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Time a Tripartite Sociotemporal Model

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DIMENSIONS OF TIME AND LIFE

The Study of Time VIII

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Abstract This paper outlines and illustrates a model of sociotemporality based upon a tripartite paradigm using the concepts of linearity, cyclicity, and liminality as basic sociotemporal primes. The paper reviews the study of time in anthropology, arguing that much sociocultural anthropology has been concerned with studies focused "on time"—either based upon the analysis of time reckoning systems and concepts of time, or with the use of time as a parametric device to measure social change. The paper suggests that societies and social interaction must be situated "in time"—as processes located upon and determined by the temporal landscape. The application of the model utilizes ethnographic data on Canadian Inuit and South Slav peasants.

An Inuit hunting trip is a journey in time as well as space. The 18,000 Inuit of the Canadian Arctic live today in some 46 communities scattered across the northern Canadian mainland and the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. As recently as 30 years ago, Inuit groups still followed a seasonally migratory cycle of movement between the winter sea ice and the summer hunting grounds and fishing lakes and streams. Contemporary Inuit are sedentary, working at service occupations in their communities, such as commercial trapping, and depend on Canadian government transfer payments (old age pensions, family allowance, welfare, and hunter/trapper subsidies). Their lives are regulated by the technical, chronometric constraints of the Euro-Canadian institutions around which Arctic community life is structured: the schools, churches, stores, government offices, and maintenance facilities which link the settlement to the Canadian state.

Hunting for seals, whales, caribou, and birds, however, remains economically important in Inuit life. "Land food" is "real" food and seal and fox pelts (despite depressed prices and widespread boycotts on wild furs) valuable sources of cash. Just as importantly, the land symbolically represents the Inuit ties to their past and their peoplehood—"Nunamiut," people of the land, is a common self-designation.
Moreover, trips onto the land which must nowadays be wedged into weekends or the summer school holidays, represent a return to a traditional, temporal order which is in stark contrast to the regimen of school and work in the town.

Inuktitut is still spoken by the vast majority of Inuit and is the language of 80 to 90 percent of the homes. The official languages of the Arctic are English and French, however, and Inuit children are schooled in these languages from about grade 4 onward. With the southern languages came southern technology and ideas. Inuktitut has had to enlarge its vocabulary to accommodate talk about government, education, business, and medicine. With the state came "Canadian time"—chronometric timekeeping, dependent on clocks, watches, schedules, and time zones. But to the student of the contemporary Canadian Arctic, it is clear that the temporal stress and distortion of Inuit life cannot be simply explained by the problems of learning to use watches, be on time for work, be at the airstrip for a scheduled flight. Temporal difficulties do not arise because Inuktitut lacked words of the days of the week, the hours of the day, minute, second, clock, or watch. The problems lie in contrastive "temporal morphologies"—in the "shapes" which events, activities, and institutional structures take on the temporal landscape. Beyond time reckoning and the conceptualization of time itself, there lies a "cultural ecology" of temporality—patterns of adaptation to certain key temporal realities: the inevitability of change, and the perception of recurrence. The model outlined in subsequent sections of this paper represents an attempt to grapple with the cultural ecology of time (Halpern, 1967b; Damas, 1984; Canadian Dept. of Indian Affairs, 1990; Halpern and Christie, 1990; Christie and Halpern, 1990).

The Triangle of Time: A Tripartite Model

The model sketched in this paper focuses upon temporality, the time dimension of human thought and social organization. We suggest that there is heuristic potential in conceiving of temporality in terms of three dominant dimensions: linearity, cyclicity, and liminality (stasis). The first two of these are, of course, very familiar in discussions of time. Linearity is Fraser's fletched and pointed arrow (1992); it embodies the personal and social sense of duration: autobiographical, familial, communal, and historical. We identify it with change. Metaphorizing linearity or linear time as line or arrow, however, masks the fact that its "motion," its "trajectory" is perceived as a series of identified alterations in the world around us: The minute hand on the clock moves on a point or two, the sun changes its position, the moon its phases. Duration itself, with its implication of changeless continuity, is identifiable only because of the contrast between that which alters and that which endures. "Generations pass while some trees stand, and old families last not three oaks," Browne reminds us (quoted in Carter, 1958, pp. 45–46). The cycle, or circle, that other familiar geometric temporal metaphor, we identify with recurrence and repetition. One's day-by-day experiences provide both novelty and recurrence; our lives are quintessentially linear in their inevitable progress toward their ends, yet
we see recurrent stages in them and we continue, Giddens (1979, p. 217) points out, to speak of "the life cycle." Society itself exists because of the persistent recurrence of familiar behavioral patterns regulated by custom, tradition, and ritual regulation. Bourdieu's (1990, pp. 106–107) use of the term *habitus* to refer to social convention is a useful reminder that the predictability of social life is a reflection of the habitually recurrent behavioral patterns that custom ingrains in us. Our third temporal modality is less familiar. We use the term *liminality* to suggest a form of temporality distinct from either linear change or cyclical recurrence. It may be thought of as the absence of "real time" or "real event" experiences. On the subjective level, liminality is experienced in psychologically altered states such as trance and epiphanous visionary events, whether induced ritually or by means of substances such as psychedelic drugs. It conforms to the "flow" experience of artistic creativity and the sense of transport which may accompany religious ritual or occasions of extreme joy, sorrow, shock, or passion. On the conceptual level, we see liminality as the quality of sacred things and events. Monuments and sacred places may be imbued with a timeless aura which lifts them out of the flow of ordinary temporality. "Time stands still" in cathedrals, cemeteries, and climactic battlefields. In fact, we physically and socially circumscribe such settings so that the very proxemics of their placement (behind fences, in parks or parkettes, on hills and knolls) encodes semiotically their special, separate status.

Temporal modalities do not exist in isolation from one another, they are interactive and enmeshed. The cycle is not really a circle, but a helix. This spring season reiterates the solar, meteorological, and biological changes that took place last spring and the springs before that, but it is also another spring in the lives of individuals who are a year older. Even for peoples without chronometric and calendrical reckoning, aging and other marks of unidirectional change are ever present. In Michael Young's (1988) apt and homely illustration: "The child is bowling the hoop along the road; each individual cycle can be unrolled, at least inside the mind, and its period measured. A mathematical snail can be made to crawl along a line on the inside of the moving hoop" (p. 12). Liminal periods implicate within the social and conceptual flow and flux of linearity and cyclicity. Sleep and sacred times punctuate normal life events (even for the nonreligious, "time outs"—Robert Grudin [1982] has called them "nests in time" [pp. 90–91]—interrupt the flow of things quotidian). On the conceptual level, the liminal may be "dreamtime" or mythtime, time before time, when another order of life prevailed. In historiographic societies, "charter" events may be lifted from the flow of historical chronology to be enshrined: Paul Revere's ride, Wolfe scaling the ramparts at Quebec. Liminal conceptual time is not necessarily past time. It may be (indeed, is, in most religious systems) a coexistent "other" time: The supernatural world exists just on the other side of death, the gods and spirits are present during ritual. There is a future dimension as well: There will be a "New Heaven and a New Earth," the buffalo will return, and the white people will depart; the earth will end in fire or ice: Whether sacred or scientific, belief systems are seldom eschatologically agnostic.

In the remaining sections of this paper we will attempt to situate our sociotemporal model in its relation to anthropological and sociological thought, explicate its
features more fully, and offer some applications to some ethnographic case material—in particular, the Inuit of the Canadian Arctic and Serb peasant peoples.

"On Time": Time in Anthropological Theory

The study of time in sociocultural anthropology has a long and extensive history. In general, anthropologists have tended to write "on time"—treating time either as a datum, an aspect of cognitive culture, or as a parametric quantity (i.e., Western chronometries) against which to measure cultural evolution or change.

As a trait of cognitive culture, time and temporal concepts are implicitly or explicitly compared with those of developed or "Western" societies. The most cited here (and certainly the most lucid and seminal) is Evans-Pritchard's account of Nuer time reckoning and temporal concepts (1940). Earlier, Hallowell, independent of Evans-Pritchard and certainly uninfluenced by him, had presented a very similar picture of time reckoning and temporal perspectives for the Saulteaux (Ojibwa) of Manitoba (1937). More recently, Bohanan (1953) and Beidelman (1963) reported on Tiv and Kaguru time reckoning respectively, as did Ohnuki-Tierney (1973) for the Ainu. Numerous studies of the calendrical systems of ancient civilizations have been provided by historians, archaeologists, sinologists, and Egyptianists. Among recent summaries of this data are those by Boorstin (1985), Whitrow (1989), and Aveni (1989). The mesoamericanists Thompson (1954) and Soustelle (1961) have written in detail on Mayan and Aztec calendrics. Parametrically, time and time scales have been of major importance and the source of fundamental conflicts in anthropology since its emergence from evolutionary social philosophy.

The central explanatory mode of the period was development—evolutionary change over time. From the work of Bachofen, Maine, Morgan, Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, anthropology inherited a quest for origins and patterns of development parallel to that of Darwin's organic evolutionary model and the schemes of prehistory of Thomsen and Lubbock. Prevalent into the first decade of this century, unilinear evolutionary theory faded as empirical field research replaced armchair speculation and as theoretical interest shifted to the cultural and social study of societies yet extant. Significantly different from each other in their interpretation of sociocultural function, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski shared a common focus on the synchronic study of extant societies and a disdain for "pseudohistory" or "conjectural history." Their Africanist and Oceanist students maintained their theoretical focus into the 1960s (Firth, 1957; Kuper, 1983). In North America the principal countervailing influence was provided by Franz Boas. Here, the problems of "salvage ethnography" and a focus on material culture (influenced certainly by the "salvage" aspect of museum collecting) eclipsed unilinear evolutionary speculation in diffusionist, cultural holistic, and historical particularistic studies. Like Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, Boas was a clan patriarch and his intellectual grandchildren are still to be found in anthropology departments and museums in the United States (Lowie, 1937; Harris, 1968).
Evolutionary interests revived on a somewhat more empirical and modest scale between the 1930s and 1950s under the influence of Leslie White (1959), Julian Steward (1955), and Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service (1960); as a consequence of the work of Marvin Harris and his fellow cultural materialists, the biocultural evolutionary perspective yet persists in some academies.

Another approach to the problem of synchronicity and the desire for a temporal component in anthropological studies led to the development of community studies and restudies. Redfield's Folk-Urban Continuum and the investigation of change, especially studies of Latin American peasant communities by Redfield, Oscar Lewis, and others, as well as acculturation studies of North American Indian peoples, were all inspired by the desire to "bring time in" to the analysis of social and cultural life (Redfield, 1930; Lewis, 1951; Halpern, 1967a; Halpern and Kerewsky-Halpern, 1972). Michael Young (1988) has noted a similar sense of frustration among sociologists. He quotes Anthony Giddens (1979): "sociologists have been content to leave the succession of events in time to historians, some of whom, as their part of the bargain, have been prepared to relinquish the structural properties of social systems to the sociologists" (p. 18).

In anthropology, critiques of more modest studies of diachronic change have been as vigorous as those directed against longer term evolutionary analysis. Such studies all fall within modern times, and the forces of modernization are alike at work in all peasant and tribal societies; therefore we are not looking at individual patterns of change of "accounting for sociocultural change" (to use the title of an "inventory" of such factors [Kushner and Gibson, 1962]); "before" and "after" "snapshots" of a society do not tell us precisely why it changes as it does, but merely provide historical documentation of the changes that have occurred.

"In Time"—Another Perspective

The model sketched here is by no means original, nor even particularly new. More than 30 years ago Raymond Firth wrestled with the often cited contradiction in structural-functional analysis: the antinomy of change on the one hand, and functionally integrated structure on the other. Firth (1963) suggests that the answer lies in what he calls "social organization": "the systematic ordering of social relations by acts of choice and decision. . . . Here is room for variation . . . Time enters here" (p. 40). More recently, sociologists, perhaps in the first instance Anthony Giddens (1979), have argued for a much more effective integration of time in social research. Giddens points out that the "synchronicity" of sociological (and, of course, anthropological) functionalism is illusory: (1) social activities take place over time (as does the research work which describes and analyzes them); (2) "stability" in social structure is not stasis (an idea which is certainly at least partly attributable to the concrete metaphorical word structure itself). Society maintains itself through dynamic processes of recurrent interaction and recurrent social habitual repetition.
“Social reproduction” and “structuration,” Giddens’ terms for societal and institutional maintenance, both imply process rather than entity—society is “inherently recursive” (p. 217). In Michael Young’s image: “Society is less like a structure made of stone than like a bubble tent kept standing by constant puffing” (1988, p. 41). We no longer have Firth’s “choice and decision” as some sort of collateral feature of an otherwise perduring “structure”: Choice, decision, repetition, and change are the constitutive qualities of social interaction. We have opted for Zerubavel’s term “sociotemporality” to refer to this processual, temporal perspective (1981). In a construct not dissimilar to, but much simpler than, Fraser’s hierarchically nested “canonical” temporal forms, Zerubavel suggests that time regulation can be seen as rooted in three “temporal orders.” The physicotemporal and biotemporal orders are those of the nonhuman world, which they obviously influence. Like Fraser’s “nootemporal” sphere (and perhaps comprehended by it, since the “no-sphere” would incorporate human thought about time as well as all else in its umwelt [Fraser, 1992, p. 164]) the sociotemporal order regulates human social life. Zerubavel (1992) sees it as a wholly socially constructed artifact, arbitrary and rooted in social convention. Other theorists would probably disagree, certainly Young (1988), who argues that societal rhythms are at root biological imperatives:

Day after day, we get up in the morning as though it were the most natural thing in the world for us to do as diurnal animals, which indeed it is; we go to work and return home and eventually, like the dormouse and the pottos, we curl up in the same warm, dark place as before to sleep... [p. 41].

In similar fashion, the necessities of work and rest and change and sex, filtered through the contraints of social custom, circumscribe human temporal behavior. It is, however, on a rather smaller scale that Zerubavel sees sociotemporality in operation. He suggests that there are four forms of sociotemporal regulation: “rigid temporal structures” (the sequential patterning of social behavior); “fixed durations” (patterns determining the appropriate length of activities); “standard temporal locations” (the “whens” of social life, and uniform rates of recurrence). As his descriptive accounts indicate, Zerubavel’s temporal constraints provide admirably illuminating insights on the structuring of life in urban institutional settings: hospitals, homes, workplaces, religious orders, and schools. Even slight cross-cultural comparisons indicate, however, that such regulators are rooted in modern Western society. Two of them, at least, are clearly the products of chronometric regulation: “duration” and “temporal location” are certainly dependent on the ordering of life by arbitrary clock time.

The model presented here is at once simpler, more diffuse, and abstract. Linearity and cyclicity are broadly defined characteristics of social phenomena. They include concepts and cognitive orientations. They may help to explain constraining customs and rules, but they are not regulatory in quite the immediate sense that Zerubavel’s temporal constraints are. The model is not based in chronometric regulation, and, indeed, seeks to dispense with all considerations of “time” itself—either as an abstract entity, or as the periodicities of life—days, months, years, and so on.
In the following sections of the paper we examine in somewhat greater detail the tripart elements of the model.

**Linearity**

Linear time is frequently associated with novelty, directionality, and change, as well as with duration. "While stretching from past to present and into the future, it admits the unexpected or non routine; innovation, even progress is in the cards" (Payne, 1990, p. 22). It has been frequently argued that since the perception of change is the essence of an awareness of duration, the linear is the intuitive, the primary temporal dimension, inherent in the autobiographical perception of our life course and that of others and other things. Certainly it is the temporal aspect most compatible with concepts of evolutionary change, progress, and, in contemporary physical science and cosmology, with Eddington's "arrow" of cosmic unidirectional movement. But the perspective here is forward-focused, turned toward what is to come, toward some perceived "telos," even if only vaguely perceived as different from the present. Such a perspective is often attributed to contemporary time perspectives as contrasted with non-urban-industrial "others." Serbian peasant pastoralists migrating northward into the central Šumadja region of Yugoslavia during the 19th century, however, transformed the oak woodlands into open and increasingly fragmented fields, changing themselves in the process into settled agriculturalists whose population expansion brought about irreversible ecological change and created an increasing premium on arable land. In the minds of the migrants they were pioneers, their irrevocable environmental changes "progress" (Halpern and Kerewsky-Halpern, 1972). Long ago the American sociologist W. F. Ogburn (1950) incorporated similar thought patterns into his "cultural lag" theory, arguing that concepts of conservation with respect to American forests had developed as late as they did because of the persistent (and to Ogburn's mind, dysfunctional) pioneering spirit which saw the deforestation of the land as "progress" and the forests themselves as a virtually inexhaustible resource.

On the other hand, retrospective linearity has a stable, perduring quality. The "structural time" of Evans-Pritchard's account of the Nuer is the backward reach of linked lives, and overlapping generations to those who first entered Nuerland (1940, p. 107). The lineage is a quintessentially linear sociotemporal form. On the other hand, the Inuit are a lineageless people who can rarely trace their ancestry more than a few generations back. Older Padlei Inuit people, however, will place their own births or those of their parents or grandparents at Padlei itself—"the source" (i.e., the source of the Maguse River in central Keewatin). If they have not been taught alternate (European scientific) views, they will also claim continued residence for their people in the Keewatin area since the time of the tuneraat—the giant people who left their tent rings on the land and placed the large erratic boulders that dot the landscape.
Lévi-Strauss echoes Eliade's notion of nonhistoric, "'archaic man,'" who, with "'antihistorical'" intent, abolishes "'concrete time.'" For Lévi-Strauss the distinction lies between "'cold'" and "'hot'" societies:

"[T]he former seeking by the institutions they give themselves to annul the possible effects of historic factors on their equilibrium and continuity . . . the latter resolutely internalizing the historical process and making it the moving power of their development [p. 233]."

Recent studies in "'semiotic history'" (Harkin, 1989, pp. 1–2) suggest that narrativization of historic events is a culture-bound form of discourse and, as Ricoeur (1983) has put it, "'the most complete sense in which narrated events are true is in the merger between narrated events and a bounded community, producing a historical consciousness' " (Ricoeur, quoted in Harkin, 1989). Moreover, the "'signs'" of historical discourse need to include those meaningful symbols of the past which when "'read'" constitute the texts from which historic meaning is drawn: the battlefield of Kosovo, ancient inukshuks (anthropomorphic stone markers) in the Arctic, the Lincoln and Washington memorials.

We suggest, then, that while linearity may be identified with irreversible change, progress, innovation, its retrospective facet is linked with rootedness and enduring stability that inhere in the backward reach of kinship and other social institutions and the perduring emblems of a known and linked past.

Cyclicity

Cyclical movement with its constant lively repetition of what has been is the nearest response that life provides to the human aspiration for permanence [Young, 1988, p. 18].

The South Slav zadruga perpetuates itself by renewal each generation (Halpern and Wagner, 1984). In fact, as Fortes has pointed out, the domestic group is everywhere a cyclical process in time, passing through phases of formation, expansion, dispersal, and renewal across the married lives of its founders (1969). For the Inuit, name souls, embodying the essence of a deceased relative, replaces that person in the child that bears their name (Balikci, 1970, pp. 199–200).

With proper treatment the animals may cyclically return as well. The Tsimshian place the bones of eaten fish in the river so that they can return to the sea, don salmon garb, and again swim back to the people's weirs and nets. Placing the bones of cooked animals in the stove achieves somewhat the same end for the Cree, as the soul of the animal leaves the house with the smoke and returns to the forest to be born in another moose or beaver.

Leach has argued that the cyclical represents an "'artificial'" temporal concept, that only change and duration can be intuitively known (1966). Following a similar argument advanced by Eliade, he suggests that the source of concepts of cyclicity
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derives from religious belief and represents efforts to avoid the terminal-going flow suggests. But cycles would seem as manifest in human life as sunrise, noon, and sunset repeat themselves day by day, as do the men of the moon and the seasonal solar round of the sun.

The “ecological” time of the Nuer, the Tiv, the Cree, and the Inuit. The Inuit (understandably) use the word ugyug for both “year” and “week” consider that together with a summer it constitutes a year (the transitions are brief and inconsequential—“almost summer” and “almost winter”). Everywhere in the world, daily, lunar, seasonal, and sidereal reiterating into systems that regulate life. Clock time, while artificial and arbitrary, is cyclical in its hourly and daily flow—even 24-hour digital clocks reset A.M. once in each daily cycle (Captains James Kirk and Jean-Luc Picard’s perpetually accumulating “star dates” have yet to be born). Canadians have been obliged to enlarge their vocabularies in order to deal with the technical, social, and political complexities that whites have brought into the Arctic. Is this more apparent than in the temporal vocabulary which must index a plethora of chronometric terms absent from traditional Inuktitut speech, the week, terms for the hours of the day, and so on. The Inuit deal with ways: They borrow the phonological words from the European language of (English, French, German), or rather, its equivalent in their own phonology (sabat—“seven”), or they create or adapt an existing word or phrase. The neologisms are the most interesting because they reflect the Inuit concurrence response to the Euro-Canadian introduction (Saturday, Sunday, Monday, before taboo day, taboo day, the day after taboo day). The word for kivallagusig—“it turns back upon itself”—the middle stage of the clock has returned to its original position (Dorais, 1980).

Liminality

We have borrowed the term which Victor Turner (1969) so insightfully from Arnold Van Gennep to refer to the third element in our sociotemporal Elaborating imaginatively on Van Gennep’s “in-between” stage in rites of passage, Turner has demonstrated that the antistructure, the “betwixt and between” the middle stage in passage rituals has wide applicability in numerous situations. Our suggestion is that there is a temporal reality at the psycho-institutionalized social level which corresponds neither to the reiterative cyclical events nor the onward sense of lineal events. The perception of is characteristic of certain beliefs and is part of the ritual atmosphere in social settings.

Van Gennep was preceded by Durkheim with his distinction between “sacred” and “profane” times. As Leach has pointed out, Durkheim’s “sacred time” is merely different from the quotidian round of ordinary time, it is typically (Leach, 1966, p. 134). Similarly, the antistructural and “communitas”
Turner's liminality may reverse roles and eliminate structural order in favor of a felt quality and bonding. We find it useful to introduce this interstitial temporal feature to take account of those situations, settings, and beliefs which are marked by an absence of the other qualities of sociotemporality—an absence of "time," stoppage of its iterative or progressive quality. Sleep is liminal. It is socially structured (in a bed, at a specific time, with or without a legitimately authorized companion, appareled in some appropriate way). But the event so structured is outside of normal interaction patterns, it is a temporary death in the sense that it involves a removal from life's activities.

Mayan and Aztec intercalary days were not the leftovers of a calendar that erroneously stopped $4^{1/2}$ days short of the length of the solar year. They represented a socially constructed period which divided off that which has ended from that which was yet to begin. As a liminal period it was marked by apprehension concerning the portents for the future which would be revealed during that time.

Duerer has described the Australian dreamtime as "everywhen" (1985). In a number of studies of mythtime (Hallowell, 1937; Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Carpenter, 1968), it is placed back of time—in an extension of retroactive lineal time—beyond the last lineal ancestor, in the time when what are now totemic eponyms lived and interacted with the First People.

This "time out of time" does not, in fact, reside only in the past but continues to exist as a ritual step beyond everyday life. Boas tells us that it returns to dominate Kwakiutl life and obliterate mundane time each winter season as the village is taken over by supernatural beings who spend the rest of the year in the forest (Boas, 1966). Harner's account of the Jivaro indicates that for them the supernatural world is real existence while the mundane life of everyday is only a vague shadow (1969).

Liminality may be considered as lying in the future in some belief systems. Millennial concepts of the time after the end of the world's existence may place the event 120,000 years in the future, or at the whim of God or the gods.

Funerals and other religious rituals are doubly sacralized in that they take place in liminal time but also represent the human approach to the perpetually liminal place/time of gods and souls.

In an earlier paper we used MacAndrew's and Edgerton's concept of "time out of time" to discuss the phenomenon of Inuit alcohol consumption patterns (1969). Sanctioned or unsanctioned release time from social responsibility as well as from the consciousness of regulatory norms can frequently characterize certain patterns of binge drinking. For some Inuit, the ordered and temporarily structured environment of the town or village is an empty place when work is not available and life on the land is not possible. Under such circumstances alcohol may provide access to a different form of liminality (Brody, 1975).

Conclusion

We began this paper with the observation that the Inuit hunt can be seen as a temporal as well as a spatial journey. Like Turner's liminal pilgrimages to sacred
shrines, the intermittent trips onto the land take Inuit families out of the temporal world of the town, onto the land dominated by ecologically cyclical realities, toward the sites and monuments that represent both the linear and liminal past.

If we were to spatialize this three-part model, we would suggest that there may be heuristic value in a concept of sociotemporality pictured as a helix in a box. The cycles of the world, of society, and biology both loop back upon themselves and move along the linear axis of the known past and the predicted future. Round about—the space within the box—lies the liminal, that time which is out of time (Halpern, 1967).

References


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