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2006

A social history of psychology and from séance to science

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BOOK REVIEWS

General

Mary D. Archer; Christopher D. Haley (Editors). The 1702 Chair of Chemistry at Cambridge: Transformation and Change. xxi + 318 pp., illus., index. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Chemists in Cambridge, England, saw the three-hundredth anniversary of the founding of their Chair of Chemistry in 1702 as a call for celebration: no doubt a good time was had by all. This book resulted from a symposium, with talks by professional historians and by chemists, working and retired. When celebratory works about a university are published by its press, the reader may be suspicious—as one is of company histories, exercises in nostalgia, drumbeating, and ego trips. We want to be sure that there is a real intellectual focus, that the events described are momentous or else typical and instructive, and that the chapters are more than elegies.

On the whole, this book passes those tests and provides useful, readable, and anecdotal ways into the history of chemistry, social and intellectual. It changes gear in the ninth essay, on Alexander Todd, appointed in 1944. Here we enter the world of managed groups, using expensive instrumentation, rather than individuals pursuing their diverse interests; and this “contemporary” history is written in the language of essay reviews in chemical journals. A familiarity with chemical terminology, formulas, and equations is taken for granted: it is insiders’ history.

That shift tells us something about the history of chemistry in Cambridge. Before the twentieth century, the Chair of Chemistry was of marginal importance in the university, where mathematics (and then later also physics) was central. Chemistry, necessarily experimental, was like surgery an art (or craft) as much as a science, hardly therefore appropriate for gentlemen: its hands-on character, hard names, and incoherence kept it down the pecking order. We first meet Giovanni Vigani, honored with the title but not paid: his connections were with medicine, as was usual after all in the world of Hermann Boerhaave. Then Richard Watson was appointed—a sound Cambridge man who promised, like a politician elected to office, to learn something about his subject. He did so, lecturing on applied chemistry and attracting audiences of wealthy young men expecting to inherit estates: a Whig improver, he was doing something like cameralistics, preparing his audience to exploit their mineral resources. He got the chair endowed, published his lectures very successfully, and became an eccentric bishop.

Antoine Lavoisier’s new chemistry duly came to Cambridge, where Smithson Tennant was in 1813 the first holder of the chair to be appointed having expertise in the science. Tennant was followed by James Cumming, a parson-chemist whose tenure of forty-six years took him through to the first students formally studying chemistry as part of the Natural Science Tripos (six candidates in 1851). His successor George Living arrived simultaneously held a position in London and retired in 1908 at the age of eighty-one. The chronicler of great events in chemistry will not have much call to look at the university in Cambridge in these years.

With William Pope, whose researches on stereochemistry were much admired by my tutor, who made us read them as undergraduates, we enter a new era: he was the first incumbent since Vigani not to be a Cambridge graduate. Indeed, he was not a graduate at all, having come through technical institutions and then a chair in Manchester. He partly modernized the system, centralizing the laboratories and teaching (which meant closing down separate college facilities in the loosely federal Cambridge structure), and attracted outside funding for the creation of new posts. By the 1930s there was something like a major if ramshackle department, ready for Todd to take firm charge of its direction and propel it at last into real significance.

--David Knight

Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr.; David B. Baker. From Séance to Science: A History of the Profession of Psychology in America. xvi + 266 pp., illus., notes, index. Belmont, Calif.: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003. $34.95 (paper).

Jeroen Jansz; Peter van Drunen (Editors). A Social History of Psychology. xvi + 262 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Malden, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. $39.95 (paper).

In everyday encounters, experimental or “scientific” psychologists frequently are pressed to distinguish what they do from the common conception of psychologists as therapists, “shrinks,” or counselors. While this misrecognition con-
ued throughout the twentieth century, experimental psychologists in fact prevailed in academic institutions and historical chronicles of psychology. This predominance lessened considerably over the last quarter century as professional psychology burgeoned, on the one hand, and academic departments were pressed at once to serve professional ends and to garner external funding, on the other hand. Thus, in 1917 only 5 percent of members of the American Psychological Association were applied psychologists, and today they constitute over 60 percent of the membership. This professional tilting led many experimental psychologists to leave the APA in 1988 and establish their own distinctly scientific organization: the American Psychological Society.

Within this transitional period in American psychology, historians began to reconsider the dominant narrative that cast American psychology as a cumulative, progressive project to replace folk and metaphysical accounts of human mental life with an empirically verifiable science of thinking, behaving, and feeling. Disregarding the canonical internalist accounts, these historians have investigated the origins of psychological expertise outside the laboratory (see, e.g., Eric Caplan’s Mind Games: American Culture and the Birth of Psychotherapy [California, 1998]), psychology’s dependence on political and economic conditions (James Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969 [Cambridge, 1999]; and Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts [California,1995]), and the dynamic relation between scientific ideas, ideology, and regulative practices (Nicolas Rose, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood [Cambridge, 1996]; and Graham Richards, Putting Psychology in Its Place: A Critical Historical Overview [Routledge, 2002]).

Not surprisingly, these professional trends—along with advances in historical scholarship—have yielded new textbook histories that significantly depart from conventional histories that narrowly chart the rise of scientific psychology, its important figures, and its great discoveries. From Séance to Science: A History of the Profession of Psychology in America and A Social History of Psychology are the first textbooks that examine psychology in its so-called applied, practical, or professional forms. While sharing an objective to tell a comprehensive story of psychology’s expansive yet largely undocumented life outside scientific chambers and beyond a relatively small cast of leading characters and events, these two textbooks differ in several notable respects. In From Séance to Science, Ludy Benjamin and David Baker explicitly aim to register the development of professional psychology in the United States, trace the sometimes nuanced subspecialties, and address the substantial impact of the various professional associations and standard-setting practices that have arisen over the last century. As such, their text fills a lacuna in our understanding of psychology’s growing entrenchment in nearly all aspects of public and private life. It offers, too, an informative explication of the specialties in applied psychology, including clinical, school, industrial-organizational, and counseling psychology. Attentive to matters of race and gender as well as to government regulations and interventions, the text provides some tangible sense of the cultural conditions enabling or promoting psychology’s impressive professional expansion. The inclusion of archival facsimiles (as, for instance, an agenda of a 1930 school psychologist’s typical day) and intriguing tales of adventuresome applications (such as Harry Hollingworth’s work with the Coca Cola company to ascertain the psychological effects of caffeine) enriches the feel of psychology’s material presence in American culture. Structuring their history according to the major specialties within professional psychology, Benjamin and Baker substantially if gently expand the conventional textbook boundaries beyond psychology’s academic domains.

As the title suggests, From Séance to Science presents but does not critically interrogate the scientific foundations and reigning theories of professional psychology. Thus, the chapter on counseling psychology describes that field’s turf war with clinical psychology, the debates over directive versus nondirective counseling, and the subsequent shift from emphasizing “adjustment” to a focus on “self-fulfillment.” What go unexamined, however, are the underlying assumptions of individual psychological functioning as self-contained, self-controlling, and self-fulfilling. Similarly, the overview of industrial-organizational psychology illuminates the notable shifts in that field as American business changed after the 1960s. Untreated in this otherwise solid description are questions about how professional psychologists collaborated with corporate management in modifying their assessment and remedial technologies without much regard for the psychological implications for the workers and the workplace more generally, how they served objectives set by others rather than scientifically
investigating alternative or auxiliary objectives, or how the evaluative practices of industrial-organization psychology itself shaped the workplace and the worker, even if inadvertently.

A *Social History of Psychology* differs in several aspects. Edited and written by Europeans, this textbook incorporates historical events in both the United States and Europe, which makes it more thematic in orientation. However, this is a relatively minor difference between the two histories; a more important distinction arises from Jeroen Jansz and Peter van Drunen’s aim to “examine critically the impact of modern psychology on society” (p. 3). This critical stance is articulated through several premises shared by the contributors. First, applied psychology is examined in terms of its social effects, which are taken to be complex. The relations between society and psychological practices are dynamic, not linear or progressive; instead, the contributors consider how the social embeddedness of practical psychology yields methods and theories—even “new concepts about man” (p. 5)—that, in turn, influence academic psychology. Further, the realist epistemology of science (and its associated “cognitivist” approach to scientific discovery) is questioned, not presumed, which allows the authors to explore the heterogeneity of psychological practices as well as the conceits of science. Finally, the authors address the dynamic operation of several key historical concepts, notably “individualization,” or Norbert Elias’s proposed “civilizing process,” whereby psychology has participated in the naming, measuring, and promotion of a shift from collective to individual life, an increased awareness of individual differences, and psychologization—“the development of a sense of ‘inwardness,’ presupposing that every individual possesses some form of private ‘inner space’ of motives, thoughts and feelings, constitutive of his very being as a unique person” (p. 7). Another key concept is “social management,” particularly the expansion of social management to address the organization and regulation of features of social life, the shift of agencies of management from private to public, and the scientizing of social management rhetoric and techniques. The first chapter of *A Social History of Psychology* elucidates these concepts via a general overview of practical psychology from 1400 to the present. Subsequent chapters are dedicated to specific subjects, including madness, work, culture and ethnicity, delinquency, and social psychological models. The historical specificity of these chapters is sometimes blurred by the transcontinental and theoretical foci, but the shared historiography affords a compelling case for understanding psychology’s evolution as a dynamic play of political economy, scientific rationality, and pre-teen human kinds.

Together these two projects chart new domains as they challenge the history textbook tradition in American psychology. Their attention to psychology as a cultural practice as well as a thriving profession affords readers a rich perspective on the history of practical psychology. Their differences invite future textbook authors to consider integrating the structural, scientific, political, and critical-theoretical facets of psychology’s history in a single volume.

**Jill G. Morawski**

Fernand Hallyn. *Les structures rhétoriques de la science: De Kepler à Maxwell.* 322 pp., index. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004. This book is not, as the title might suggest—and as some readers might fear—a theoretical overview of the rhetoric of science or a proposal of a new system. Instead, as the subtitle suggests, it is a series of closely argued case studies of rhetoric “in the contemporary sense of analysis of ways of influencing others in communication” (p. 12). Fernand Hallyn notes that his examples are familiar, “celebrated cases, problems, or passages” (p. 13). But he does not just assert that they involve rhetoric, or illustrate rhetorical terms with texts; his project is to find how one or another rhetorical device emerges, serves the purposes of the author, and links to the thought of the time, a poetics or “deep rhetoric” that “explores the formation of representation” (p. 12). This formation is to be found in careful attention to what historians have shown about science in the making.

The book consists of a series of chapters (some of which have appeared in earlier forms) arranged in order of the periods studied. There is little attempt to develop an overall argument, and there are few cross-references. But a consistent approach runs through all the studies: a familiar case is reframed in terms of rhetoric, and that reframing leads on to larger issues of textuality in science. For instance, Galileo’s interpretation of the moon as seen through a telescope is framed in terms of the metaphor of the moon seen in terms of earthly relief. Then Hallyn pursues this metaphor through the scientific disputes in which it was employed, the theories of painting then current, and, finally, to a shift in which the lens is no longer seen as an eye but the naked eye is seen as a lens. Underlying all this is the