Skip to main content
Article
Reforming China’s Securities Civil Actions: Lessons from US’s PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government Sanctioned Non-profit Organization
Columbia Journal of Asian Law (2008)
  • Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang
  • Jianlin Chen
Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the different civil enforcement regimes of China, US and Taiwan to answer how China should reform her securities civil actions. Drawing on the latest scholarships and empirical studies, we examine the inadequacies of the US class actions in achieving the goals of deterrence and compensation and the implementation of PSLRA reform. The surprise finding on the active role by public institutional investors but passive role by private institutional investors is highlighted and discussed. Recognizing that efficiency of private attorney does not equate to efficiency of public good production and the importance of institutions motivated by public interest in class actions, we discuss the Taiwan’s utilization of government sanctioned NPO to supplement public and private enforcement. Indeed, we argue that due to China’s limited legal infrastructure and political-social considerations, the Taiwan’s model with improvement in transparency and independence is more suitable for China’s reform need at this present stage.

Keywords
  • Securities Civil Action,
  • Class Action,
  • China,
  • Taiwan,
  • PSLRA,
  • Non-profit Organization
Disciplines
Publication Date
2008
Publisher Statement
Originally published in 21 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 115 (2008) Version from Westlaw
Citation Information
Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang and Jianlin Chen, Reforming China’s Securities Civil Actions: Lessons from US’s PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government Sanctioned Non-profit Organization, 21 Colum. J. Asian L. 115 (2008). Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jianlin_chen/3