1991

Quandary of the quacks: Struggle for expert knowledge in American psychology

Jill G. Morawski
As a young discipline at the turn of the twentieth century, psychology in the United States had to differentiate its work from that of other disciplines concerned with human nature, especially biology and philosophy. However, disciplinary divisions were not the only boundaries that posed a problem for psychologists; they also had to differentiate their claims of knowledge from those of other avowed experts of mental life and from ordinary actors for whom psychological explanations were a regular part of everyday experience. To do this, psychologists had to try to convince the public that scientific psychology offered an understanding of mental events superior to that of common sense. While psychologists were quick to see that psychics, healers, mystics, and other "quacks" were somewhat dangerous competitors, they were slower to recognize the need to establish their scientific understanding of the mind as truly superior to everyday accounts.

In the early years of the discipline development, from 1885 to 1910, psychologists presented their arguments for superior knowledge primarily in academic settings, training students to appreciate and acquire a scientific attitude toward psychological phenomena. Through such training procedures, the distinctions between valid and invalid, scientific and nonscientific forms of knowledge were painstakingly constructed and refined. In describing the proper scientific mind, textbook writers often contrasted the objectivity and rationality of the experimental scientist with the subjectivity of the layperson. Well-known Cornell psychologist E. B. Titchener, for example, encouraged "long training" to overcome the "ignorance" of the untrained. G. Stanley Hall, an early
founder of psychology laboratories and graduate programs, held that research "emancipates the mind from error and superstition" and "gets the mind into independent action so that men became authorities and not echoes." Harvard psychologist Robert Yerkes employed a psychodynamic account when contrasting those trained in psychology with the untrained: "Millions of human beings — unfortunate but all unconscious of what they are missing — go through life blind to the psychological world." The ability to "psychologize," the special talent of the properly trained psychologist, was clarified by such contrasts. Thus, to the extent that the trained researcher could be identified by special cognitive skills of observation and reasoning, then the ordinary person was reduced to a poor observer, one deficient in or incapable of rational thinking and the appropriate scientific gaze on mental events.

These two social classes, the scientific psychologist and the layperson, were obvious enough by 1921 that an author could title his textbook *The Psychology of the Other-One.* Meanwhile, in the development of laboratory practice, researchers established roles for the experimenter and the subject that reflected and maintained such social distinctions. At times, the criteria defining what constituted the proper attitude were even used to discredit other academic psychologists whose work was not seen as sufficiently accurate, precise, or controlled to warrant being called "psychology."

These constitutive arguments regarding the psychologist's advantage were extended to address a larger public, typically in the form of popular writings on assorted psychological subjects. Few of the prominent early psychologists refrained from describing their "new" science in popular magazines or newspapers. They wrote to clarify the differences between traditional philosophy and their new scientific enterprise as well as to demystify folk thinking about human nature by introducing the scientific attitude, often materialistic and reductionist. Here psychologists refined further a rhetoric that set themselves and their accounts apart from what the ordinary observer might say about a particular psychological topic. In so doing, psychologists often deliberately presented as opaque and problematic what commonly was held to be self-evident or intuitively clear.

However, popular psychology in the early twentieth century was not restricted to simple translation and transmission of the scientific spirit. Psychologists devoted much of their popular articles, books, and radio talks to explicating the practical uses of psychological knowledge. Illustrious figures such as Hugo Münsterberg, John B. Watson, James McKeen Cattell, Joseph Jastrow, and G. Stanley Hall, as well as many lesser-known researchers, extended psychological findings to the expla-
nation of such diverse life situations as marital discord, success, education, thumb sucking, and work efficiency. For instance, between 1916 and 1924, four leading psychologists published utopias in which the perfected worlds were fashioned according to psychological knowledge and managed by psychological experts.8

In producing a popular literature on practical psychology, these researchers were not creating an entirely new genre. By the early twentieth century there already existed a corpus of what can be termed human improvement psychology. Historians have examined the rise of popular self-improvement literature that stressed psychological mechanisms, and magazines in general often adopted a rhetoric of personal control. Popular psychology appealed to a culture of readers said to be motivated by a therapeutic ethos of self-help, narcissism, and control.9

Given this cultural climate in which everyone was psychologizing to some degree, it would be misleading to try to understand the popularization of psychology through any simple model of united scientists speaking to a naive readership. The dynamics of popular science in general are more complex, especially after World War I, when scientists had to make appeals both for economic support and a respectable self-image. During this postwar period, for instance, physicists sought not only to relay new research advances but also to present their science as democratic, socially responsible, and useful.10 Organizations such as Science Service were created precisely to organize and control the voices of scientists and the image of science being presented to the public.11

While riding the postwar wave of interest in psychological phenomena, a time in which one historian claimed psychology had become a “national mania,”12 psychologists had to continue their efforts to define and maintain distinctions between their scientific knowledge and the audiences’ common-sense reasoning. By the 1920s, their popular rhetoric, which originally had been intended as a way to identify and market a specific form of expert knowledge, actually created a blurring of this boundary. That is, in order to sell scientific psychology to the public, psychologists modified and simplified their accounts, often omitting details of methodology, conceptual analysis, and theory. The resultant discourse was clearly accessible to a large audience of readers; however, it also could be imitated readily by writers who were not formally trained as scientific psychologists. Thus, in the end, popularization served as much to erode the fragile boundaries between common sense and science as to create them, which had been the original intention. As a result, some psychologists attempted to sharpen the distinctions between “common sense” of the layperson and “popular psychology” of the expert. In naming his 1928 textbook Popular Psychology, A. A. Roback reminded
readers that his book was a psychology of the "scientifically trained person" which had been obtained by "authority," an essential feature "which no amount of common sense or general experience can compensate for." Nevertheless, journalists were to capitalize on this fuzzy boundary, and in writing about psychological subjects they became not simply lay interpreters of psychological knowledge but actual contributors to that knowledge.

The history of popular psychology in the early twentieth century has much in common with recent historical studies of popularization of the physical and biological sciences. These studies have challenged the notions of popular science as a process of simplifying and diffusing scientific knowledge for the purpose of informing laypersons. Popularization has served more than a singular enlightenment function. Its audiences are often highly educated and may even include scientists (for example, Fermi was a regular reader of popular science presented in Reader's Digest). Popular accounts do not always represent consensual scientific knowledge that remains unaltered by the simplification process. The knowledge communicated through popularization may actually represent the thinking of a subgroup of scientific practitioners; it may be fashioned to serve and persuade a particular audience; it most certainly is transformed through the processes of redescription and retelling.

This study presents two case studies in the popularization of psychology in the twentieth century. Both cases illustrate the complications of blurred boundaries between psychologists' knowledge and knowledge of psychological processes held by others. The first case traces psychologists' reactions to psychoanalysis, a movement which had captured the public imagination in the first decades of the century. Initially, Freud's work was a subject of critique by academic psychologists who attempted to discredit his enterprise and dissociate it from their own work on the grounds that it was not scientific. However, in spite of these efforts, psychoanalysis became so popular during the 1920s that it threatened psychologists' claims to sole expertise over mental phenomena. In response, psychologists in the 1930s and 1940s began to switch from discrediting psychoanalysis to demonstrating how its concepts could be incorporated into scientific psychology. The second case is an account of the intentional blurring of boundaries by a scientifically trained psychologist who rebelled against the proffering of a practical psychology by fellow psychologists. The rebel, Grace Adams, found such popularizing unbefitting to the scientific attitude and at the same time misleading to the audience of eager readers who sought guidance in their personal lives. Her ventures into a critical popular psychology produced both resentment among psychologists and paradoxes in her own writing.
Thus, both of these cases illuminate some of the general processes involved in establishing and maintaining claims to expert knowledge.

Psychology’s Problematic Relations with Psychoanalysis

When experimental psychology emerged as a distinct activity during the last decades of the nineteenth century, it had to effect a differentiation from related disciplines such as philosophy. This was done primarily on the basis of method, with psychologists adopting the experimental approach of the natural sciences. But to ensure that the subject matter of their field was in fact different from philosophy, psychologists had vigilantly to insist that a whole range of phenomena which might otherwise be considered psychology were in fact not part of the discipline as they conceived it.

From a certain purist perspective, this narrowing of focus might have been a successful strategy on which to launch the new discipline were it not for the problem of ensuring sufficient support to carry on its activities. But to attract university positions, research funds, and students, psychology was obliged to demonstrate that its understanding of mental events was superior to that of common sense. The discipline thus found itself in a bind—the more abstruse its formulations and the more esoteric its subject matter, the more scientific and expert it appeared. However, these same qualities also made it seem unresponsive to the concerns of ordinary people, who continued to be interested in such banned phenomena as suggestion, self-improvement, extrasensory perception, dreams, irrationality, and so on.

There were some attempts to persuade the public that scientific psychology was worthy of interest and respect in its own right and that it could be useful in daily life. One striking example is a series of mystery stories published between 1909 and 1911 in which Luther Trant, the brilliant “psychological detective,” arrives at amazing solutions to his cases by relying on esoteric findings from current research in experimental psychology. In general, however, scientific psychologists resisted applications of their work and thus risked having their discipline seem irrelevant to the concerns of the public. At best, they asserted that their work would someday have important practical applications, but these could not yet be demonstrated because psychology was such a “young” science.

Meanwhile, a whole host of other “psychological experts” were claiming the attention of the public through their discussions of faith healing, Christian Science, mind cures, and so on, to which scientific psychologists could respond only with disgust.
gists liked it or not, people continued to think that they knew something about their own minds, their behavior, and other people, and they remained interested in any approach, scientific or not, that appeared to concern these issues.18

Yet when psychoanalysis first arrived in America via the previously little-used port of Worcester, Massachusetts, psychologists saw little reason to worry that this new, seemingly crackpot theory would provide any competition with their careful scientific work. Appearing to be simply the latest in a string of popular mind cures of the period, psychoanalysis seemed fated to take its place with the Emmanuel Movement, Weir Mitchell's rest cure, faith healing, and the rest as a mere diversion.19

And indeed it did take some time for psychoanalysis to attract more attention, either from psychologists or from the general public. There were a few early supporters (mostly psychiatrists), a few early critics (mostly psychologists), and a few popular presentations of the theory. But by the mid-teens, psychoanalysis had "eclipsed all other [mind cures] in the nation's magazines"20 and had captured the public imagination with such enticing articles as "You Can't Fool Your Other Self," "How We All Reveal Our Soul Secrets," "Speaking of Psychoanalysis: The New Boon for Dinner Table Conversationalists," and so on.21

It is hardly surprising that psychoanalysis became so popular. It combined in an almost perfect way the key ingredients of sensationalism—sex, violence, and hidden motives. It appeared to promise a miracle cure for all sorts of ills. It told people what they were really like, how they should raise their children, live their lives, and so on. And it appealed to the kind of magical, superstitious thinking characteristic of many people while being couché in the language and authority of science. Thus, people could believe in a mysterious force inside of them that controlled their behavior and still be scientifically au courant. In general, psychoanalysis reflected and described precisely that tension in American society created by the repression of sexuality. The conflicts and symptoms this repression caused constituted a major social problem. But complete license was not an acceptable solution for most people. Psychoanalysis both advocated more freedom and yet insisted that it was important to maintain some control (ego) over the dictates of irrational desire (id). It also explained the inconsistencies rampant in Victorian behavior (gentlemen who went to prostitutes, a country that talked constantly of peace but prepared systematically for war, and so on).22

The intense popularity of psychoanalysis presented a number of problems for scientific psychology. First, it meant a return, in the guise of science no less, of all those phenomena that psychologists had taken such pains to banish.23 There were really two problems here: The phe-
nomena themselves were back, and psychology’s claim that they were inherently unscientific was being undermined. An even larger problem was that psychology’s claim to expertise over mental phenomena was being eroded, thereby endangering large sections of its intellectual turf.

Had psychologists been willing to consign themselves to practicing an esoteric specialty with no particular relation to daily life, they could simply have ignored both these problems and psychoanalysis itself. However, their desire to constitute themselves the arbiters of psychological understanding and to claim expert knowledge over this realm was too strong. Even more nettlesome was the fact that the public confused psychologists with psychoanalysts and thus came to assume that psychology had something to say about dreams, sex, and other personal experiences. Students arrived in introductory psychology courses (and still do) because they wanted to learn about these things and they thought psychology was the place to do it. For all these reasons, there turned out to be no way for psychologists simply to ignore psychoanalysis.

The First Response: Criticize from Outside

Starting around 1915 or so, psychologists began to put forward the argument that psychoanalysis was unscientific and should therefore be discounted on these grounds. A spate of articles of this sort appeared both in psychological journals and in the popular press, varying in tone from careful critique to hysterical outcry. An example of the former is Robert Woodworth’s paper in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 1917, which examines in systematic detail the concept of causality inherent in psychoanalytic thought as a way of showing that conclusions derived from this perspective are not empirically grounded but are based instead on preconceived assumptions. But it was the impassioned attacks in the popular press that received the greatest attention. Christine Ladd Franklin, for example, writing in the Nation in 1916, describes psychoanalysis as a product of the “undeveloped” German mind and as an “utterly unscientific” view comparable to witchcraft; she concludes by warning that “unless means can speedily be found to prevent its spread . . . , the prognosis for civilization is unfavorable.” Unfortunately for psychology, these critiques seemed to fall on deaf ears: The number of popular articles exclaiming the wonders of psychoanalysis increased in the early 1920s, and psychoanalysts themselves seemed uninterested in whether their work was scientific enough to warrant the approbation of psychologists.
The Second Response: Criticize from Within

In the late 1920s and into the 1930s, some psychologists tried a different tack—fighting the enemy from within. For reasons that are not entirely clear and no doubt differed for each individual, a number of experimental psychologists, among them some of the leading lights of the discipline, chose to undergo psychoanalysis themselves, at least in part to find out what the fuss was all about. Some years after they had concluded their analyses, they published accounts of their experiences in a special symposium in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1940 entitled "Psychoanalysis as Seen by Analyzed Psychologists."

E. G. Boring’s paper, "Was This Analysis a Success?" is particularly revealing of psychologists’ mixed feelings. Boring entered analysis because he was depressed and unable to work (to "save face" he told his colleagues that he was investigating the relation between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis). He was critical of the metaphysical assumptions and lack of methodological rigor which in his view characterized psychoanalysis. However, he was also poignantly and painfully trusting in its ability to effect a magical transformation of his personality within the space of ten months. When this appeared not to be forthcoming, he became "desperate" and "distraught." Consoling himself with the belief that this transformation might not emerge until a few months after the end of the analysis, he waited nervously "for a light from heaven, [or] at the very least to be changed from Saul to Paul." Nothing happened. In a plaintive tone, he concluded his paper with the statement, "there is so much about this personality of mine that would be better if different, so much that analysis might have done and did not!" And in the final hope that there might have been some positive outcome that he had overlooked, he persuaded his analyst, Hanns Sachs, to append his own evaluation of the analysis to Boring’s paper. Although considerably less naive than Boring, Sachs was no more optimistic about the success of the analysis. As readers, we are supposed to conclude from all of this that experimental psychology was right all along: Psychoanalysis was nothing but a bunch of metaphysical hokum, raising people’s hopes only inevitably to disappoint them. But what is also clear is that if psychoanalysis could attract even hard-boiled experimentalists (who appeared drawn to it, almost in spite of themselves), then the public, which didn’t care in the slightest whether psychoanalysis was scientific or not, could hardly be blamed for lapping it up.
The Third Response: Co-opt What You Can, Ignore the Rest

It had become clear to psychologists by the 1930s that psychoanalysis was not a passing craze but a serious competitor which threatened the foundations of scientific psychology, at least in the mind of the public. Criticizing it out of hand had not seemed to work. Trying it and then criticizing it hadn't had much effect either. Some other response was needed, and here psychologists took a page from the politician's book and tried the strategy of co-optation. This approach, which continues to be an effective one, involves granting the importance of some of the phenomena psychoanalysts examine while remaining critical of the methods they use to study them. Thus, by the 1930s, we see the beginnings of a movement still in full force today in which psychologists attempt to appropriate for themselves those aspects of such phenomena as emotion, self-awareness, infant experience, psychopathology, and so on that can be made amenable to experimental treatment.

For instance, in an early example of this genre, John B. Watson wrote in 1927 that there are certain phenomena corresponding to the realm the psychoanalyst terms the "unconscious" and that these need to be taken seriously by the psychologist. But, Watson argued, this does not mean that one has to resort to the "voodooism" of mental constructs like "conscious" and "unconscious"—these phenomena can be more efficiently examined by the behaviorist strategy of differentiating between the "verbalized" and the "unverbalized."

The main thrust of psychologists' attempts to co-opt psychoanalytic phenomena entailed subjecting these notions to the rigors of quantified experimentation. Thus, starting in the late 1930s and continuing at least into the 1950s, we see a whole host of studies in which such classic psychoanalytic concepts as reaction formation, the Oedipal conflict, the oral character, and so on are brought into the laboratory for careful dissection. The intent of this extensive line of research was to separate the wheat from the chaff: that is, to differentiate those psychoanalytic notions that could be shown to be "scientifically valid" and thus worthy of inclusion in the canon of psychological theory from those that could not and should therefore be discarded." This effort restored psychologists to their rightful role as the arbiters of psychological truth, even if they did at times look a bit silly, as for example, when O. H. Mowrer pronounced reaction formation a meaningful concept because it could be demonstrated to occur in rats.30

This strategy of co-optation accomplished several things. First, it demonstrated that scientific psychology was not, in fact, irrelevant to the concerns of ordinary people, that it had something of importance
to say about these things. Once psychologists established their expertise over the irrational, psychoanalysts stopped looking as if they had some special claim to their territory. This garnered for psychology some of the public respect that psychoanalysis had generated and enabled psychologists to join analysts in making various public pronouncements about how people should live their lives, bring up their children, run their relationships, and so on. The seemingly limitless market for such statements testifies to the wisdom of this strategy.

But because psychologists took the so-called irrational and subjected it to the rigors of experimental study, they were able to insist that they were not simply aping the analysts but in fact taking over their job and doing it the way it should be done. Thus, the methodological purity which had served as the hallmark of scientific psychology was reasserted and shown to have been right all along. Indeed, if anything, it was strengthened, since if such methods could be used to study even such seemingly metaphysical phenomena as the "self," then this demonstrated the apparent superiority of experimentation as a way of knowing.

The Fourth Response: If All Else Fails, Beat Them at Their Own Game

The strategy of co-opting those psychoanalytic phenomena that could be made amenable to experimental treatment and ignoring or disparaging the rest continues to work well for experimental psychologists. Indeed, it seems to have removed the threat that psychoanalysis once presented to a scientific psychology whose boundaries were diffuse and difficult to maintain. However, experimental psychology now represents but one subarea within a more diverse discipline and, as it turns out, its particular resolution to the problem of psychoanalysis does not hold for other areas of psychology. In particular, the co-optation strategy does not work for the clinicians, who have become the current combatants in the apparently endless struggle between psychology and psychoanalysis.

For reasons that are complex and reflect the ambiguity of clinical psychology's status vis-à-vis psychiatry, an increasing number of clinical psychologists have become interested in receiving psychoanalytic training to expand the range of their professional expertise. However, psychoanalytic training institutes in the United States have insisted since their formation early in the century on restricting admission to only those individuals with a medical degree, that is, psychiatrists. Although Freud himself opposed this policy, and it does not characterize the practice of European institutes, the American Psychoanalytic Association has refused to alter its rules and has for years systematically rejected the
applications of psychologists. As a consequence, the American Psychological Association, acting on behalf of its huge clinical constituency, filed a lawsuit several years ago against the American Psychoanalytic Association in an effort to force it to admit psychologists as training candidates. Arguing on the grounds of restraint of trade, the psychologists claimed that the analysts had created a monopoly on psychoanalytic practice and were unfairly limiting competition. In an out-of-court settlement, the psychologists recently won this battle and in so doing have ensured a place for themselves within American psychoanalysis. The irony of this accomplishment, given the earlier history of psychology’s hostility to psychoanalysis, hardly needs comment.

The shifting boundaries of American psychology and the difficult task it faced in maintaining its claims to expert knowledge are further illustrated in our second case, that of the rebel popularizer, Grace Adams.

**Practical Psychology versus Common Sense**

By the 1920s, psychologists had begun to establish arguments for distinguishing their knowledge of human action from that held by the ordinary person. Roback’s concept of scientific authority was assumed and the “other-one” was portrayed as deficient in objectivity and rationality. Popularizing psychology afforded a means whereby the laity could begin to understand the superiority of psychologists’ knowledge of mental life. They could gain an appreciation of expertise and simultaneously learn the limitations of common sense. Popularization, then, was presumed to be a straightforward process through which scientific knowledge was simplified and presented in a comprehensible form to a lay audience.

At least one psychologist challenged these assumptions about popularization and the laity. Grace Adams employed what was becoming the conventional genre of popularization to disclose some unspoken qualities of the production of scientific psychological knowledge and its implication in popularization. Yet she found popularizing to be a convenient medium, a means to debunk aspects of psychology she had come to disdain. While exposing the hidden life of the popularizing process, she profited by its established presence in American culture. This debunking in turn led her to a rather unusual view, at least for the therapeutic and technocratic ethos of the 1920s and 1930s, that common sense might be the best guide to assessing the mental processes of self and others. As we shall see, her rather radical defense of common sense created a paradox which she seemed unable to remove or transcend.
Without the usual artifacts and imprints of an academic career, there remains little evidence of Grace Adams’s professional life. After receiving a B.A. from Randolph-Macon Women’s College she did graduate work in psychology under E. B. Titchener at Cornell. Her dissertation research adhered to the Titchenerian experimental tradition: She studied the observer’s introspective memory of smells, tastes, colors, sounds, and cutaneous sensations when the usual qualities of the stimulus objects were exchanged for atypical ones (i.e., a rose smelling of lily perfume or a copy of Titchener’s *Textbook of Psychology* hollowed out and filled with basswood). Both this research and Adams’s popular writing attest to the influence of Titchener on her stance regarding psychology. Although no evidence can be found of Titchener’s evaluation of Adams, one observer’s opinion was that she stood as a favorite among his “girls.” After completing the Ph.D., Adams taught psychology at Goucher College for a year (1923–24) and worked for a year as a psychiatric aide in a private children’s home. She then began her popular writing, which stands as both the most concrete marker and accomplishment of a short career (although there is some evidence that she periodically held positions in public education in the 1950s). These works, appearing between 1928 and 1952, include at least twenty-five articles and five books. Adams died in Spain in 1958. Her career was on the margins of the profession and resembles those of many women psychologists of that generation who could not secure regular positions teaching in universities.

**Questioning of Science**

During the first six years of her writing (1928 to 1934), Adams’s publications were unique among the popular articles on psychology, although she was among a distinguished company of trained psychologists who wrote for the popular press. From the beginning of the century, psychologists had written about the new experimental psychology and especially its practical utility in guiding everyday life. Psychology in all its varieties had the potential to inform self-enlightenment as well as control the social problems that seemed to threaten cultural stability.

Adams’s articles contrasted with these exuberant messages of eupsychias. They all contained in varying degrees a chastisement both of psychologists and the reading audience. The negative assessment of American psychology and psychologists was twofold: It included direct accounts of scientific shortcomings and only slightly more subtle critiques of the psychological community itself. The two earliest articles, on animal mentality and human instincts, at first sight appear as fair reviews of research on those subjects. However, both suggest psychol-
ogists' slippage from the appropriate scientific standards. American psychology, Adams noted, had "laid its grasp on the human instincts" that were once a subject of biology. In doing so, psychologists had turned away from objective, experimental evidence and instead relied upon logic, and "when the evidence for accepting a group of phenomena into a science is based not on experimental data but on logic, there is no guarantee that this logic will be continually persuasive or that its interpretation will always be the same." To illustrate the frailty of depending on such processes, Adams juxtaposed various psychologists' definitions and enumerations of instincts. Her account not only suggests an arbitrariness in psychological theorizing but more importantly reveals a lack of consensus in the house of psychology.

In later pieces Adams further developed the image of a confused and divided scientific community. In one narrative history, the "decline" of this community is described as a failure to uphold the founding ideals of a rigorous and objective experimental science. After jesting about William James's mysticism, G. S. Hall's religiosity, and John B. Watson's entrepreneurism, the cause of psychology's decline is baldly stated: "What has happened to psychology in America is clear. The objective records of the psychologists themselves tell the tale. Of all the outstanding experimentalists since the science was established here, only one neither deserted his subject nor lowered its standards. And he was never part of America. The mooniness which passes as psychology today is the inevitable result of popularization and neglect." Adams's twofold strategy was forceful. First, in illustrating the multiple cases where the scientific attitude had been forsaken for fact or popular appeal, credible doubts were cast on the scientific status of an already questionable science. The plethora of contesting theories and the pull of sensationalism apparently weakened the cognitive faculties of even the most objective of psychologists, John B. Watson:

The most alarming feature of this general trading of psychological terms among the various schools is that it is so contagious that even Dr. Watson is becoming slightly infected whenever he enters the nursery. When he is proclaiming behaviorism from the platform he still denounces the psychoanalysts for the charlatans he has always found them; but when in softer moments he advises young mothers about how to fashion their daughters' nighties and how to powder their sons small behinds, he speaks of inferiority and father fixations as though they were the most respectable of established facts.

Just as objectivity, experimentation, and disinterestedness were found to be substituted by the logic of theorizing, so that logic was infused
with metaphysics. Child psychologists had confused understanding with an idealistic worshiping of children: “So instead of casting a cool and disinterested eye upon the brats they found around them, they bestowed upon the ‘child soul’ all the transcendent virtues of both animals and angels.” Once mental hygienists began categorizing neuroses and psychoses they “realized that there was not one door forever locked against their techniques of discovering abnormalities among the seemingly normal.” And on Terman’s use of school grades as a criterion of his intelligence tests being an “objective measure of intelligence,” Adams simply noted that “his brother educators saw nothing paradoxical in using admittedly faulty personal judgment as the final test of the objective tests, themselves.” The disregard for scientific methods and experimental procedures was shown to result in psychologists’ confusion, a vertigo so serious that it left these scientists less competent on matters of the mind than most laypersons. For instance, in assessing intelligence research Adams concluded that so far the chief result had been to confirm the psychologists’ doubts as to the nature of intelligence. “Not only are they not sure what intelligence is; these tests make them uncertain what it is not.”

Psychologists’ failure to maintain scientific standards supported Adams’s reporting of chaos in the scientific household. Identifying fragmentation and even dissent among these scientists probably represented the strongest indictment of American psychology. After all, this portrayal of disorder challenged the common assumption that scientists produce and confirm truths that ultimately are acceptable to their entire community. The argument of a fractured science was enhanced both by Adams’s considerable knowledge of the history of psychology and by her rhetorical skill. Through simple but strategical listing of contrasting points of view, nearly every psychological subject that Adams reviewed gave evidence of confused disagreement. Her 1931 book Psychology: Science or Superstition? best exemplifies these capabilities with historical narrative. In telling of the rise of an experimental science and its collapse with popularization and the proliferation of ungrounded ideas, Adams interjected the rhetoric of cruel satire. However harsh, her play with history and words was effective:

Yet from this welter of claims and accusations and denials and even bitterness, one thing seemed permanent: despite all small, internal differences and bickering, there were three distinct and incompatible schools of psychologists: the conscious, the unconscious, and the anticonscious. The pronouncements of any one group must remain forever unintelligible to the other two. There was apparently no hope of compromise or reconciliation.
Yet the miracle has come to pass. There are today in American universities professors who recognize no conflict between the fundamental positions of the behaviorists, the introspectionists, and the psychoanalysts. They can skip nimbly and agilely from one set of concepts to the other. They can quote Watson in one sentence and Freud in the next as if both gentlemen were talking about identical processes. The only instruments they need are elaborate “restatements” of old theories and a brand new terminology for every book they write.

Whether one’s school was conscious or unconscious, it had lost certain analytic skills associated with normal scientific thinking. Adams furnished luring anecdotes to portray this community of confusion. A straightforward listing of the varied papers presented at the 1929 Congress of Psychology created a cacophonous effect beyond that which any carefully honed argument could provide, and her numerical study correlating the rise and fall in popular psychology articles with the stock market before and after the 1929 crash illustrated the profiteering behind American psychology.

Adams’s critical stance on practical and popular psychology is consistent with that of her mentor, E. B. Titchener, who had spoken vehemently against the trends toward practical psychology and for retaining rigorous and pure experimental science in the tradition of nineteenth-century German psychology. These claims, along with several efforts to create elite learned societies of experimentalists, earned him a reputation as a purist. Even his rare excursion into popular writing privileges that which is experimental and uninteresting. There is considerable evidence in Adams’s early writings that she shared his esteem for pure experimental psychology and a belief in the introspective study of consciousness. However, Titchener is not simply praised but also subjected to her poison pen. Her accounts of Titchener’s contributions to experimental science are laced with less praiseworthy character assessments. The failure of the experimental tradition to continue after Titchener’s death in 1927 was attributed to his autocratic governing of labs and journals and the consequential absence of competent progeny who could undertake leadership roles. Adams did not hesitate to mention his exploitation of “lady” psychologists and his lifelong allegiance to German rather than American culture. In an article devoted entirely to Titchener’s career, his laboratory was likened to both an industrial factory and an empire. Titchener directed his students much like Henry Ford might have instructed assembly line workers: So closely did Titchener identify the men who comprised his department with the subject that he taught them that they seemed to belong to him not only as pro-
fessional assistants but as human beings. 51 Adams acknowledged Titchener's commitment to psychology but questioned his "quality of affection" for experimental work, noting that "an experimental scientist is a rather different kind of person from a successful executive." 52

Despite her respect for a particular research tradition, Adams clearly was not an emissary of Titchener's ideology. Even if she had not written so acidly about him, her other major focus of criticism belies any Titchenerian scientific elitism. Embedded in her critiques of contemporary psychology was a critical commentary addressed to the reading audience of nonpsychologists. She found that the failure of the experimental program and the scourge of the practical psychologies was hastened by that "younger generation of college students who, in their high school days, had learned that psychology meant either the personality that helps a salesman sell bonds, or a polite word for smut." 53 Not just students but all participants in the American commercial spirit were implicated:

Not only were the psychology of business and the psychology of personality popular with students looking for snap courses, but they also find favor with presidents and trustees looking for appropriations. If the graduate students of a university can be put to work discovering the kind of desk kindergarten children prefer, some company manufacturing such desks may be induced to hand over a nice sum to the university.

Or:

America, to be sure, wanted a science of psychology, and wanted it badly, but Americans reserved the right to construe their own definition of that science. They had no desire to make "impersonal observations"; they had no sympathy with the "disinterested attitude." They asked for results. They demanded of the psychologist that he teach them how to improve their own minds and how to understand and solve their practical psychic problems. 54

Psychologists' claims to offer a competent technology were, after all, "what the public wanted and what it offered its good dollars for at the bookstores. But eventually it got more than it paid for—and a good headache into the bargain." 55 Given the socioeconomic bases of psychology's popularity, Adams found it quite understandable that Americans' disillusionment with psychology coincided with the Great Depression.

Claims of the public's vulnerability are typically made from an author's distanced position as expert, but Adams rejected such a hierarchical stance. Her accounts of Titchener were in themselves self-indicting, for she herself had been an active member of his autocratic system. Adams's self-reflective gestures went further. In an article on psychiatric care she reported her own professional participation in charlatanism: She
wrote candidly of her role in a scam aimed at the rich and through which suffering children were the victims of irresponsible professional practices. Adams's self-criticism is a clue to the politics undergirding what appears to be simple muckraking. The politics are laid out in the introductory pages of *Psychology: Science or Superstition?* at the point where psychology is differentiated from physical science: "The domain which the psychologist explores is accessible to everyone who realizes that he has a mind." Further, in the 1920s American psychology "had become a popular spectacle of absorbing interest to everyone"; the McDougall-Watson debate captivated the public much like a Dempsey-Firpo fight, and Joseph Jastrow's news columns competed with those of Dorothy Dix. Thus, just as American psychologists (excepting Watson and Titchener) were unwilling to accept the fact that "we are conscious automata," so the consuming public was unwilling to recognize their role in sensationalizing psychology and especially their potential ability to use their own discerning judgment about mental processes. Between 1928 and 1934 Adams's articles are laced with this two-strand message of reprimand and empowerment. Although she invokes cases where the laity fall prey to psychological jargon, she also intimates their own competency and their ability to be reasonable judges and independent actors.

**Reconsidering Common Sense**

From 1934 onward Adams's writings reflect a marked change in strategy. The articles and books written between 1934 and 1943 contain rare mention of the technicalities of scientific psychology—its leaders, theories, treatises, or experiments. The writings largely concern practical life problems (although several pieces focus primarily on political and social institutions) and proffer a consistent "theory" for dealing with these problems. Adams continued to castigate experts of the mind and soul along with the laity who blindly rely on them, but the critiques contain a new tactic. The experts over-analyzed human problems and neglected to simply observe real life. As a consequence they imposed ideal and aseptic standards of conduct while failing to appreciate human interaction for the messiness, bumblingness, and spontaneity that make it worthwhile. Parents, it would seem, can barely face their child's simple inquiry into where babies come from. That question "has caused more worry to parents and more needless embarrassment to their offspring, and it has also been responsible for more ponderous books being written and more tedious lectures listened to, than any other five-word sentence that could possibly be fashioned in any language." If people try to
explain sexual matters, like obscenity, "in terms of thwarted sex lives, or the emotional strictures of civilization, or some other abstraction invented by the psychologist," they too are "disregarding the facts of common observation." Adams invited readers to imagine a world governed by the utopias implied in psychological theories: "Suppose by some psychological magic not dreamed of, the sexual urge could be so disciplined that human beings would desire and enjoy only its most exalted manifestations and lose all interest in its lowlier ones. Suppose that normal people found no more pleasure in scandal-mongering, or suggestive dancing, or incidental spontaneous love-making. What kind of world would result?" Not only does the experts' advice on how to answer the child's questions about babies result in the child's confusion and reluctance to inquire further, not only does the advice that the mother of adolescent boys should have open, unrepressed conversations on sex encourage those boys to frequent convenient brothels, but these therapeutic guidelines rob life of its mundane if less than noble pleasures.

In these later writings Adams privileged common sense and the common life. Her conception of common life was that children indeed are often selfish, stubborn, and cruel; adolescents are in a murky period of groping and fumbling; and humans are fond of practices such as obscenity. Common sense dictated a method for everyday living, be it mating or parenting: Rather than subscribing to some academic profundity one would be better to take "the more devious path of common human experience." The terms common sense, natural, and normal were reinvested with values they had been denied in recent psychology. In keeping with these prescribed methods Adams's next two books contain only the rarest comment on psychological theory. Don't Be Afraid, rather than drawing upon the wealth of research available on fear, actually contains only several such passages; instead it advocates, largely through anecdote, the use of common-sense treatments of fear. Thus, just as one learns through experience to avoid foods that upset the stomach, so one should avoid phobias. Likewise, one ought to confront superstitions and defy them by boldly putting "your cigarette to a match that has already lighted two others." Those banished concepts of "reason" and "conscience" are revised as guides to conduct.

These writings might be interpreted not as advocating common sense and legitimating ordinary judgment processes but rather as unrelenting criticisms of psychology. Adams then might be seen as a Menckenite, an imitator of the period's most famed journalist. Among other things, H. L. Mencken was renowned for pouring "critical acid" on what he viewed as academic pomposity and invented a style of critical
journalism that was consumed voraciously by readers and imitated routinely by other writers and editors. Or Adams's invectives might be taken as the reactions of a committed reductionist (like Titchener), a psychologist intolerant of any but a most pure materialist theory.

In her writings on common sense, however, Adams departed substantially from these two figureheads, especially in their denigration of the common man—Mencken through his satire on the "booboisie" and Titchener through dogmatic differentiation between the "trained" and "untrained" observer. Her confidence in the ordinary person's judgment is elucidated in her third book, *Your Child Is Normal*. Like the preceding works, the text criticizes experimental psychologists and other avowed experts on childrearing except that it recognizes those psychologists who rely on natural observation, especially observation of their own children (she argued that physical and mental measurement ignores the complexity and variance of the normal child). Drawing upon the records of these professional-observer parents, Adams developed the thesis that parents' observations are important and can be used to control the child's environment and ultimately influence his/her development. Over and over again, Adams stressed the naturalness of a wide range of behaviors, from displaying lack of special talents to destructiveness and masturbation. She simultaneously reinforced parental judgment in discipline: "Because all children are born into this world innocent of standards of conduct and ignorant of ideals of living, and must, in one way or another, acquire such practical guides from the adults with whom they live most constantly, our influence over them is very real and very potent."

Parents are thus empowered with observational acumen and discerning judgment abilities. Yet, in order to instill these powers, Adams spoke from an empowered position as psychologist and writer, one who can discern good from bad psychological research, natural from unnatural child behaviors, and responsible from nonresponsible parental guidance. Adams both anticipated and challenged the attitude taken by authors of childrearing manuals, the bibles of the post–World War II generation. After all, Benjamin Spock's first book, *The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care*, published in 1945, opened with a section entitled "Trust Yourself: Don't Be Afraid to Trust Your Own Common Sense." Yet that command is preceded by another, less confidence-inspiring one: "Bringing up your child won't be a complicated job if you take it easy, trust your own instincts, and follow the directions that your doctor gives you."

Her fourth book, *Workers on Relief*, follows another strategy, for it makes no mention of psychological science. It provides an extensive common-sense analysis of the psychological effects on workers of the
WPA. In keeping with the shift away from formal psychological talk, Adams employed fictional narrative, complete with characters and dialogue. Through the lives of several WPA workers, Adams portrayed the psychological damage rendered by the Depression program intended to increase employment and well-being. Adams's final book was written with her husband, Edward Hutter, in 1942. *The Mad Forties* also is a narrative story, but this time in the form of a loosely fictional history. Through the life story of Mary Gove (Nichols), a nineteenth-century reformer and water-cure physician, Adams and Hutter recounted the medical and psychological fads of the 1840s. The parallels with fads of the twentieth century are hardly disguised. In describing one practitioner of a variation on phrenology, Adams and Hutter compared his work to mental testing: "The aptitude tests, through which the vocational psychologists practice psychometry today, seem merely to complicate and render more mysterious his candid and straightforward technique." Adams's popular writing, both critiques and advice, resulted in paradox. Despite vitriolic critiques of popular psychology, Adams shifted from criticism to the production of popular psychologies. Her repeated suggestions that readers need not rely on experts to guide their lives but rather might better believe in common sense evolved into something of an expertise of common sense whereby she undertook the authority to pronounce what counted as "normal," "natural," "healthy," and, above all, "common sense experience." In other words, common sense mediates between cultural beliefs and the corpus of formal knowledge, which was becoming known as scientific psychology. Adams appropriated common sense and argued for the empowerment of everyday understanding, yet she did so from the position of expert, the "knower" of scientific psychology and its methods.

**Between Common Sense and a Common Science**

What can we make of this career in and about the popularization of psychology? Adams's work can and has been taken as simple muckraking, albeit journalism from an enlightened muckraker. Such a classification, however, dismisses a corpus that is at once keenly vested in the hope of a scientific psychology, the eradication of metaphysics, and the protection of human agency and reason. Given this heterodox agenda, it is possible to see Adams's journalistic career as a compromise. Women social scientists of Adams's generation were most likely to find their stellar graduate education leading them to careers at the margins (if anything) of academic life. Their careers meant substantial sacrifices in personal life and in their scientific as well as political, often reformist,
Adams's writing echoes these dynamics: It combines, but certainly does not blend, the highest ideals of academic science, the politics of individual rights, and the practical attitude of earning one's keep.

Whatever the motivations, the writings of Grace Adams reveal some possibilities and peculiarities in the popularization of psychology. Popularization is not a simple derivative or extension of scientific activity but rather entails transformation of knowledge. Adams herself identified some of these transformative processes and criticized them. Her deconstruction similarly exposed two other suspect assumptions about popularization: that the knowledge being relayed comes from a cohesive, consensual scientific community, and that the relation between scientist-popularizers and audiences is a simple and hierarchical one. Adams revealed tensions, gaps, and contradictions in scientific work and highlighted the interdependence of scientific writers and their readers. One of her chief interests, common sense, underscores a peculiar problem in the popularization of psychology. In order to instill the privilege of their position and the legitimacy of their knowledge, psychologists had to tread the narrow line between denigrating the reader's mental competency and convincing her or him of the cognitive superiority of the psychologists' purchase on social reality. Adams attempted to erase this line only to redraw it, trying to situate common sense (and thus knowledge) somewhere in the middle between expert and layperson. In this regard Adams's work was at the margins: Although challenging the conventions of popular science, she nevertheless was unable to eradicate or transcend the discursive boundaries of this genre of professional writing, boundaries which were constructed upon a privileging of the knowledge transmitted through certain expert voices.

The popularization of psychology, both in its conventional form and in its variations as illustrated by Grace Adams's writings, offers a valuable perspective on the development of scientific psychology. On the surface, such writings reveal scientists' missions that are not included in intellectual histories of science—they represent the public relations of new disciplines. Close analysis of popularization shows how it functions in setting the scientists' status and publicizing their product, at least during the emergence of scientific psychology. Popularization represented a dynamic negotiation about what products psychologists were to manufacture and distribute. To diverge from the formula of scientist as knower, as Adams did, was to invite cultural paradoxes or irony.
The Quandary Continues

The two cases we have examined in this chapter indicate that the boundaries of psychological expertise are intrinsically vulnerable to permeation or transformation and thus have to be negotiated and reclaimed repeatedly. Psychologists' strategies to defend their disciplinary turf have had only limited success: Although a few skirmishes have been won, the war has surely been lost. Indeed, the present situation seems considerably worse than that which existed earlier in the century. Although the expertise of scientific psychology was questioned and sometimes attacked in the 1920s and 1930s, the ideology of the Progressive movement at least ensured that the assertions of psychological "experts" would be taken more seriously than those of the laity. This is hardly the case at present. Almost anyone can write a book, host a TV or radio show, or give a talk which deals with psychological issues, and the public remains hopelessly confused about which of these people are professional psychologists and which are journalists, hucksters, or general self-help advisors. In a vain attempt to stem the tide of ersatz psychologizing, the American Psychological Association decided several years ago to purchase the popular magazine Psychology Today. The hope was that if professional psychologists could recapture control over the market for popular psychology, they might be able to upgrade its quality. After losing several million dollars and watching scores of scientific psychologists defect from APA in disgust, the leadership of the organization finally decided to sell the magazine at a considerable loss. Psychologists continue to criticize journalists for misrepresenting their discipline and to debate about the ethics and efficacy of self-help books, but these discussions have done little either to create or maintain a clear boundary between professional and popular psychology.

Why has it been so difficult for psychologists to establish themselves as the arbiters of psychological knowledge? Disciplines ranging from the natural sciences to art history have managed to map out their own unique intellectual terrains and defend them from the intrusions of nonexperts; why haven't psychologists been able to do the same? While no single answer can be given to this broad question, there seems little doubt that part of the problem has to do with the subject matter of psychology. People seem to feel acutely ambivalent about giving the analysis of their private experience over to outsiders, alternately seeking and rejecting the opinions of these "experts." For psychology to succeed in garnering for itself hegemony over the psychological realm, it would have to persuade people that they were entirely incapable of understanding the conduct and meaning of their own lives. That the public resists such attempts
is unsurprising. And yet the very complexity of contemporary life makes people aware that they do not in fact know how to cope with many of the situations facing them and, in this sense, they desire advice. The problem for psychologists is that the public is willing to be eclectic, to take any advice that seems to make sense, whether it arises from science, common sense, or divine revelation. Unlike their natural science colleagues, psychologists have failed to establish the scientific way of knowing as clearly superior to other means. However, professional psychology can reassure itself that at least it has succeeded in establishing its claims as no less credible than those of its competitors; in this respect, it has fared better than philosophy.

Notes


16. The Luther Trant series was written by E. Balmer and W. B. MacHarg and was published in Hampton's Broadway Magazine intermittently from 1909-1911. We are indebted to Michael Sokal for bringing these materials to our attention.

17. See Burnham, How Superstition Won, pp. 91, 94.

18. Indeed Burnham notes (ibid., p. 85) that for much of the nineteenth century, knowledge of "psychology" was the property of any educated person.

19. For a detailed discussion of these other forms of psychotherapy popular at the turn of the century, see N. G. Hale, Jr., Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings

20. Ibid., p. 397.


23. T. H. Leahey and G. E. Leahey, Psychology’s Occult Doubles: Psychology and the Problem of Pseudoscience (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1983) discuss this general issue in detail. And, consistent with the present analysis, they note (p. 14) that psychology’s occult doubles (e.g., phrenology, mesmerism, spiritualism, etc.) can be seen as the “dark, unconscious side of establishment psychology.”


25. C. L. Franklin, letter to the editor, Nation, 19 October 1916, pp. 373–74.


27. E. G. Boring, “Was This Analysis a Success?” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 35 (1940): 9–10; H. Sachs, “Was This Analysis a Success?—Comment,” pp. 11–16. The rest of the symposium includes papers by C. Landis, J. F. Brown, R. R. Willoughby, P. M. Symonds, H. A. Murray, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Shakow, R. Alexander, and A. B. Wood. They vary in their conclusions about psychoanalysis, and some of the more clinically minded psychologists are reasonably positive, but it can hardly be said that the symposium as a whole did anything to improve the overall relation of psychology to psychoanalysis.


29. The key epistemological issue raised by this research and by the general struggle between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis has to do with what will be taken to count as data. Experimental psychologists steadfastly refused (and still do) to consider clinical evidence to be data. It therefore goes without saying that if experimental data constitute the only “real” data, then psychoanalysis is indeed not a data-based theory. That the argument was joined in this way is, however, not surprising, since the primary characteristic that differentiated late nineteenth-century experimental psychologists from the philosophers who were studying many of the same problems was the fact that the former relied
on experimental data. Psychologists have thus been obliged to defend the necessity of such data at all costs or risk the foundation of their whole enterprise. Thus we see Boring in his History of Experimental Psychology, 2d ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 713, calling psychoanalysis "prescientific," because "it lacked experiments, having developed no technique for control." He does grant that "psychoanalysis has provided hypotheses galore" which can then be rigorously tested by experimental psychologists. Since, in terms of the ideology of the experimental method, hypotheses arise from "hunches" and other unknown intuitive processes, this is not much of a compliment.

30. O. H. Mowrer, "An Experimental Analogue of 'Regression' with Incidental Observations on 'Reaction Formation,'" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 35 (1940): 56-87. Many of these kinds of studies have been assembled in collections which evaluate the general "scientific status" of psychoanalytic theory. See, for example, P. Kline, Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1972); H. J. Eysenck and G. D. Wilson, The Experimental Study of Freudian Theories (London: Methuen, 1973).

31. For a detailed history of this methodological ideal, see Gail A. Hornstein, "Quantifying Psychological Phenomena: Debates, Dilemmas, and Implications," in Rise of Experimentation, pp. 1-34.


35. Oral history of Cora Friedline, 3 May 1966, pp. 13-14, Archives of the History of American Psychology, Akron, Ohio. In correspondence, Titchener repeatedly referred to Yerkes's "girl" students: "They are good girls, and have worked hard; and once they catch the attitude they ought to psychologize all right." E. B. Titchener to R. M. Yerkes, 5 May 1907, Robert Yerkes Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven.

36. There is now a substantial research literature on the careers of women in psychology and related disciplines. These studies report the frequent pattern of professional marginalization: if women could secure employment in universities, it was typically in auxiliary roles. Women researchers often took positions in

37. See nn. 8 and 9.
38. Historian Frank Manuel coined the term eupsychia to refer to the twentieth-century reliance on psychological thinking in the formulation of utopian plans. For a review of psychologists’ formal and informal utopias between 1915 and 1930, see Morawski, “Assessing Psychology’s Moral Heritage.”
40. “Decline of Psychology in America,” American Mercury 15 (December 1928): 453. The “one,” of course, was Titchener.
43. “Golden Age of Mental Hygiene,” American Mercury 23 (May 1931): 95.
45. Ibid., p. 198.
47. Adams frequently referred to the economic forces behind the rise of practical psychology. These claims are most developed in Psychology: Science or Superstition? and “The Rise and Fall of Psychology,” Atlantic Monthly 153 (January 1934): 82–92.
50. Ibid., pp. 459–53.
52. Ibid., p. 446.
55. “Rise and Fall of Psychology,” p. 92.
57. Psychology: Science or Superstition?, p. 16.
59. Ibid., p. 276.
63. "Where Do Babies Come From?"; "Lesser Ways of Love."
64. "Lesser Ways of Love," p. 28.
71. Indeed, Adams's early popularized critiques were considered scandalous among some psychologists. Robert Yerkes reported being distressed and referred to her *Mercury* articles as an "outpouring." Boring claimed to have been so upset that he wrote Mencken and even submitted a "corrective" to one of her articles. Boring as well as others mentioned that Adams left academic work for freelance writing because she had broken "some smoking rules." On the other hand, Boring and Yerkes as well as Hull found her first book to be a refreshing and accurate analysis of the problem besetting American psychology. Yerkes to Boring, 4 December 1931; Boring to Yerkes, 7 December 1931; Yerkes to Boring, 12 December 1931, Robert Yerkes Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven; Clark L. Hull, "The Conflicting Psychologies of Learning—A Way Out," *Psychological Review* 42 (1935): 492.