For decades, courts have struggled with how to treat claims of “third party retaliation” – situations where one employee engages in some protected activity for purposes of Title VII but where the employer retaliates not against that employee, but rather against one of his or her coworkers – his or her spouse, or sibling, or mere workplace acquaintance. While some courts have permitted these third-party retaliation claims in order to ensure robust safeguards against workplace discrimination, other courts have deemed this type of employer conduct to be outside the scope of Title VII’s retaliation provision. With its January 2011 decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP., the United States Supreme Court finally has weighed in on this issue, deeming employees protected against third-party retaliation under Title VII.
This Article stands as one of the first in-depth examinations of Thompson and its potential impact on both employers and employees. While this Article approves of the Supreme Court’s decision to deem third-party retaliation claims viable under Title VII, this Article proposes a different framework for analyzing these claims than that applied by the Supreme Court in this case. Specifically, this Article argues that courts should apply jurisprudence from negligent infliction of emotional distress cases to conduct a more structured analysis of third-party retaliation claims. In addition, this Article argues that courts should define the class of plaintiffs who can assert third-party retaliation claims by requiring that only individuals who have engaged in some protected activity can sue. Other employees affected by employer retaliation – those who receive adverse treatment from their employer, but who did not themselves engage in any protected activity – should not be permitted to bring third-party retaliation claims. In articulating this framework, this Article seeks to strike a balance between deterring employers from engaging in retaliatory behavior while avoiding the negative consequences that could result from failing to place reasonable limits on the third-party retaliation doctrine.
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jessica_fink/3/