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Article
A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R&D Duopoly
Review of Industrial Organization (1999)
  • Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, Loughborough University
Abstract

The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R&D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R&D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R&D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value.

Publication Date
1999
Citation Information
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R&D Duopoly" Review of Industrial Organization Vol. 15 Iss. 3 (1999)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/joanna_poyago_theotoky/19/