, it is interesting to compare Stalin's carefully planned war on his own people, collectivization. The alternatives to English capitalism of the nineteenth century or Russian communism of the twentieth, in their respective centuries, are not clear. It may be, given the inevitability of the rural revolution and the culturally approved need for industrialization, that the working out of the large scale changes that it involves cannot help but be traumatic to some degree. It cannot speak well for the future of man, however, if such suffering and violent death is passed off as in the nature of the cultural process and hence inevitable. It is the irony of Marxism-Leninism that while depicting an inevitability of human history there is the simultaneous assumption that the ultimate progressive stages must be brought about by the coercive leadership of an elite whose sole objective is the betterment of every man. The idyllic planned future is to be brought about by inverting economic determinism where political ideology, not economic forces, become dominant.

From another point of view the development of Marxism is remarkable, for in the middle of the nineteenth century it took as its main theme a critical problem of life today yet one that was then only beginning to be significant, even in western Europe: "Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country." Although Marx condemns both the "idiocy of rural life" and the poverty and misery of the workers in the cities, he is much bound up with the potential of industry and its future in the city. Unlike some of his contemporaries he was not given to enthusing over a picture of model factories in a bucolic setting, but was convinced of the indispensability of the city. At the same time Marx has the greatest regard for "the ideal of human existence as embodied in the proletarian's dream of a 'natural,' stable and egalitarian agrarian community."²⁵ This was in part a reflection of the new worker's nostalgia for his former stable life in the village community, but the impossibility of his return was implied by Marx when he stressed the grim actuality of the rural poverty that the city migrant had fled. What was conceived of as tem-

²⁴ Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Random House, Inc., Vintage Book, 1964), p. 61.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

porary urban hardship seems to have almost always been preferred to the virtual certainty of permanent rural stagnation.

It is one of the salient features of the rural revolution in communist countries that Marxist-Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist ideologies conceptualizing the end of peasant society have been remarkably successful in psychological impact but economically disastrous in agriculture. Or, if this be too strong an evaluation, it might be more conservatively said that they have been successful in achieving their minimum objectives, of providing assured but limited supplies of food to growing cities at minimum cost. Much has been written in the West about the stolid peasants under communism resolutely devoting their best efforts to small private plots. These are acts not of faith in private farming but of desperate, clever "rural idiots" conscious of their own inferiority choosing the best of limited alternatives. Few wish to remain in farming if they can avoid it. As a result, these governments must limit population movement from rural to urban areas and simultaneously move trained cadre into rural areas (see pp. 53, 104). In developing countries a lack of economic growth often forces rural people to compete increasingly for limited economic resources within the context of a largely closed village society. In communist countries, for those who remain on the land choice is often limited by political factors.

In considering the rural revolution in the following pages, primary reference is not to the context of contemporary or recent historic political revolutions as such, although these are, of course, involved, nor to fuel revolutions, although these play a role as background factors. Here the focus is on the drastic changes in the lives of individuals who remain as well as those who have migrated en masse from rural to urban areas and on the subsequent alterations in the nature of ecological settings, social structures, and on the increasing similarity of value patterns in rural and urban areas. The term rural revolution is used because it is postulated that the more basic changes are taking place in rural areas. These changes derive from the universalization of certain urban-focused values:

In spite of the immense range of variation in values and other elements of culture, as in social structure, there has come to be an almost world-wide consensus on the evaluation of high, industrial-level, economic productivity. Ideology is the main expression of this at high cultural levels. Essentially it means the general acceptance of the industrial models of Western society as providing at least *one* essential part of the "good society."²⁶

²⁶ Talcott Parsons, "Some Principal Characteristics of Industrial Societies," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 21. Reprinted by permission.

Given "normal" conditions, i.e., avoidance of world-wide devastation by a nuclear war, the changes implicit in the rural to urban migration are but to a limited degree reversible and then only in the short run. At the height of the last world war there was a temporary return to the countryside in those areas most directly affected. (Some students of the question have, of course, stressed that even with a significant degree of nuclear destruction and huge loss of life it should nevertheless be possible to continue, in the main, our present form of industrial society.)²⁷

RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES

During the course of their careers individuals may move back and forth between village and town, but the overall trend is very clear, as demonstrated by the greater rates of increase for cities as opposed to rural populations.

From an overall point of view there are reciprocal influences in the contact of rural and urban subcultures. At the same time that the village is being urbanized peasantization of the towns appears to be taking place. The rural migrant brings with him many cultural traits that are only slowly being modified in the urban environment, and he in turn, in part by the pressure of numbers, causes changes in the urban scene not only in the obvious degradation of certain urban facilities but also in changing social relationships and life styles, which may or may not be linked with political revolution. Housing is an immediately evident case, with shanty town dwellings and more permanent types of private or semi-private houses carrying over many rural architectural patterns. In many new industrial towns in Yugoslavia, for example, privately-owned brick and concrete houses have been built which are identical in style and whose furnishings approximate those found in new village homes. They are surrounded by small yards containing a garden, a chicken coop and, despite the prohibition of town authorities, perhaps a pig or two. Of course, the persistence of certain of these practices is related to economic factors and poor marketing facilities, which are linked to the stress on urban facilities. In Yugoslavia, as elsewhere in the world, there are major problems of maintenance of modern apartment buildings when they are occupied by people unfamiliar with plumbing and heating systems.

The concept of peasantization is also applicable to the continuing kin bonds and sense of mutual loyalties and ceremonial obligations. Cer-

²⁷ Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

tainly these are not unique among rural migrants to urban areas, but they do serve to tie closely rural and urban areas in this transitional period. The peasantization of the town as a direct influence, however, is clearly limited to a few generations at most. Whatever future cultural distinctiveness urban areas will possess may be due at least in some degree to the patterns of earlier rural migrants, i.e., hopefully the *favelas* of Brazil and their approximations in other areas will eventually be incorporated into the social fabric of their society, but it is doubtful that they will disappear without a trace. Their impact will probably be felt not only in the political institutions that will make this absorption possible but in other ways as well. (This transformation is reflected in the ethnicity of New York politics.)

We lack careful cross-cultural analyses of the nature of modern urban life in countries such as Japan, India, and the U.S.S.R. For example, it would be interesting to know to what degree the varying rates of urban residential stability are linked to economic development on one hand and the maintenance of kinship networks on the other. This is a particularly vital question with regard to town-dwellers one or two generations removed from a rural background. The way in which the rural to urban move is made may well condition the nature of the urban environment for a long time to come. Such matters, of course, go well beyond the concept of peasantization as used here.²⁸

²⁸ Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Joel M. Halpern, "The Rural Revolution," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, 28, No. 1, 73-80. Reprinted by permission.

The significance of the rural revolution can best be illustrated by the ways individual rural people have reacted to changes experienced in the course of their lifetimes, illustrated here in two autobiographical fragments from Yugoslavia. The first was written by an eighty-eight-year-old villager from central Serbia and points up the kinds of changes that have taken place in rural areas all over the world during the past century.

A LIFETIME OF CHANGE

I was born in 1866. At that time we ate less than we do today. Our clothes were not good. We went without pants [in the traditional peasant costume of long shirts over linen underdrawers]. There was no doctor, no railway. There were dense forests all around. At that time we paid only one ducat for taxes on our property, which amounted to thirty hectares. There were only three stores in our nearby market town then. We had no beds.

We slept on the dirt floor around the hearth.

In the old days we had a wooden plow.

Now we use a steel one. We did not have brick houses, nor did we know how to build them. A recruit used to go to serve in the army on foot while today they all go by train. Until 1905 we all went everywhere on foot. I took part in three wars—first, in 1885, against the Bulgarians, second the Austro-Hungarian War and the third the terrible war in 1941.

CHAPTER FOUR We used to eat corn bread, and nobody ever

Changing Rural-Urban Differences

smoked or cursed. People were healthier than they are today. Holy things were respected and kept. Today all is different.¹

Change in the contemporary context is reflected in these comments of a factory foreman in a small industrial town:

My father was born in the village. My grandfather was also born there. Father was one of eight brothers and sisters and all lived together although there were only six hectares of land. My father had nine sons and two daughters. Although my father, who was a farmer, wanted to educate all his children, none was able to go beyond the four-year school. As my older brothers grew up they worked mostly cutting lumber in the woods.

After the war my father got a job in the store operated by the agricultural cooperative [in the town]. He used to come home once a week, since it was a three-hour walk over hilly trails. Later he returned to farming in the village, since the going back and forth was too much for him.

In 1955 I started working in the paper factory. I became a mechanic and studied to become more skilled. Two of my brothers work in the factory, and one of them is also studying to improve his qualifications. Two of us have apartments in town and one is building his own house. The brother who is now in the army will remain on the land. My father sends me cheese, meat, and eggs from the village. I give him presents of coffee, sugar, and other things. When he comes to town he stays with us, and we often visit the village during the summer and sometimes help with the work.²

The coming of the railroad, the steel plow in the village, and the factory in the town are, of course, all part of the industrialization process that has so altered rural and urban living. The first account quoted above reveals something of the drastic improvements in living standards during the past century and at the same time the ambivalence of the old man reflecting on these changes. Although we may perhaps dismiss the villager's idealization of his childhood as reflected in his statement that "nobody ever smoked or cursed," his contention that "holy things were respected and kept," referring not only to religious beliefs but to a whole range of social values and practices, is worth more serious regard.

FOLK VERSUS CITY

Such changes, within the village context and without, are directly related to the concept of secularization advanced by Robert Redfield.

¹ Abbreviated from Joel M. Halpern, *A Serbian Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 205.

² See Joel M. Halpern, "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Human Organization*, 24, No. 2 (Summer, 1965), 169-70.

This concept derives in part from his studies of a series of communities in Yucatan, in which an ideal type of folk society is contrasted with that of the modern city. The folk society is defined as being composed of a relatively small group of people who know each other well, are similar in their tastes and interests, which are intimately connected with life within the community, and who have a strong feeling of group solidarity. They are nonliterate and this, combined with their inward focusing orientation, tends to cut them off from other contacts, particularly urban ones. Behavior is fixed by convention, and relationships are on a personal basis determined to a great degree by kinship ties.³ In contrast, the modern city is seen as being large, diverse, secular, literate, with behavior determined more by the impersonal concepts of a market-focused economy and with position in a large measure deriving from occupation and formal institutional associations rather than resting primarily on kinship.⁴

As Redfield points out, certain of these concepts are related to those of Henry Maine as set forth in *Ancient Law*, in which he differentiated between society based on kinship and status and society based on territory and contract. These in turn are related to the concepts of Ferdinand Tönnies opposing *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and those of Emile Durkheim in the *Division of Labor in Society*, where a contrast is made between social units resulting from shared attitudes giving rise to "mechanical solidarity," and those based on "organic solidarity" where unity is derived from the complementary relationships of the specialized social roles performed. These much-discussed distinctions⁵ have a strong appeal to common sense and appear obvious to those who vacation in the countryside and then return to their homes in the city. To a degree they have been useful in ordering some of the descriptive data concerning changing village communities.

Shared Characteristics

These changes are not distinctive of rural communities. In fact, communities possessing many of the same characteristics exist within large

³ Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, 52 (January 1947), 293-308.

⁴ Horace Miner, "The Folk-Urban Continuum," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (October 1952), 529-37.

⁵ For example, see Richard Dewey, "The Rural-Urban Continuum: Real but Relatively Unimportant," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46, No. 1 (July 1960), 60-66, and Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, "The Application of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as Related to Other Typologies," in "Introduction" to Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 12-29.

cities in various parts of the world. Studies of a number of working-class communities specifically parallel descriptions of village communities on an impressive number of points, and the break-up of an old working-class community under the impact of urban renewal has been likened to the transitions encountered by village society under urban influence.⁶ Such urban communities were originally formed mainly by migrants from rural areas, although the transition from the rural to urban environment may have involved an overseas trip as in the case of Italians in the United States or Chinese in Southeast Asia. The ways in which these communities may be formed and the important role of kinship is stressed in the second autobiographical excerpt. That is, this initial peasantization of the towns is to a degree reflected in the partial replication of the village in the town or more frequently a part of the village in a part of the town. This situation is clearly reflected in a major modern metropolitan area such as New York City, where once in various areas the whitewashed stone houses of rural southern Italy, complete with grape arbor and small truck garden, could be seen, with perhaps a goat in a nearby lot, although most have now been modernized or obliterated by apartment houses.

Peasantization of the town, and the degree of continuity implied in this type of rural to urban transition, has led some observers to postulate that in some ways the most difficult transition occurs not in the rural-to-urban move but in the movement from the working-class into the middle and professional groups, and that the working-class community is a huge processing mechanism, providing for entry into urban society.⁷ In many countries there is, of course, direct recruitment en masse from the rural community into the civil service, professions, and commerce, so that the transition to middle class status is made within a period of decades rather than over several generations. It is, of course, the change from agriculture as an occupation and the simultaneous or subsequent move from the village community that makes further transitions possible. The nature of the occupation and the social and technical setting of the employment, as well as the site and type of residence, are crucial determinants of the rate of change. The existence of kinship networks is felt by many observers to have eased the strain of the initial rural-to-urban transition.

The preceding autobiographies also suggest sources of change in the village community's exhaustion of certain ecological possibilities (e.g.,

⁶ Marc Fried, "Transitional Functions of Working-Class Communities: Implications for Forced Relocation," in Mildred B. Kantor, ed., *Mobility and Mental Health* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, Publisher, 1965), pp. 129-30.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

forests) and its related overpopulation; also significant is the effect of military conscription and war on both the individual soldiers who leave to fight and the community itself when subjected to invading armies. Further, in peacetime there is the impact of those villagers who work outside the village for a time and then return home, as well as of those who find employment in local extractive industries. Military service and periods of work outside the community, however, can occur within the context of traditional village society; these alone do not imply a rural revolution. Full-scale transition can take place only where a modernizing nationalism exists or is in the process of coming into being.

DIFFERENCES IN RURAL AND URBAN CHANGE

There are a number of fundamental distinctions between the changes taking place in the urban areas as opposed to rural regions, for which the terms modification and revolution resulting in reformulation respectively are appropriate. Although it is true that the strains of occupational, spatial, and social mobility are often intense in established urban communities, still the changes are less drastic than those occurring in rural areas. There are several basic reasons for this. Perhaps most fundamental is that the urbanite by the very nature of his environment is conditioned to change and diversity even though he may resist it; despite the insularity of some groups the city dweller is made constantly aware of other groups and alternative patterns of behavior. The distinction is neither precise nor absolute. Farmers can change crops and livestock often surprisingly readily in attempting to adapt to market demands, or a man can give up farming and move to a nearby small town and be involved in roughly the same kinship network in which he was previously engaged. There is, however, the basic fact that rural life is founded mainly on agriculture and that one of the key indices of modernization is a decline in the percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture. Coincident with this is the growing politicization of the villager. His labor becomes increasingly dispensable and at the same time he develops new needs, and the state commits itself at least in principle to meeting these needs—an essential constituent of modernizing nationalism. Since modernizing states can function effectively with progressively fewer workers, the primary need of the nation is for an individual's loyalty and only secondarily for his labor. The two are entirely separable, but the matter of emphasis is important, as attested to by the growth of pension, insurance, subsidy, and relief systems. This situation holds true whether the villager remains at home or migrates to the town.

The nature of the changes in the village community can be concisely

FIGURE 3

Modern consumption patterns can spread without much accompanying industrial development, and everywhere it is evident that in even the most prosaic chores villagers are becoming increasingly involved in a cash economy. Washing with detergent in an enamel basin, Luang Prabang Province, Laos.

viewed as involving a number of primarily interrelated factors. First is the process we call modernization, subsuming under this the complex of scientific, technical, industrial, commercial, and organizational ideas, forms, and patterns that began in western Europe and somewhat later in North America in the eighteenth century and subsequently spread to the rest of the world. Combined with this has been a general growth in population, increasing growth of urban centers, and more intensive use of natural resources. As a result people are being forced off the land while they are simultaneously drawn to the towns, especially to large cities. But the cities are bursting at the seams, and so the world-wide transformation from village to town is slowed while the necessary human and organizational arrangements are being made. The technological potential already exists in large measure. Once effective organizational forms have been devised in the so-called developing areas, at best a slow and painful and at times even violent process, these new centers may surpass their European models. In any case, the distinction between modernization and westernization (even including Soviet Marxism) will become even more sharp.

Village life, with its traditional, long established cultivation techniques, is the counterpart of cottage industry, but unlike that of the village potter or blacksmith the work of the peasant farmer is more difficult to rationalize and mechanize. The concern to improve village

conditions derives not only from the concern to make agriculture more efficient but to enable the village to be a more attractive place in which to live and thus to relieve the pressure on the already overcrowded cities. From a particular point of view it might be conceivable to minimize educational and health investments in rural areas and concentrate on developing industry and an infrastructure while simultaneously restricting population mobility. An approach to this seemingly reactionary policy has been made by communist countries in initial stages of their development and in another sense by certain fascist states. Although it is possible to isolate the countryside and so for a time relieve pressure on the cities, the two are bound up together. The trauma of Russia's collectivization illustrates the price that must be paid in such an effort.

A REFORMULATION OF CULTURAL VALUES

It does not provide much perspective to view change in the village community solely in terms of the penetration of urban traits. Rather we must view change in the village in terms of a reformulation of cultural values and social structures and attempt to conceive the kinds of patterns that will emerge. That is, there can be a selective valuing of certain past traditions in present subcultures, but in the main these can be only the ones previously shared with the urban subculture (e.g., a national history). Because of the fundamental nature of the transitions, thinking only in terms such as village and town or even rural and urban may hinder our understanding. We are now in the process of attempting to conceive the precise meaning of megalopolis and suburbs in a cross-cultural sense. City planners have, of course, already undertaken to do this in a highly specific and instrumental way. To conceive of the future, however, it is helpful to know the nature of the past. This presents difficulties, for even terms such as peasant, village, and town in the traditional context do not have precisely agreed upon definitions in the anthropological and sociological literature.

It is possible, nevertheless, to point out certain distinguishing characteristics. Generally speaking, in the pre-industrial context peasants live in villages and are engaged in agriculture from which they derive their primary source of income while towns function as combinations of trade, government, and religious centers. Although distinctions are not absolute within one culture (and certainly not cross-culturally through history), towns tend to be larger than villages, and there is more marked differentiation among the inhabitants in terms of occupation, wealth, education (secular or religious), dress, manners, and view of life—in short, social class differentiation, while not peculiar to towns

alone, is more characteristic of them because the functions of the town are more varied. Traditional peasant farming, although producing a surplus (so defined by taxes or rents) to feed the towns, is primarily subsistence-oriented; the growing of crops is thought of as a way of life not as a business. The yearly cycle is closely integrated with the agricultural cycle, and spring planting and autumn harvest tend to be sanctified by religious ceremonies. The principal crop is thought of not only as food but as the source of existence, reflected in terms such as the soul of rice, or wheat bread as the staff of life. The only enduring relationships are kin ties, and no other way of life is conceivable except for the relatively small number of persons who manage to find careers in the pre-modern city. In this case many of the cities of Asia such as Bangkok, although not based on industry, are modern in that they are closely related to world trade in raw materials and industrial goods and to the expanding functions of the modern state.

CHANGES IN RURAL AND URBAN CONTACTS

Because the traditional pre-industrial village is ceasing to exist, in increasing numbers of countries we can no longer speak of a rural-to-urban transition or a rural-urban continuum but can talk only in terms of changing rural and urban contexts. Secularization is perhaps a meaningful term but one that is equally applicable to the transformation of the pre-modern town and to the changes in the pre-modern village. Obviously all villages, as all urban centers, are not changing at the same rate or in the same ways. It is possible to speak of a rural revolution rather than an urban and rural revolution because, as has been shown, in peasant society there must of necessity be greater break with tradition. The traditional past is not an undifferentiated period. It was often one of great change, involving migrations, alterations in political systems, varying styles in architecture and clothing, new techniques of cultivation and new crops, and modifications in social patterns and trading relationships—but all of these changes took place against the background of certain constants, and the focus on the rural community remained. Horse-drawn iron plows could be substituted for oxen and wooden ones; corn and potatoes could make possible greater production of livestock; forests were turned into fields; and great increases in population occurred, but the village community retained a degree of autonomy. Gasoline-powered tractors, artificial fertilizer, the use of modern hospitals and schools permit no autonomy for the contemporary village.

Worth looking at in detail are the many well-intentioned and democratically oriented programs for village development that have unexamined assumptions and possibly unintended effects. A good example is the community development program as set forth in the United Nations document, *Social Progress through Community Development*, which is particularly significant in that it represents something of a consensus, at least among non-communist governments, and therefore a shared series of objectives.

VALUES IMPLICIT IN UNITED NATIONS

The basic problem is stated in the following terms:

In the world of today, there may be from three to five million rural "communities"—local groups possessing some cohesiveness and some common institutions—ranging from nomadic tribes of fifty members up to densely settled agricultural villages of several thousand inhabitants. Such groups comprise up to eighty per cent of the people of the so-called economically less-developed countries. During recent years, as the governments of these countries have assumed wider responsibilities for the promotion of economic development and human welfare, they have found in the rural communities their most challenging problems.

The impact of economic, social, and technological changes in the world has, by and large, not brought much benefit to these communities, but has served rather to

CHAPTER FIVE

throw out of balance the traditional subsistence

Social Meaning of Planned Programs of Change

economy of the village and to impair its social and cultural integrity. The rural communities are subject to overwhelming and disruptive pressures and attractions from within and without: population increases pressing on inadequate and often deteriorating land resources; new demands for consumer goods and social benefits, stimulated by mass communications and the population movements that have accompanied two world wars; wider opportunities to produce goods for the market rather than for subsistence, or to migrate to the towns to work for wages. The traditional family and community relationships tend to break down under these pressures; the rural people may respond with apathy, blank resistance to change, or extravagant hopes and demands.¹

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Community development is conceived of as a process that facilitates "economic and social progress for the whole community." This includes the active participation of and greatest possible use of the existing leadership within the community itself utilizing the "ability to assimilate and adapt new ways of living that is at least latent in every human group," and it means drawing on the world-wide experience at the disposal of national governments and their specialized agencies in the fields of agriculture, health, education, welfare, whose efforts are often uncoordinated at the local level. A specific example is the voluntary mobilization of underemployed manpower, particularly during slack seasons, for the building of roads, wells, schools, community halls, and other public facilities.

Development programs are seen as coordinating existing expertise in public health, agricultural extension, cooperatives, home economics, and social work. The aims are to increase agricultural production, expand subsidiary sources of income in handicrafts, control disease, improve housing and sanitation, and develop education.

Expressed Needs

One basic element in the United Nations publication is that community development projects undertaken must be "in response to the expressed needs of the people." Examples of this type of project are expanding the amount of cultivated land and improving yields, employment of those who are not needed in agriculture, water for irrigation and drinking, market roads, health services, and schools. It is cautioned that it is not enough to construct buildings such as community centers, desir-

¹ *Social Progress Through Community Development* (New York: United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, 1955), pp. 5-11.

able as they may be in certain cases, if they are not considered to be needed by the community.

In considering this first requirement, two questions come to mind: what is meant by community, and who are the people? For settled agriculturists we can assume that the village is meant as the unit, usually the formal political and administrative unit. But there is a need to know whether such units represent historical and socioeconomic kin groupings or are based on arbitrarily drawn boundaries for administrative convenience. It is essential to understand how and under what circumstances people are accustomed to working together. A related question is the extent of social, economic, and ethnic differentiation that exists among villagers within the same community, for example, where there are separate caste groups as in India, or Buddhists and Moslems as in Thailand, or Catholics and Orthodox as in Yugoslavia; or more generally, are there fishermen and farmers, or carpenters and traders, are some landowners and others landless laborers? Do disputing interest groups exist? Are conflicting political parties present?

Whose needs should then be considered primary? Let us assume that the villagers have a sense of unity and are able to agree on a "need"; it may well be that this expressed need runs counter to the interests, desires, or preconceptions of the government agents or foreign aid officials who stimulated the meeting. In Laos, for example, American aid officials were nonplused by the villagers' desires to obtain gold leaf in order to gild their Buddha images, and to utilize proffered cement for use in reconstructing the village pagoda. Some American officials did not feel the religious merit that they would derive from aiding such an enterprise would be sufficient to counterbalance the potential ire of congressmen. (In a number of cases the matter has been imaginatively sidestepped by supplying materials for construction of dormitories and schools for public use within temple grounds.)

Integrated Planning

The foreign official aside, real problems of inter-agency jealousy may arise as, for example, in the case where the local schoolteacher starts an experimental garden and is supported by the villagers in his request for seeds and tools for his pupils. Is the Ministry of Education possibly intruding into the sphere of the Ministry of Agriculture? This leads into the next point: "Balanced community development requires concerted action and the establishment of multipurpose programs." Let us assume that through integrated planning the different ministries are able to compromise their differences so that the interests of all are ad-

vanced. But what about the local reflection of national issues, as where health measures contribute to a population increase, which negates the efforts of agricultural extension workers in securing increased production to say nothing of raising the pressure on what are usually limited educational facilities?

Changes in Attitudes

Here the third point becomes relevant: "Changed attitudes in people are as important as the material achievement of community projects during the initial stages of development." One wonders whether improved methods of cultivation are seen as more crucial than concern about ways of preventing the spread of disease. This is obviously a real problem in terms of dividing limited resources between health and agricultural agencies. Perhaps there is less conflict on the local scene where, although fewer people do ease the pressure on limited food production, nevertheless a healthy farmer is obviously more productive than a sick one.

There is another dimension to "changed attitudes": The instigators of the program cannot be sure that these changes will not be in the direction of "extravagant hopes and demands," which are seen as an implied consequence of uncoordinated change. Even if a small initial program is successful in arousing specific interests in, say, the use of artificial fertilizer, or in having a health team visit periodically, the government may not be able to provide artificial fertilizer at a reasonable price or to allocate funds to establish a convenient clinic. We are leaving aside for the moment the very real problem of overcoming traditional attitudes and communicating a new idea or concept in an effective manner. The matter is complex. In considering health practices, for example, if attitudes change based on faith (but without understanding) they can create unjustifiable needs and raise unreasonable expectations (a problem not unique to developing nations). Injection and pills may be seen as a cure-all and become incorporated into the arsenal of techniques employed by some traditional, amateur, or poorly-trained medical practitioners or be sought from state health services for all types of illness with consequent resentment if they are refused.

At the heart of changing attitudes is the process of education, formal as well as informal. Although better educated community leaders can be seen as desirable, formal education and training above the locally available minimum often makes it more difficult for the successful student to adjust. More advanced schooling often takes many of the most intelligent and aggressive youth away from the village community.

Participation of the People

The fourth point, in which "community development aims at increased and better participation of the people in community affairs, re-vitalization of existing forms of local government and transition towards effective local administration where it is not yet functioning," can be seen as an unobjectionable democratic virtue to some, but to the entrenched political hierarchy, even an elected one, such activities may appear to be a very real threat. On an urban American level, during 1965 not a few mayors complained about the implementation of the clause in the poverty program calling for representatives of the poor to participate in policy plannings of programs designed to aid the economically disadvantaged. In rural Mississippi the Headstart nursery school program, utilizing mainly local talent, was so successful among Delta Negroes that it was regarded as a threat by some local whites, contradicting as it did their stereotypes about passive and biologically inferior Negroes.

In countries with strongly competing political parties or interest groups, community development programs make an ideal vehicle for promoting special interests. This has happened in a number of countries where the army, with specially-trained personnel of its own, has become deeply involved in rural programs, as a counter-insurgency tactic, in moves to strengthen political support. These tendencies can be observed in Southeast Asia and Latin America. In such instances the question naturally arises as to whether limited innovation in the local community is being traded off for continuity of power on the national level.

Related points are: "The identification, encouragement, and training of local leadership should be a basic objective in any programme;" and "Greater reliance on the participation of women and youth in community projects invigorates development programmes, establishes them on a wide basis and secures long-range expansion." Here again we wonder which leaders—the older men of status or the future ones in the younger generation.

Even the formal leadership group in a village is often split by internal conflict. A good example of this situation is provided by a study of an Egyptian village in the early 1950's, in which there were two distinct factions and several cliques within each, represented by the mayor and the sheiks who supervised sections of the village. The most "revolutionary" was in favor of any change that held out the possibility of raising the low standard of living. The mayor stressed the attempt to combine modern change and traditional practices. Within the conserva-

tive group one sheik opposed any change in traditional ways, and another approached the views of the mayor in that although he wanted to preserve the traditional structure he recognized the necessity for change as new problems appeared. The mayor, although elected, was one of the largest landholders in the village, but his position was far from unchallenged. He had enemies because his grandfather had inherited land at the expense of his great-uncles, and the latter's impoverished descendants still resented the fact of the inheritance. It is purely individual and personal factors such as these that play a great role in determining the nature and effectiveness of local leadership.²

Aside from conflict between generations there is the matter of class and social group affiliation. It is also important to know to what extent status in the existing hierarchy derives from amount of formal education, personal inclination toward innovation, occupational skills, and experiences outside the village. We can also wonder to what extent reliance on women and youth undermines the formal leadership.

National Programs and Local Developments

Two final points deal with the relationship between national programs and local developments: (a) "Implementation of a community development programme on a national scale requires: adoption of consistent policies, specific administrative arrangements, recruitment and training of personnel, mobilization of local and national resources;" and (b) "Economic and social progress at the local level necessitates parallel development on a wider national scale."

These assumptions, of course, beg certain fundamental political questions, but considering the structure of the United Nations, the foregoing approach is most reasonable and illustrates the essential commitment of most nations to promoting rural development of some sort. The last point may contain a false assumption, however, for it seems to imply that a rising standard of living on the village level is dependent on a national commitment to fostering improvements in agriculture and associated handicraft and artisan enterprises within the village community. But, for understandable reasons, nothing is said about industrialization. Decisions about plant location can obviously affect whole communities. Although in certain cases factories needing a large labor supply may purposely be placed in overpopulated rural areas, more importantly availability of power, transportation, and raw materials—all totally unrelated to the nature of the local rural economy—can nevertheless make

² John B. Adams, "Culture and Conflict in an Egyptian Village," *American Anthropologist*, 59, No. 2 (1957), 225-35.

irrelevant the question of developing local agriculture in any significant way, since in most cases rural peoples appear to be relatively easy to entice off the land when permanent employment at reasonable wages is offered. Often at least one member of the family will seek a job, and the homestead will continue to be maintained by others. In some areas such developments have resulted in the gradual depopulation of the more marginal areas of the countryside. The needs of industrialization are such a key factor that even in the rare case where the government is committed to a retrogressive or very limited rural development policy the rural population is drawn off the land and given a degree of technical education when it is needed as a labor force. Thus, rural conditions may be unintentionally ameliorated through remittances or lessened population pressures. This appears to have been the case in South Africa. On the other hand, governments strongly committed to rural and national development are unable to accomplish too much at least within a short time, since they lack an industrial base. This generalization seems to apply to Algeria and Indonesia.

The above reservations should not be taken to imply that particular programs with limited objectives cannot accomplish their ends. Although failure is frequent so is success, and the results are certainly significant. The achievement of limited goals, however, should not be confused with the solution of more fundamental problems.

An important question is the extent to which the local community need be an important focus for services. For example, what are the relative economies of centralization in services, e.g., health center in a provincial town versus a number of smaller ones in surrounding villages; here related questions of roads, vehicles, and telephone service are pertinent.

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Focusing now on the individual, there is the related question of fundamental "rights" posed in the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. These include: participation in the government directly or through freely elected representatives, protection against unemployment, adequate pay for work performed, a standard of living which properly provides for the health and well-being of an individual and his family, free elementary education, free movement within his own country, free departure and return, and promotion of social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.³

³ *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: United Nations, 1963), Special Fifteenth Anniversary Edition.

Few Americans would actively dissent from these ideals as desirable goals, but agreement on the ways they can be achieved is another matter. What do these goals imply for the village community? Can they be achieved within the framework of the village community as we now know it, taking into account great variety?

Let us examine some of the specific implications of the phrase "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," a basic point in the preamble to the United Nations Charter and specified in detail in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

It is certainly true that many of the political rights in the Declaration—equality before the law, an impartial judiciary, freedom to leave one's country, free elections, free expression and right of peaceful assembly—are not widely honored throughout the world today. In communist countries these freedoms are conceived of as existing only within the context of the leadership of a single party and a unitary ideology. But it would be a mistake to disregard the whole document as something not to be taken seriously. The social as opposed to political rights do find a wide degree of acceptance, as manifested, for example, in the constitutions of both communist and non-communist states and party programs throughout the world. In fact an aspect of conflict in the contemporary world is the competition over which is the quickest and most effective way to implement social benefits. Although modernization is specifically linked to industrialization, there is also a related desire to preserve "a national personality." Many contemporary national leaders in new states tend to stress economic and social development espousing a variety of "guided democracy," which has tended toward at least a temporary de-emphasis and minimization of political rights.

When the nationalist leaders speak of the "development" of the nation, they are speaking primarily of *economic* development. The leadership and members of nationalist movements are acutely aware of the galling contrast between the poverty, illiteracy, and disease of their own countries and the affluence of the economically developed areas. For them, the crucial division in the world is not between the rival political faiths of communism and liberal democracy, but between the rich and the poor, the economically developed and the underdeveloped, the technically competent and the technologically "backward" areas of the world. . . . With development and industrialization, it will be possible to achieve social equality, educational opportunity, and minimum standards of health and sanitation—in short, the modern welfare state.⁴

⁴ Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., ed., "Introduction," *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 11. Reprinted by permission.

Freedom of Movement

Article 13 declares, "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." Does this mean that villagers have the right to seek a life outside the confines of their community? Such a freedom seems to imply the peasantization of the town as an assumed stage in the evolution of contemporary civilizations. An illustration of this situation is provided by the population of Istanbul. Starting in the mid-1940's were "gecekondus" (birds that come to roost during the night), communities of squatter huts erected by recent migrants from the countryside. According to estimates, from one fifth to one fourth of the population of the city currently live in these settlements. Once erected these one- and two-room hovels are difficult to remove legally. As evidence of their permanence, some have recently acquired electricity although they lack running water and indoor latrines. Older urban residents lament this peasantization of the town, some feeling that Istanbul has been degraded to the status of an overgrown provincial town and that the revolution begun by Ataturk forty years ago has not been fulfilled.⁵

In Brazil. A similar situation prevails in Rio de Janeiro's favelas, populated to a significant extent by rural people from the dry areas of northern Brazil where water is scarce and famine a well-remembered experience. Uneducated and unskilled, they are drawn to Rio, which seems to hold out promises of water, food, and opportunity. In 1962 the favelas housed approximately 338,000 people, almost a 100 per cent increase over 1950. The diary of an articulate inhabitant who collected scrap paper for a living describes in great detail the daily hunger, scavenging for food in the city's garbage heaps, personal conflict and brutality within the slum, and the striving for her children. These communities "grow and grow and grow until they are small cities of filth, perversion, and prostitution."⁶ None of these characteristics are unique to the modern city, but modern technology and our contemporary ideology enables us, in fact forces us, to conceive of their elimination.

In China. No country is immune from these problems. During the period 1953-1957 it appears that a large-scale movement from rural to urban areas took place in China, receiving much comment in that nation's press. Many official attempts were made to reverse the trend. One Chinese official estimated that by the end of 1957 there was a "temporary and floating" population in China's cities amounting to more than

⁵ Hedrick Smith, "A Tribute to Ataturk," *New York Times*, November 13, 1965.

⁶ David St. Clair, translator's preface to *Child of the Dark: The Diary of Carolina María de Jesús* (New York: New American Library, Signet Book, 1963), p. 8.

2,200,000. In Tientsin alone it is estimated that some 205,000 peasants came between 1956 and 1957, or over seven per cent of the city's total population (this city had an estimated 2,700,000 people in 1953).

According to the *People's Daily*, there were many reasons for this migration: "Flight from calamities is only one of them. Most of the peasants involved were not happy with the jobs of agricultural production they had and admired urban life." They specifically liked the urban level of pay and welfare benefits (presumably including the access to facilities unavailable in the countryside).⁷

But opportunities in the city have not expanded to meet the desires of the migrants. According to a survey by the United States Bureau of the Census:

The scale of the decrease in nonagricultural employment in 1961 signifies an almost catastrophic reduction in nonagricultural economic activities.⁸

From March through July, 1961, the *People's Daily* listed seventeen separate transfers to agriculture of 3.5 million urban workers from different cities.

These transfers have only to a small extent offset the very rapid urban growth. During 1953-1958 it is estimated that while the total population grew at the rate of 2.4 per cent a year, the urban population increased by four per cent per year and the rural population by two per cent per year. From 1949-1958 urban areas grew from 56 to 96 million while the rural population expanded from 481 to 559 million or 71 per cent and 16 per cent respectively.⁹

Urban crowding is a world-wide problem. In Calcutta, some 600,000 people sleep in the streets, and it is estimated that about 100,000 farmers continue to move in yearly. In Karachi squatters represent about a third of the population, in Manila twenty per cent, in Caracas thirty-five per cent and twenty-five per cent in Santiago. As in Turkey, courts in Pakistan and the Philippines feel powerless to evict squatters. The political impact is obvious since many of the fastest growing cities are also national capitals. In some cases, in addition to the attraction of the city and the poor yield from the land, cities grow with refugees fleeing

⁷ Morris B. Ullman, *Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958*, International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 59 (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Manpower Research Office, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, 1961), p. 12.

⁸ John Philip Emerson, *Nonagricultural Employment in Mainland China: 1949-1958*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division), pp. 79, 95.

⁹ Ernest Ni, *Distribution of the Urban and Rural Population of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-95, No. 56 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, Foreign Manpower Office), pp. 1-2, 4.

armed political warfare in the countryside; this was the case of people fleeing the Huks who came to Manila and more recently Vietnamese farmers seeking refuge in the coastal cities. These developments have been characterized as an urban revolution, but it is even more fundamentally a rural revolution, since the intense crowding in urban slums is hardly a bright alternative to rural poverty. Most migrants view their village situation as so undesirable that it is only a minority who return. This high urban growth closely correlates with village attitudes. In Turkey, in addition to the situation in Istanbul, urban squatters make up forty-five per cent of the population of Ankara and eighteen per cent of Izmir;¹⁰ a nation-wide survey found that over one fifth of the village men interviewed said they would like to move to the city, primarily for economic reasons; two-fifths wanted their children to move.¹¹

FAMILY FORMATION

Leaving aside the matter of urban migration and turning to some of the other rights within the context of the village community, Article 16 states: "Men and women of full age without any limitations due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family." That this is not an unrestricted right has been officially recognized in a United Nations General Assembly Resolution (18 December 1962) stating that economic development and population growth are closely related. These problems are widely acknowledged, and India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Turkey have adopted national policies of encouraging family planning while Taiwan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic subsidize it even though they do not have formally enumerated policies. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union there are liberal policies with regard to abortion and to making contraceptives available. China also provides family planning services justified on health and welfare grounds. There is a growing desire among rural people themselves to limit family size, although they appear less strongly motivated in this direction than urban people. For example in South Korea, which has one of the world's fastest growing populations, increasing at the rate of three per cent per year, urban people are reported as desiring an average of 3.3 children as compared to 4.3 in rural areas. Similar results have been obtained in India where seventy-one per cent of the men and seventy-five per cent of the women in villages said they wished

¹⁰ Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 10, 13, 23-24, 268.

¹¹ Bernard Berelson, "Turkey: National Survey on Population" (New York: The Population Council, Studies in Family Planning No. 5, December, 1964), p. 1.

no more children in addition to the four they already had; the figures rose to ninety-two and ninety-one per cent respectively in cases where there were already five children in the family. In terms of actually practicing family planning, however, surveys found only three to eight per cent in rural India and 1.5 per cent in rural Egypt.¹²

Abortion and more rarely infanticide are, of course, old methods of population control. There is also the possibility of marrying at an advanced age or not marrying at all, rural Ireland being a well-known example. In Japan abortion is completely legal and has played a major role in reducing population growth. Currently, induced abortions approximate the number of live births. Abortions are also numerous in eastern Europe, where the laws are liberal and the practice is widespread. In a number of countries it constitutes a major health problem. It seems likely that some combination of late marriage, coitus interruptus, and abortion has been responsible for the limitation of size of families in rural areas.

Returning to Orašac as an example in depth, there has been a significant reduction in the number of children borne by individual mothers. Data from 1881 and 1951 showed that in 1881 fifty per cent of the fifty-eight cases were of a mother having her fifth or higher number of consecutive births, while in 1951 less than two per cent (one of the fifty-two cases) were in this category; put another way, taking as the unit those women living in 1953, of those who were over sixty-five, fifty-eight per cent had had four or more children while only thirty-eight per cent of the women in the forty-six to fifty age group bore that many. Since no family planning services or devices have been available in Orašac, the reduction in fertility has been accomplished by coitus interruptus and self-induced abortion, both practices having become common within this century.¹³ These conscious efforts to limit family size certainly appear to be a perception of the increasing limitation of natural resources. Such self-limitations of family size are found in an even more drastic sense in rural China where the available land is more severely restricted (see pp. 89-90).

Among the means of limiting population, the mechanical and chemical methods of contraception developed in the West seem most widely acceptable. These modern methods require a technically trained bureaucracy to implement them. Contemporary governments, even the most democratically oriented, cannot help but involve themselves in the most

¹² W. Parker Mauldin, "Fertility Studies: Knowledge, Attitude and Practice" (New York: The Population Council Studies in Family Planning No. 7, June, 1965).

¹³ Joel M. Halpern, *A Serbian Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 139.

intimate details of a villager's life. This ever closer relationship between the villager and the national state is an important aspect of the rural revolution.

Disasters are often effective in bringing about population change. Ireland suffered a severe famine in the early nineteenth century and subsequently limited its population by emigration as well as by late or nonmarriage, and Japan legalized induced abortions after her defeat in World War II. Perhaps Latin American and Asian countries that have not evolved their own solutions can benefit by recent inventions, but this cannot be done without a feeling of self-need among village people. There is some indication that this is slowly taking place, aided no doubt by severe economic stress and in some cases by a declining standard of living. Obviously major cultural transitions never take place in a tranquil setting. It is not yet clear to what extent a peaceful revolution is a contradiction in terms.

Control of population and immigration are key factors in making possible a situation in a village where "everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" (Article 23), and "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood, in circumstances beyond his control" (Article 25).

ROLE OF TRADITIONAL VILLAGE COMMUNITY

The rights expressed in these two Articles, with the possible exception of free choice of employment, are precisely what extended family groupings within the traditional village community provided. This was also largely the case in the pre-industrial city, since municipal services were at best weakly developed. Free choice of employment is in many areas a new idea, since it requires perceiving alternatives to a given way of life. In many countries the persistence of traditional family patterns makes it possible for those who fail in the city to return to their village homes. This contributes to a lack of productivity in agriculture but enables the state to avoid the social and economic overhead of institutional care.

The south Slav *zadruga* was such an extended family grouping functioning as a semiautonomous production and consumption unit, providing employment and security for its members. The advantages and

disadvantages of this way of life are described by a Serbian ethnographer of the nineteenth century.

The Serbs live mainly in *zadrugas*: in some houses there are four to five families and one-family households are few. Each house has a headman who manages the house and the whole property: he gives orders to adults and young people where to go and what to do; he communicates with the Turks and takes part in village and district meetings; he sells what has to be sold and buys what has to be bought in agreement with other members of the household and pays the taxes. If a headman does not manage the house well the members elect another. Every woman spins, weaves and makes shirts for herself, for her own husband and children; the women prepare food in turns, a week at a time. The Serbs, as peasants, live only from land and livestock, cut timber, build houses and make their own sandals.¹⁴

It should be stressed that the autonomy was relative, not absolute. Trade, especially in livestock, was an important feature of Balkan life, and the services of a variety of artisans and other specialists both in the village and town were essential to the household.

NO ALTERNATIVE TO DEVELOPMENT

The Declaration of Human Rights is focused on the future, not the past, and appears to assume that the primary obligation for assuring human welfare rests not with the family or even the village community but with the national state and secondarily with international organizations. This is implicit in statements about medical care, presumably meaning modern medicine, employment security, and social services and is made particularly explicit in Article 26 dealing with education: "Everyone has the right to education," which shall be free and compulsory in the elementary stages with technical and higher education open to all on the basis of merit. The duties and obligations of the citizen are specified in Article 29: "Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of the personality is possible."

The community development program appears to place a higher premium on individual initiative than does *The Declaration of Human Rights*, but neither document has anything to say about the possibility of nonparticipation. Although conceptually an alternative, realistically it does not appear to be one. That is, villagers have no choice of whether or not they wish to be developed. The failure of village improvement

¹⁴ Abbreviated from the writings of Vuk Karadžić translated in *Contrasts in Emerging Societies*, ed. Doreen Warriner (London: Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 297-98.

schemes can be regarded as only a temporary failure. It does seem worth stressing, however, that while progress as a fact of life is not debatable, nor is an admiration for the past a helpful way of anticipating the future, still the implications of change for the villager need to be clearly stated. Provision of state services in health, education, and welfare are admittedly an improvement over the formerly limited protection and marketing facilities that the state offered villagers in return for taxes, *corvée*, and military service. But the provision of these services does necessitate a more intimate allegiance to a central authority than used to be necessary. It is certainly conceivable that some peoples, if given a choice, might prefer to be let alone and endure the penalties of nondevelopment—earlier death, the disabilities of disease, illiteracy, an impoverished economy, and occasional starvation. Such options do not exist, however, and indeed seem never to have existed in an absolute sense. Trade was an important factor, even in the paleolithic. In modern times even seemingly isolated tribal peoples are intimately linked up with the world economy.

Universal Education

What, then, are some of the consequences of the implementation of these rights set forth in the United Nations declaration? Universal education implies a number of things for the village community. First there is the question of physical facilities. Sometimes the central government will, as part of a plan or a political promise, provide a community with a school building and send the teachers to staff it. Frequently the community is asked to contribute funds or labor for the building. Often there is a degree of resistance and at other times real enthusiasm. Once the school is established in the community a secular presence makes itself felt. That is, the pre-existing intellectual leadership in the community begins to be either implicitly or explicitly challenged. Most often this reflects on the role of the church, mosque, or pagoda, particularly with regard to the matter of religious instruction of the young. Although it is true that this can take place after-hours under the religious leader, nevertheless competing demands are placed on the child's time and as a practical matter traditional formal religious instruction tends to be bypassed or at least limited. Sometimes a tentative compromise is reached in a country where one faith prevails. There may be some degree of religious instruction in the school or, in some countries where teachers are scarce, the instructor may himself be a priest, monk, or nun. But generally speaking educational systems tend to be secular.

It is also necessary to consider the demands of the school as opposed

to the needs of the family, a situation that becomes particularly acute when all available labor is needed at harvest or planting time. Although truancy laws are not always enforced at the village level, the potentiality for conflict exists. An additional factor is the role of the teacher himself. Being an educated man (compared to the villagers) he usually assumes a position of some importance in local affairs (although this position may tend to be tempered by the age of the teacher, his length of stay in the village, and his personality).

The development of rural educational systems is a critical part of the rural revolution, since exposure to formal secular education begins to offer the village youth an alternate set of values. It may also arouse in him unrealistic expectations, e.g., the hope of a career in town for which his family means as well as the resources of the state as a whole are inadequate. Elementary education is relatively cheap financially so that the degree of literacy does not necessarily correlate closely with the degree of economic development. The ideological content of education may be sufficiently restricted so that it is possible to have widespread literacy without too great an implied threat to the established social order.

In some cases the teacher comes to the village as a dedicated idealist, determined to bring knowledge to the benighted. Most often such efforts are met by indifference. An example is provided by the reformist Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century who saw in peasant life "vital" institutions such as the communal land system that might provide the future base for a new society. Idealistic students serving as village teachers went among the peasants hoping to convert them to socialist ideas. They were not welcomed and the movement was a failure.

In this century in Turkey, Atatürk made a central point of his program for national development the creation of secular village schools. Many were built, in part by forced labor. Although it was decreed that village teachers would occupy a place on the village council, they were often ostracized and beaten. The problem had not been solved a generation later when an idealistic young teacher wrote an account of his bitter experiences in a village school that subsequently became the best selling book in Turkey.¹⁵

Some rural teachers are without doubt idealists, but there are others who are less conscientious in the performance of their duties and in some cases do not appear to be above embezzling school funds. Many resent being posted to rural areas and look down upon both the pupils and their parents. Even those who want to do a good job are often

¹⁵ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1964), pp. 121-22.

poorly paid or have inadequate supplies. Most importantly, many are poorly trained, sometimes having only a few more years' education than their pupils. In many ways the situation of a rural teacher in Laos is typical:

I am twenty-three years old. When I finished the sixth grade I received a certificate and I took the examination to be a teacher. I passed. The government sent me to Teachers' Training School. After I finished the course I was sent back to my native province and assigned to Ban Beng. When I got here I organized the building of the school. I teach the pupils to show respect for country, religion, king and laws. The villagers don't give much support to education and improving the school. When I asked for aid to repair the school-house, I had to speak many times and then only three or four people came. People are interested in their personal work and are too busy to support the school. Some parents want their sons to work in the fields so they take them out of school. So many students are always absent.¹⁶

In many cases the curriculum is unrelated to the background, needs, or interests of the villagers, and so they see little functional use for the training their children receive. The only instrumental use for education, as seen by many villagers in countries such as India and Egypt, is for their children to attain the status of civil servants. This takes money, which most villagers lack. In addition, competition for the limited number of jobs is becoming increasingly acute.¹⁷

The total educational system in much of Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia is oriented toward producing civil servants, and so shortages of technicians have developed at the same time that there is an unemployable surplus of liberal arts graduates.¹⁸ This may be one reason student demonstrations are so easily organized. In any case, from 1950-1959 primary education grew by fifty-four per cent, enrollment expanding from 208 to 321 million students, and secondary enrollment doubled to eighty-four million.¹⁹ It surely seems that the future useful employment of both uneducated village migrants and educated school-boys will be an increasingly crucial problem in future decades.

¹⁶ Abbreviated from Halpern, *Government, Politics and Social Structure in Laos: A Study of Tradition and Innovation*, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph No. 4 (1964), pp. 167-68. Reprinted by permission.

¹⁷ See Hamed Ammar, *Growing Up in an Egyptian Village* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), Chap. 2, and Nityananda Patnaik, "Education in the Area of Barpali" in Lyle W. Shannon, ed., *Underdeveloped Areas* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957), pp. 100-108.

¹⁸ *Report on the World Social Situation, 1963* (New York: United Nations, 1957 and 1963), pp. 68-69.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Despite great progress there is still a long way to go before most of the world's rural population will complete primary school. In the largest countries of the world, the percentage of the population ages five to fourteen enrolled in primary schools (1950-1960) grew in mainland China from 21 to 57, in India from 21 to 32, in Indonesia from 28 to 42, and in Pakistan from 17 to 22.²⁰ The quality of this increased effort, of course, varies enormously.

It is possible that the full implementation of the education and migration provisions of the Declaration might negate the ones that call for public order. Poverty can be painful and to be ignorant is to live in an incomplete world, but the total implications of the alternatives are as yet unknown.

Among the most important influences making for change in the village community has been the attraction of a new life in part inspired by education as well as the push of rural impoverishment. These points are brought out in the autobiographical notes of a young Lao official:

From temple school to the town, by merits I accumulated or by sins which I committed during my last life, I parted from my childhood teachers and came to the *lycée*. I had a feeling of prestige in coming to Vientiane, the beautiful city of Laos. Being in the city was a great pleasure. I did not have to arise with the cocks and sleepily find a lantern to light before starting the fire to cook rice. I used to have to study by firelight. I was glad not to have to go into the jungle for firewood, or to find mushrooms, bamboo shoots and other vegetables. No more stepping on thorns and stumps. I didn't have to fight off mosquitoes and escape from leeches. No fishing for food. No setting fish traps or bird traps.²¹

Has this been a common attitude historically? Is this revulsion against the harsh realities of rural living a new phenomenon not only in Laos but elsewhere in the world? Unfortunately, for lack of evidence, we cannot answer this question in any definitive way—but we do know that in the contemporary world population movement has not been a simple matter of people fleeing the village for the pleasure and prestige of city life.

²⁰ *Compendium of Social Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1963), p. 326.

²¹ Halpern, *Government, Politics and Social Structure in Laos*, pp. 146-47.

Having briefly surveyed in Chapter Two some of the problems of change on the village level in two medium-sized developing countries, Mexico and Yugoslavia, it is now appropriate to look at the changing village community in four of the world's major nations, India, China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, and to consider the routes they have been taking toward development.

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

A North Indian Study

What meaning does the concept of rural revolution have for village India? A number of both Indian and foreign scholars have studied the village community, and it is possible to look at change in diverse regional settings. East of Agra in northern India, one village has been observed over the course of thirty years. The attitudes of the villagers of Karimpur, a settlement enclosed within high, rain-furrowed mud walls, were first summed up in 1930:

To a newcomer we may seem suspicious, obstinate, intolerant, backward—everything that goes with refusal to change. We did not choose these characteristics for ourselves. Experience forced them upon our fathers. And the warnings of our fathers, added to our own experiences, have drilled them into us. Refusal to change is the armor with which we have learned to protect ourselves. If we and our fathers had accepted the new ideas and customs commended to use, we might have made greater progress. But greater progress would have drawn the eyes of a covetous world toward

CHAPTER SIX

The Rural Revolution: India and China

us. And then our lot would have been worse than before. Where are the cities that flourished for a time? In ruins. While they climbed to great heights and fell to the depths of destruction, we kept to the old reliable level. And we have survived. We are not blind to the advantages of the new, but unless we know just where it will lead us, we prefer to let it pass us by.¹

These attitudes appear to be widespread among rural people in areas not undergoing significant economic development and with a low level of political consciousness, or where such aspirations have been effectively blocked. Explicit in the foregoing statement is the idea that the peasant continues on his way while urban-focused civilizations rise and fall. The peasant views the outside world as essentially hostile. This, however, is not entirely a matter of village solidarity versus the outside world. Often villagers use their outside connections to exploit fellow villagers, as in cases where village watchmen, local representatives of the police, trump up charges and then extract bribes by threatening their fellow villagers with the retribution of higher authority. Such attitudes common to many traditional rural communities are closely tied to the limited ecological possibilities available. An anthropologist who has worked extensively in Mexico has spoken of "the image of the limited good," in peasant society;² that is, all valued things whether they be land, wealth, health, friendship, status, power, or security are viewed as existing in strictly limited quantities, and the villager has no possibility of altering this undesirable situation. Thus it is possible for one individual to advance only at the expense of another. To some extent this situation is redressed by a successful individual being forced to expend significant resources on a ceremonial occasion.

The very title of the Karimpur study stresses this theme. It is the purpose of the village's mud walls "to conceal us and our possessions from the greedy ones." These walls look dilapidated in order to hide from the rest of the world the situation within. Fear of the outside world, including one's neighbors, places stress on the family and to a lesser extent on more distant kin for security. Combined with this is an emphasis on land and the role of hidden caches of silver to ensure survival in the most elementary sense.

Not all aspects of village life are fraught with unhappiness and pain, nor are these negative aspects of human existence peculiar to traditional rural societies; interpersonal conflict certainly is by no means peculiar to a particular group, a way of life, or even a period of history.

¹ William H. and Charlotte Viall Wiser, *Behind Mud Walls: 1930-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 117. Reprinted by permission.

² George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist*, 67, No. 2 (April 1965), 293-315.

Interpersonal conflict is, however, related to the man-land ratio and the nature of the inheritance system, i.e., conflict among brothers may be avoided where there is a clearly defined pattern of primogeniture, as in western Europe. Social structuring may also serve to lessen conflict. An anthropologist who has studied villages in both India and Mexico feels that the presence of clan and caste systems in the former gives a cohesive quality to social relations, in contrast to separateness in the latter society, where emphasis is on the small family group. On another level it has been suggested that conflict is more productive in understanding human society and that emphasizing enjoyment leads to a static picture.³

Life in Karimpur was not seen as necessarily tranquil or unchanging but rather that conflict and individual development occurred within the context of a relatively unchanging society. Villagers fought with and intrigued each other, and individual lives changed as people aged and family fortunes varied. Weather, too, brought changes. Yet all change occurred within an overall framework of stability. From the long-range point of view there was, of course, a process of cultural evolution at work, but this took place slowly and was apparently not of immediate concern to the people of Karimpur. The observers' strongly felt impression in 1930 was that "the ordinary village farmer is the victim of circumstances, not the master. His life is pervaded and pressed down by his fears of the forces which control him."

Two decades later they saw little change: continued resignation to the effects of drought and flood, the persistence of cholera as a health problem, and exploitation by minor officials. Some improvement was noted in sanitation and in the potential of recently instituted land reform.⁴ In 1962 when one of the authors revisited the village there were notable developments, among the most significant of which was a fifty per cent increase in population over the thirty years, to a total of 1,129 in 1961. An important contributing factor to this natural increase has been better health services, including more effective malaria spraying. The increase has even occurred in the face of some migration out of the village. A number of low-caste families (sweepers and water-carriers) have gone to Delhi and Calcutta. Men who have left their families in the village have done so partly because they cannot find living space in the urban slums to which they go and also because of economic and social ties to the village. In addition there has also been the more traditional inter-

³ Oscar Lewis, "Some of My Best Friends Are Peasants," *Human Organization*, 19, No. 4 (Winter 1960), 179-80.

⁴ William H. and Charlotte Viall Wiser, *Behind Mud Walls* (New York: Agricultural Missions, Inc., 1951), p. viii.

village migration among Brahmins due to property transfers. There appears, however, to have been a significantly greater number leaving than arriving.

With regard to education, just as upper-caste young people are beginning to look around for jobs outside the village, competition has become keener for civil service positions: "B.A.'s and M.A.'s are now competing for clerkships which high school graduates once could hope for."⁵ In 1962 one village youth aspired to become a lawyer and another, although he failed his examination at the end of eighth grade, had hopes of getting into the police department. It appears that further social pressures of this nature will be building up with the continuing expansion of school facilities in Karimpur (planned through junior high school). This problem will doubtless be intensified by greater land fragmentation and increasing population pressure on limited land resources to which the villagers themselves refer.

Aside from emigration and education, contacts with the town have increased on a number of levels. Bus service to town has existed for about twenty years. In 1962 there were well over a dozen buses to nearby towns daily, although the fare is too high for poorer villagers. Of equal significance are the fifty-six bicycles in the village; thirty years before there were only two. A villager has specialized in their repair, and a Brahmin has opened a stand at the bus stop. In addition two brothers have each invested in oxen and a cart to transport farmers with grain to town. Shepherds now carry milk into town for sale. The village still lacks a radio. A post office was established for the area twelve years ago, however, and mail, mostly postcards, is sent and received. Official newspapers are received by the headmaster of the school and the council president, and increasing travel naturally promotes the dissemination of news by word of mouth.

These contacts have brought difficulties to certain village craftsmen. Three brothers who used to press oil from mustard seed can no longer compete with the mills in town and have become agricultural day laborers while their equipment stands idle. Among the cotton carders, carpenters, and washermen business is on the decline because of better access to superior urban facilities.

A most important change has been the land reform. It has been successful in that all the farmers have managed to become owners of the land they cultivate, a change greatly appreciated, although many doubted the possibility at the outset. On the negative side, however, there has been a great increase in land disputes and court litigation in-

⁵ Wiser and Wiser, *Behind Mud Walls: 1930-1960*, p. 215.

volving significant expenditures. Village government has become more vigorous, and projects have been undertaken such as the paving of lanes, a fish pond, and a new school. A new tube well provides an improved supply of water for irrigation; there are more wells for the use of individual households (approximately twice as many as thirty years before); pumps have begun to be installed; improved lanterns are used at night, and electricity is hoped for in the future. There is a functioning community development program with a *gram sevak*, or local extension worker, backed by a bureaucracy with specialists whose services he can draw on. Together with the head of the village council he has encouraged new varieties of seeds and the use of chemical fertilizers and has urged better livestock practices.

New crops include cotton and peanuts, introduced in about 1954, and more recently, tomatoes. There is also an improved variety of sugar cane, and more vegetables are raised.⁶ The number of traditional plows in Karimpur has doubled, and many are factory-made. Fodder-cutters are more commonly used than the old hand choppers, and more sugar presses are in use. Kerosene lanterns have replaced open clay saucer lamps, which burn mustard oil.

Today "young men of Karimpur see village life as more open, with more good things possible, than did their fathers."⁷

Conflict and problems as they concern the village are not glossed over in the Karimpur study, and several developments should give us serious thoughts about the future, namely the increase in population, the rising aspirations of the younger generation, and the technological unemployment of village artisans. For a fuller understanding we must look beyond this single village. A basic problem implicit in the caste structure of Indian villages is the conflict between the democratic ideology of the government of India, specifically as stressed in the goals of its community development program, and the fact that as presently designed it benefits, in the main, farmers of higher caste, since it is generally the most prosperous farmers who are best equipped to profit from the advice offered. In some cases this has resulted in the hostility of both high- and low-caste groups to the program, the former because they fear a change in the status quo since the government has openly proclaimed its opposition to the caste system and outlawed untouchability, and the latter because the Community Development Program offers them no potential benefits.⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63, 197-99.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xi of "Introduction" by David Mandelbaum.

⁸ Gerald D. Berreman, "Caste and Community Development," *Human Organization*, 22, No. 1 (Spring 1963), 90-94.

These questions raise a number of fundamental problems whose solutions do not appear to be possible within a restricted framework. For India, or even in the specific case of Karimpur, we have a number of expectations, a set of limitations, and a series of instrumentalities. Regarding the expectations, we could define as an absolute minimum the continuation of the status quo, with a maintenance of the present standards of food consumption, the continuance of existing programs in health and education, and the maintenance of such minimal services as, for example, the village bus service. But this is a totally unrealistic assumption because future progress is not conceived as something finite by either the villagers or the government (i.e., not a plateau to be achieved at a given time but rather an infinitely expanding horizon). Further, because of increasing population a continuation of anything approaching the status quo can only mean progressively accelerating hunger in India.

Limitations are inherent in the amount of land that can be brought under cultivation as well as the range of other natural resources. The instrumentalities are the ways in which the resources can be utilized to fulfill the expectations or at the very least the basic necessities. In the Indian case these instrumentalities have been a democratic form of government, and, with regard to rural areas, a community development program, as well as a significant amount of foreign aid, mainly American.

Future decisions cannot be made in any meaningful way without assessing the attitudes of the villagers. In Karimpur at least some young people seem to prefer the rural life, stressing its present advantages but aware of future problems.

We are not driven, the way men in the city seem to be. We take time to enjoy our families before we go out to work in the fields. And after work we sit with our friends. . . . Most men in cities work in mills. This is not for us. We want to be free. The time is sure to come when some of our children will be obliged to get jobs in the city. Our fields are being divided and redivided with each generation until they already seem too small. The land can no longer support us all.⁹

A Kerala Coastal Village

The significance of future problems is implicit in much of the published data. The increasing number of restudies of village communities

⁹ Wiser and Wiser, *Behind Mud Walls: 1930-1960*, pp. 154, 228-29. The price of land is currently ten times what it was in 1930, and land is jealously guarded as a family heritage. Reprinted by permission.

is helping us see the problems of the rural revolution in concrete historical perspective. Another case of a restudy of an Indian village, this one a narrow coastal settlement in Kerala, bordered by brackish lagoons and the sea, helps us visualize the problem of growing urban influences and at the same time see the parallel pressures on limited land resources.¹⁰

A striking fact about this village, called Mayur, is its population density, which approximates 4,700 to the square mile (a 1955 population of 2,000 on less than half a square mile of land). With expected future population growth the density here will approximate Indian urban conditions, and it may be impossible to maintain even the current low standard of housing. Mayur villagers' main source of income is rope-making from coconut husks. Most of the land not used for housing is devoted to coconut palms for which the sandy soil and the climate are well suited. Of 297 families, almost eighty per cent are landless, only seven own rice fields, and relatively few have kitchen gardens. Great prestige is attached to landowning, and quarrels over the small parcels are bitter. Only eleven of the sixty-eight families with land have holdings greater than one acre. Eighty-eight per cent of the 662 employed villagers are involved in some way with the production of the coconut fiber rope. The others practice various crafts, operate small shops, or are fishermen.

Since the 1880's people have been leaving Mayur to take jobs in Ceylon, Colombo representing for them a glamorous urban setting. Recently Ceylon has forbidden immigration, responding in part to the pressures of its own population growth. At present about a fourth of the adult male population of Mayur works outside the village. Remittances are an important factor in the local economy. In the past money earned in Colombo, Bombay, or Singapore was used to build a house, buy land, or set up a small business in the village, in patterns reminiscent of those in rural areas in southern Europe and the Caribbean. Today most of the 113 individuals working outside the village are in India, although outside the Malabar District; only nineteen are employed abroad. Their occupations vary with caste and religion. The most able, those who are educated and technically trained (Mayur has produced a number of professionals and subprofessionals) tend to settle gradually in their place of employment.

In looking back over the period 1905-1955, the author of this study, an Indian anthropologist, sees very significant changes taking place within the context of the village community. Caste structures remain, but social

¹⁰ A. Aiyappan, *Social Revolution in a Kerala Village* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

distance, both in physical and psychological forms, has been much reduced. Today no member of a higher caste can order a member of a lower one off a road or path. Access to the temple is no longer restricted, and all use the tea shops. The landlord is still powerful but can no longer dispossess his tenants. The landed families have lost their position and have left to seek employment outside the village; they have been replaced by moneylenders, who live outside the village. The author characterizes these changes as a social revolution and infers that it is far from complete.

Kerala is the only state in India where communists have elected a government. The central government, however, has not allowed them to implement their program. Not inhibited by the exercise of power, the Communist Party of India is able to call for the vesting of ownership rights in all tenants, imposition of a ceiling on all holdings, and distribution of surplus land to agricultural laborers, with the abolition of rural indebtedness and the simultaneous rapid industrialization of India.¹¹ Elements of this program have a strong appeal for lower-caste Mayur laborers as they have become more conscious of their rights.¹² Literacy in Mayur is thirty-one per cent, lower than the forty-eight per cent for Kerala as a whole but well above the national average of twenty.

For the increasing number of newspaper readers diverse points of view are represented in publications such as those of the Muslim League and the Communist Party. The communists seem to have significant potential in Mayur. As the author of this study remarks: "Unless radical steps are taken by a powerful government there seems to be little hope of any palliative legislation succeeding in improving the agrarian situation in Kerala." At the present level of development the contradiction inherent in the Communist Party's opportunistic program of land reform combined with industrialization does not appear to be of much importance to villagers in Kerala, who are too preoccupied with their immediate problem—elimination or at least modification of the power of outside Christian, Tamil, Brahmin, and Muslim landowners who have no interest in their welfare—to worry about who will pay for future industrialization.

In some respects village life has a positive side. Clothing has improved, and most women now wear saris on special occasions. Soap is more frequently used, children have schoolbooks, and attendance at movies is a new form of recreation. Modern fashion has a negative effect on nutrition, since tapioca, which is cheap and available locally, is now

¹¹ *Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question*, Resolution adopted by the National Council, Communist Party of India (New Delhi: New Age Press, 1958).

¹² Aiyappan, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

disdained. The Communist Party government in Kerala was ridiculed for its attempt to popularize a kind of macaroni made of vitaminized wheat and tapioca flour. With mounting population and increasing cash economy, the number of petty traders has expanded, with a total of nineteen tea shops and stores in the village. In the nearby town there are some seventy-five, a three-fold increase in less than twenty-five years. There are interesting parallels with Tepoztlán. The chief justification for an increase in shops is the marginal employment they provide in a place where labor is underemployed.

Despite the limiting economic factors, inspired local leadership can be effective. The case is cited of a low-caste villager who managed to go to college, subsequently obtained a government job, educated his brothers, and ran a night school. He led the villagers in building a road and persuaded landowners to donate their property for the right of way, urging others to make contributions in cash and labor. Finally, he was instrumental in organizing a ropemakers' cooperative.

In this coastal village the problems of absentee landownership, dependence on a single industry, and overpopulation remain, becoming more acute as the pressures on limited resources increase. The villagers' realization that with capital it is feasible to drain their marshes and obtain more land, improve local industry, and earn money through work outside the village, creates the impetus for future radical change. The situation will become more severe as the villagers experience a little progress but not nearly enough to satisfy their increased aspirations.¹³

A Bengali Community

Another village restudy shows a concentric organization where high-caste members form the nucleus of the social structure and lower castes form the periphery.¹⁴ A fictionalized account of Bengali rural life a century ago centers on a real village known under the pseudonym of Kanchanpur. The village was studied in the early 1930's and revisited in 1958. Located in the Ganges Delta area of West Bengal, Kanchanpur, sixty-six miles northwest of Calcutta by rail and several miles from the railway station located in the market town, is still fairly inaccessible during the rainy season. It is an occasion for village children when buses or trucks can enter over rutted roads during the dry season. There are now fifty bicycles in the village, and these play an important role in promoting contact with the market town. Links with the past are everywhere apparent in Kanchanpur's twenty-five temples in various stages

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 78, 92-94, 148-53.

¹⁴ Tara Krishna Basu, *The Bengal Peasant from Time to Time* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962).

of decay, and it appears that here as in other Indian villages not much investment is going into religious structures.

In the 1870's the village had a population of some 1,500, which by 1931 dropped to 872, increased to 1,101 in 1951, and by 1959 reached 1,466, a rather remarkable increase representing a change in less than a decade equal to the total decline from 1874 to 1931.¹⁵ Between 1931 and 1959 the number of Brahmin households in Kanchanpur decreased from sixty to fifty. At the same time a number of landless laboring castes have been drawn to the village to work the land on a wage or share basis. The Brahmins, who receive income from the land, have tended to migrate to urban areas. This suggests what has also been indicated in other Indian studies—that the groups on top and bottom of the social pyramid are for different reasons the most mobile elements in the population.

Brahmins hold about forty per cent of the village land; 131 of the 287 households in the village have no land. Holdings of seven acres or more are owned by thirty-two households, all classed as prosperous. The priestly, learned castes, constituting thirty-two per cent of the families, own sixty-eight per cent of the land. In recent years the number of low-caste agricultural laborers has increased. Members of laboring castes who have abandoned their traditional occupations often do not cultivate their own land because they feel it to be beneath their dignity. This is particularly true when the new occupation is a higher status one. For example, in Kanchanpur a member of the traditional blacksmith caste has become a primary schoolteacher in a neighboring village. He owns about two and a half acres of land and has hired laborers work it.

Eighty-two per cent of the households are engaged directly in agriculture, however, and only four per cent work in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation. A few men work in the market town and in Calcutta. Among the villagers there is some feeling that life has improved during the years from 1933 to 1959. The number of households of peasant proprietors has increased by one-third, although there continue to be noncultivating households who own land. The land reforms did, however, eliminate the large absentee landowners. Another important change has been the disappearance of the traditional curer caste, which was represented by nine households in 1933; some of these families remain in the village but now have other occupations. In fact, 116 or forty per cent of the village households follow occupations other than the traditional ones, the largest percentage shift being in Brahmin households.¹⁶

Since 1933 a canal has been constructed in village lands, providing

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

irrigation and resulting in a different type of rice cultivation. Sugar cane, a very important crop in the nineteenth century, has virtually disappeared.

Education beyond the primary school is still a prerogative of the higher castes, who tend to be more prosperous and to have larger households. (Over half the high-caste families live in joint households, as compared to under a third of the laboring castes.) The villagers have expressed doubt about the value of the modern elementary school curriculum, which attempts to present a large variety of subjects ranging from social science to gardening at the expense of what they feel are the fundamentals. Formerly pupils came almost exclusively from the higher castes, and there were few girls. Since 1933 the proportion of girls in the village school has remained approximately a third of the total enrollment. Primary education is free and officially compulsory, but only forty per cent of the boys and thirty-five per cent of the girls from ages 6-11 actually attend; among the lower castes the figures are five and four per cent respectively.¹⁷ This poor attendance is attributed in large part to parental pressure. Twenty-two village boys attend junior and senior high schools outside the village, and two are enrolled in college in Calcutta.

Many traditional attitudes remain. Despite the land reforms and the government's community development program the investigator expresses the view that agricultural laborers, who feel that education can be of little use to them, are still in a state of "social serfdom."¹⁸ At the top of the social scale the former *zamindar* remains the biggest landowner in the village, with the best home and a key role in village government. He continues to receive appropriate ceremonial gifts and other traditional forms of recognition. The *zamindar* was the only one of the resident villagers affected by the land reform, which limited individual holdings to twenty-five acres, but he avoided its impact by transferring part of his lands to his sons. Landowners continue to enforce the fifty-fifty sharecropping system, although in 1955 a sixty-forty arrangement in favor of the worker was legally decreed. Under this system the worker is still obliged to supply the plow, cattle, manure, and seeds. The agricultural laborers are too unorganized to protest, while the landowners have organized a cooperative and have received government technical and financial assistance. (The cooperative was eventually dissolved because the landowners objected to the government tax regulations.)

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

In other spheres of village life important changes are taking place. When the author of this study first visited Kanchanpur he observed:

Here are no high discussions on politics. . . . Kanchanpur, like so many other villages in India, is indifferent to such matters. The peasantry, and not even all of them, know that their king is some one called George V, the lord of the whole world, and that he lives in a land called *Bilat* [England]. . . . He has maintained here his two employees—*Baralat*, the Viceroy, and *Chhotalat*, the Governor of Bengal. Beyond this they do not know anything of the government hierarchy or of the parliamentary hierarchy. . . . Gandhi? They know him as the great national hero who is fighting the British raj to win Swaraj [self government] for the country. But they have only the vaguest idea as to what Swaraj may be.¹⁹

All types of politicians now come to Kanchanpur. Communists have a sympathetic audience when they talk of low prices for agricultural produce and the high prices of goods. "The peasants must organize themselves to resist this antipeasant and destructive policy of the Government. The Government must be made to yield. Long live Revolution!"²⁰ Even while welcoming these remarks, some older men declared that the British were right, that India was not ready for self-rule, and that corruption reigns while taxes are drained from the people.

Now there are many sources of information, and people are aware of accusations of official corruption. There are battery-powered radio sets as well as weekly magazines and a daily newspaper, which is read aloud by the postmaster.

In common with Karimpur, Mayur, and village life in India generally, traditional rites and practices in Kanchanpur remain important while undergoing change. Marriage for girls continues to be a universally accepted value, but the age at marriage has risen. Arranged unions are still the rule. Caste restrictions in matrimony and commensality remain, although the occupational functions of caste have altered to varying degrees. Men retain a formally dominant role in family affairs.

Change is widely apparent in material culture. European clothing, chairs, shelves, clocks, watches, bicycles, flashlights, and kerosene lamps are widespread in Kanchanpur as elsewhere in rural India. Similarly tea has become a popular drink, and chemical fertilizers are beginning to be used.

The pressures of the rural revolution in such villages are more poten-

¹⁹ Basu, *The Bengal Peasant*, pp. 142-43. Reprinted by permission.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

tial than actual in terms of the feelings expressed by the villagers themselves. But the situation is not a stable one particularly in overpopulated areas such as Bengal and Kerala. In Bengal population densities have increased fifty per cent in the last twenty-five years (from 400 to 600 per square mile), while agricultural techniques have remained essentially stationary. At the same time malaria has been virtually eliminated, and the population is increasing at the rate of 1.7 per cent per year without corresponding rises in food production. One of the components of population growth is increasing longevity, as illustrated by the decreasing proportion of widows in Kanchanpur (one in four women in 1933 and one in five in 1959). It appears that most of the population increase is concentrated among the lower castes where eighty-eight per cent of the adolescent females (ages 12-21) were married, as contrasted with forty-two per cent of upper-caste girls in this age group.

Famine remains a threat and is infinitely less tolerable politically than in the days of British rule. One encouraging fact is that the cattle population has slowly been diminishing. The situation is not fully understood and further investigation is needed; however, data from rural Bengal seem to indicate that, in contrast to the increase in the number of people at the rate of almost two per cent yearly, the cattle population is apparently declining at an annual rate of one per cent.

Village and City in India

It is in cities, and most dramatically in Calcutta, that the tremendous pressures for change become most evident. Reports of food riots accompanied by burning and looting followed by the intervention of the army have become all too common. To say that Calcutta's problems today are simply too many in-migrants from the countryside is an oversimplification. One of the big reasons for the growth of Calcutta in the nineteenth century was the vast influx of rural people due to the scourge of malaria and the decay of irrigation systems. In the past decade Calcutta has grown by only eight per cent, however, while all of west Bengal has increased thirty-three per cent (about double the rate for Kanchanpur). This leads an Indian official to observe that despite its sprawl and squalor, Calcutta is not growing fast enough. That is, that Calcutta is not growing fast enough relative to the needs of the region it serves. Concurrent with the development of Calcutta, planners hope to develop other smaller centers that can also attract the rural population. From the point of view of the rural revolution one of the most significant demographic facts concerning Calcutta is that a full half the "households" in the city are single men predominantly from rural

areas. They provide much of the unskilled transport and factory labor in the city. Despite relatively low wages they save enough so that they build up bigger balances in postal savings accounts than in any other Indian city. Remittances to villages mean that much less is spent in Calcutta and in effect render marginal rural families parasitic on the city. This may to a certain degree foster, for a limited period, a situation of economic stagnation in rural areas. A factory worker in Calcutta can maintain his family more easily there than in the city. Under different conditions he might be more strongly inclined to postpone marriage or to limit the size of his family.²¹

Not a few observers have commented on the "village fetish" in Indian thinking, an uncritically accepted assumption that the village must continue to be the key unit in Indian rural life. The result has been a fragmentation of administration and the entrenching of power among the existing village elite who tend to benefit most from government programs (as aptly illustrated by Kanchanpur's zamindar). These programs may achieve more production from the prosperous farmers and force the marginal ones off the land, but the problem remains unsolved as to how this excess labor can be absorbed.

One writer has outlined three alternatives: (1) a village-focused development program; (2) a program concentrating on expanding major cities; and (3) a program emphasizing centers of intermediate size.²² The logical impossibilities of the first are obvious. In addition to the scattering of skills and administration that India's Community Development Program already demands, almost all types of modern industry are too capital-intensive and require too highly specialized skills to permit their fragmentation on a village level (China's brief experiment in backyard steel furnaces, p. 93, is a good illustration, leaving aside the problems of distribution and accessibility to a market). The possibility of further extension of India's major metropolitan center cities to 35 or up to 66 million is also difficult to conceive. The suggestion of dispersed centers with peasants commuting to jobs in nearby towns offers at least an interim solution for India's 558,000 villages, where eighty-two per cent of the population live (1961). All the villages cited in this chapter already have bus service, and some villagers have begun to be commuters.

In connection with this, although on a much smaller scale, the Yugoslav experiences are pertinent. There, as in India, the majority of people

²¹ See Nirmal Kumar Bose, "Calcutta: A Premature Metropolis," *Scientific American* (September 1965), pp. 92, 96, 99-100.

²² John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 170, 187.

live in small communities. About half of Yugoslavia's industrial workers live in rural areas, and approximately half of rural income is derived from nonagricultural work. Almost a third of private agricultural households have someone employed full time off the land. There are costs in such a solution. Hours spent in traveling, often under difficult conditions, tire the worker before he reaches the job. Attempting to keep his hand in farming often results in a poorer job both at factory and in agriculture.²³ But such a development on a major scale may be an improvement for India, with ultimate relocation perhaps occurring subsequently.

A Suburban Village

This is what has been happening in Namhalli, a village of white-washed mudbrick houses located on a plain about a half hour's bus ride from Bangalore in Mysore State, in south central India. Here the influences of the city have begun to predominate, and in the past twenty years the transition has been made from rural village to "quasi-suburb." Villagers with training, skill, and modern materials such as chemical fertilizer and insecticide have started large-scale production of vegetables for the urban market, deriving maximum income from minimum acreage intensively utilized. Many Namhalli villagers have become factory workers, minor government officials, and teachers. Education of their children is a matter of intense concern among village parents. Almost everyone is literate and most young men have completed high school, a striking contrast to the situation a decade ago. Work experiences have had a strong effect on family structure. The wage earner belongs to a union, subscribes to a newspaper or magazine, and eats his lunch on the job with members of other castes. Marriage is at a later age, and there is a wider range for choosing a mate.

Namhalli villagers tend not to fear government officials but to regard them as public servants. Naturally, old values have not disappeared without a trace, but the changes are in marked contrast to the patterns described for other Indian villages.²⁴

The impact of the rural revolution in another south Indian village has been summed up as follows:

²³ Joel M. Halpern, "Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," in Rex Hopper, ed., *Social Change: Studies of a World in Transition* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967, forthcoming).

²⁴ Alan R. Beals, *Gopalpur: A South Indian Village* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962), pp. 92-96.

Whether or not Gopalpur is, in fact, richer or poorer than it was a hundred years ago, the new wind has brought to its people the sudden realization that they are now second-class citizens of the world. Only a few years ago people felt that they were part of a great civilization and that most of the other people in the world were dirty, uncouth, and barbaric. Now the coin is most bitterly reversed. . . . People in Gopalpur have always admitted themselves to be uncouth but they have always been proud of their skill at doing their job. They have considered themselves to be not just farmers, but the best farmers in the world. Now, even their ability to farm is treated with contempt.²⁵

There is ample reason for their concern, for there can be little possibility of avoiding major future changes. Indian economists have already begun to speak of the need to destroy the existing structure of land tenure. There is also a general reluctance to accept any solution that requires large-scale coercion. There is a desire to organize agriculture in larger production units with more flexibility in ownership and to absorb the surplus population in industry and capital works in agriculture.²⁶

THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE

Compared to India, China has a relatively monolithic party and a rigid program, or better put, a series of programs, for coping with the problems raised by the rural revolution. Unlike the opportunities for analyzing the situation in an open society such as India, however, attempts to understand contemporary Chinese developments in rural society are beset with frustration. There are no objective surveys of local conditions in China parallel to those for India for the post-war period, only a few surveys and impressionistic accounts and one major study, which focuses on the early period of the Chinese Communist government's rule.

The problem of the meaning of social as distinct from political revolutions has already been discussed. By comparing China with India here and in the following chapter the United States with the U.S.S.R., it may be possible to gain some understanding of how the problems raised by the rural revolution affect all of these societies. Despite vital differences they share many significantly similar problems. Certainly there is a shared view of the world among almost all nation-states today that is

²⁵ Beals, *Gopalpur*, p. 76. Copyright © 1962 by Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

²⁶ Comments of V. M. Dandekar in Amlan Datta, ed., *Paths to Economic Growth* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1963), pp. 45-50.

"enthusiastic acceptance of the view that change is feasible and desirable."²⁷ Closely connected with this is the strongly adhered to value that science can help man understand environment and that engineering can alter it for the achievement of a better life. It is also felt that political and social institutions can be adapted to the new circumstances. This process of adaptation and its concomitant expansion of the role of the state, however, involving as it does changing allocations of political power and the use of governmental power in new ways, is an underlying cause of contemporary political revolutions. It would be remarkable if such transitions could occur peacefully. Both the communist view of change and that held in the West recognize the enormous potentialities and creativity of man together with the possibility of a future life of economic abundance. The western outlook is basically pragmatic, stressing that human costs need to be the major consideration in planning. This approach is influenced by the diversity of the histories of the nations of western Europe and North American in their relatively long period of "modernization." Thus future development is seen as being guided in large measure by past experience and diversity. The approach is multilineal and multifaceted.

Unlike the West, communism as an ideology of states more recently undergoing the process of modernization is itself implicitly under the pressure of more advanced models. As a result the approach is radical and unilineal, and dogmatically asserts Marxism-Leninism as "scientifically" valid and more advanced politically than noncommunist systems, although specific types of deficiencies may be acknowledged. The future is seen as predictable, determinable, and inevitable.²⁸

Indian Perception of the Chinese Experience

Despite radically changed international relationships the general Indian perception of the Chinese rural experience, as reflected by the following report of a visiting agricultural delegation in the mid-1950's, remains valid in placing in perspective the fundamental differences between the rural revolutions of India and China.

It is the Communist Party of China which has 10.7 million well-organised, disciplined, and hard-working members. It is the members of the Party working in the remotest villages who have brought about a fundamental change in the rural structure of China within a short period of seven years. . . .

²⁷ Cyril E. Black, "Revolution, Modernization and Communism," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

In Indian villages in areas where development programmes are undertaken and the right kind of leadership is forthcoming, there is perhaps more voluntary effort, local initiative and general awareness than we were able to observe in China. But what may be lacking in these directions appears to be more than made up through better organisation, fuller mobilisation of manpower resources for works benefiting the community as a whole, more hard work and, on the whole, a more concerned rural leadership. The need for our peasantry and our entire administrative machinery to work harder than at present cannot be too much stressed. . . . It will, however, be necessary for us to evolve our own solutions which fit better into our conditions as also democratic tradition and are in accord with the needs of our villages. The progress of cooperatives in India is likely to be more gradual than in China, and we should expect an "individual peasant" sector to continue along with a growing cooperative sector.²⁹

This statement illustrates the problem of evaluating change in countries that have gone through a violent political revolution and that emphasize highly centralized planning and coercion, as opposed to countries that have stressed peaceful evolution and consensus. Indian planners emphasize the need for cooperatives and planning in the context of an open society with voluntary compliance. On the other hand China after 1960 reinstated the private plot and has experimented with several types of local administrative units subsequent to the agricultural producer's cooperative observed by the visiting Indians.

Although independence in India was not achieved without a real struggle, and the partitioning of Pakistan was a traumatic, bloodletting affair, change has come to the Indian village gradually. Most analysts recognize both the inevitability and desirability of future radical change. In the Chinese case the radical institutional transformation has encountered the problem of limits to the changes that can be brought about on the village level, as illustrated, in the case of the communes, which, by emphasizing large-scale administrative units, attempted to replace the village with another type of unit. It is impossible to understand the social structure and values of an Indian village today without attempting to conceptualize the immediate future. The immediate past is crucial in understanding Chinese rural life, recognizing, of course, the overall importance of the millennia of past civilizations in each case.

Revolutions in China

The T'ai Ping Rebellion. The most significant fact about the course of the rural revolution in China is the successful communist-led politi-

²⁹ *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agricultural Planning and Techniques* (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1956), pp. 191-93.

cal revolution, which drew its main strength, but not its leadership, from the countryside. Historically the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, which reached its full development in the 1850's, anticipated in its ideology some of the changes introduced by the communists in the 1950's. It represents a significant nineteenth-century Chinese effort to modernize and was in part a messianic cult representing an indigenous interpretation of Christianity. The leadership of the movement as it sought mass support developed a program focusing on modernization but lacked the organizing capacity to carry it out. In addition to incorporating heaven, hell, the Last Judgment, and the Ten Commandments, the ideology stressed the sharing of wealth and the redistribution of the land. The movement's long-range plan read like a catalog definition of nineteenth-century modernization: the inauguration of railroads, steamships, banks, post offices, flood control, patents for inventions, assistance for the distressed, and prohibition of infanticide, opium, female foot-binding, and bribery. Social organization was to be set up on the same principles as the military structure. During wartime farmers were to be ready to fight along with the standing army, and in peacetime the soldiers were to do agricultural work. Followers were exhorted to show determination and patience and not to be discouraged by the temporary successes of their enemies. Officers were instructed to be dutiful, law-abiding, and strict with their soldiers, and the latter were to be obedient and not to touch the property of others. Appeals were made to join the T'ai P'ing and enjoy heavenly grace while living together as good citizens in a prosperous world.³⁰

Characteristically, the Imperial powers, Britain and France, concluded a trade agreement with the Manchus and preferring a weak, corruptible government, represented the T'ai P'ing creed as "blasphemous distortions of Christian doctrine," thus assisting in its suppression. Just as characteristically Sun Yat Sen eulogized the movement, and the contemporary communist Chinese regard it as a forerunner of their own revolution.³¹

The Chinese Communist Revolution. To help gain perspective on the changing village community in China it is necessary to examine the Chinese Communist Revolution and its rural base. In this connection it is instructive to compare it with the Yugoslav Partisan Movement. Both revolutionary armies were composed primarily of villagers led by a group of tightly organized urban communists (the term urban is used

³⁰ Ssu-Yü Teng, *Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 6-35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44, and C. P. Fitzgerald, *China* (London: Cresset Press, 1942), pp. 562-79.

here not to stress the social origins of the leaders but rather to emphasize that their ideology is urban-derived and urban-focused). This approach can be contrasted with that of the peasant parties that existed in Eastern Europe between the two world wars and who were more concerned with preserving what they felt to be rural values and improving the socioeconomic status of villagers than in coming to terms with the actual problems being raised by the incipient reformulation of village communities. The rural revolution exists only as a potential, however; it requires a set of conditions, namely the full impact of modernization, to actualize its transitional pressures, which in turn can help create the environment for a successful political revolution. Social and political change can most easily come about when the old order is no longer effective, particularly in an administrative sense. In the Chinese and Yugoslav cases the Japanese and the Germans respectively destroyed the existing structures by conquest, or if they did not completely destroy the local organs of government made them anathema by having them serve the occupier.

In both China and Yugoslavia there was also simultaneously a civil war among nationalist factions whose appeal was to specific classes or ethnic groups within the population. Both the Nationalists and the Chetniks lacked a comprehensive future program for work in rural areas. In contrast to other indigenous forces, the communists were disciplined and taught not to oppress the rural population. In the Chinese case they were specifically ordered to be honest, courteous, considerate, and careful of the peasant's personal property, even to the extent of replacing the door of a house if they had used it as a bed.³² In strong contrast to the behavior of the nationalists, they impressed foreign observers as "ill-equipped peasants who behaved like well-bred soldiers."³³ This was a significant accomplishment in a society that traditionally honored scholarship and where good farming was a source of pride.

In both China and Yugoslavia the peasantry did not automatically flock to the communists, often remaining neutral and then slowly being won over, particularly as a result of progressive victories. Although primarily fighting forces, the armies performed many vital functions. In China the Red Army sought to make its recruits literate and ideologically conscious, rendering them more receptive to propaganda and facilitating local administration. Unlike the nationalists, who relied mainly on

³² Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), p. 92.

³³ Robert Guillian, in Otto B. Van Der Sprenkel, *et al.*, *New China: Three Views* (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), p. 84, and Jean Lyon, "When the Communists Entered Peking," *Harper's Magazine*, 200, No. 1197 (February 1950), 83.

force in conscription, the communists used persuasion as well. The communists developed "Mutual Aid Labor Teams" for the purpose of working the land of any man who joined the army. If he were killed or wounded, the village was supposed to care for his family. These types of relationships enabled the army to have mobility and a flexible supply system. An important result of these relationships has been villagers' feelings of direct personal involvement with the national state, a sense of nationalism that is seen as different from a knowledge of belonging to a larger political and economic unit. Some scholars take the position that China did not become a "nation-state" in the sense of having a nationally conscious population until World War II. They feel that previous Chinese political organizations such as the nationalists had a "head and no body," a group of intellectuals largely restricted to the upper classes of urban areas and without mass support, which in China, with its lack of an urban working class, could come only from the peasantry. Thus the idea has been advanced that "the peasants of the occupied areas in China were socially mobilized by war and resistance organization, and thereby became a national population."³⁴ Both the Chinese and the Yugoslavs paid great attention to the local organs of government, setting up a rudimentary administration at the village level to replace the existing structure whenever they gained control of a territory for any length of time. This gave impetus to the development of political consciousness among the rural population and represented an important initial step in the communists' plan to bring modern urban concepts of organization to the village community.

Land Reforms

After the defeat of the Japanese and their victory over the nationalists, the Chinese communists undertook land reform in 1950. This resulted in the redistribution of some 46 million hectares among 300 million peasants, an action designed to win the support of the "poor and middle peasants." Land reform was, of course, intended only as a step toward the ultimate socialization of the land and collectivization of agriculture. Mutual Aid Teams, intended as initial pooling of labor for joint cultivation of the land, were set up in 1952. Private holdings were retained, with a certain amount of equipment and livestock collectively owned. In 1955 the Agricultural Producers Cooperative was introduced. After a phase when land was rented by the cooperative and centrally man-

³⁴ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Pre-Revolutionary China, 1937-45* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 26.

aged, holdings were then collectivized without compensation, although a small private plot could be retained.

With the People's Communes in 1958 all means of production became group-owned, including the private plot and excluding only a small number of domestic animals. An individual household's minimum food supply was no longer directly related to work performed but was made available and consumed at the communal mess hall. The unit of planning in all matters was the commune composed of 5,000 to 8,000 households. By 1960, however, this system was replaced by degrees; the private plot was reinstated, the production of pigs was returned primarily to the household, and brigades of twenty to thirty households were formed as the main planning units. Food was no longer distributed free. This represented a significant degree of decentralization.³⁵ Such are the broad outlines of officially decreed changes in post-war rural China.

A Village Near Canton

Available village studies aid in understanding how these national events impacted on the local level. A well-documented description is that of Nanching, five miles from the city of Canton in South China. A community of tightly clustered houses surrounded by paddy fields, vegetable gardens, and fruit trees, Nanching is situated on the Pearl River alluvial plain, bordered by low rolling hills. Its location makes the impact of change all the more intense, and in this sense is analogous to the Indian village near Bangalore previously described. Despite its location its total incorporation into the expanding urban complex of Canton does not appear imminent (Canton grew from 1,250,000 in 1948 to 1,789,000 by 1957). The population pressure on the land in this area is very marked—3,494 people per square mile of crop land in 1951,³⁶ making it one of the most intensively cultivated places in the world. Comparable densities exist in areas such as Japan, Korea, and the Nile Delta, and are exceeded only by coastal strip settlements in Kerala (although the available figures are not strictly comparable).

Kwangtung Province with its port of Canton was a center for European trade and for migration overseas. It has been an area of high tenancy rates—forty per cent of the peasantry as compared to twenty per cent in North China. Not surprisingly, all of the important modern revolutions originated in this province, including the T'ai P'ing Rebel-

³⁵ Kenneth R. Walker, *Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialisation and the Private Sector, 1956-62* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 16-17.

³⁶ C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition in Chinese Society: The Family and the Village* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 4.

lion, the Republican Revolution of 1911, the Second Revolution, which established the Nationalist government, and the Canton Commune, which was a forerunner of the Communist Revolution.

The Communist Revolution (or some other form of drastic change) appeared inevitable when we examine the failure of Nanching's socioeconomic structure to provide minimum subsistence and security to one half of the village population . . . the peasant economy of microscopic family farms made up of tiny and widely scattered plots, worked with backward techniques, burdened with a crippling tenancy structure and rapacious rent rates which, together, condemned a significant portion of the villagers to semistarvation. . . .³⁷

But in the pre-war context the oppressed were unable to improve their situation; rather, these factors combined with a tightly organized kinship system and a significant degree of political autonomy served to restrain change within the context of the village itself despite its close commercial relationship to the Canton market. However, employment in Canton and migration overseas did provide outlets prior to World War II. Chinese peasants coming from this starkly competitive environment established prosperous colonies "overseas" mainly throughout underpopulated Southeast Asia, providing something of a parallel to migrations of Indians from Kerala to Ceylon and elsewhere.

Thrift and industry developed over a long period in this environment and in time came to be cultural imperatives. The South Chinese peasant was oriented primarily within a reference frame of kin, looking to past ancestors as well as to descendants yet to be born. Thus his hard work and savings were for reasons beyond his own advancement or survival. Unlike other peoples, such as those of Southeast Asia, he was not concerned primarily with individual salvation but with the progress of his clan group. The most highly esteemed attainments in Chinese society—the large extended family in one household, proper respects paid to ancestors, scholarship, a position in the government hierarchy, all the highly valued attainments of the Confucian ethic—were really possible only after a position of prosperity had been achieved. Those few peasant families who achieved a rise in status helped to reinforce these ideals and to reinforce the cultural values.³⁸ The contrast with the relatively fixed positions in the Indian caste system is marked.

Striving and thrift, then, served ends transcending an individual's life. Once loyalty could be transferred, at least partially, from the kin group

³⁷ Yang, *A Chinese Village*, p. vii. Reprinted by permission.

³⁸ G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 92-93.

to the state this attitude could be used compatibly with certain Chinese communist objectives oriented toward future achievement and selective veneration of past traditions.

China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and Russia are all countries in which indigenous communist revolutions have been successful, and in the first three cases the movements have been rural-based. Since all these countries and particularly the Chinese have strong systems of extended kin relationships, it is worth considering the extent to which the partial transfer of kin-oriented loyalties has made their political revolutions possible. Under different circumstances, of course, kin loyalties make for nepotism and a degree of anarchy, but they also provide for a certain amount of striving, at least partially for others, and for the postponement of immediate benefits.

Nanching was composed mainly of two large and three minor clans, one of which traced its ancestry in the village back through forty-two generations, the founder having arrived in 1091. In 1948 the village population was approximately 1,100 persons living in 230 households and subsisting principally on 200 acres of cultivated land, or about one-sixth of an acre per person. This situation was characteristic for the region. Selective baby care in favor of males, a somewhat more socially acceptable alternative to infanticide, resulted in the 110:100 ratio of males to females.³⁹ When it is recalled that some men emigrated to find work outside the village the significance of this factor is all the greater. The temporary or long term absence of men is also a possible explanation of the relatively small annual population growth rate of three per thousand. As in the Indian villages discussed, in Nanching it has been the poor as well as the prosperous who migrate. A number of migrants who became relatively prosperous in Canton or Hong Kong were joined by their families. Unlike in India, no leisured upper class resided in the village (with the possible exception of a few concubines left to watch over the lands of their departed masters). The absence of landlords may also have been due to the proximity of Canton. Poorer peasants were preoccupied with the struggle for survival and felt fortunate if they were able to raise to maturity two children out of six or seven.⁴⁰

The nearness of the city also significantly influenced agriculture. Much acreage was given to vegetables fertilized with night soil from the city, thus tying the village closely with the fluctuation of the urban market. In the early thirties, at the time of the economic depression, many of those who had earlier migrated to cities returned, increasing pressure on the land. The depression also cut the villagers off from certain urban

³⁹ Yang, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

markets; for example, they were no longer able to sell jasmine flowers for tea, which they had previously raised for export.

There were no slack seasons in agriculture. Vegetables were cultivated in the winter while the rice fields lay fallow. Poultry raising provided supplementary income. The five largest landholders together held a total of fifty-two acres, or twenty-six per cent of all cultivated land. They composed only two per cent of village families. The average Nanching holding was .8 to 1.6 acres. Nine per cent of the village households owned no land. Remittances and rentals of small plots supported thirteen per cent of the families. Those who possessed five acres or more constituted a landlord class. Approximately 136 acres of irrigated land were fragmented into about a thousand scattered parcels.⁴¹ The tremendous waste of human resources is obvious under this system. Land-ownership was closely related to family size and to marriage, most of the single men in the village being landless peasants. In the 1930's and 1940's, prior to the time Nanching was studied (1948-51), the number of landless laborers seeking part-time work increased. These were mostly "boat people" whose livelihood had been supplanted by the increasing motorization of river transport beginning in the 1920's. Another effect of modernization was the reduction of handicraft industries in Canton and nearby towns, creating unemployment there and making it harder for villagers to find jobs in town.

Before the depression of the 1930's somewhat less than half the village households had one or more members who were long-term migrants. Their number decreased by half by the time of the study. In addition to those who returned for other reasons, old men usually returned to the village to die in their ancestral home. Village men who worked as porters and unskilled construction workers in Canton generally returned to the village during peak agricultural periods.

Kin ties facilitated migration. If a man prospered he would usually send for relatives from the village to work for him. This also applied to obtaining jobs in a particular craft or industry. Those who were successful outside the village purchased land in the community, and large holdings were acquired; but over time ties with the village tended to lapse. Purchasing land and expanding holdings continued to remain a primary aim of the less fortunate.

At the time of the study many villagers expressed the view that the past was better than the present. In terms of physical evidence the best structures in Nanching were the older brick houses and the ancestral halls. No similar structures had been built by the present generation.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 43-44.

Evidence based on genealogical records indicated that the end of the average life span of a group of Nanching males in the middle of the eighteenth century was the early forties, while those born in the late nineteenth century lived only until their late thirties.⁴² In evaluating this attitude, however, it is necessary to recall that the Civil War had only recently ended when this study was made, concluding more than a decade of continuous conflict with the Japanese.

It was a period of considerable anarchy; in the absence of the effective functioning of other institutions the clan played a strategic role in maintaining law and order and undertook public works, operated the village school, and possessed an armed force. In addition there were individual rich families and a crop protection association, all possessing arms. The villagers were, of course, aware of a national government and displayed a sense of at least formal submissiveness when the tax collector or groups of soldiers entered the village. Prior to the disintegration of the Chinese Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century the gentry, more prosperous villagers who had passed at least the lower-level imperial examinations, had served as the recognized intermediaries between the village and the government. At that time the formal institutions of government extended only to the county level. The Confucian theory of government with its accompanying ethical values provided a rationale for the government's physical coercion.

As a result of the series of political revolutions, the old gentry was replaced, but the new group of officials lacked a supporting political ideology. Under the nationalists village government depended largely on an informal balance of power among local groups. Education remained an important value but it was now modern and not classical training that mattered. Access to education was now determined more by the wealth of the individual household and less by the wider lineage.

When the victorious communist armies reached Canton in October, 1949, villages like Nanching appeared to be ready for change despite the fact that traditional social structure was largely intact. The villagers had seen individuals grow prosperous through emigration. They had observed technological change in Canton. And yet for a good half of the village population, staying alive was a constant struggle. The communists set in motion their land reform program, the initial objective of which was to get the poorer peasants to denounce the landowners and secure a reduction in rent, including refunds on past payments. The funds were supposed to be used to improve production, but actually they were often distributed among the farmers who had accompanied the

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 78.

tenants to the landlord's house. These procedures were followed by effective searches for hidden arms. An attempt was made to determine the actual holdings of the various households. The villagers were categorized according to official designations: landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant, worker.⁴³

Other categories were established which crosscut these classifications: "intellectual," "idler," "religious practitioner," "Red Army man," "worker," "bankrupt." Thus the elaborate land reform laws have special provisions for such individuals as "bankrupt landlord" and "worker from rich peasant family." Supporters of the regime were rewarded. Red Army soldiers of rich peasant or landlord households had the right to share in the distribution of land, "provided they fight determinedly for the interests of the workers and peasants."⁴⁴

One obstacle to the implementation of the land reform laws was the villagers' apparent reluctance to denounce each other and particularly for poorer peasants to denounce those who had formerly held dominant positions in village life. There were not only ties of unity against the outsider but bonds of kinship and the force of tradition. The government policies were carried out with the help of outside cadres composed in part of students from the cities, and in the process the cohesive social character of the village community was partially undermined. The direct power of the central government in village affairs was correspondingly enhanced. In some villages where there evidently were not enough landlords to go around, rich peasants were "promoted" into the landlord category, and their land, implements, and household effects were then distributed to the "poorer classes."⁴⁵

These reforms succeeded in eliminating many of the more ambitious and skilled farmers and leaders in village affairs. Those who were not exiled or executed were "neutralized." Because of the many men who had worked in cities Nanching had a relatively high proportion of landlords and rich peasants. About half the arable land in the village including that belonging to the temple was confiscated for redistribution. The government's intention was to "leave the middle alone while equalizing the two extremities."⁴⁶ The net effect was a great feeling of uneasiness among all in the village, even those who had received some land.

After the reform the value of food taken from the village as taxes

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-18, 141.

⁴⁴ *The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953), pp. 23-46.

⁴⁵ This kind of situation is described in fiction form in Eileen Chang, *Naked Earth* (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1956).

⁴⁶ Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

was greater than both previous government taxes and the rent paid to absentee landlords. This, of course, was planned policy to subsidize the greater needs and greater services of the new state and especially to underwrite the building of urban industry and ultimately to end traditional village life. There was no question of passive compliance. Peasants, by the new government's definition ignorant, were to be improved through literacy courses. Marriage arrangements were no longer the prerogative of parents; young men assumed positions of authority, and women were encouraged to play a more open and direct role in village affairs. Landownership, kin ties, and the complex of traditional beliefs and practices concerning reverence for ancestors all became less important. Traditional festivities in which the more prosperous families had played a leading role were replaced by western-style group games and singing featuring the intermingling of the sexes.

Our direct picture of Nanching takes us only to 1951, but there are a few subsequent reports of Chinese villages by western observers. There is, of course, a great deal of information in the Chinese press and periodical literature.

A Village on the Yangtze Plain

Kaihsienkung, a lakeside village on the Yangtze Plain about eighty miles west of Shanghai, was studied by a Chinese anthropologist in 1936,⁴⁷ and was visited for several days by a non-Chinese speaking scholar twenty years later.⁴⁸ This village has a population density of 1,980 per square mile of arable land, which, while high, is only two-thirds that of Nanching. In the period between the two studies Kaihsienkung's population remained amazingly static, with a decline of just over one per cent. A further striking feature is the relatively small number of children per household, 1.3 in 1936 and 1.2 in 1956. This is closely related to the limited land holdings, which averaged 1.2 acres per household in 1936. Small as these are they were nevertheless larger than the .9 acre family farm in Nanching. Over the twenty-year period the sex ratio in favor of males in Kaihsienkung had risen from 110 to 130:100. The later investigator implies that female infanticide is still practiced although it is prohibited by law and its existence was vigorously denied in 1956. Another explanation, and one that is suggested by the Nanching study,

⁴⁷ Hsiao-T'ung Fei, *Peasant Life in China* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1939).

⁴⁸ W. R. Geddes, *Peasant Life in Communist China*, Society for Applied Anthropology, Monograph No. 6 (1963). Ordinarily the results of a visit as brief as the one on which this study is based would not merit publication, but the special circumstances and particularly the closed nature of contemporary Chinese society make this report a useful one.

is that unwanted female babies are eliminated by selective child care.

This is understandable considering the unremitting toil that characterizes this type of peasant agriculture, the small size of families, and the need for all adults as field laborers. Special effort is required in order to care for any infant.

On the basis of the data available it appears that the people of this village were eating more nutritious and varied food in 1956 than a generation before. By this date the cooperative had taken over a number of the functions of the family, regulating the work for all and assuming responsibility for the needs of the aged and infirm. There were no longer seasonable migrations by men who transported goods in their own boats.

According to the later report overall village production improved, and two grain crops a year were raised. From 1950 to 1955 rice yields increased by roughly one-sixth because of innovations that included motor pumps for irrigation, improvements in transplanting techniques, and the use of insecticides and artificial fertilizers supplied by the cooperative.⁵⁰

These developments did not take place against an unchanging background. The increasing status of women, the decline in authority of the old, and the breakdown in the pattern of mutual understandings between landlord and tenant were observed in 1936. Generally the thirties and forties were a transitional period in Kaihsienkung as they were in Nanching, when neither lives nor property were secure but kin ties remained strong.

A Cave Village in North China

Village change after the land reforms and subsequent period of People's Communes, when the private plot had been re-established, is described in an account of Liu Ling, a cave village in the loess hills near Yen'an in northern Shensi Province.⁵¹ The village is in one of the "old liberated areas" where agrarian reform had been instituted on a local basis during the Japanese Occupation, and villagers had long been involved in the communist movement. Mao Tse-tung led his forces to this area in the Long March following his defeat by the nationalists and set up a local administration in 1935. In part because of the fighting and violent social reforms it is essentially without a history and lacks the extended lineages characteristic of much of Chinese rural society. Almost everyone in the village seems to have come from somewhere else, there having been only eight households in Liu Ling in 1935. The number in-

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-16.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

⁵¹ Jan Myrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965).

creased to fifty households and 212 people in 1962, with approximately four members per household, roughly parallel to the household size in the other two Chinese villages considered here. In any case, the primacy of the small family grouping in all three communities is not a consequence of recent change as such but of long-term intensive pressure on limited resources.

Eleven presumptive household heads are employed outside the village as workers and party officials. They return to the village weekly or several times yearly. One of the principal "tasks" cited at the Second National People's Congress in 1962 is: "To reduce the urban population . . . by persuading, first of all, those workers and functionaries who had come from the rural areas to return to rural productive work and strengthen the agricultural front."⁵²

How do village people feel about "strengthening the agricultural front?" The political pressures of the Communist Revolution strain toward extreme order because only under conditions of order and control can centralized planning be instituted. But the pressures of the rural revolution tend to create unstable situations because of difficulties in controlling the growth of cities and towns. Keeping the majority of the population productive and on the land, despite the existence of underemployed labor, is an understandable goal of the Chinese government. As with all developing nations, this must be a major objective, at least for an interim period while the infrastructure to support a more highly urbanized way of life is established. As the personal revolutionary experience recedes and as a growing technology reduces the impact of ideology, the provision of useful and rewarding employment for all, particularly the young, becomes increasingly difficult.

Aspirations toward directing rather than doing appear high in Liu Ling. A young parent is quoted as saying, "I want my child to be a *ganbu* [civil servant]." ⁵³ This is given as one reason parents encourage their children in school, an attitude reminiscent of countries such as India and Egypt and developing countries in general, where becoming a civil servant enables a village child to gain prestige and escape the toil that had been his parents' lot.

In Liu Ling there is not the pressure on the land that exists in the South. Villagers or labor brigade members, as they are now known, are permitted to clear as much land as they wish, presumably after their primary work on collective land is finished. According to the local Party

⁵² New China News Agency, April 16, 1962, cited in H. Yuan Tien, "Population Control: Recent Developments in Mainland China," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (July, 1962), p. 13.

⁵³ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Secretary, "We have never given up the principle of having private plots,"⁵⁴ a significant statement in view of the tendency to eliminate private plots during the period of the commune. Private holdings in livestock not only are accepted, but future goals are seen in terms of increasing private as well as collective property: "We are to get up to a collective stock of animals corresponding to two oxen and seven goats per household and a privately-owned stock of two pigs and two hens or ducks per head."⁵⁵

Education strongly based on ideology, even on the primary level, is having its effect. When the village teacher assigned the schoolchildren a composition on their aspirations for the future, in addition to the anticipated responses of what might be considered glamorous in the eyes of the children: an airman "to defend China's frontiers," tractor driver, teacher, several replied that they wished to become merit workers in agriculture,⁵⁶ an unusual response for rural children in countries where there are large rural-urban differences.

Family ties are a factor in retaining ambitious youth in the village. The talented young village bookkeeper was attending secondary school in Yen-an when his mother died. His father asked him to return to the village. He agreed, although it was against his wishes: "The family needed me. I had no choice." He found it difficult to readjust to village life after being a student in town for several years. Eventually he became reconciled to living in the village and, according to his narrative, gradually found fulfillment in participating in setting up a local library, conducting literacy classes, and acting as a correspondent for a Yen-an newspaper. Although he is one of the innovators in the village he still feels he has a great deal to learn from his father.⁵⁷ In another interview a man tells of giving up a chance for a career in music in order to remain with his mother. One wonders about the households where the husband works permanently outside the village. An example of family attitudes promoting mobility is the case of the children of the former village landlord, who grew up in town, and now drives the manure cart from city to village. Two of the four Liu Ling children attending the Yen-an middle school are his, and they are regarded by other villagers as "the best dressed, the best washed, and the best behaved [in the village]."⁵⁸

From the perspective of these three Chinese village studies there can

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-95.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 280-81.

be no doubt that there have been improvements in the rural standard of living, particularly for formerly more deprived segments of the population. People are pleased that they can now have such things as thermos bottles, blankets, and bicycles and that they have adequate food and a modicum of security.

The Communes and After

Although it is not possible to comprehend the frustrations of village life in China in the same way as in an open society like India, even a casual perusal of the Chinese press reveals problems. There are exhortations for "Raising peasants' socialist consciousness and their consciousness of farming for the sake of the Revolution."⁵⁹ It is not possible to document in terms of individual experiences and within the context of a specific village community the limits for reformulating Chinese rural society, but these were clearly reached with the failure of the communes. The rural peoples' view of life was evidently different from the government directive that asserted:

The people have taken to organizing themselves along military lines. . . . Community dining rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, sewing groups, barber-shops, public baths, happy homes for the aged, agricultural middle schools, "red and expert" schools are leading the peasants toward a happier collective life. . . . the establishment of people's communes with all-round management of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side-occupations, and fishery where industry (the worker), agriculture (the peasant), exchange (the trader), culture and education (the student) and military affairs (the militiaman) merge into one, is the fundamental policy to guide the peasants to accelerate socialist construction, complete the building of socialism ahead of time and carry out the gradual transition to communism.⁶⁰

But demographic, economic, and social considerations over-rode political ones. From 1958 to 1960 the urban population increased by 20 million. In 1959 some peasants reportedly destroyed their tools rather than turn them over to the commune. In 1960 perhaps the worst crisis was encountered by the government in agricultural production of both food and industrial crops. The problem was further complicated in the initial stages of the commune system with the setting up of rural steel furnaces at the crucial time of the autumn harvest. In 1960 the number of pigs, then mainly under collective ownership, began to decline due to poor

⁵⁹ *Red Flag*, April 5, 1966, quoting a speech by a provincial Party official.

⁶⁰ *People's Communes in China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 2-3.

care. By the second half of 1960 people were forced to return to agriculture on a massive scale. Natural disasters also contributed to the stress. In the fall of 1960 private plots, privately owned livestock, and free markets were formally re-established.⁶¹

A SENSE OF PROGRESS

One of the most striking attitudes to emerge from the studies cited for India and China is that despite very real problems village people have at least some sense of progress and improvement in their lives. The total incorporation of the peasant into the national state is well under way in both India and China, and the so-called competition between the two is in good measure a question of which nation can more effectively undertake this process. This entails extending both the benefits and controls that are already encompassing the urban population to the people in the countryside. Perhaps it is too soon to foresee when rural roles will become interchangeable with urban ones or, to put it another way, when distinctive rural and urban subcultures will cease to exist; but the increasing of contacts on a massive scale *has* begun. Both states have sent great numbers of urban-educated cadre into the countryside. Whether they be land reform activists, or party officials as in China, or community development workers as in India, the day is gone when government presence in the countryside was represented solely by the tax collector, teacher, and militiaman. Now services as well as controls are in the process of becoming universal. Certain services, most notably education, designed to increase the number of trained people in rural areas, actually often have the opposite effect of draining the countryside of its most enterprising manpower. As has been illustrated, education is most eagerly sought by the children of families that already have had urban contacts. Although, as the communes illustrate, there are limits to the extent to which rural cultures can be redesigned from above, evidence appears persuasive that in neither India nor China does attachment to traditional patterns prevent rural people from accommodating to drastic and rapid change and even to anticipating it. In India, Namhalli village and the appeal of the Communist Party, particularly in Kerala, are apt examples. Both the achievement of independence in India and the victory of the Communist Revolution in China have made villagers acutely aware of their direct involvement with their own nation and their own future. Where fully conceptualized alternatives are offered, change if not welcomed is usually accepted.

⁶¹ Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-87.

COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION

The behavior of urban-based officials toward the rural population is sometimes reminiscent of that of a colonial ruler toward his subjects, but still the appeals of nationalism are very strong. Abasement of the villager is in large measure a self-abasement. He feels himself backward within the context of his own evolving nation, not in terms of submission to a foreigner.

Colonialism, even within a European context, has, however, served to open doors into the modern world. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire assumed control in Bosnia in 1878, taking it over from Turkey, the occupying forces amazed and shocked the local population:

The newcomers were never at peace and they allowed no one else to live in peace. It seemed that they were resolved with their impalpable yet ever more noticeable web of laws, regulations, and orders to embrace all forms of life, men, beasts, and things, and to change and alter everything, both the outward appearance of the town and the customs and habits of men from the cradle to the grave. . . . They measured out the waste land, numbered the trees in the forest, inspected lavatories and drains, looked at the teeth of horses and cows, asked about the illnesses of the people, noted the number and types of fruit-trees and of different kinds of sheep and poultry. . . . Every day a fresh regulation. With each regulation men saw their individual liberties curtailed or their obligations increased, but the life of the town and the villages, and of all of their inhabitants as a mass, became wider and fuller.⁶²

And when the Austrians departed in 1918 they left behind them an expanded network of roads, a railroad system, public buildings, and urban utilities. Modern educational opportunities were improved, and universal military service gave peasants and shepherds the chance to visit Vienna and Budapest. It was in a certain way logical that the Hapsburg heir was assassinated in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. The intentions of the occupiers were no longer impalpable—entry into the wider modern world had begun, and the people wanted to oversee their own modernization. Revolt against foreign oppressors is not unique to our modernizing age, but a future-oriented nationalism, to be implemented by rationalistic if not humanistic means, is characteristic and is one of the motivating drives that set in motion the rural revolution. As in Bosnia, the first steps toward modernization in India and China

⁶² Reprinted with permission of the Macmillan Company from *The Bridge on the Drina* by Ivo Andrić, trans. Lovett F. Edwards. © George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959.

were carried out by foreigners backed by military force. Self-interest, of course, motivated the imperialists, but this was a self-interest based on a return for productive investment in the nineteenth century (as opposed to the more direct type of exploitation by the Turks and Spaniards, for example, where the mother countries, having not yet entered the rural revolution, thought only in terms of agriculture and trade). Gandhi could deplore the cotton mills of Manchester and bemoan the absence of spinning wheels in India; however, it was India's initial modernization under British auspices that contributed to the success of his nationalistic movement. In a different way the colonial type development of China led to the T'ai P'ing movement, Sun Yat Sen's nationalists, and ultimately to communist victory. Even governments representing nationalistic forces, if they are unwilling or unable to accommodate themselves to the rural revolution, cannot be expected to have a long future. The contrast of certain governments in Latin America with others in Asia is striking in this respect.

The rural revolution has obviously gone much further toward completion in the U.S.S.R. and especially in the United States than in India or China. The two former countries are uniquely comparable in size, resources, and relatively favorable man-land ratios, which are not to be found in most developing nations, and analysis of the rural revolution in these dramatically different political contexts can help shed light on the extent to which certain aspects may be universal.

THE SOVIET UNION

Unfortunately there are no accounts by western-trained scholars of rural life in the U.S.S.R. comparable to the kinds of community studies that exist for India and China. The circumstances of war, however, have made possible a more intimate glimpse of one local part of Soviet society during the process of collectivization than would have been possible for any scholar making an investigation at the time. During their invasion the Germans captured a large portion of the archives of Smolensk. These subsequently came into American hands and have been analyzed in detail.¹ They cover the period

¹ Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). There is an extensive literature on village life in the U.S.S.R. For some selected translations of Soviet authors see the journals *Soviet Sociology* and *Soviet Anthropology and Archeology*, International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, New York.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Rural Revolution: The Soviet Union and the United States

1917-1938 with most interesting data, from the viewpoint of rural society, focusing on the period of the First Five Year Plan (1928-1933), during which time collectivization was undertaken. The rationale for collectivization after the period of the twenties, when private agriculture had been permitted to flourish was that, given the assumption that rapid industrialization was imperative, only an agriculture under centralized control could supply the necessary food at minimum prices. In effect the rural population, still the great majority, was to involuntarily underwrite this program.

Smolensk is located on the Dnieper 250 miles west of Moscow, in an area of rolling hills with relatively poor soils. Flax, fodder crops, dairy farming, and hog raising predominated in agriculture. Over ninety per cent of the region's population was rural in 1925, but by 1939 this figure had fallen to eighty-three per cent.

In 1903 a distinguished British observer of the Russian countryside noted in Smolensk a great improvement in villages in the area. He was particularly impressed by the appearance of chimneys, which were far superior to the old method of venting smoke through the door. Wooden plows had begun to disappear. Clover was planted, indicating a more intensive form of land use. He attributed these changes to the increasing income from flax, work in lumbering, and the relatively large numbers of peasants who had temporary work in the towns.²

The records show that in 1898 ten per cent of the male population of the Smolensk district and three per cent of the female obtained internal passports as *otkhodniki*, migratory workers. They took jobs on the railroads and in industry as well as becoming servants in Moscow and St. Petersburg.³

The 1917 Revolution and Soviet Collectivization

At the time of the 1917 Revolution there was already a class of prosperous peasants in this area. There were also many who lived in poverty. A third of the land was owned by merchants and the nobility, who rented much of it to villagers, and land prices increased as a result of the demand.

By late spring of 1917 peasants had already begun to occupy the estates, following the fall of the Czar in February. In July Kerensky's provisional government attempted to set up committees to compensate owners or at least to prepare for an orderly settlement until the Con-

² Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (London: Cassell and Co., 1905), 2, 202-203.

³ Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

stituent Assembly could meet. By fall, however, the Bolsheviks' slogan of "Land to the Peasants" had found so much support among rural people that the Bolsheviks received the largest number of votes for the Constituent Assembly in Smolensk District, despite Trotsky's characterization of the area as a "backward province" likely to be especially unresponsive to their appeals.⁴

Lenin proclaimed "the transfer of the land of the landlords, of the crown and monasteries to the peasants' committees without compensation," at the time the Bolsheviks were seizing power and were anxious to attract allies and further their cause by undermining the old order.⁵ The peasants occupied the estates, and considerable anarchy resulted, since these actions coincided with a period of civil war.

The peasants withheld produce from the towns, refusing to accept worthless paper money. The population of many towns declined drastically, and city people made long trips to the countryside to barter clothing and other items for food, often to have it confiscated by the Soviet authorities when they returned home. Markets became so deserted "that even dogs and pigeons stopped coming to them."⁶ Theoretically the peasants were to surrender a portion of their produce to the government, but faced with noncompliance the new Soviet authorities sent food battalions into the countryside to confiscate food for urban workers and new officials. Pitched battles took place, and both food battalions and villages were destroyed. Government control was gradually asserted with the aid of "poor peasants" who were organized into Committees of the Poor and empowered to take livestock and wheat from the so-called middle and rich peasants.⁷

After the communist victory in the civil war and following brief experiments with radical reforms, a decision was made to embark on the New Economic Policy, a prominent feature of which was the leaving of agricultural lands in peasant hands. This was motivated by the devastated condition of rural areas and the need for the new government to consolidate its power. During the 1920's the countryside recovered considerably, but communist control remained to be asserted. Usually the chairman of the Village Soviet, the local organ of government, was

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵ "To the Workers, Soldiers and Peasants," in *Lenin: Selected Works*, reprinted in Robert H. McNeal, ed., *Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev: Voices of Bolshevism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 46.

⁶ Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 486-87.

⁷ Ivar Spector, *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 288-89.

not a party member and tended to side with his fellow villagers. He had all he could do to collect taxes, furnish recruits for the army, settle land quarrels, and manage whatever public services existed.⁸

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

The First Five Year Plan contained as a basic assumption the view that the collectivization of agriculture was essential to assure reliable grain supplies at minimum prices in order to underwrite the extensive program of industrialization, since no outside aid was forthcoming. That is, the peasants were to be forced to subsidize the expansion of urban growth by giving over to government officials control of agricultural price and marketing. Ideological reasons were propounded: the elimination of private property as a productive base, of "exploiting elements" (rich peasants, or *kulaks*), and class conflict in the countryside.

In 1929 half the village chairmen in the Smolensk area were removed. According to the Secret Police archives some of these who attempted to implement the party line were murdered or had their homes burned by protesting villagers. For example the archives state: "Kalinin, a poor-peasant public servant who carried out the class line was murdered. . . . The kulak Novikov finally confessed and added that besides him 2 kulaks and 3 well-to-do people took part in the murder."⁹

Protest took other forms as well. Those who were among the first to enter the collective often found their homes set afire. Others slaughtered their own livestock rather than turn them over to the authorities of the collective. Some village officials made efforts to protect relatives and friends who were classified as kulaks, and as in China the "poor peasants" were reluctant to denounce fellow villagers, due to uncertainty about the future as well as to kin bonds and friendship. Gradually younger, well-indoctrinated officials, many of them army or party veterans, were sent to the village to implement government policies.

Among almost 400,000 peasant households registered in the Smolensk District in 1927, five per cent were classified as kulaks, seventy per cent as middle and twenty-five per cent as poor peasants.¹⁰ Since the Revolution flax and hemp cultivation had declined, with a shift to food and fodder crops oriented toward home consumption. People evidently ate better in the villages but less was marketed, a situation that was not to be tolerated by a government determined on rapid expansion of indus-

⁸ Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 41. For a fictionalized account of the working out of these problems among the Don Cossacks, see the novels of Mikhail Sholokhov.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

try. The official approach was to enlist the aid of the middle and poor peasants, at the same time denying to kulaks all state facilities such as credit and prosecuting them for the concealment of grain surpluses. Although no precise data are available it seems that the kulaks were in the best position to market their produce; a great deal of the increase in consumption probably had taken place among the least prosperous. The Soviets were clearly not interested only in promoting the marketing of agricultural produce but in destroying the existing village structure and remaking it in their own ideological image. This was a matter of considerable significance to them because the prosperous peasants were also village leaders and often highly respected members of their own communities, having become successful in local terms as a result of their own labor and that of their families.

Poor peasants denied that there were kulaks in their villages. Party and soviet workers were denounced by the peasants as thieves and bandits. According to one report almost half of those arrested for terroristic acts were people who had been designated middle or poor peasants linked to kulaks by family and economic ties. According to police archives in late 1929 and early 1930 kulaks were divided into three categories. The first group, designated as counter-revolutionaries, was to be arrested by the Secret Police; the second group was to be deported to "far-off" parts of the Soviet Union; and the third was to be settled on eroded and swamp land "in need of improvement." The first two groups were permitted to retain only those things essential to survival, and those in the third category were to keep "an indispensable minimum of work implements" and in addition to serve on work gangs on the roads and in the forests.¹¹ As in China a generation later, official directives attempted to make the transition orderly, specifying that none of these "de-kulakization" measures were to be undertaken against poor and middle peasants and the families of Red Army men, even if the latter could otherwise be classified as kulaks. Local realities were another matter. According to a police report of February, 1930, "certain members of the workers' brigades and officials of lower echelons of the party-soviet apparatus," tore off children's caps, removed shoes from people's feet and eyeglasses from their faces, consumed food and vodka on the spot. Some of these confiscations evidently assumed the dimensions of an orgy. Confiscated property was stolen, inventories were falsified, rich peasants bribed poorer ones to be removed from the list of kulaks, some committed suicide or divorced their wives to preserve certain property, some sold what they owned or fled if they could. Many poor and mid-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-43.

dle peasants refused to cooperate in what they considered to be the government's unjust measures. Reactions are recorded in the police records: . . . "the best and hardest workers of the land are being taken away." "What kind of kulaks can they be—they who have just begun to enjoy their own piece of bread?"

As a result of these events on a national scale Stalin's famous article, "Dizzy with Success," calling for a halt to "excesses" in the collectivization process, appeared in March of 1930.

Collectivization Consolidated

Collectivization continued, however, but by 1932 members began to leave the collectives despite drastic sanctions. Famine threatened, reaching a severe crisis in the hard winter of 1932-33. The procurement system was revised and made less onerous, and by the end of 1934 over three-fourths of the households in Smolensk District were collectivized.¹² The program was successful in terms of the limited, specific objectives, that is the Soviet Union succeeded in its program of industrialization. Many non-Soviet observers maintain, however, that in most other respects collectivization was a failure. Even in the 1960's the continuing supply of food to urban centers is not well organized, shortages are frequent, and supplies irregular. Despite periodic curbs the private plot and free peasant market continue to be a vital part of Soviet agriculture, particularly in dairy products and vegetables. The food grains that are produced on the collectives and state farms have been supplemented in recent years by large purchases abroad. (Prior to the Revolution Russia was a grain exporter.) These are taken as signs that the peasant has continued to resist state policy. Actually the ideology of the party and the policies of the state have been successful with the rural people in destroying forever the primacy of a village-centered existence. Their choice to work private plots in whatever time can be safely culled from collective work, by legal or illegal means, is a decision between relative rewards within restricted alternatives.

Given a choice between life on the land and an urban occupation there can be little question that the latter is overwhelmingly preferred. This is so despite the fact that the children of peasants must undergo greater transformations than others. Unlike the children of workers and intelligentsia they must reject their past to succeed in the new society. The peasant family lost many of its economic functions with the onset of collectivization. No longer could it be said that the natural labor unit

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 245-63.

was “a man, a woman, and a horse;” rather, an attempt was made to substitute the brigade and the tractor.

The experiences, attitudes, and values of young people of rural background were negatively valued in the new Soviet society. Patterns of parental authority and religious belief were oriented toward the past. The bourgeoisie was frowned upon and discriminated against by the new government, but their professional skills were highly valued. Attitudes toward education and experience with urban life helped the old middle class and civil service face the future. The workers were in an officially favored position. But despite the rhetoric about “workers and peasants” and the appeals directed toward “poor and middle peasants,” it soon became apparent that along with the old upper classes and nobility the traditional subculture of peasants had no long-term future. Unlike the former upper classes, their subculture continued to exist but only after undergoing drastic reformulation.

The negative attitudes toward agriculture as a way of life are obvious. In many areas the majority of the agricultural work force is made up of women and old men. Women comprise about sixty per cent of the total labor force on collective and state farms. They do most of the unskilled work in the fields and with the livestock; men run the machinery and occupy most managerial positions. The shortage of young men is repeat-

FIGURE 4

In the U.S.S.R. women comprise about sixty per cent of the labor force on collective and state farms. They do most of the unskilled work in the fields while men run the machinery and occupy most managerial positions. On a state farm near Kharkov, in the Ukraine.

edly emphasized in the Soviet press. In 1961 the total number of workers employed in food production, including those involved with private plots, declined to 48.1 million, a decrease of over 14.6 million since 1940. (The 1959 figure is, however, more than six times the United States total.)¹³

More telling than statistics are the human relations expressed in contemporary Soviet literature. In a recent novel the collective farm chairman is depicted as a harried individual beset by often unreasonable administrative measures regarding the procedures for agricultural work and rigid demands for meeting production quotas. In order to accomplish these objectives he must round up groups of women to do the work. The able-bodied men are off laboring in the towns or in lumbering, and those who remain are either over age or unfit for work. The women much prefer to busy themselves on their household plots or to gather mushrooms in the woods. When he tries to round up schoolgirls he is confronted by maternal resistance: "What? Have my daughter raking manure? Was it for this that the old man and me broke our backs so she could get an education?"¹⁴ This novel depicts the local communists as all being state employees, virtually none of them engaged directly in cultivation. It was they who had the nicest homes in the village; any villagers with "the slightest claim to literacy," had left to make a livelihood in the town.¹⁵

Collective farmers cannot move freely to urban areas, however, for they lack internal passports. For them to visit a town, even for medical care, a travel order is necessary, and they cannot leave their collective without the permission of the chairman. Even those who receive temporary travel permits have trouble finding lodgings in town, since their permits are not honored on an equal basis with internal passports.¹⁶

Migrations to Work in Towns

Otkhodnichestvo, temporary, usually seasonal, migrations by villagers to towns, has a long history in many parts of Russia. It was important as far back as the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly in the northern parts of European Russia where there was a relatively dense population and agricultural yields were low. Many worked in the forests during the winter and in summer migrated south to help

¹³ *Soviet Agriculture Today*, Foreign Agricultural Report No. 13 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, December, 1963), 1, 28-30.

¹⁴ Fyodor Abramov, *The New Life: A Day on a Collective Farm*, trans. and "Introduction," George Reavey (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), p. 26.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁶ See V. Frolov, "No Room at the Inn," *Selskaya Zhizn*, trans., in *Atlas*, 11, No. 2 (February 1966), 117-19.

with the harvests in more prosperous areas. In addition to seeking work in service occupations in the major cities, a large number were artisans. They preserved their ties to the home community, since as serfs they remained legally bound to the land and retained their rights in affairs relating to the village even while forming artisan communes in the towns. This link came in time to be an undesirable burden for many migrants who, until 1903, were liable to taxes levied on the village community. Further, the community's permission was required for the extension of the worker's passport. In 1900 ninety per cent of all Russian urban workers were still formally classified as belonging to the legal category of peasants (although some were a generation or two removed from the village community).¹⁷ Many returned seasonally to help with work in the fields. At the time of the Revolution there was a temporary return en masse to rural areas.¹⁸

Despite travel restrictions, *otkhodnichestvo* is not extinct. A Soviet report of a village of approximately 1,500 people 200 miles southeast of Moscow, cites several cases of villagers who work part time in the Donbas mines while their families remain in the village. These jobs may provide the means for eventually moving the family to the city, or the worker may retire to the village at the end of his career.¹⁹ Such cases are certainly typical of a world-wide pattern of rural migrants and represent the personal aspects of the transitional phases of the rural revolution. It must also be remembered, of course, that in the Soviet Union much of the movement of labor has been government-directed. This was particularly true in Stalin's time.

Political leaders have also experienced these transitions in their own lives. Khrushchev was of this sort of background, having left his village at age fifteen to work with his father in the mines: "My father was a farmer who worked in the mines in the winter in the hope that he would some day earn enough money to buy a horse, so that he could raise enough potatoes and cabbage to feed his family. He never got the horse."²⁰

Mass migration to towns has been one of the greatest changes in Russian village life. In finding its own solutions to the problems of the rural revolution, the Soviet government is also faced with the task of

¹⁷ Jerzy G. Gliksman, "The Russian Urban Worker: From Serf to Proletarian," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 313.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-17.

¹⁹ Cited in Stephen P. and Ethel Dunn, "The Great Russian Peasant: Culture Change or Cultural Development?" *Ethnology*, 2, No. 3 (July 1963), 331-32.

²⁰ Harold H. Martin, "Back to the Beginning of the Tumultuous Life of Nikita Khrushchev," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 7, 1964, p. 19.

encouraging technically trained and ideologically motivated cadre to go to the countryside. Though the educational and training qualifications of collective farm personnel have increased, high turnover remains a severe problem. In addition, because of inadequate manpower in the rural areas, at times of peak demand for agricultural labor it is necessary to mobilize students and workers to get the crops in. Centralized planning in agriculture means that in the highly variable production processes that exist due to variations in climate, terrain, soil, and crops, personnel coordination becomes a major problem. Small-scale peasant agriculture is, of course, limited with regard to the utilization of technical innovations and is in some respects wasteful of labor and resources, but decisions as to when to plant, when to weed, and when to harvest can be made quickly. This is one reason why China and the U.S.S.R. are continually mobilizing labor to go to the countryside while at the same time the rural areas remain overpopulated and the young people strive to go to the cities. Recruiting rural labor, educating village children for urban occupations, and sending city people, including intellectuals, to work in the country does tend to reduce rural-urban differentiation, but the social stresses and lack of production efficiency are apparent.

Changes in Village Communities

What about changes within the context of village communities themselves? Certain of the externals are obvious to the foreign traveler. Innovations are the state-run general store, loudspeakers broadcasting Radio Moscow, and billboards along the road honoring Soviet achievements in space, spurring fulfillment of state plans, or pointing out the need for progress in the Soviet Union relative to other countries (one memorable poster urged villagers to "Overtake America in Pig Production.") Roads other than the main highways generally are not paved, but schools, hospitals, and libraries are well provided in rural areas relative to their own past histories but not when compared to towns.

The contrast between collective and private ownership is immediately apparent when one crosses the border, for example, from Poland into Byelorussia. Individual farm outbuildings are replaced by the more massive sheds and administrative structures of state and collective farms. The state or collectively owned tractor displaces the horse. Rural churches are more often than not abandoned and decaying. In villages near cities TV antennae appear. Unlike in many parts of Eastern Europe, where elements of folk dress are retained, the dress of Russian villagers is basically similar to that of urban workers.

There is also a continuity with the pre-Revolutionary past. In many

areas new dwellings are constructed in the same style, wooden frame or log houses, as formerly, and in the steppe they are of whitewashed mud plaster, often retaining some special characteristic such as a particular pastel tint or ornamental stenciled design. The massive Russian brick and clay stove used for heating and cooking still dominates the interior of many peasant homes.

Although many ambitious young people can get some sort of education and leave for a town, the family continues to function as a corporate entity, with payment in kind for individual labor performed on the collective farm going to feed the whole household. Produce from the private plot, which can be up to two-fifths of a hectare in size, further bolsters the household economy. The large extended family, however, is regarded as a reactionary social phenomenon, the nuclear family being the socialist ideal.²¹ This is easily understandable in that large household groups can have greater independence of state control and be less reliant on state services. It can be stated fairly that collectivization, industrialization, and the war all have combined to destroy traditional peasant society. The effect of the latter should not be underestimated. "The collective and state farms are full of lonely, middle-aged women whose husbands or potential husbands lie buried somewhere between the Moscow-Stalingrad Line and Berlin."²²

Village-Town Differences

Despite modernization and the attempts to remold rural life there are striking rural-urban differences. These override, in most cases, the very significant regional differences. Youth and old people compose a greater proportion of the population in villages than in towns (fifty-one per cent as compared with thirty-six per cent). In rural areas there is a ratio of eighty-one males per 100 females, as opposed to a ratio of 89:100 in urban areas, a difference the more notable in view of the age structure. In 1959, when measuring rural data as a percentage of urban, the figure is 109 for the total population, but eighty-two for males aged 16-59. If we look at ethnic composition the ratio is sixty-three for Great Russians and 217 for all other groups. In other words, rural-dwelling Great Russian males in the active age-group are relatively few.

Differences in education are also marked. Just under one per cent of adults in rural areas have a higher education, contrasted to five times that number in urban settlements. The state is the only significant employer in cities, but it has been estimated that in 1959 over a third of

²¹ Dunn and Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

²² Allan B. Ballard, "Private Plot vs. Collective Farm," *New York Times Magazine*, June 13, 1965, p. 70.

the entire work-time on collective farms was devoted to private plots. Per capita farm income has been estimated to be less than half that of the urban worker. State welfare expenditures are only one-half as high as those in urban areas. In 1961 only a third of those enrolled in advanced agricultural schools had come from peasant homes. Against this background, where the strongly felt inferior status of rural people is consciously reinforced, it is not surprising that here, too, movements looking toward the past or anticipating a cataclysm should occur. One such movement foresaw the world ending at the opening of the World Youth Festival, at which time divine punishment would be inflicted on "all who worked in factories and read books." The appearance of a "Grand Duke Mikhail" was seen as a sign of salvation.²³

The Soviet future is conceptualized in a recent Party Program as guiding the rural revolution to completion and eliminating the differences between the town and country. "Agriculture will approach the level of industry in technical equipment and organization of production; farm labor will turn into a variety of industrial labor."²⁴ To accomplish this end the state is to supply the equipment and trained personnel. At the same time labor satisfaction is presumably to be raised by increasing the amount of consumer goods and public facilities, which will lighten the burden or, depending on one's point of view, decrease the functions of the family. According to the Program when productivity is at a high level the collective farmers will voluntarily give up their private plots. The distance to be traveled toward this end is indicated by the fact that in 1959 the private plots, with only 3.7 per cent of the total sown area, produced seventy-nine per cent of all eggs, sixty-three per cent of potatoes, and about half of the meat, milk, and vegetables consumed.²⁵ It is interesting to speculate how such aims could be accomplished, bearing in mind the lack of able-bodied male labor. Significantly the Russian Republic, the largest and most developed area, is the most deficient in this regard.

A strongly felt ideal repeated three times in the text of the Program is that "elimination of socio-economic and cultural distinctions between town and country and of differences in their living conditions will be one of the greatest gains of communist construction."²⁶ Five years later

²³ Demitri B. Shimkin, "Current Characteristics and Problems of the Soviet Rural Population," in Roy D. Laird, ed., *Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1963), pp. 79-127.

²⁴ *The New Soviet Society* (Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), annotations and introduction, Herbert Ritvo, *The New Leader*, 1962, p. 131.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-43.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

at the twenty-third CPSU Congress this theme was repeated. A step in this direction was the establishment in 1965 of state pensions for collective farmers. Under the current Five Year Plan it is proposed to expand construction of schools, hospitals, and theaters in rural areas. By 1970 it is planned to triple the amount of electric power available in the countryside compared with 1965. State investments in machinery and equipment will be raised. The development of secondary sources of employment in the processing of agricultural produce is envisaged in order to more fully utilize available labor during agricultural slack seasons. Pension benefits are to approximate those of workers and office employees. A monthly minimum wage is to be introduced. Significantly, the private plot is mentioned as a supplementary source of income. With increasing electrification, greater use of television, radios, refrigerators, and washing machines is seen as improving rural living conditions.

If rural-urban differences are to be eliminated, however, the problem becomes not only one of progress for rural areas but of greater relative change than that which will be occurring in urban areas; otherwise standards can rise in rural areas, but the gap relative to urban conditions may widen. This problem is illustrated by the fact that from 1959 to 1966 although the number of collective farmers with a secondary education increased from twenty-three to thirty-one per cent, among people in industry the increase was greater (forty-five to fifty-eight per cent). These objectives also make more understandable the Soviet concern with size of operation, presumably based on the idea that rural food factories must be large so that the population of the countryside can be concentrated and urbanized in order to provide modern services and so gradually eliminate village-city distinctions.

THE UNITED STATES

In turning now to look at the changing village community in the United States, we shall take as an example a rural settlement known as Plainville.

A Missouri Farm Community

This is a Missouri farm community that was studied by an anthropologist in 1939-40 and reinvestigated fifteen years later by another scholar.²⁷ It is located in an area of forested hills, bordering a meandering river. Most of the farms are situated on prairie land away from the

²⁷ James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945) and Art Gallaher, Jr., *Plainville Fifteen Years Later* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

river, the best land being on alluvial soil along creeks. The ecological setting rather closely approaches that of the Serbian village Orašac. The pattern of extensive land use compares with that of the Soviet Union as contrasted with the intensive-irrigation and multi-cropping agriculture of the southern parts of India and China.

Plainville's history, like that of Orašac, is brief, the area having been settled by homesteaders in the early part of the nineteenth century. The first settlers came west from Kentucky and Tennessee about 1830. Unlike in Orašac here there are no remains of an earlier agricultural civilization, and in this respect analogies are closest to commercial farming of the Argentine pampas, the Canadian prairie, and Australia, which were opened up by railroads and steamships in the nineteenth century.

About a century earlier, expansion southward into the Russian steppe and the elimination of nomads had begun, the pattern of establishing large landed estates and extended family units contrasting with the stress on the individual nuclear family more characteristic of Anglo-Saxon pioneers in North America. Such nuclear families were often part of larger kin groups, but the economic and social ties linking the constituent nuclear units appear to have been looser than in many parts of the Old World.

There are certain parallels with the settling of Siberia, notwithstanding the exile system; people sought land and freedom not found in their former home, and like the American pioneer farmer the Siberian settler found that he could bend law and officialdom to a degree to accord with his desires, at times evading the government entirely. These pioneering ventures were to some extent self-selecting, and people of different homelands intermingled, from the different provinces of European Russia in Siberia and from various parts of Western Europe in the American Midwest. In each case they came from areas where resources were limited to a place where the amount of land that could be cultivated depended more on individual and family initiative than on the ability to purchase.

The first farmers in Plainville raised minor crops such as potatoes, cabbage, and onions, supplemented by hunting and gathering of forest products. Grain cultivation did not become important until later and hay not until after the Civil War. Here again contrasts come to mind with the Serbs, who came down to the wooded lowlands in sizeable extended family units. As we have seen, their herding tradition was transferred to raising pigs fattened on acorns in the oak woods. Since pigs, and later plums, were important export crops to Austria, the villages in this area of Serbia were directly participating in a limited cash

economy and international trade at a time when the farmers of Plainville were still involved chiefly in subsistence agriculture.

By the second half of the nineteenth century the agricultural focus around Plainville shifted from small bottom and hill fields to the prairie, accomplished by a second wave of immigrants between 1860 and 1890. The post-Civil War period was also the time when industrialization in America began to gather momentum, and modern farm technology made its initial appearance in Plainville. In Serbia, for a complex of political and other reasons, analogous industrialization did not occur; the rolling land was filled up by natural increase, the forests were cut over, and the economy, lacking capital and an industrial base, essentially stagnated while technology remained constant.

In Plainville after 1890 when all the land had been claimed, many youths migrated to new land further west. Subsequently new industrial expansion absorbed the excess able-bodied population. The population of the county reached a peak in 1900 and by 1940 had declined by thirty-five per cent, mostly through migration to one region in the Sacramento Valley. The only twentieth-century increase was in the 1930's when, as a result of the Depression, more people returned than left. The downward trend continued to 1950 when the county population was about half what it had been fifty years earlier. In those countries in which industrialization began later (Mexico, Yugoslavia, India, China) individual village populations have kept on increasing or have levelled off only in recent times.

Migrations from Plainville

The exodus from Plainville was not entirely voluntary. In the period of post-war prosperity in the late 1940's ex-soldiers and former defense workers returned home hoping to buy farms or set up businesses. A number took agricultural courses with support from the government's training program for veterans. But most of the trainees could not be absorbed and a decade after the war less than ten per cent of those who took the courses were found in farming. As a local man described it, "The day their checks was stopped, they hightailed it to the city."²⁸

The pattern in Plainville is in contrast to the migrations so marked among Russian peasantry. In America there was no legal counterpart to the village commune or to the patriarchal extended family so characteristic among the eastern Slavs. In the case of Plainville there was occasionally a return to the community, and kin ties did facilitate migra-

²⁸ Gallaher, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

tion, as is demonstrated by the move of groups of former residents to California. But the migration to California was, after all, the third such move in approximately as many centuries, and the ties to place could not be enduring. There is perhaps more than a small degree of correlation between these recurrent movements and the ability to innovate. For these are not the moves of nomads in familiar patterns but are a series of progressive adaptations, each one in a different ecological setting and at a different technological level. The move to Siberia or the relocation of Chinese overseas are in their own ways the extending of frontiers as the result of man's relatively recent urge to exploit natural and human resources to increasing limits, made possible only by successive advances in technology. The steamship made mass travel of Chinese from South China to Southeast Asia feasible, facilitating as well the movement of Europeans to the New World.

Older migration patterns similar to those of the Old World are, however, still to be found in the United States. In the small community of Beech Creek in eastern Kentucky, among 318 people who lived there in 1942 and were alive in 1961, only forty-two per cent still lived in this community or nearby. Over the nineteen-year period in one kin group composed of fifty-three members, twelve had moved to a small city in southern Ohio and six to a town in Kentucky. Among seventy-six in a still larger group, thirty-six had moved to a town in Ohio. Inverse migration also took place on the part of older people and others who could not adapt to the new environment.²⁹

In the part of Kentucky where Beech Creek is located the concept of roots and the homestead more closely approximates that of village communities in the Old World than is the case of Plainville. But in both instances, and from other villages it is clear that kin ties, while they may temporarily hinder some movements, are of great positive value in making easier the individual transitions that are part of the rural revolution.

In Plainville as in rural Russia there is a disproportionate population of older people. From 1940-1950 those in the ten to thirty-nine age group declined from forty-six per cent to thirty-seven per cent of the total population.³⁰ In the United States farmers tend to be older than the general working population. In the 1960 U.S. Census the median age of employed males was 40.6 years, that of farmers 49.2, farm laborers

²⁹ J. S. Brown, H. K. Schwarzweller, and J. J. Mangalam, "Kentucky Mountain Migration and the Stem-Family: An American Variation on a Theme by LePlay," *Rural Sociology*, 28, No. 1 (March 1963), 48-49.

³⁰ Gallaher, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

45.8, and laborers other than those in farming and mining 37.5 years. The rural revolution with a probable ultimate result in the professionalization of farming and positive rather than negative selection of personnel still has a long way to go even in the United States where the large-scale exodus from the land continues.

In America the impact of the highway and private car on the rural community has given a distinct turn to the processes of change. It is relatively easy to maintain a farm residence along with a job in industry. Going for a ride has also become recreation, movement for its own sake, for it is not the sights to be seen that intrigue but the closeness to machinery in motion with its related feeling of power and transitory independence that compels. The adaptability of the automobile's back seat, becoming today's equivalent of the front parlor, is often a secondary attraction.

In the words of one Plainviller, "Most of them high school boys would give their eye teeth to own a car . . . we've had several around here quit high school so's they could git one." One father bought a car for his son so that he would complete high school.³¹

The people of Plainville are in touch with the wider world through TV, radio, newspapers, and popular magazines. Emphasis is more on entertainment and local news than on information, with the possible exception of technical agricultural information distributed through the agricultural extension service. A library exists in Plainville, but it does not attract much interest. This contrasts with the Soviet rural environment, which features a maximum of official lectures, both political and informational, and usually a well stocked and frequently used library.

Education and Mobility

The older generation in Plainville felt that an eighth-grade education or at most the completion of high school was sufficient. In the more modern view a high school education is a necessity. A few see a college education as desirable, but expense is a great barrier and motivation is not strong. Among juniors and seniors at the local high school, boys expressed aspirations in terms of becoming mechanics (6), unspecified kinds of urban workers (3), farmers (3), veterinarian (1, without having to go to college), lawyer (1). Eight of the fourteen boys said they expected to receive vocational training in the army. Among the fifteen girls in the upper grades aspirations included jobs as business secretaries (4), hospital work (4, but with no formal education specified),

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

housewives (3), work with children (2), musician (1) and beautician (1). All the students were aware that they would probably leave Plainville.³²

These occupational aspirations are in marked contrast to those in other countries. Notably absent are white collar civil service and professional jobs so much desired by rural youth in countries such as Egypt, India, China, and the nations of eastern Europe. Virtually absent from the Plainville list are those occupations that require technical or professional training, which are the fond dreams of rural youth elsewhere. A 1962 inquiry on the same topic in Yugoslavia, among students in their final year in the gymnasium of a small district center in Serbia, revealed that among the nineteen who lived in nearby villages and whose fathers were peasants the boys aspired to be lawyers (3), engineers (3), high school teachers (2), technicians (1), agronomist (1); the girls in the group wanted to become lawyers (2), engineers (2), teachers (2), doctor (1), reporter (1), economist (1).³³

Montenegrin shepherd boys dream of exploring the moon or at least becoming pilots, even though they live in homes without electricity and may never have been on a train. Children from a Slovene village located near a town with electronics and textile industries, whose usual activities include watching television sports events and illustrated travel lectures, aspire to become skilled workers. A conjecture, applicable to both Plainville and rural Yugoslavia, is that in those regions where material conditions are poorest occupational aspirations are highest. Also, attending high school is the norm in Plainville while the student body in the inquiry cited for Yugoslavia is much more highly selected. Further, since the rural revolution is only in its initial phases in the latter country, competition for urban situations is keener; in Plainville both selection and expulsion processes have been at work for more than half a century. Thus in Plainville those who opt for farming and homemaking reveal a kind of contentment not present in the other village communities examined. At the same time the massive transformation that has taken place in rural American society is evidenced by the fact that eighty-two per cent of the total number of graduates of the Plainville high school (562 as of 1953) have moved from the county.³⁴

For those who remain in Plainville the change in standard of living has been dramatic. In 1940 seven per cent of the farms in the county

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63.

³³ Joel M. Halpern, "Farming as a Way of Life: Yugoslav Peasant Attitudes," in *Proceedings of the Conference on Soviet and East European Agriculture*, ed. Jerzy Karcz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

³⁴ Gallaher, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

had electricity; by 1950 this had risen to sixty per cent and by 1954 to ninety-one per cent. In 1938 only two in 103 births were in the county hospital, while in 1952, eighty-eight of a total of ninety-two took place there. As of 1940 seventeen per cent of the farm families had an income over \$1,000; by 1950 fifty-seven per cent were in this category. This is an impressive change even allowing for the decline in value of the dollar.³⁵

The government's role has become increasingly strong. In 1954 government expenditures in the county for social security, welfare, agricultural conservation, civil service, and military disability totalled approximately one-quarter of agricultural sales, the main source of income.

Mechanization and Large Farming Units

The most significant change has been in the nature of farming itself. Holdings have become larger and more capital-intensive. Between 1945 and 1954 the number of farms decreased by a third but holdings of 180 acres or more rose from twenty-nine to forty-four per cent. Those farmers who have mechanized now need more land to make their holdings profitable.³⁶ The countryside contains increasing numbers of deteriorating, unoccupied farm houses.

In 1940 there was resistance to various kinds of modern farming practices. This has largely disappeared, and the current enthusiasm for mechanization is high. Certain investments appear to reflect not so much economic need as an assertion of status—even close relatives duplicate expensive machinery.³⁷ There has been a growth in specialization and a shifting in specialties to meet changing market demands.

In a rural community in southern Illinois quite similar to Plainville a local businessman interpreted the changes he observed in his lifetime as a revolution in agriculture, citing the population decline, the negative effect of emigration on local commerce, and the concessions made to local industry. When a small factory was opened there were 600 applications for 150 jobs.³⁸ He expressed the feeling that with the need for farms to be large to be economical it is no longer possible to divide holdings among sons. In expressing resentment over the increasing role of the government he acknowledged that farmers use the technical and advisory services and take advantage of crop subsidy and control pro-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 119.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³⁸ Joseph P. Lyford, *The Talk in Vandalia* (A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara), 1962.

grams, since "farmers are opportunists like everyone else." He felt that there was a need for government price control on milk, for example, to stabilize the farmer's income. "The conservative and wealthy farmers who oppose government help to the farmer are the ones who are really on the side of the revolution." Since the economic and technological innovations favor the large farmers, it is understandable that these people resist government measures that tend to delay, at least for a while, the departure of the smaller operators.³⁹

A local farmer who owned and rented a total of 215 acres, on which he felt he could not survive, observed that his father, with his sons and horses, made a living on eighty acres. Another who owned 118 acres and farmed a total of 318 talked of the difficulty of finding enough land to rent, since much was being bought up by nonfarmers.⁴⁰

In American history both the lure of cities and the push of economic pressures are involved in the exodus from the land. Viewing other countries going through these processes today, Americans too often tend to overlook the extent to which suffering has been a part of our own development. We all know the violent drama of the Western, but the less spectacular farm foreclosure is often forgotten.

An attempt to define what are the most efficient production units, given the availability of capital, trained personnel, and machinery, is basic to assessing the impact of the rural revolution and to trying to conceive the future reformulation of farming. Despite certain reservations about the significance of cultural and geographic diversity, it does seem clear that the type of peasant farming based on small scattered plots currently practiced in most of the world represents a technological anachronism. Yet it does not follow from this that huge corporate farms are necessarily the most workable production units. A study of American Midwest farming maintains that, although the average farm has increased in size significantly, the key limiting factor has been how far new machines and techniques will allow the manager-operated farm to be extended. Various studies made in Nebraska, Iowa, and Illinois reveal that in recent years maximum economies of size range (according to the type of farm) from some 300 to 400 acres with present-day equipment. Indeed, using least-cost machine combinations for farms of different sizes in north central Iowa, an Iowa experimental station study found that growth between 320 acres and 880 acres added but negligible economies. Furthermore, beyond 880 acres, costs per units of production

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-18.

FIGURE 5

Economic pressures in American agriculture are relentless; in order to meet commercial requirements this farmer will soon have to invest heavily to modernize his barn. A Vermont dairyman.

began to rise somewhat, "because of the lack of timeliness in operations resulting in declines in per acre yields."⁴¹

A further point is that as factory manufacturing processes and particularly automation change the nature and order of production operations in agriculture (with the possible exception of certain kinds of poultry and livestock operations), a shift to mechanized farming "leaves relatively undisturbed the sequential pattern of operations that has prevailed in farming since the domestication of plants and animals."⁴² In other words, the annual growth cycle for crops and the time required for livestock to mature remain the same as always. Herein lies one of the decisive factors defining the boundaries of the rural revolution.

The American farm population declined by one-third during 1939-1959, but output per man-hour increased three times in the same period, so that the family farm in American society does not seem to be inevitably disappearing. It might be better described, however, as a highly capitalized family business enterprise rather than a "way of life." The Soviet view apparently remains that increasing size is to be equated with economic progress. The fact that from 1957 to 1959 the area worked by the average collective farm brigade rose from 485 to 590 hectares (a twenty-two per cent increase), while the size of the brigade changed from 89 to 121 (a growth of thirty-six per cent) is referred to approvingly in Soviet reports. The apparent fourteen per cent loss in labor efficiency is not explained. An undesirable price of the collective-state

⁴¹ John M. Brewster and Gene Wunderlich, "Farm Size, Capital, and Tenure Requirements," in Carlton F. Christian, ed., *Adjustments in Agriculture: A National Basebook* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1961), pp. 196-228.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

farm system is the administrative overhead, employing one worker in six in the former and one in eight in the latter. This type of work in the American system tends to be handled on the side, at night, in off seasons, and in unfavorable weather.⁴³

PROBLEMS REMAIN

Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has solved the problems created by the rural revolution. In the Soviet Union much of the economically and socially marginal population remain on the land, but in the United States they are to a great degree concentrated in the core areas of major metropolitan centers. Because of emphasis on private property and the nuclear family and the lack of closely integrated village communities, many fewer unsuccessful American migrants have a rural home to return to or even to revisit. Many become wards of urban administrations or form part of the floating migrant farmworker population. Commuting to factory jobs from rural homes is a common pattern in many parts of the United States. In the American experience there is no parallel to Soviet collectivization of agriculture, but economic pressures, particularly those of the depression years, have forced the marginal farmer from the land. The Depression occurred at the same time as the Soviet collectivization; the more prosperous and better capitalized farmer in America survived at the same time that he was being eliminated in the U.S.S.R.

Both countries have paid enormous and involuntary social costs in facing the problems of the changing village community. Since the transitions are still taking place we cannot yet fully evaluate Soviet attempts to deal with rural stagnation and inefficiency and American efforts to overcome urban degradation and conflict. In America the more affluent groups, wedded to the automobile, make an abortive attempt to return to the land in suburbia, and in the U.S.S.R. some city people have garden plots and raise limited amounts of livestock. The ecological aspects of the peasantization of the town and suburbanization of the countryside seem at best to be the transitional stages of decades, certainly not of centuries. The slovenly and haphazard construction of contemporary Soviet cities, with their monumental façades, is matched by the fake rustic exteriors of America's suburban sprawls. Parts of Alma Ata resemble sections of Minsk in the same standardized ways as Anaheim looks like Levittown. Neither has used the craftsmanship inherent

⁴³ Roy D. Laird, "Khrushchev's Administrative Reforms in Agriculture: An Appraisal," in *Proceedings of the Conference on Soviet and East European Agriculture*, ed. Jerzy Karcz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

in building a moon rocket. They will all doubtless have to be rebuilt before the end of our century, hopefully with more attention to land use, æsthetics, and the psychological needs of their human occupants.

These developments are, however, understandable. The pressures the rural revolution creates cry out for immediate solutions. This makes slow growth impossible and discourages long-range planning. If these two countries of such immense resources and relatively sparse populations have still to solve such basic questions, what is it possible to say for less well endowed India and China? Neither a monster Calcutta nor a prison-like commune can be a satisfactory answer.

If one grants the validity of the rural revolution and particularly its most crucial aspect, the reformulation of peasant subculture, what are some of its more significant implications? These can be looked at from the viewpoint of scholarship concerned with understanding the development of human societies and from the standpoint of future national and international politics, especially those of developing nations. The reformulation of rural subcultures as opposed to the modification of urban subcultures has certain significant features that have been stressed in these pages: the turning away from agriculture as an occupation, reflected in the flight from the land and emigration from the village, the rising level of dissatisfaction exceeding the rising expectations within village communities, and a negative self-image by rural people, especially younger ones.

It requires little exercise of the intellect to proclaim conflict and chaos as a probable future human condition. From one perspective Marxism offers defined goals, but nationalistic fragmentation of communist countries and the growing sophistication on the part of the developing nations has dulled its attractiveness. On the other hand Western concepts of diverse patterns of evolutionary development and the related ethical values of various religious systems continue to have appeal as expressed, for example, through the efforts of the United Nations and its

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Future of the Village Community

specialized agencies, of the World Bank, and various national programs of assistance. Despite these efforts it seems vain to hope that economic crises will be resolved by solely nationalistic, religious, or political-ideological solutions.

THE RURAL REVOLUTION IN PERSPECTIVE

Perspective can be gained by viewing the problem in evolutionary terms, that is, to see the rural revolution in the perspective of the neolithic, urban, and more recent industrial and power revolutions of the nineteenth century, not as a situation focusing on conspiracy and exploitation but as one related to growth and development. Being human we are inclined to look for human villains as a cause of conflict, be they prehistoric priests, feudal landlords, factory owners, revolutionaries, or bureaucrats. One of the interesting facts about Marxism and its subsequent Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist adaptations has been its ability to serve as a system of impersonal scholarly analysis and at the same time as a crusading faith in a power-political context. Its analytical potentialities are severely limited, however, by its theoretical emphasis on an omniscient, closed system that conceives of all development as oriented toward a series of delineated "scientific" pre-established stages caused by specific economic forces. In Marxian terms the rural revolution does not exist as such; rather it is a question of the control of state apparatus, ownership of the land, elimination of class exploitation, and the ability to plan economic development, including the collectivization of agriculture and ultimately the elimination of economically based rural-urban differences and conflicts. Problems have been seen in terms of organizations rather than individuals, with all significant criticism taking place within the confines of a unitary ideological framework.

In the Western oriented world criticism is more free ranging, but the problems are often conceived of in a fragmentary way, with local-level developments sometimes seen as self-contained entities. There is no single way of viewing the present and no planned conceptualization of the future, but there is a recognition of a multilineal approach to the problems of development.

Planning for the future is, of course, possible on a number of economic and technical levels and has been practiced for some time in both East and West. Demographic projections, although not always correct, are very useful. Furthermore, since the number of basic factors with which they contend is finite, it is possible to indicate future possible limits, as in the case of forecasting future population growth based on past trends, and the possible variations in future birth and death rates. Making labor

force predictions is usually more difficult since here there tend to be more unknown variables. Related is the problem of forecasting future migration patterns and long-term rural or urban residence patterns. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that with growing experience it may be possible to forecast the gross demographic outlines along which the rural revolution will proceed and conceivably the eventual date of its completion in individual countries. This is not to say that population movements will cease but merely that the off-the-farm trend will cease to be a major movement. Another related matter is that of the long-term psychological effects of crowding in urban areas and the relationship between community size and meaningful social integration. Much has been done along these lines, but the detailed answers are far from clear. Obviously there will not be a single set of answers but groups of solutions relating to the diverse settlement patterns that already exist in highly industrialized and urbanized states.

There have been a number of attempts to estimate the extent of surplus agricultural population from an economic point of view, but we do not yet know the degree to which these estimates correlate with the "psychological" surplus, i.e., those who feel they cannot earn a living from the land, or with the "absorbable" surplus, which reflects the amount of investment available to create the necessary new jobs and urban social facilities for the migrants. To be more precise, it is necessary to divide those who must leave or are planning to leave from those who only wish to do so. A significant feature of this is the consistent skimming off, usually by schooling, of the most ambitious and intelligent who seek careers outside their own communities.

We lack a typology or series of typologies of models of changing village communities. All villages, even within the same culture area, will not be changing at the same rate and in the same ways. A number of crude generalizations are, of course, obvious. First there are those villages located near major towns that change from independently functioning communities to suburbs at the end of a streetcar or bus line, a situation that usually leads to a total extinction of agriculture although this may be a long time in coming. Related to these are communities on the periphery, where many inhabitants become commuters and the remaining farmers orient their production toward perishable vegetables and dairy products, which can be sold with maximum profit in the town. At the other extreme is the isolated mountain settlement where the local economy was never quite sufficient to provide a livelihood for all the inhabitants and where patterns of temporary or long-term migration have been going on for centuries. Often such communities are located in scenic areas, and in recent times tourism is replacing agriculture as

the main industry. This is also true of various coastal areas where fishing and shipping can no longer employ enough people. The development of tourism is related to the growth of cities and industry, and people acquiring the concept of and means for a vacation. Increasingly tourism is becoming a source of government concern whether it be related to the development of parks and historic sites, the provision of vacation periods and hotels, or a source of national income. Thus this type of village ends not as a suburb but as a resort. A third pattern is that of the village community that serves as a mixed residence for employees, workers, and farmers. Hopefully the category of peasant-worker will be a transitional phase, but there is no reason why such occupationally mixed communities cannot remain for some time and play an important role in the decentralization of industry. Finally there is the specialized farming community, already a reality in many areas of the United States, where only milk, poultry, fruit, wheat, or beef is produced. The future will probably not see such neat categories, but certainly the all-purpose village focusing inward will not continue to exist.

Within the village context the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of elders in terms of both community and family organization. Not only are their children and grandchildren better educated, but the life experience of elders, whether it relates to agricultural methods, house construction, marketing procedures, dealing with the government, or methods of healing is at best only partially relevant to current needs.

Although kinship ties and obligations remain important, the large household group no longer accords with the growing individualism of its members, and there is a lack of common bonds of interest; in increasing numbers of countries basic needs are being met by government programs and services. Women are coming to play a larger formal role in family and village affairs. Their informal roles were always acknowledged, but with the number of births being progressively limited there is the potential for more time for other matters as well as the possibility of more intensive care for the fewer children. Often equal educational opportunities are important in this connection. Due to government intervention, economic development, and increasing freedom of movement, the villager is less frequently faced with a fixed universe of limited resources to be divided among an increasing number of people.

A SUMMING UP

What is the rural revolution and what does it imply for the future? The village community by definition has never been a totally isolated

entity but a part, however remote, of the national state. It has nevertheless been possible to view the most significant aspects of life, be they economic, familial, religious, or political, as taking place primarily within the social and geographic context of the village. Temporary migrant labor to far places, marriage outside the village, marketing of goods in distant cities, pilgrimages to shrines, military service perhaps outside national boundaries, an occasional villager who has become a successful merchant or made his way up the bureaucratic ladder—none of these are unfamiliar phenomena in the peasant agricultural community as it has existed prior to the twentieth century and more specifically before World War II in most of the world. But these contacts were subordinate to the main themes of life that revolved around the community (not always a territorial unit) as the home to which one returned, the land worked by the family unit as the primary source of livelihood, and the local relatives and neighbors as the social embodiment of values to which one adjusted. Older kin were the source of authority and wisdom. ✓As a point of departure for investigation, the village community remains a valid unit of analysis.✓Community studies continue to have value, but a fundamental impact of the rural revolution is the decline in the autonomy of the village community. It is no longer a world apart in even a limited way but an integral unit within the modern state. In some areas, of course, this is more a prospect than an actuality, but the general trend is clear.

A most important part of this transformation is that family farming based on human and animal power, the main occupation of village people, is increasingly becoming a low-status occupation to which there are a variety of alternatives instead of remaining a satisfying and dignified way of life. Capital-intensive mechanization of agriculture either leaves a minority of relatively large-scale agricultural producers on the land, or, as in all countries regardless of their political systems, fosters an attempt to create factory-like organizations in rural areas. In all contemporary societies the universal problem is the large-scale establishment of jobs for the majority who leave the land and the village. And for those who remain, the local standards set by family, neighborhood, and community become less meaningful in terms of potential reward, and they lack the coercive power they once had.

This is not to conjure up a romantic past of happy farmers. The frequency of rural revolts and plentiful descriptions of the hardships of village life make such a view untenable. But past attempts at change by rural people have involved either a desire to improve the existing system or to seek comfort in a life after death. The rural revolution is distinct from previous change in that the solution sought is of this world and

in a future new system. Life within the village is not seen as existing primarily apart from the town but rather that the most meaningful possibilities and programs for betterment are found outside the context of the village community. The problem is not one of minimizing external demands for taxes, crops, labor, or conscripts but of how to become more closely involved in the life of the nation. This is possible in two ways: either to leave the village and go to the town or to bring the organizations and facilities of the town to the village. A temporary compromise is to live in the village while working in town. The problem of combining satisfactory employment and desirable living conditions remains to be solved. As agriculture, with the aid of modern technology, becomes more an occupation and less a way of life involving the whole family, the way to resolve the situation clearly seems to be the gradual elimination of those factors that tend to make rural and urban life distinct. This is one of the most important implications of the rural revolution. A consequence of the diminishing of distinctions between rural and urban subcultures appears to be that comparatively more of the change takes place within rural areas. It is not possible, however, to analyze this question in terms of any specific list of traits on a world-wide scale, for not only is there too much cultural variation, but, even more to the point, within a given nation the urban centers themselves are so varied in class, occupational, and ethnic structure. The city has given rise to innovation, especially in technology and economic forms, which impact on the rural areas. The dynamics of the situation, however, are not simply the extension of urban influences into the countryside but the impact of rural migrants and their values upon the city—the peasantization of the town—and the simultaneous evolution of both types of communities within the larger society. In the process cities are modified but rural society is transformed.

We have seen how changes emanating from urban areas have affected all aspects of rural life. It is not possible to take urban culture (or even urban upper- or middle-class culture) as a standard against which to measure rural change. Nor is the stratum of official or bureaucratic subculture an adequate index. Similarly the values implicit in the mass media are not in and of themselves a sufficient indicator. A possible measure is the "national culture," that is, that complex of future-oriented goals often embodied in the national polity and felt to be desirable by both urban and rural people. To some extent these are worldwide and are reflected in United Nations pronouncements, but they are never shared by all in any given country, nor are the means for their implementation ever fully agreed upon. For example in Yugoslavia Marxism-Leninism is the frame of reference of the dominant Communist Party

FIGURE 6

Educating youngsters requires relatively little capital compared to the building of factories, and it is a readily used means by which developing countries seek to incorporate rural citizens into the national culture. A schoolgirl in a Kerala village.

but cannot be considered an integral part of the value system of the majority of the population, most of whom live on family holdings and work as private farmers. However, education, a skilled job, or white-collar work that carries with it security, pension rights, and free medical care are virtual universal goals in Yugoslavia. Further, shared values relate in part to how earnings are to be spent, for example on television sets and automobiles, both of which can be considered urban influences in only a limited way since their possession is a new experience for all. It is true that villagers may utilize cars mainly for marketing produce, while in town they are used more for recreation. Still, the distinction is hardly total, since vehicles may be important for commuting to jobs for the townsmen, and peasants learn to use cars for pleasure. The key factor is the ownership of kinds of goods and the common access to social services. A TV set and a car, pensions and medical care, may change life in the village more than they alter city living.

Urbanization of the village may be a shortened way of describing this, but what is actually taking place is mutual change tending toward common participation in a constantly enlarging series of activities in which the subcultural variations are reflected largely in embellishments. The basic matter is one of shared goals, activities and satisfactions—

Prior to beginning school the child has been exposed, then, via mass media or relatives in town. Thus the main job of the rural teacher is not simply to serve as a channel of communication for official policy and secular ideas but to show rural youth the ways in which they can fit into the larger world.

Naturally the impact of the school on the village community cannot be separated from the dynamics of socioeconomic growth in the nation at large, but there does appear to be a close correlation between the effectiveness of the village school and the upward occupational mobility of rural youth. That is, through education the village child becomes part of a developing national culture and does not merely move from a rural subculture into an impoverished urban setting. Since the number of white-collar jobs is limited and their expansion often places burdens on a country in the initial stages of industrialization, a real need of educational systems is to depict the skilled worker and the trained farmer as desirable, useful, and recognized members of society. Textbooks cannot determine wage scales, but an educated working class can achieve some of its goals through effective organization and political influence. Formal education is not, of course, the only path to social and occupational mobility—job experience, military service, and kin ties are other means. But formal education does make possible a more planned and orderly transition needed in a complex modern society.

To date it seems that in most rural areas the better the school the more the most intelligent and dynamic village youths seek careers elsewhere. Hopefully, as the gap in income and living standards between rural and urban areas narrows, rural schools can serve as stepping-stones to advanced education in agriculture and related subjects, making it possible for rural youth with higher training to return to their native areas to participate in modern agriculture, as in the American Midwest. Such possibilities will not exist as long as small-scale traditional peasant farming is the prevalent form of cultivation. Modern agricultural development cannot take place without reducing the excess agricultural population, and this is in turn linked to urban job opportunities, to investment of the capital necessary to mechanize agriculture, and to birth control. In modernizing farming production, it is of vital importance to entice at least some of the more enterprising youths to remain home in the village. Younger people migrate, able-bodied men take jobs away from the land, and older people live longer; these factors combine to make full-time farming an occupation of old people.

Health programs, like those in education, require less investment than job-creating programs and so can be more easily instituted than other facets of modernization. Many modern curative techniques are usually

inexpensive, dramatically effective, and easy to implement. They are frequently accepted with enthusiasm, making them politically desirable. Preventive medicine is a more difficult matter, which requires changing daily habits and desiring to be "modern." Villagers need to relate to social trends at large. If, thanks to modern medicine, death is no longer inevitably a question of fate or supernatural forces but is instead caused by malfunctions of body mechanisms, which are often possible to correct, then the decision to prolong a life—or to generate life—becomes in part a matter of family option. At the same time that the rural revolution has restricted certain aspects of man's activities it has given him the ability to make decisions not possible before.

This is especially true with regard to birth control, although national policy in this regard has been inconsistent in many countries. Artificial contraceptive techniques will help, and medically performed abortions are obviously useful. The real limitation in population, however, will come only when the villager is no longer primarily oriented toward the possibilities within his community but sees himself and his household fitting in with the total culture of his country, as appears to be the case in Japan. In the past, faced with limited ecological possibilities within an agricultural settlement rural people have often limited family size by abortion or infanticide. In other regions a high birth rate has been considered essential in order to maintain the needed agricultural labor force. It is in large measure a question of the interrelationships between the labor and capital requirements of agriculture, the impact of health services in extending the life span, and the extent of the outlet for surplus population by migration to and/or employment in cities. The working out of these factors, including the too rapid growth of urban centers, is only now becoming clear to scholars. It is understandable that the attitudes of village people are just beginning to change in those countries at the initial stages of modernization. For rural birth rates to approximate those of educated urban groups implies at least a degree of shared values. Thus in a real way all these developments are intertwined.

Mechanization of agriculture and the provision of urban amenities to the countryside are long-range ways of attempting to achieve a stable balance. The scattered settlement pattern of much of the world's agriculture makes it difficult to provide either easy transport of products to market or services whether in schooling, health, agricultural machinery, electrification, or entertainment. In certain respects effective administration is also more difficult in scattered rural areas. These are big problems in a country like Thailand and even more so in Laos. Consolidation of services and in some cases resettlement of populations in a more confined area are obvious alternatives, which have been tried

videly. Ready examples are the consolidated rural schools in parts of the United States and the whole program of collectivization of agriculture and especially the development of state farms in the U.S.S.R.

Encouragement of the formation of smaller urban units rather than a few large ones, as has been recommended in India, is the urban reciprocal of the problem of rural consolidation. The key objective is to reduce the rural-urban distinction in population grouping and facilities.

Given sufficient investment, as in North American and western Europe, it is possible for farmers to have approximately the same amenities available to urban people. Good roads and large-scale private ownership of cars make towns easily accessible. Extensive use of machinery can eliminate certain backbreaking chores, but crops and domestic animals are not amenable to the eight-hour day and a Monday through Friday schedule. Unlike in refineries and power plants, which also require constant operation, in farming automatic controls have a more limited potential. Industries located in rural areas can also help, particularly if they involve skills for which local labor can be trained. Aside from providing a source of income, factories, through their structuring of the production processes and stressing a precise work schedule, and through associated developments such as unions, help to reorient the new worker even if he continues to live on the farm.

All these developments are made effective in the long run only through the political process. The increased role of political action in rural areas, whether supporting developmental programs of the existing government or trying to replace them through peaceful or violent means with new programs, indicates that the political allegiance of rural peoples is being sought by invitation and coercion. The primary emphasis seems to be ensuring loyalties rather than the development of rural areas; collectivization and community development appear to aim as much toward improved political control as toward raising rural living standards. Particularly education and health programs, which raise hopes and prolong life, provide a major impetus to the rural revolution. It is understandable that political organizations are reacting to the symptoms of rural unrest instead of seeking to resolve the main problem raised by the rural revolution—that is, reducing rural-urban differences.

Some of the most significant changes are coming about in an unplanned way, for example in the role of kin ties in promoting communication and movement between village and town. A most hopeful aspect of change is that despite much pain, suffering, and frustration many villagers, particularly the young, do have a sense of exhilaration about the opening up of new opportunities and possibilities. Much can be accomplished if these positive aspirations can be harnessed in rational

ways. But if for reasons of political expediency false promises are made or premature and overambitious changes are devised, a kind of useless deadlock between villager and state can result.

Perhaps one of the most frightening and yet possibly hopeful facets of the rural revolution is the actual interdependence of peoples today; despite political conflicts, economic realities tend to mock political ideologies. The Great Plains of the United States and Canada, together with the wheat-growing areas of Australia, have become the major bread-basket for the world. Hunger is no longer politically feasible. More to the point, growing cities must have food to meet the imperatives of industrialization. The universe of village communities now includes not only the territory of the national state but often distant states as well. For a long time North America was part of the expanding horizon of villagers in southern and eastern Europe. Today labor migrations are taking place from those parts of Europe to countries in the north and west of Europe. As a result of former colonial ties migrants reach England from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean. In a similar way Puerto Ricans and Mexicans are coming to the United States. Unlike earlier migrations to the United States, however, when there was still something of an open frontier and heavy industry and mines required large numbers of unskilled laborers, today's needs whether in western Europe or North America are either seasonal, as for agricultural labor, e.g., the *braceros*, or relatively limited for services or industry. Most contemporary migration is now controlled by intergovernmental agreements. When there are no barriers because of former colonial ties the situation seems to work least well, as with the cases of Algerians in France or Jamaicans in England. Mass resettlement of people from North Africa or the Caribbean in Europe, even if there were local consent, cannot be an answer to the problems of village migrants. Nor will the remittances of those who are working in towns do more than temporarily relieve the situations in their home communities. Support at little more than subsistence levels is not a substitute for development.

Another aspect of the problem is that Mexicans who go to work in the American Southwest and Serbian villagers who are employed for a time in Germany often learn skills that are later useful in their own countries. Participation in wars can also result in useful innovation on the village level. Orašac men who as prisoners worked on farms in Hungary during World War I saw how scythes could be used for reaping grain. Upon returning home they began to use them instead of the sickles previously employed. Their sons returning from Germany after World War II began to feel that things like electricity and out-houses were not luxuries.

The communist alternative may be obvious, but in view of the current world situation it might be better to ask which communist alternative. This is especially true when it is recalled that in countries such as Poland and Yugoslavia the large private agricultural sector continues to exist and does not give signs of disappearing in the near future. Further, when considering the markedly nationalistic tendencies of the developing nations, engineered revolutions resulting in predetermined outcomes appear quite unlikely. At the same time, for North America and western Europe to play policeman to the world in the interests of stable non-communist societies is an equally unrealistic expectation that can have little lasting success. No national or prominent contemporary ideology seeks a disorderly world, but visions of order differ drastically. The demands raised by the rural revolution will tax the capacity of all mankind. Conflict cannot be excluded as a means for evolving the needed new institutional patterns. This is particularly true within the presently existing context of nation states. Competing ideological systems can be productive in evolving a future world of at least some diversity even considering uniform technologies. Political revolutions, however, can at best determine only who will oversee, for a time at least, the problems posed by the rural revolution and the general need for modernization. This is pertinent to the increasing number of cases where the army as the only stable, technically trained, and socially integrated force has moved into a position of political power.

Exclusivistic, dogmatic ideologies may temporarily solve specifically limited problems at huge human cost, but they inhibit the flexibility and imagination of man, which is necessary for his continuing survival. Change is a part of man's biological nature and in a broader sense part of the exchange of energy in the universe. Perfectibility, while useful as a goal, does represent in certain respects the negation of change. The ultimate in order seems to be the antithesis of life. Out of a striving for order may come creative conflict resulting in a stimulating environment of constant change. Man is challenged by his own culture, the heritage of his pain and hopes. The ways in which the village community is remade and replaced will be as decisive for the future as have been the agricultural, urban, and scientific-industrial revolutions. The diversity of the solutions being proposed and applied today may make a uniform world an escapable human condition, provided unlimited conflict does not become the major preoccupation of man.

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