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The village and the city, the farm and the factory, the developers and the developed—these are the too frequently evoked dualities used to describe some of the complex processes of change being acted out in our time.¹ In those countries which have experienced the major portion of their industrialization since World War II, we cannot easily draw any firm lines separating villager from urbanite because they are both changing, although not always at the same rate or in identical ways.

The pre-industrial city which served as an administrative market and religious center, or a combination of these, has undergone enormous changes, but the continuity with the past has usually been more clearly

¹ This essay draws on two of my articles published earlier: "Yugoslav Peasant Society in Transition—Stability in Change," *Anthropological Quarterly*, XXXVI (July, 1963) and "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Human Organization*, XXIV:2 (Summer, 1965). It is based on research carried out in Yugoslavia during 1961–1962 and in the summer of 1964, supported by grants from the National Science Foundation and counterpart funds from the Department of State. The present discussion includes a preliminary survey of some of the field data, a more complete analysis of which will be published later. Part of the field data was gathered by Yugoslav students, with organizational support from university authorities in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo. Vida and Theodore Tarnovsky assisted in the United States, and helpful comments on a preliminary version of the essay were received from Dimitri Shimkin and Jozo Tomasevich. To these varied sources of assistance appreciation is gratefully expressed. A fuller discussion of the general question of social change in Yugoslavia may be found in the author's study "Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State" in Rex Hopper, ed., *Social Change: Studies of a World in Transition* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

evident than in the village community, although there is considerable variability. Even the most revolutionary governments do not seek to obliterate the traditions of the preindustrial city. Rather, these traditions are regarded as a key factor in asserting national identity. By contrast, village-based values and traditions are almost uniformly regarded as obstacles to progress, or at best provide incidental subordinate embellishments to the national tradition.

The village is certainly being urbanized, and we can also with some legitimacy speak of the contemporary "peasantization" of the town. Specifically the pressure on limited urban facilities and the carry-over of rural habits become strongly manifest, as in the maintenance of public housing. While these negative effects on the quality of urban life are apparent, to some degree they have been offset by the lessening of population pressures on the land. Further, geographic and occupational mobility are by no means synonymous, as attested to by the phenomenon of the peasant-workers who commute daily from their village residences to their places of work.

The reciprocal influences of village and town concern not only economic ties through jobs and marketing but also social ties, particularly those of kin, and ceremonial obligations. These patterns are especially important in eastern Europe where a large majority of the population is at most a few generations removed from a rural environment.

The mass exodus from the land for the attractions of the city is happening on a worldwide scale with a variety of local manifestations. An important insight into this process can be gained by considering peasant attitudes toward farming as a way of life. This is a difficult matter for generalization, especially in a country as ethnically varied as Yugoslavia.

There are, however, some shared features. First, whether as a serf, owner, or pastoralist the peasant was primarily involved with his land and livestock. Not only were there no other alternatives available, but his way of life was also sanctioned by religion and tradition. This is not to say that submission was unquestioned, as peasant revolts demonstrate, or that toil was given without hardship, as folk sayings bear out, but that in general the peasant accommodated himself to his lot while simultaneously fearing and mistrusting the city and its people. Farming was the only way of life he knew. He could know no other.

This situation is well illustrated by the situation in Serbia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Writing in 1827 the pioneer Serb ethnographer and linguist Vuk Karadžić said:

There are no members of the Serbian nation but peasants. The small number of Serbs who live in town as traders and craftsmen are called townsmen. They wear Turkish costumes and live according to the Turkish way of life; during rebellions and wars they shut themselves up with the Turks in the towns, or run away to Germany with their money; for this reason they are not called Serbs by the people and are despised by them. The Serbs, as peasants, live only from land and livestock.²

Today, despite the often traditional appearance of the countryside, national policies of industrialization have in some areas depopulated the land and in other areas drawn away much of the youth. Thus in 1961 Tito could speak of a national objective being the reduction of the proportion of the population dependent primarily on agriculture from 50 to 40 percent.

Among the most telling statistics are those of the sex and age ratios of the farm labor force in eastern Europe and how these have noticeably changed in the postwar period, with an increasing preponderance of older people and women in agricultural labor. Further, not only has the composition of the agricultural labor force changed, but in some areas their numbers have declined in relative and absolute terms compared to the total population.

In eastern Europe, a number of negative features, often associated with modernization and industrialization in other parts of the world, are directly linked by the peasant to Communist ideology, so that in some measure peasant resistance has been a general resistance to change as much as it has been to specific value connotations of communism.

Change in a rural or village context is not a new phenomenon. House types, clothing, social structures, customs, and agricultural technology have all changed through the centuries, reflecting migration patterns, ecological developments, conquest, style evolution, improved techniques and technologies, and varying governmental forms. But because of the limited opportunities in towns, in crafts, trade, administration, the military, or the religious hierarchy, a focus on the village prevailed. Further, in times of frequent wars and epidemics, the preindustrial town offered only limited attractions and these to only a limited number of people. Villages were not immune to plunder and plague, of course, but their

² Vuk Karadžić, in *Danica*, II (Vienna: 1827), 79–83, republished in *Istoriska Citanka* (Belgrade: 1949) pp. 84–85. The English translation is from Doreen Warriner, ed., *Contrasts in Emerging Societies* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 298. This quotation from Karadžić implies a village orientation but not economic isolation, since livestock trade with Austria was important at this time. See "The Commerce in Swine," in Warriner, *op. cit.*, pp. 300–302.

closeness to the food supply and their ability to survive for prolonged periods without urban trade goods, gave them a basic viability which the inhabitants of preindustrial cities lacked. One might add that they lacked mobility as well, because it was much easier for farmers to migrate with their families, herds, and tools and to establish a new village in a different locality than it was for the inhabitants of preindustrial cities to transport themselves *en masse* to a new area. Evidence of this situation was dramatically provided during World War II in East Europe when many city dwellers sought refuge in the countryside. If ready access to education, manufactured goods, mass amusements, sophisticated medical care, a guaranteed income, and avoidance of adverse natural phenomena be considered desirable ends—in short, a life of prestige, diversity, and comfort—then these can be more easily obtained in the city than the countryside.

The most stirring testimonial to the attractiveness of the modern city is the extraordinary extent to which people have voted with their feet, to borrow a phrase from another context, giving rise to the world-wide growth of cities in the past century. This development has continued despite the great problems of urban growth and crowding. As a result, the prestige of traditional small-scale farming has declined, as have handicrafts, but the problem of replacing the village weaver or blacksmith has been much easier than that of replacing the peasant farmer. The problems of urban growth, however, have demonstrated that the absorptive capacity of the city is finite. It may well be that what is often cited as the peasant's innate conservatism or attachment to the land represents his desire to achieve security within the limited opportunities available.

Much has been written of the deadening effect of mass production on the factory worker. Others have commented on the banalities of rural life even during the nineteenth century when it was being romanticized. But the problem is usually conceived of in terms of modifying the urban environment and not, as the slogans for the rural areas would have it, of transforming the countryside. To borrow a phrase from an American context, we often hear of urban renewal, but not of rural renewal. If one can view the relationship between rural and urban subcultures as one of reciprocal patterns of influence, then it seems clear which way the equilibrium point is shifting. Items derived from rural subcultures may be used in an artistic and recreational context to provide a degree of specific national identity (folk art, crafts, literature, song and dance). This is harder to do for aspects of industrialization. It is easier to identify with a folk song than with a steel mill. But it would seem that,

generally speaking, in terms of contemporary national cultures these village-derived elements tend to be overshadowed by their urban counterparts as, for example, folk crafts versus painting and sculpture or folk dance groups versus a *corps de ballet*. There are more subtle ways in which village-derived value patterns influence urban and national life, but these generally tend to be part of a large shared tradition which existed in the preindustrial city as well as the countryside, such as in religious beliefs and patterns of family structure and behavior.

Significantly, when speaking in terms of urban influence in the village as opposed to peasant influence on the town, society tends to regard the former as positive and the latter as negative. In short, the peasant has been adapting to industrialization much more than industry to the peasant (although this, too, has occurred, mostly in short-range tactical accommodations). The reference here is primarily in terms of the evolution of patterns and values and not of administrative accommodation, even when this may be of long-standing duration. For example, the retention of the private garden plot in the Soviet Union, or the private farm in Yugoslavia and Poland may not be evidence of the future viability of peasant society; rather, it may be possible to regard this situation as a temporary accommodation to an urban focused society in an interim transitional period. Communist planners have, indeed, spoken in these terms when referring to the transformation of the countryside. With the increasing mechanization of agriculture, the diffusion of urban amenities, the related progressive disappearance of the peasant farmer, and the consequent increase in wage labor on large farms run as modified industrial enterprises, there arises the crucial question of the status of rural workers and their future useful role in an evolving industrial society.

Few village youths voluntarily choose farming as a career. Those who have remained in farming seem to be persons who have been unwilling or unable to make the transition to some city-oriented activity. If we exclude from consideration the former leadership group, there seems little doubt that the segment of the population most drastically affected by the introduction of Communist governments in East Europe has been the peasant. When viewed over generations, it is conceptually much easier for the children of the former bourgeoisie to make the social and even ideological adjustment than for those of peasants. It is true that the question of competing ideologies is present. But in a broader sense there is also a question of the role of abstract ideas derived from an intellectual tradition that is foreign to the village. The child of bourgeois or middle-class parents may be in conflict with his parents over

specific ideas and values, but the child of peasant parents must reject many of the values in his background to succeed in an urban environment. The child of working-class parents may wish to see his children progress in the social scale, but there need not be a complete break in the same way that is forced on the village child. Certainly this shows clearly in the official attitudes of Communist governments toward workers as a group who are in general idealized as opposed to farmers. These attitudes are reinforced by the schools and mass media, as well as by the disadvantaged position of the farmer in a nation placing emphasis on industrial growth.

There then naturally arises an antipathy and contempt with regard to farming as a way of life or even as an occupation. It is possible and indeed likely if present trends continue, that agriculture will employ fewer, and more highly skilled, people, but there remains the problem not only of finding useful employment for the surplus agricultural workers, but of being able to house and provide other amenities for their families. An interim solution exists where the worker remains on the land and commutes to his job. The ultimate urbanization of village life takes place when no heirs remain to inherit the land, and the countryside becomes depopulated.

The village and town are changing. The village subculture is being reformulated while urban subculture is undergoing modification. This is clearly shown in that urban traditions are venerated even by revolutionary regimes, while rural traditions are viewed usually as a bar to progress, or at best as quaint specimens for museums. The tragic and perhaps foredoomed efforts of peasant parties in the interwar period in East Europe show some of the difficulties in attempting modernization under the auspices of a rural-oriented political system. (The reference here is to the ideal programs which were formulated and not to the ruthless ways in which these parties were dealt with, but, significantly, they receive little support from any organized urban group.)

One of the greatest problems of the rural peoples of eastern Europe is their own negative self-image. Also, they lack the ability to come to terms with their own past in any reassuring way; there is a negation of the past, a frustrating present and an uncertain future. Although their *raison d'être* has not been totally destroyed, the fundamental problem of rural areas appears to be that of its inhabitants attaining a meaningful stake in society, not only in economic terms but even more importantly in terms of a positive social role. Despite a generally rising standard of living in rural as well as urban areas, the degree of frustration has increased because of the more rapidly mounting level of aspiration.

From an over-all viewpoint there is presently more hope, however, because there now are vastly greater opportunities than existed a generation ago.

YUGOSLAV DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

How do these generalizations apply to Yugoslavia? As in the other countries of eastern Europe the rural population of Yugoslavia has been generally declining in both relative and absolute terms since Yugoslavia became a nation at the end of World War I. The percentage decline has been continuous from 79 in 1921, to 75 in 1938, and to 49 in 1961.

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, YUGOSLAVIA, 1921-1961

	Total population (thousands)	Agricultural population (thousands)	Nonagricultural population (thousands)	Percent of Agricultural Population
1921	12,545	9,885	2,660	79
1931	14,534	11,132	3,401	77
1938	16,657	12,027	4,030	75
1948	15,842	10,696	5,196	67
1953	16,999	10,352	6,647	61
1961	18,549	9,170	9,173	49

These figures are intended to show only general trends and are not strictly comparable since varying criteria were used in the different census periods. The 1960 census has revealed some of the complexities; see Table 2 where the population living on the land is broken down into categories which include those who earn their living outside of agriculture.

SOURCE: D. Marković, *Soc. Sela*, No. 1, 1963 Table 1, p. 44.

Trends in absolute terms have been somewhat different: agricultural population first increased to a peak of 12 million in 1938 but declined by 1961 to 9 million (Table 1).

However, these statistics reflect only the portion of the village population engaged primarily in agriculture. A more comprehensive view of the total village-dwelling population is given in Table 2 which is based on a special 1960 agricultural census. Assuming for the moment that the populations of Yugoslavia for 1960 and 1961 were roughly equivalent, we see that the total population living on agricultural holdings was more than one-third greater than the number of agriculturalists listed in Table 1 for 1961, or somewhat greater than the agricultural population in 1938. These figures include an important component of the Yugoslav industrial labor force, namely 1,306,000 peasant-workers, who commute from their agricultural holdings to their jobs, out of a total number

TABLE 2
MEMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS BY OCCUPATIONS AND REPUBLICS, YUGOSLAVIA, 1960

	Yugo- slavia	Serbia			Croatia	Bosnia Herce- govina	Mace- donia	Slovenia	Monte- negro
		All Serbia	Vojvo- dina	Kosmet					
Population living on land (thousands)	12,590	5,204	1,124	755	2,775	2,503	947	822	339
Agriculturalists	5,585	2,489	498	278	1,259	956	384	363	134
Men	2,533	1,185	238	156	528	440	183	140	56
Women working primarily on land	1,244	543	76	27	275	207	85	106	27
Women working part-time on land	1,809	761	184	95	456	309	116	117	51
Peasant-Workers	1,306	452	142	49	351	244	94	139	27
Housewives	830	347	96	72	156	224	62	22	19
Others ^a	4,869	1,916	388	356	1,009	1,079	407	298	159

^a Children, pupils, elderly and infirm.

SOURCE: *Stat. God.-1964* (Belgrade: 1964), after Table 205-230, p. 415.

TABLE 3
MIGRANTS FROM RURAL AREAS, YUGOSLAVIA, 1949-1960

Year	Number (thousands)	As a percentage of natural increase
1949	121	70
1950	131	76
1951	139	81
1952	146	85
1953	154	89
1954	164	95
1955	172	100
1956	184	106
1957	198	114
1958	216	122
1959	235	134
1960	262	152
1949-1960	2,162	107

SOURCE: *Jugoslovenski pregled*, No. 11-12, November-December, 1962, p. 422, reproduced in Andrew Elias, *The Labor Force of Yugoslavia*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1965), Table 9, p. 15.

of 2,985,000 employees in 1960. In addition to this large number of peasant-workers who have made a partial transition to urban life, the total village population has been declining because in recent years the number of migrants from villages has exceeded the natural increase (Table 3). In a decade more than 10 percent of the population of Yugoslavia, or 2,162,000 people, have left their agricultural holdings.

These migrations, both permanent and daily, have altered significantly the age structure of the full-time agricultural labor force. Between 1953 and 1961 the 50-to-64-year age group increased its proportional representation in the total agricultural labor force from 15 to 22 percent, while the 15-to-19-year age group declined from 18 to 12 percent.³ Even more striking is the contrast in age structures of the agricultural and industrial labor forces. Of the total number of male workers (miners, industrial workers, and craftsmen) in 1961, 54 percent were 20-34 years of age, 22 percent were 35-49 years of age, and only 12 percent were 50 or more, as contrasted with 33 percent, 21 percent, and 35 percent respectively for agricultural workers.⁴ Those who were

³ Danica Marković, *Soc. Sela*, No. 1 (1963), Table 4, p. 47.

⁴ Andrew Elias, *The Labor Force in Yugoslavia*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1964), Table 12, p. 16.

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY AGE OF AGRICULTURALISTS
AND EMPLOYED PEASANT-WORKERS, YUGOSLAVIA, 1960

Age	Agriculturalists	Peasant-Workers
10-14 years	2.1	.1
15-19 years	9.8	7.6
20-29 years	25.2	38.3
30-39 years	21.1	26.7
40-49 years	14.2	14.1
50-59 years	16.8	11.0
60 years and over	10.8	2.2

SOURCE: P. Marković, *Soc. Sela*, No. 2, 1963, Table 3, p. 25.

employed outside their holdings were by and large the younger men (Table 4). Households without adequate manpower have been increasing in rural areas, constituting 8 percent of all agricultural households in 1960, and approximately 3 percent of all agricultural households were composed of elderly people exclusively.⁵

OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV POLICY

Before turning to the attitudes of rural people on farming it is necessary to identify the official policies which in part condition these attitudes. The Yugoslav constitution, as revised in 1963, states that farmers have the right to own arable land up to a maximum of ten hectares per household. However, the ultimate ideological desire for the socialization of the land is clearly set forth in a preceding statement in the same article: "The social community shall provide the material and other conditions for the establishment and development of agricultural working organizations based on social ownership of land and socially organized work, and for cooperation of farmers with the cooperatives and other working organizations."⁶

This policy has been specifically outlined by the leading Yugoslav theorist Edvard Kardelj, who states that the Yugoslav government has not applied the classical type of collectivization practiced in the Soviet Union. Without doubt this is in part due to the unfavorable experience of 1949 to 1951 when an abortive attempt was made to emulate Soviet policies. Kardelj gives as the main reason, however, the fact that unlike

⁵ Petar Marković, *Soc. Sela*, No. 2 (1963), Table 1, p. 22.

⁶ *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, 1963), article 21, p. 19.

in tsarist Russia, where the land belonged to feudal landlords, in Yugoslavia the peasant was attached to his own land.

Although the statement would not seem to apply to the areas ruled by Austria-Hungary and Turkey, it was substantially valid for nineteenth-century Serbia. Kardelj continues that two-fifths of Yugoslavia is mountainous and mostly unfit for modern agricultural techniques and the development of large-scale farming, a point which appears to be more rationalization than reason since large-scale herding could be undertaken in these areas.

The long-range objectives are clear, however. Kardelj points out that although most of the land "appears" to be in the hands of private owners, the socialist sector markets a higher percentage of agricultural products than one might assume from the amount of land at its disposal. (The socialized sector is more productive because it has a virtual monopoly on modern machinery, and peasant agriculture is preserved in a somewhat forcedly archaic condition. Artificial fertilizer and other supplies are made available to socialized farms at subsidized prices. Because of the high cost to them, peasants hesitate to use some of these products. Nevertheless items such as improved seed and veterinary services are relatively easily available and are extensively used by peasants.)

It is planned that by 1970 the socialist sector will become predominant in the marketing of agriculture goods. Currently the "socialist transformation of agriculture" is seen as proceeding in two ways: The first is by the enlargement, through purchase, of land in the socialist sector, including a transitional phase in which the peasant receives "a larger or smaller rent" and then is employed by the cooperative or industry. The second is when the peasant and the cooperative enter into an agreement for services to be performed by the cooperative.⁷ These services may include plowing the private holding by tractor or harvesting by combine. It is the government's hope that these arrangements will eventually lead to a more intimate relationship between the private peasant and the cooperative. Considerable progress appears to have been made in this direction, particularly in the flat wheat plains of the Vojvodina where jobs in industry are relatively easily available. More than one-tenth of individually owned arable land was worked by machinery drawn from the socialist sector (600,000 out of 5,346,000 hectares); of this, 239,000 hectares were in the Vojvodina, where

⁷ Edvard Kardelj, "Some Current Questions in Yugoslavia's Development" in *Interviews with Edvard Kardelj, President of the Yugoslav Assembly with Foreign Journalists* (Belgrade: Federation of Yugoslav Journalists, 1964), pp. 13-15.

184,000 men worked outside of their holdings, whereas 498,000 were agriculturalists working on their own land.⁸

These policies have been reaffirmed at the Eighth Yugoslav Party Congress in 1964. There has been a claimed growth in agricultural production of 50 percent over the 1930-39 average (from 1956 when the prewar average was regained there has been an annual growth rate of 4½ percent over-all and 17 percent in the socialist sector). "However," says Kardelj, "these results still do not satisfy our growing needs in feeding the population, and agriculture is still constantly lagging behind. . . . The problem is first of all that within the framework of the adopted agricultural policy, which has been absolutely confirmed by practice, more should be invested in agriculture."⁹

This seems a rather predictable analysis and solution. The related exodus of labor, particularly youth from the countryside generally and from agriculture specifically, is seen by the government as a positive development albeit one that raises some problems: "The young generation is quitting the countryside and wants to work outside agriculture, in urban settlements and industrial centers. Every year a larger number of people have to be provided with work. Thus we have a constant and strong pressure on the employment front." Kardelj points out, however, that merely to absorb these people into industry with a built-in low productivity would be detrimental to the economy. Nevertheless he states: "It is quite clear that relatively speedy transfer of the labor force from the countryside to non-agricultural activities will continue to be not only our task but also a condition of economic progress."¹⁰

Kardelj conceives of the problem in broad terms, mentioning automation and the relative decline of the number of industrial workers while at the same time foreseeing new jobs, services, and social activities. He concludes this discussion by observing: "Neither must we lose sight of the fact that this problem is solved, or at least reduced, by speedier development of agricultural production, given the ever-expanding and comprehensive cooperation of the socialist sector with individual producers, and given the improvement in general economic conditions of life and work in the countryside."

⁸ *Stat. God.-1964*, p. 415.

⁹ "The Social Economic Tasks of Economic Development in the Coming Period," Report of Edvard Kardelj, Secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to the Eighth Yugoslav Party Congress, December 7, 1964 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, Supplement, U.S.S.R. and East Europe*, No. 13 (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, December 14, 1965, mimeographed), p. 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Unemployment, particularly of unskilled workers from rural areas, is a growing issue in Yugoslavia. According to official statistics, it increased from 82,000 in 1953 to 230,000 in 1963 and ¹¹ to 288,000 in 1964, of whom 86 percent were unskilled.¹² Significantly, while figures remained stable in Slovenia, greatest increases occurred in the less developed areas during the past decade—five times in Montenegro and four times in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is also much concealed unemployment, since those who cannot find work in the towns often return to the land without formally registering with the government. A semi-official estimate for 61–62 characterized 10–15 percent of job holders as potentially surplus.¹³ In 1959 an official publication estimated the number of underemployed in industry to be 300,000.¹⁴ In addition, there are Yugoslavs working in western Europe, more than half of these in West Germany. No official statistics are published and precise estimates are difficult, varying for those in West Germany alone from 50,000 to 80,000.¹⁵ Many of those working abroad are unskilled or semiskilled workers from peasant villages, particularly from underdeveloped parts of Croatia.

The underemployment of industrial workers reflects one aspect of the heavily burdened urban resources attempting to absorb migrants from rural areas. One report describing the process of urbanization in a town of above-average economic standards estimated that 70 percent of the immigrants were of working age and without skills. To provide jobs for each one it was necessary to invest up to 3,000,000 dinars in industrial capacity and social services in order to retain present standards. However, the commune in which this town is situated did not have these resources. Consequently both working and living standards were lowered. It was also found to be difficult to decrease the number of unemployed, for as fast as new jobs were created additional migrants arrived from the countryside.¹⁶

This is one aspect of the "peasantization" of the town. Another is the

¹¹ *Stat. God.-1964*, p. 380 and Elias, *op. cit.* (in n. 4), p. 27.

¹² *Indeks*, No. 5 (1964), p. 3.

¹³ As quoted in Robert G. Livingston, "Yugoslavian Unemployment Trends," *Monthly Labor Review*, LXXXVII:7 (July, 1964), 756.

¹⁴ "People Leaving Agriculture—How and Why?" translated from *Ek. Pol.*, No. 362, March 7, 1959 in *Joint Translation Service*, No. 2738 (Belgrade: U.S. Embassy, April 17, 1959), p. 7.

¹⁵ For more on this question see Livingston, *op. cit.* (in n. 13), p. 762; Anthony Sylvestre, "Yugoslavia's Triumphant Reformers," *East Europe*, XIV:2 (February, 1965), 4; Irwin Ross, "European Slogan—Go North Young Man," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 9, 1965, p. 34.

¹⁶ Rikard S. Stajner, *Ek. Pol.*, No. 364, March 21, 1959, pp. 299–300.

form of new towns and the ways in which older settlements expand. In many areas, in addition to new industries, apartment houses and stores a large number of private homes have been built, particularly in the outskirts. These are most often the homes of families who have moved to town from villages in the area. The men are urban workers in the sense that they are permanently employed in a local factory or enterprise, but their cultural and social ties with the village remain strong. This is reflected in house plan, furnishings, and other material ways, and in social patterns such as sleeping arrangements, kinship bonds, and modified gardening and stock-keeping within town limits.¹⁷ The process is reciprocal, of course, and the rural migrant alters his ways at the same time that he is changing the urban setting.

The negative attitudes of villagers toward hard agricultural work and toward their way of life appear to encompass an aversion to farming in general, including the state-supported and mechanized variety. The basic problem, then, goes far beyond a question of increasing investment in agriculture or of providing more amenities for villagers. Although manual work in industry has gained greatly in prestige in postwar years, the prewar attitude of idealizing the life of the white-collar worker who was not required to perform hard manual labor has continued. Education, whether technical or academic, is highly valued as a means of achieving mobility, despite the fact that the sons of peasants are in a disadvantaged position relative to the children of industrial and white-collar workers and especially professionals. These status differences are also reflected in Party membership which, as would be expected, includes but a small proportion of peasants. Aleksandar Ranković, vice president of Yugoslavia, recently discussed these questions and commented on the desirability of attracting more workers and peasants into the party but spoke of

objective difficulties resulting from their material position and the need of some workers for a supplementary income and participation in schools for professional education, and because of the special position of the so-called worker-peasants, who still live in the village and are tied to their property.

¹⁷ For a detailed description see Halpern, "Yugoslav Peasant Society in Transition—Stability in Change," *op. cit.* (in n. 1), pp. 167–168. The problem of rural-urban transition has begun to be investigated seriously by Yugoslav scholars. In addition to the pioneering work of Cvetko Kostić, *Seljaci Industriski Radnici* (Belgrade: 1955), significant articles have also appeared in the journals *Sociologija* and *Sociologija Sela*. The following monographs are also of note: *Strukturne Promene na Selu kao Resultat Ekonomskog Razvitka, Period 1900–1960* (Belgrade: 1963) and *Socijalna Struktura i Pokretljivost Radnicke Klase Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: 1963).

. . . It is also necessary to refer to the admission of farmers, the individual producers. Many organizations have been rather passive and reserved toward admitting them, and the result of this is that some rural organizations contain the smallest number of peasants. The content and method of work of many basic organizations are such that they do not attract peasants, and even make passive those who are already members.

Ranković contrasts the small number of peasants admitted to the Party with the growth of cooperatives in the countryside and states that poor peasants should not be especially favored but that peasants should be admitted on the basis of their attitude "toward processes which contribute to the strengthening of socialism in the countryside." He also points out that the strengthening of the socialist sector has involved peasant members who became workers on state farms.¹⁸

ASPIRATIONS OF VILLAGE CHILDREN

With this much background on official policies and attitudes, we can turn now to those of the villagers themselves. In the course of investigations in Orašac, a village in central Serbia, in 1953-1954 I was able, with the cooperation of the principal of the eight-year village elementary school, to sponsor an essay contest among the thirteen- to fourteen-year-old eighth graders, whose theme was "What I Want to Be and Why." The boys typically desired to become workers, "inspired," as they put it, by the examples of the founders of the Communist party in Yugoslavia, especially Tito, about whom they had read at school. Others expressing patriotic motives said they wanted to join a military service or become a border guard to protect their country. A few with more personal motives wanted to be sailors in order to travel and see the world. The girls often wrote about becoming teachers, emphasizing the social service implied. None of the pupils considered careers involved in any way with agriculture, even in a professional sense. Only one mentioned agriculture, but this was in the context of his wish to become a writer. He felt compelled to justify the role that peasant farmers can play in the development of a modern state: "If a conscientious man cultivates the land in the proper way, he helps the rebuilding of the country. If it weren't for agricultural products, all factories would stop. So it is clear

¹⁸ "The Further Work and Role of the Yugoslav League of Communists," Report of Aleksandar Ranković to the Eighth Party Congress, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, Supplement, U.S.S.R. and East Europe*, No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, December 17, 1964), pp. 22-23.

that a man is a man whether he works in a village or in a city, and one can't live without the other."¹⁹

In a survey of educational and job aspirations conducted in the nearby market town of Arandjelovac in 1962, among the sixty-two students in their final year of the gymnasium forty-two were born in local villages, the fathers of nineteen of whom were still farmers (of the other twenty-three, the parents had moved to town or the father had died; a few were children of teachers in village schools). Only one student mentioned as a desired occupation one related to agriculture—the boy said his parents wanted him to become a physician while he preferred to be an agronomist. Three students (two of whom were born in town) whose parents also lived in town chose advanced education in forestry. The ten boys and nine girls whose fathers were farmers, the following occupational aspirations were given: among the girls, teachers (2), lawyers (2), engineers (2), doctor, reporter, economist (1 each); among the boys, lawyers (3), engineers (3), high-school teachers (2), technician and agronomist (1 each).

Despite the relatively great potential for mobility most university students are of urban white-collar class origin. According to data available, in 1957–1958 at Sarajevo university 38 percent of the students in the Agriculture-Forestry Faculty were of peasant origin, while children of white-collar workers composed 44 percent of the enrollment in this school. Students of peasant origin made up only 24 percent of the total full-time enrollment in the university (children of white-collar workers accounted for 53 percent).²⁰

These figures reflect nationwide university enrollments. Of a total of 69,000 university students in Yugoslavia during the same academic year, 26 percent were of agricultural origin, 48 percent of white-collar background, 12 percent from workers' and 7 percent from craftsmen's families.²¹

In 1962, pupils in village elementary schools in areas other than central Serbia were asked to write essays about their plans for the future. Most participants were eighth-graders who would soon face turning points in their careers. As with the Orašac group earlier, none of these wanted to remain in the village or pursue a career related to farming. It should not be inferred that their attitudes toward village life

¹⁹ See Joel Halpern, *A Serbian Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 258.

²⁰ A. Fiamengo, *Pregled*, September, 1959, pp. 215–216.

²¹ Vojin Milić, *Stat. Rev.*, No. 1–2 (1959), p. 71.

were wholly negative. On the contrary, many expressed real affection for the place where they were born and raised, acknowledging at the same time that they would eventually leave. A Montenegrin youth said: "I love my village because here I was born and first heard my mother tongue. I will remember the beautiful meadows, the hills on which shepherd boys watch their flocks and autumn, which I awaited with great anticipation, because of the beautiful fruit." Others expressed the joy of running through fields looking for flowers or watching lambs. Another declared affection for his village in terms of his ancestral roots. Some mentioned the increasing attractiveness of their village in terms of electrification, improved roads to town, the presence of a new store or school or better-constructed peasant homes.

One girl (who had repeated the grade) from a remote mountain village expressed fear of the city, with its tall buildings and factories, and a reluctance to leave her friends. Few seemed to fear the city as she did and most were keenly aware of the limitations of village life. A boy from the same mountain village recognized education as a channel of mobility, aided by kin ties in town: "I do not want to become a peasant or agricultural worker, for I want to be somebody. This can be done only by going to the city. Those who remain in the village have a difficult life, with much hard work. When I complete eighth grade this year I will go to live with my brother in Tuzla. There my life will be better, but if I do not get good grades now I will not be able to enter high school there. I must therefore study." Another wrote: "My desire to continue my studies becomes greater when I see how hard workers have to labor with a pick-axe. If I graduate from a higher school I would become a *gospodin* [gentleman, a bourgeois word frowned upon by the government]. This is my greatest wish."

Others were less concerned with status and more with the possibilities of consumption and travel. One boy in southern Serbia said he would like to become an engineer, have a comfortable apartment, buy a television set, go to the movies, get a motorcycle, travel to cities throughout Yugoslavia, and learn foreign languages. Another put it succinctly, "I wish to dress nicely in city clothes and be able to eat my fill."

Youthful fancies may run wild, but peasant school children have no illusions about the difficulties which face them or about the very real possibilities of failure to realize an urban career. Because of the scattered nature of most Yugoslav rural settlements and the frequent lack of dormitory facilities in towns it is often necessary to walk long distances to school, especially for those who go on to higher grades (in some villages past fourth grade and in others past eighth grade). Boys and

girls in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia wrote about getting up before sunrise, pasturing the livestock, and setting out for school on foot. Sometimes the schools were as far as ten kilometers away. They wrote of arriving too early or too late and of snowy or rainy days when part of the school hours had to be spent thawing and drying out around the wood stove.

An interesting conjecture, although the data are not conclusive, is that in those regions where material conditions are poorest occupational aspirations are highest. Montenegrin and Serbian shepherd boys dream of exploring the moon or at least of becoming airplane pilots, even though they live in homes without electricity and may never have been on a train. Children from a Slovene village near a town with electronics and textile industries and whose usual activities include watching television, sports events, and illustrated travel lectures, aspire to become skilled workers (some of the girls want to be shop clerks). These aspirations are paralleled by those of children in a village near Zagreb. The closest approach to continuing contact with the village is found among those pupils, particularly girls, who indicate a career in teaching, possibly in villages. The situation is not as strange as it might appear, since in the more marginal agricultural communities a certain proportion of the youth must leave the land. Factors of accessibility and contact are also significant, and it is true that some of the richest farm land in Yugoslavia is now being abandoned.

In interviews conducted among members of youth brigades engaged in highway construction, in a sample of 650 which included 391 young workers (361 males and 30 females) and 259 peasant youths (252 males and 7 females) of whom 75 percent of the total were of village origin, the most favored occupations among both workers and peasants were found to be those of chauffeur, craftsman, and mechanic. The closest to an occupation related to agriculture (other than agronomist, which was listed among a miscellany including actor, photographer, reporter, and lawyer) was that of tractor driver, favored by 3 percent of the young workers and 8 percent of the young peasants. Significantly, 9 percent of the workers and only one percent of the peasants said they were satisfied with their occupations. Relatively few appeared to aspire to professional occupations such as engineering (4 percent of the workers and one percent of the peasants) or to the arts (3 percent of each group). When asked why they desired a particular occupation the most frequent reply (a third of the workers and half the peasants) was: easier work followed by better pay. There seems to be a greater reality orientation among these young adults than among the school children,

but their basic feeling toward farming as a way of life appears unchanged.²²

INTERVIEWS WITH VILLAGE ADULTS

The more realistic aspirations of the children are reinforced by those their parents have for them. Included in a questionnaire which was used for interviewing adult villagers in Serbia, Bosnia, and Slovenia were these questions:

What do you think about educating children beyond the eighth grade? What do you think is the best occupation for young men and young women, and why?

If it were possible to live your life over would you like something to be different, would you choose the same occupation, would you live in the same place?

(Under normal circumstances it is of course desirable to prepare an initial questionnaire, test it out, and on the basis of the responses formulate the final version. It is also desirable to preselect according to certain criteria the group of individuals to be interviewed and to have trained interviewers to do the job. For a combination of reasons the field conditions were not ideal, and pretesting was not possible. Further, the population interviewed was a random sample of those people who were available at the time the interviews were to be conducted. However, the questionnaire was based on extensive background experience in conducting unstructured interviews in depth in many villages. It was devised with the active advice and support of Yugoslav sociologists. The interviewers were sociology students, in most cases in their final year of university studies, and with some previous interview experience. A number of them were of village origin. The villages in the over-all sample represented a diversity of ethnic and religious groups, occupations, education, and income levels, and data from three of the ethnic areas are summarized below. Generally, most questions were readily answered. There was, however, some resistance to the abstract nature of the question concerning repeating one's life experiences, many replying that such a thing was impossible. A few responded to this question on the level of personal emotional experiences; one old man replied that he would pursue and seduce beautiful girls; several women said they would never have married.)

²² Krsto Kilibarda, *Soc. Pol.*, XV:7-8 (July-August, 1960), pp. 60-64. Five of those in this sample had less than four years of schooling, 214 completed four grades, 260 had from four to seven grades, 115 completed eight grades and 52 had more than eight years of school.

Perhaps most typical for Yugoslavia as a whole were responses to interviews conducted in Šumadija in central Serbia in villages clustered near the town of Arandjelovac. This town had a population of approximately 10,000 in 1961, having increased greatly in size since the war and more than doubling since 1948. Much of its growth can be attributed to the expansion of fire-brick and electro-porcelain factories which draw on local clay resources. Unlike some western parts of Yugoslavia, with an industrial tradition of several generations, the labor force in the Arandjelovac factories was recruited from the surrounding villages primarily within the last decade. (It should be added, however, that mining has an older tradition than manufacturing in this region, so that among the families interviewed there were a number of pensioned miners and clerks.)²³

Interviews were conducted with eighty-five household heads in nine villages (not including Orašac) in the vicinity. Five of these villages are basically agricultural, and four, because of their proximity to town and the fact that a large proportion of villagers from them work in town, have a mixed economy. Thirty-seven interviews were conducted in the agricultural villages and forty-eight in the mixed settlements. Of the heads of households questioned, sixty were full-time farmers and twenty-five were workers or were on pensions but practiced agriculture to some degree.

Twelve of those who farmed exclusively indicated that they would repeat their careers. Their average age was considerably greater than the average in the total sample, all of them being more than 50 years old at the time (nine were over sixty). One 48-year-old farmer said he would like to have been an agronomist, providing the sole case where a professional occupation related to agriculture was mentioned. In these twelve cases, at least one son in each household has remained on the land, the one exception being a family where the son was attending an agricultural school. Seven of the twelve were from villages with a mixed economy (of a total of twenty-eight full-time farmers in the sample from the mixed villages); the remaining five, from the purely agricultural villages, were part of a total of thirty-two full-time farmers questioned in those villages.

In prescribing ideal career patterns for boys and girls most of the

²³ It is significant to note that in Serbia in the 1880's, approximately 5,000 Italians were working on railroad construction. Evidently, there was not a sufficient number of Serbian peasants interested in wage labor. See Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955).

twelve household heads expressing a preference for agriculture as a way of life nevertheless highly valued education and urban careers, in some cases for women as well as men. One man related schooling to inheritance of land, saying that those who have land should stay in the village, while if there are many children and little land they should be educated. This attitude, which is increasingly common, represents a change from the traditional pattern where sons generally remained on the land. A 67-year-old farmer was moved to be defensive, saying that he was never ashamed of his work, for in it he had found satisfaction and happiness. He agreed that schooling was a good thing but claimed that it was best to be a farmer.

Among the 80 percent of the full-time farmers in the sample who explicitly rejected agriculture and in most cases life in the village as well, the most common response was that they wished they had learned a craft or continued in school. Five would have become workers but would have remained in the village, and an equal number who would have liked to become workers said it would not have mattered where they lived. However, seventeen of those responding to the part of the question about place of residence indicated a desire to leave the village. Twenty-one expressed a wish for change in terms of a different occupation only, although the nature of the job change appeared to carry with it an implicit desire to move. It seems clear, however, that the main dissatisfaction was with farming as an occupation rather than residence, especially in the villages nearer Arandjelovac. A number of replies explicitly rejected agriculture: "I would search for an easier life. A peasant's life is hard. I have had enough of the land." An illiterate 60-year-old woman said, "I would go to school and wouldn't even look at a peasant." A villager whose son had completed law school remarked, "No one brags about being a farmer," and a middle-aged man who had had one year of school said, "I would study day and night. I'm tired of working the land." (However, his 30-year-old son went to school for two years only.)

The latter case is but one of twenty-two from both types of villages where the household head expressed a desire for a life other than farming but where sons have either remained on the land or become peasant-workers at unskilled manual work which is supplementary to the agriculture-based household economy. Thus those twenty-two individuals all stated that they would study or learn a craft, in most cases would move to a town, that children should be educated beyond elementary school, if possible for a white-collar job or profession—but the fact remains that their own children have done none of these things. How-

ever, these men are mostly in their late fifties and sixties, and since the extended families of most of them are composed of three-generation households, many of their grandchildren show promise of achieving a career outside the village. In nine out of the ten cases where applicable, the grandchildren have already surpassed the educational experience of their parents and grandparents. Most of these grandchildren are now in their teens, and so the extent of their careers cannot yet be determined. Some have already reached the university or skilled technician level of training. Undoubtedly some will remain on the land, but the implications for increasing depopulation of rural areas, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, are evident.

From 1890 to 1948 the population of the primarily agricultural villages in this region remained approximately stable. During 1948 to 1953 village populations declined slightly in a number of cases. Significantly, if we analyze the population living entirely or partly from agriculture in 1890 and in 1960 in ten comparable villages, including most of those in which the interviews were conducted, six showed a decline in population and four an increase. With one exception, the increases have occurred in villages adjacent to Arandjelovac which have large numbers of peasant-workers.²⁴

Of the twenty-five household heads in the total sample who are peasant-workers or pensioners, only three (one over 50 years of age and two over 60) indicated satisfaction with the ways their careers had turned out, and two said they would have liked to get further education and changed jobs but remain in the village. The majority indicated that they wished they had been able to have more education and a different job. They also expressed a desire to live in Arandjelovac, Belgrade, or some large town. The peasant-workers' ages ranged from the late twenties to the early fifties. They were generally younger than the farmers and their households were smaller, usually composed of two generations. In two of the twenty-five cases sons were farmers. In six households children had achieved schooling or jobs superior to those of their fathers.

Another view of the peasant-worker is obtained from data from a Moslem village near a coal-mining and steel complex about an hour's train ride from Sarajevo. This Bosnian sample included 118 interviews with heads of households, of whom only ten were farmers. Most of these peasant-workers worked in the mine or on the railroad, and some

²⁴ Joel M. Halpern, *Social and Cultural Change in a Serbian Village* (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), p. 125, and *Popis Poljoprivrede*, I (Belgrade: 1964), 343-344.

were on pension. All of them cultivated their own land in the village, which is situated in relatively fertile rolling hills. Only one of the ten farmers in the sample (all of whom were more than sixty) said he would repeat his life experience. The others said they would like to have had more schooling and another occupation. Four of these said they would have moved to town. Among the 108 peasant-workers ranging in age from 20 to late sixties, less than half (thirty-seven) expressed a desire to remain in the village, but only four of these said they would choose the same careers; the others would have liked more education and to have entered a more highly skilled occupation. In some cases the children of peasant-workers achieved the goal of moving to a job in town. More frequent in this area are cases of three-generation households where fathers and sons are or have been workers. Here as in Serbia most movement can be looked for in the generation now in school.

Studies conducted in other areas of Yugoslavia corroborate the Serbian and Bosnian peasant-workers' great desire for occupational and spatial mobility. This is not universal, however, in all parts of the country, particularly in village communities in prosperous regions situated near towns. An example is the Slovene village of Šenčur, a short bus trip from the industrial town of Kranj. This alpine area combines a highly prosperous farming, tourist, and industrial economy. Of sixty-seven peasant-worker household heads interviewed, thirty-six indicated that they would prefer to continue living in Šenčur, and only nine said they would have liked to move. Five of the six farmers in the total sample of seventy-three indicated a preference for remaining in the village. However, there was markedly less occupational satisfaction, since only eleven of the peasant-workers and two of the farmers wished to repeat the same experience. (The attitude of rural Slovenes in less favored regions matches that of villagers in other parts of the country: among sixteen heads of households in a relatively remote and backward region of Slovenia, all of whom are farmers, thirteen indicated a desire to change both occupation and place of residence.)

CONCLUSIONS

The survey data and personal accounts presented here suggest trends not intended to be conclusive. It is not possible to see this evolutionary stage in the development of a total society as simply involving a peasant attaining an education, developing new skills, and learning urban ways of life. All these factors are only part of the total nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization process.

An integral aspect of the process has been modern warfare. The peoples of today's Yugoslavia generally, and Serbs in particular, have been deeply involved in the major wars of this century. A peasant's closest contact with modern technology and a modern state organization has been his army service, making a greater impact on village youth than a few years' attendance at the local school. Many peasant soldiers were prisoners of war. It is no accident that in autobiographies obtained from villagers often 80–90 percent of the narrative relates wartime experiences (although this might have been done, in part, to interest or impress a foreigner). Many Croats and Slovenes who were taken prisoner by the Russians during World War I were witnesses to some of the more dramatic moments of the Bolshevik Revolution. Those from Serbia, especially, who spent several years in both world wars in Austrian or German prisoner-of-war camps, returned with lasting impressions of an industrialized society and of more advanced agricultural techniques than they had known before.

Undeniably they lacked the technical background, financial resources, and national leadership which would have enabled them to use their experiences comprehensively in order to raise their standard of living. Various innovations did come about, however, and, more importantly, despite the traditional appearance of the countryside, the peasants' view of the world was receptive to change. This attitude was reinforced by a self-consciousness of their own relative backwardness. The Communist revolution has been opposed on ideological grounds but much less so with regard to its schemes for economic development.

Particularly in Serbia the concept of a peasant state is pertinent. That is, the successful achievement of independence growing out of armed revolt, with Serbia's coming into existence as a country composed mainly of peasant small holders, developed in the individual villager a high degree of national consciousness.

These developments provide something of the background for a statement often heard in the countryside: "Give us twenty years without a war, and we will make our country into a little America." This and the frequently uttered village axiom, "A man must work," reflect attitudes radically different from those which have been written about elsewhere with regard to European peasantries. There are surely elements of Slav Messianism, an early twentieth-century immigrant view of America, and the more recent future-oriented Communist ideology—but the particular historical experience of the villagers is also important.²⁵

²⁵ These interpretations have been suggested in conversations with Asen Balicki and Eugene Hammel.

The villager does not see himself as a passive element in change. He seeks active involvement. Despite an early tradition of mistrust of the city, especially with regard to urban merchants and creditors, migration to towns and social and economic advancement is eagerly sought regardless of the difficulties encountered. Peasants' attitudes toward change can be a series of interrelated and often contradictory views. In speaking of the Yugoslav rural population as a whole differences among regions has been stressed. Differences between individuals must also be borne in mind. A villager may make great sacrifices to send his children to school and prepare them for a professional occupation, be willing to try improved varieties of seed, or experiment with better breeding stock, and at the same time cling to traditional religious observances and the virtues of home cures as opposed to modern medicine. The concern of the preceding pages has been the attitudes toward agriculture and associated village residence. Therefore many values and practices which the rural migrant carries with him when he settles in town have not been discussed other than to indicate the existence of the broad phenomenon of the peasantization of the town, which implies a continuity in many types of behavior and not a complete psychological, economic, or social break with his rural past.

In Serbia, which lags significantly behind the former Austro-Hungarian areas of Croatia and Slovenia, developments have been particularly dramatic within the past half century. Taking 1921 as an index of 100, the rate of growth of the urban population of Serbia proper by 1953 was 295, compared to 221 for Croatia and Slovenia.²⁶

Other factors have aided the transition. The rural areas of Yugoslavia have long lacked experience with wage labor in the extractive industries of logging, mining, and quarrying. In addition, there has been the even older tradition of peasant migrant workers known as *pečalbari*, who left from areas such as Macedonia to work in Turkey, Egypt, or the United States for months or years before periodically returning to their villages. Within Yugoslavia peasant traders and craftsmen have also ranged widely in disposing of their wares. These various activities have all served to acquaint the villager with the town.

A village-based peasant subculture is not about to disappear from Yugoslavia. In fact, the situation in Šenčur suggests how some peasant villages are being incorporated in the suburbs of expanding industrial towns, promoting the peasantization of the towns. But the consequences of the negative attitude toward farming as a way of life for the

²⁶ Dolfe Vogeltnik, *Urbanizacija kao Odras Prevrednog Razvoja FNRJ* (Belgrade: 1961), Table 8, pp. 44-45.

future of the agricultural labor force on both private and state farms is already evident. Providing increased economic incentives to villagers alone would not appear to make a career in agriculture more attractive.

The villager has strong ties to his native place and to his family's plot of land, and at the same time he is attracted to a job in the town. The current resolution of this dilemma is the transitional phenomenon of the peasant-worker. The equilibrium is a dynamic one, with movement both ways. Developments in 1965 indicate that with greater stress on economic efficiency in industry numbers of unskilled factory workers may have to return to the land.²⁷ Under such conditions it would seem that the transitional status of peasant-worker will not soon disappear. The ultimate security which the land offers in time of crisis is not lightly abandoned. However, this is not synonymous with permanent, unyielding attachment to village life.

The peasant has stubbornly resisted collectivization, but it seems he is even more determined to gain access to the seeming attractiveness of urban life. His attachment to his land appears to vary inversely with the degree to which other opportunities become available. This has not always been so, and it is not true everywhere in Yugoslavia today, but the general long-term trends are clear.

²⁷ David Binder, "Price Increases Pain Yugoslavs," *New York Times*, August 1, 1965, p. 13.