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Article
Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D
Review of International Economics (2013)
  • Huw Edwards, Loughborough University
  • Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, La Trobe University
Abstract

We investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, governments can impose HTBTs, so long as firms operate different technologies. With firms being first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating national monopolies, unless spillovers in R&D are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers

Publication Date
2013
Citation Information
Huw Edwards and Joanna Poyago-Theotoky. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D" Review of International Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 4 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/joanna_poyago_theotoky/33/