Waiting for Hohfeld: Property Rights, Property Privileges, and the Physical Consequences of Word Choice

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Abstract

An important part of our institutional and cultural history is our understanding of a system of property interests. The most common trajectory of land-use regulation appears consistent with a property rights meta-narrative that informs multiple academic disciplines and levels of human interaction. This meta-narrative suggests that all land-use decisions begin with an assumption about the nature and extent of property rights held by potentially affected landowners, and that the ultimate end of any land-use regime is to “protect” those assumed property rights from unwarranted or unjustified intrusion by government. Because the law is a distinct linguistic environment in which word choices, and definitions, have significant consequences, this assumed rhetorical landscape of a property dispute plays a significant role in determining the dispute’s ultimate outcome. In most land-use disputes, all participants make one important concession, or assertion, before the discussion begins. The often unchallenged assertion is the claim that the discussion is in fact about property rights. Once a particular property interest is characterized as a “right,” the community’s political capacity to regulate that property interest diminishes substantially. Consequently, our decisions to characterize as “rights” those settings, circumstances and relationships that are better and more accurately understood as “privileges” changes our focus from the community to the individual, and necessarily weakens the political justification for, and community understanding of, most resource- or community-protective ordinances. This article considers contemporary property jurisprudence, theory, and conflict in a Hohfeldian context to demonstrate how

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our default rhetorical landscape leads to real and unnecessary negative social and environmental effects.

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1. Introduction

An important part of our institutional and cultural history is our understanding of a system of property “rights.” The most common trajectory of land-use regulation (or the lack thereof) follows a property rights meta-narrative that informs multiple academic disciplines and levels of human interaction. This meta-narrative suggests that all land-use decisions begin with an assumption about the nature and extent of property rights held by potentially-affected landowners, and that the ultimate end of any land-use regime is to “protect” those assumed property rights from unwarranted or unjustified intrusion by government or neighboring landowners. Or at least to regulate land in a way that causes the least harm to those assumed rights.

While this meta-narrative provides some useful information, it suffers from (or more accurately, benefits from) an intentional carelessness regarding its most crucial term. Perhaps more than in any other epistemic community, language matters in the law. Even at its most generic, the law is a distinct linguistic environment in which word choices, and definitions, have
significant consequences. In this specific context, all participants in the discussion make one important assertion, or concession, before the discussion begins. And that assertion largely predetermines the discussion’s outcome. The assertion is the claim that the discussion is about property rights.

The word “right” has – or at least could have – a distinct meaning in the law. But at that initial conflict when adjoining property owners first go about negotiating their interactions, most of the circumstances that we consider property rights are not in fact rights as the law understands them. Rather, at that first conflict, most alleged property rights are better understood as property privileges. This distinction is important. Our decisions to characterize as rights those settings, circumstances and relationships that are better and more accurately understood as privileges changes our focus from the community to the individual, and necessarily weakens the political justification for, and community understanding of, most resource- or community-protective ordinances.

This article argues that we misuse legal terms of art in a fashion that causes negative changes to the landscape and to the communities that emerge around given landscapes. Proponents of legitimate, and arguably necessary, land-use or environmental regulation facilitate these negative outcomes by conceding the rhetorical playing field to anti-regulatory advocates. The rhetorical and political landscape resulting from this concession creates a gap between a local government’s potential Constitutional authority and its actual political authority—that is, rhetorical choices create political conditions that prevent state and local governments from exercising the full range of regulatory authority and options available to them.

2 I may be running against the grain a bit in my insistence on using the word “privileges” rather than “liberties” to describe the property interests at issue. But given the nature of this argument, my fear is that replacing “rights” with “liberties” does not get me where I want to go. So I’ll use privileges even if I’m alone in doing so. See James Penner, Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property, in Property Problems, From Genes to Pension Funds, 164 n. 7 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997) (“The term Hohfeld uses is ‘privileges,’ but no one else does, and for all intents and purposes he means ‘liberties.’”)

3 In some ways, this work is an extension of recent empirical work performed by Professors Jonathan Remy Nash and Stephanie M. Stern regarding the effect of different property “frames.” Although, as will be clear throughout this article, I think Professors Nash and Stern would have benefitted from a Hohfeldian conception of their property frames. See Jonathan Remy Nash and Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449 (2010); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Packaging Property: The Effect of Paradigmatic Framing of Property Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691 (2009).
Failing to recognize property as consisting of both rights and privileges, and focusing on property exclusively as a set of rights, allows property to exist as a setting or circumstance unique and singular to each individual. Property becomes less of a mutually-beneficial agreement between the individual and her community and more of a bulwark against that community. This singular understanding of property precludes considering property as part of a broader institutional, cultural, or community arrangement. And that failure potentially transforms what is an otherwise rational balancing of various individual and community interests into the “taking” of private property that cannot be justified by the local government. But often it is not a Constitutional taking; it is instead and merely a context-specific political taking.

So when the discussion about proposed land-use regulation becomes a dispute over “property rights,” anti-regulation, or anti-communitarian, activists have already largely won the battle. More troublesome, those activists enjoy the considerable assistance of their opponents in framing the issue in this fashion. Courts, academics, environmentalists, community interest groups, and others all concede this characterization, giving up an important rhetorical and legal tool.

To be clear, this argument that particular property interests are inappropriately classified as “property rights” is not an argument that the fundamental property interest at issue is inappropriate—too large, too “absolute,” or too anything. The basic nature, justification, and purpose of the property interest does not change, only the rhetorical landscape in which we consider the property interest. An accurate rhetorical rendering of the property interest is relevant, and important, because it allows for a better individual and community understanding of both the costs and benefits of the proposed or final institutional arrangement. An accurate rhetorical landscape does not leave us with less property. It leaves us with better property. And consequently, it leaves us with better communities and landscapes.

4 Property interests might also be characterized as including powers and immunities, but I set aside those interests for the moment to focus on property privileges.

This article will begin by considering how the American public understands and uses its rights rhetoric in a property context. My goal is not to recreate the significant but somewhat more general work already completed on this subject, but rather to create a context for the section that follows: the reintroduction of an understanding of property first proposed in 1913 by Professor Wesley Hohfeld. Although Hohfeld’s approach is both simple and useful – and inspired the first five sections of the Restatement (First) of Property – courts, academics and activists have chosen not to take advantage of the rhetorical tools it provides. Following the reintroduction of Hohfeld, I present examples of how courts, academics and activists fall prey to the same misuse of a property-rights rhetoric. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment provides a useful example of how a Hohfeldian approach might have facilitated better understanding of the dispute and its resolution. My argument is not that Hohfeld presents the best possible, or even best currently available, approach to understanding property. Rather, my claim is simply that recognizing the distinction between rights and privileges – and then using it – provides for a better discourse about how a community might use, protect or restrict potential interests in land.

2. Land and Rights in American Cultural Discourse

In its simple American form, the language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over.

Because this article argues that the claim of “property rights” is significant, in fact often outcome determinative, we must begin with a brief discussion of how we – as a social and cultural organization – understand the phrase “property rights” and why its use is worth reconsidering.

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7 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
8 There are a number of significant and reasonable criticisms of Hohfeld’s approach. See, e.g., A.M. Honoré, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34 TULANE L. REV. 453 (1960); James E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002).
10 For a much more thorough discussion of the role of a rights rhetoric an American political and cultural discourse, see id.
One of the potentially more troubling legal concepts awaiting a new law student is also one of the most fundamental. From the first day of the 1L Property class, emerging legal scholars are informed that property is not a thing, but rather a constellation of relationships about a thing. And more important, and perhaps more troubling, we teach immediately that there is nothing inherent in land that we can identify as constituting “property” as a cultural and legal concept. There is no a priori eternal truth about property or its nature, no ideal that might be identified and then pursued. As Justice Marshall provided in *Johnson v. M'Intosh*, the first property case experienced by many law students: “As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the title to lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie.” While this statement presupposes “property,” it is consistent with the notion that property must and can only emerge from the ongoing disputes, community conversations, and temporary resolutions that we call law.

This understanding of property as a set of relationships about a particular piece of land, for example, rather than the land itself, is neither new nor controversial within the legal community, even if it might be controversial culturally. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in *Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.*, where it was tasked with determining whether trade secrets were property interests recognized by the 5th Amendment:

> It is conceivable that [the term “property” in the Taking Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhereing in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter.  

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11 Professor Arnold has argued that we focus too much on the relationship and not enough on the “thing.” I’ll address Professor Arnold’s approach briefly in Section V, although it is worth acknowledging here that his fundamental critique is useful. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, *The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests*, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002); see also James E. Penner, *The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property*, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).


This characterization of how the law understands “property” is also reflected in the Restatement (First) of Property, first published in 1936. The introductory note to Chapter 1 – “Definition of Certain General Terms” – provides:

The word “property” is used sometimes to denote the thing with respect to which legal relations between persons exist and sometimes to denote the legal relations. The former of these two usages is illustrated in the expressions “the property abuts on the highway” and “the property was destroyed by fire.” This usage does not occur in this Restatement. When it is desired to indicate the thing with regard to which legal relations exist, it will be referred to either specifically as “the land,” “the automobile,” “the share of stock,” or, generically, as “the subject matter of property” or “the thing.”\textsuperscript{14}

Unfortunately, this understanding makes less sense to the mass of landowners and decision makers that influence and create land-use regulation. While lawyers and legal academics are relatively comfortable distinguishing between res\textsuperscript{15} and relationships, for the general public, the res – the land itself – matters more than the relationships it inspires.\textsuperscript{16}

From a simplified perspective, property disputes might be broadly characterized as addressing one of two issues: who owns the thing, and what does that ownership mean?\textsuperscript{17} The 1L property class is likely the first place many people first think carefully about the second question—to that point, what ownership means seems obvious to them. This distinction is not perfect, of course, as answering the “who?” question requires the antecedent answer to “what?” the thing is to be owned. And the “what?” answer necessarily requires consideration of the relationship of the potential owner, whoever that may be, to other potential owners or to the

\textsuperscript{14} Restatement of Property(First), Chap. 1, Introductory Note (1936).
\textsuperscript{15} Res is used here to represent the physical object of the property relationship. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
\textsuperscript{16} “Do you stand there, Scarlett O’Hara, and tell me that Tara – that land – doesn’t amount to anything?”

Scarlett nodded obstinately. Her heart was too sore to care whether or not she put her father in a temper.

“Land is the only thing in the world that amounts to anything,” he shouted, his thick, short arms making wide gestures of indignation. “for ‘tis the only thing in this world that lasts, and don’t you be forgetting it! ‘Tis the only thing worth working for, worth fighting for—worth dying for.”

Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind 35 (1954).
\textsuperscript{17} Carruthers and Ariovich identify five distinct dimensions of property, of which I’ve only explicitly mentioned two. However, the other three are implicit in the two primary dimensions identified here. Those five dimensions are: the objects of property (what can be owned), the subjects of property (who can own), the uses of property, the enforcement of rights, and the transfer of property. Bruce G. Carruthers and Laura Ariovich, The Sociology of Property Rights, 30 Ann. Rev. Soc. 23 (2004).
potential owners’ neighbors. The Coasean parable occurs at the intersection of these questions.\textsuperscript{18} The farmer and rancher in Coase’s tale do not dispute the appropriate boundary between their parcels, but rather dispute the meaning of that boundary. The “who?” and “what?” questions become somewhat more complicated when we realize that it is some element of the relationship between the parcels that must be identified and allocated. The answers to these questions are reciprocally constituted. In the Coasean conflict, we only have a “what?” and subsequent “who?” problem because of the particular whos involved in the conflict. The conflict does not occur, at least not in this fashion, if both landowners are farmers without cattle that might stray.\textsuperscript{19}

But those are the conceptual realities and difficulties of a law professor, not a first-year law student, much less a typical landowner. For our simpler purposes, identifying these two distinct questions does provide a few benefits. First, it is consistent with how the law treats property questions. Again returning to the popular Dukeminier casebook, we find the first two chapters dedicated to the idea that property can be “acquired.”\textsuperscript{20} In articulating the sets of rules — and justifications for those rules — that apply to found property, gifted property, trespass (adverse possession), etc., the law is focusing on answering the who question and leaving the what for later (albeit sometimes within the same dispute). The “takings” jurisprudence that has emerged from the 5th Amendment also recognizes this distinction. The Supreme Court has recognized two basic categories of takings: “classic” takings and regulatory takings.\textsuperscript{21} The classic takings

\textsuperscript{18} Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase described a situation in which a cattle rancher owns land next to a famer. Without a fence, the cows wander across the property boundary and cause harm to the crops; each additional cow causes more harm that the previously-added cow (i.e., the marginal cost increases with each cow added). At some point, the harm caused by a new cow is greater than the benefit to be gained by adding the cow. Additionally, at some point, the cumulative harm caused by the cows exceeds the cost of building a fence between the parcels. For the purposes of this article, the interesting component of this story is the question of who should be responsible for building the fence between the parcels, i.e., does the rancher have the privilege of letting his cows wander (and the farmer no right to remain unmolested by wandering cows), or does the farmer have a right to remain unmolested by wandering cows (and the rancher a duty to control his cows). Note this does not address the question of the farmer’s right to exclude the cows by building the fence, which is assumed.


\textsuperscript{20} Chapters 1 and 2 of the Dukeminier casebook are titled “First Possession: Acquisition of Property by Discovery, Capture, and Creation,” and “Subsequent Possession: Acquisition of Property by Find, Adverse Possession, and Gift.”

involves the actual, physical appropriation of land, taking it from one owner and conveying it directly and completely to the public for a public use, such as a road, a school, a park or some other similar use. To the extent these cases are controversial in their every-day application, the controversies revolve around the relatively simple questions of what actually has been taken, and the value of that thing taken. In both cases, the primary focus is on defining the physical boundaries of the “thing.”

In contrast, regulatory takings cases do not transfer property from one owner to another as transfer is commonly understood – i.e., they do not change the “who.” Rather, a regulatory takings case – particularly a case that does not rise to a level sufficient to be characterized as a takings – adjusts the “what” that is owned. The landowner has not changed, but her relationship with the community has.

But most important, this distinction is also consistent with how we – as a social community – understand property. More to the point, the distinction highlights what the public understands, and what it chooses to ignore, about property. People care primarily about land. And we care about specific parcels of land that we can call our own. There is a reason that the “right to exclude” is considered the most important right in the bundle. And there is also a reason that of recent Supreme Court decisions characterizing the rights guaranteed in the Bill of

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22 The takings clause of 5th Amendment is perhaps best understood as creating a limitation on a pre-existing power of government. That pre-existing power is to take private property for a public use. The limitation is that when private property is taken for a public use, the government must provide just compensation. As Justice O’Conner noted in Hawai’i Housing Authority v. Midkiff: “The ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” Hawai’i Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984). This is something of a doubled-edged sword, however. While an expansive definition of “public use” allows government to take private lands for activities that do not contemplate actual use by the public (see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, CT, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)), it also arguably expands the reach of the regulatory takings doctrine to land-use regulation that is not the equivalent of “use by the public.” In other words, the government’s ability to take is larger than a strict “use by the public” standard would allow, but it’s ability to regulate without compensation is also potentially restricted. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER AND THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 397 (2003).

23 See, e.g., Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007), determining whether in exercising eminent domain, the Utah DOT must pay for the value associated with visibility from a highway (no) and the value associated with the view from the building (depends on if the land condemned was essential to the project that blocked the view).


Rights, *Kelo v. City of New London, CT*\(^{27}\) had a much larger immediate cultural impact than *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*,\(^ {28}\) even though *Citizens United* is arguably more offensive and consequential.\(^ {29}\) Although it actually had very little effect on the existing legal landscape, *Kelo* appeared to affect the sanctity of the private home, which has a greater visceral effect – if nothing more – than some abstract change in the intricacies of campaign finance.

The public’s focus on the physical component of property is a durable part of American Culture. Professor Eric Freyfogle describes our early understandings of the relationship between land and property:

> When Americans in the early nineteenth century thought of property at law they envisioned preeminently the fee simple ownership of an imaginary land parcel, with distinct boundaries and a physical, albeit hypothetical, existence. Other forms of ownership existed, but it was land that supplied the paradigm, a physicalist model that drew attention to actual boundaries and to the landowner's right to exclude.\(^ {30}\)

It is this physical notion of property that matters most to us, and it has always mattered most to us. From the beginnings of the Anglo-American system of property relations, we could not understand property without the physical thing.\(^ {31}\) Although we no longer require the literal transfer of a clod of dirt or other physical representation of the land, on the land, when we transfer interests in the land, the land itself remains meaningful.\(^ {32}\)

Our connection to land – and general assumption that land and property are synonymous – presents some difficulty in achieving a sophisticated understanding of the word “right” as it

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28 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The cultural effect of Citizens United has increased, particularly during the “Occupy” period and the early stages of the Republican Presidential Primary. Although unlike *Kelo*, the public perception of the connection between negative campaign advertisements (or the “Definitely Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert Super Pac”) and a Supreme Court decision is much more attenuated.
31 There is a brief discussion of the importance of “livery of seisin” in JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY, 6TH ED. 205 (2006); see also Percy Bordwell, *Seisin and Disseisin*, 34 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1921).
relates to property. I suggest above that property disputes can be loosely characterized as answering one of two questions: who owns the land? and what does that ownership mean? But the entering 1L students and the general public largely already understands the answer to the second question. Ownership of land means the ability – the “right” in the typical parlance – to do whatever one chooses with her land.\textsuperscript{33} For that public, there are not two distinct questions. Or if there are, the second is readily answered.

Our understanding of the source of those individual perspectives of property is facilitated by considering both historical ideas and contemporary events, with the contemporary events serving as evidence of the significance of the historical idea in the American experience. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes published \textit{Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill}. As cultural participants, we are most familiar with \textit{Leviathan’s} description of life in the state of nature before the creation of the sovereign. In that pre-sovereign life there is “no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”\textsuperscript{34} That last phrase being, for many of us, the limit of our cultural understanding of Hobbes.\textsuperscript{35}

But as political participants, we understand Hobbes much more thoroughly, even if indirectly. Hobbes’ description of the “natural condition of mankind” in the absence of a sovereign was intended to justify the existence of that sovereign. And not just any sovereign, of course, but the Leviathan—an absolute sovereign unconstrained by the desires or inputs of its subjects. Hobbes’ Leviathan had twelve “rights,” many of which contemporary Americans would find spectacularly offensive.\textsuperscript{36} Of the more offensive rights, the following are illustrative. According to Hobbes, after first agreeing to create the sovereign, its subjects cannot later change the government by subsequent covenants.\textsuperscript{37} The sovereign is incapable of breaching the covenant with its subjects, and thus sovereign power cannot be forfeited.\textsuperscript{38} Because the sovereign acts for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, \textit{Private property: Correcting the half-truths}, 59 Planning \& Envtl. L. 3 (2007); see also William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries 1 (1813) (“sole and despotic dominion”).
\item \textsuperscript{34} Chap. 13, paragraph 9 (page 99 of Oxford 1909 edition).
\item \textsuperscript{36} Chap. 18. “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution.”
\item \textsuperscript{37} Id. at 133
\item \textsuperscript{38} Id. at 134.
\end{itemize}
and as all of its subjects, it cannot therefore harm any of its subjects – “For he that doth any thing [sic] by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth[.]”

In short, the sovereign’s power is absolute, and the sovereign’s subjects possess no rights that might limit its power.

The influence of these alleged rights of the sovereign on both the political views of early Americans and much of our contemporary political discourse should be obvious. The American Constitution, and its Bill of Rights and subsequent Amendments, are designed specifically to limit the authority and capacity of the Leviathan. The Constitution creates a government of limited and enumerated powers. From this perspective, the purpose of individual “rights” is to protect against a Leviathan that attempts to exercise authority beyond those specifically granted in the Constitution. In many cases, the connection between the rights and the Leviathan are obvious. Free speech rights, including the right to petition the government, prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibitions on the quartering of troops, due process guarantees, among others, all mediate this relationship between governor and governed. For the purposes of this article, the protections of property in the 5th and 14th Amendments are our primary concern. But even beyond the confines of this specific article, the protections afforded property are significant. Because from the perspective of many landowners, “property rights” serve principally to protect all other asserted rights: “The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.”

In The Noblest Triumph, Tom Bethell takes this understanding of the importance of private property one step further. According to Bethell, as the title of his work suggests, private property is the bedrock on which prosperity and civilization are grounded: “When property is privatized, and the rule of law is established, in such a way that all including the rulers themselves are subject to the same law, economies will prosper and civilization will blossom.”

At times, Bethell’s rhetorical engine runs a bit hot. Rather than identifying the potential benefits

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39 Id. at 136.
40 See, e.g., James Madison, Federalist 45 (“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”)
42 Tom Bethell, The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity Through the Ages 3 (1998). A criticism of this argument presents itself immediately, as Bethell’s argument appears to rely more on the rule of law than the institution of private property. But the point here is not to assess the strengths or weaknesses of his argument, but rather to identify its contribution to a broader narrative.
of private property, he finds “blessings.” And not simple blessings, but “liberty, justice, peace and prosperity.”

But while Bethell’s language might claim too much for the detached, “objective” academic, it is consistent with the perspective of many landowners. Over the past few decades, an allegedly grassroots “movement” has emerged attempting to focus our understanding of property on this relationship with the Leviathan. A range of works from multiple disciplines address this modern private property rights movement. This movement’s expressions in public policy are somewhat complicated, at times focusing more on dissatisfaction with federal lands management. But the fact that a “private” property rights movement might include private claims to public lands demonstrates the importance of attachment to particular lands and landscapes.


The bill would prohibit states and political subdivisions of states from exercising eminent domain for economic development purposes, on pain of being ineligible for federal funding. The operative provision – Section 2 – is titled “Prohibition on Eminent Domain Abuse by States.” The bill then provides a “Sense of Congress” section that provides: “It is the policy of the United States to encourage, support, and promotes the private ownership of property and to ensure that the constitutional and other legal rights of private property owners are protected by

43 Id. at 9.
46 H.R. 1433. See Bill Summary and Status, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.01433:
the Federal Government.”47 But Congress is a little slow in getting on the anti-\textit{Kelo} bandwagon. According to the Castle Coalition, forty-three states have already enacted some form of legislation restricting the exercise of eminent domain.48

And of course, the “\textit{Tea Party Movement}” follows a similar pathway, emphasizing the importance of private property rights above all other potential interests, public or private. As provided in Article 6 of the \textit{Tea Party’s} “\textit{Articles of Freedom}:”

The United States is the only nation on earth specifically based on the premise of the right of individuals to own and control private property. It is the essential ingredient for Freedom and in the ability to build personal wealth. Private property ownership is the main factor in creating our national prosperity and it is the root of our individual Freedom.

Ownership of private property is essential to guaranteeing individual Liberty. Without private property, no other rights are possible. There can be no freedom of speech, no freedom of mobility, or no ability to be secure in our persons without the ability to own and control private property.49

But more significant, in terms of its potential long-term impact on the rhetorical landscape of property disputes, the emphasis on absolute \textit{rights} in land is also developed in recent political work on the importance of private property in the fundamental structure and function of government, particularly its role in ensuring liberty and prosperity to developed and developing economies. Over the past few decades, a new understanding of the role of the state emerged that has dramatically influenced governance at all levels. Governments (and not just the governed) now consider government to be a market actor that should assess its potential choices based on the marginal utility each might provide. This transition to a “\textit{neoliberal}” government places increased importance on the government’s relationship with the private property of its citizens. The government’s role is to protect that private property and facilitate its use in an unfettered market economy.50 Orthodox neoclassical economics becomes the guiding principle in

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47 H.R. 1433 at §11.
50 See, \textit{e.g.}, \textsc{David Harvey}, \textsc{A Brief History of Neoliberalism} (2005); \textsc{Loïc Wacquant}, \textsc{Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity} (2009); \textsc{Suzan Ilcan}, \textsc{Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government}, 46 \textsc{Can. Rev. Soc.} 207 (2009); \textsc{Terris Milton}, \textsc{The Neoliberal Triad of...}
government, and even social and cultural relationships; the role of the state is to ensure the unfettered function of private markets:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.⁵¹

From this perspective, the guiding principle of modern government is the market economy.⁵² Among the core neoliberal principles are the sanctity of private property and deregulation.⁵³ A rights rhetoric – from an economic perspective rather than personal liberty or social betterment perspective – now pervades even the most basic and fundamental structure of government.

This increasingly uniform understanding of private property – and particularly, private property as a suite of individual rights – is an integral part of American culture. In a review of Ely’s The Guardian of Every Other Right, Professor Herman Belz identified a transition that was occurring in historical understanding of private property. Property had previously been understood as but one component of “economic liberty as a legal construct embracing ‘the whole of the citizenry and ... the prosperity of the larger society.’”⁵⁴ Ely’s work, in contrast, signaled a transition to an intellectual and cultural climate in which property rights are a form of individual rights that are “essential to personal and political liberty.”⁵⁵

What is important about this transition is not its own inherent value – i.e., whether it signals a move toward a better community understanding of property – but rather what it demonstrates about how we understand property. To the typical cultural participant, a property “right” is not a simple legal relationship, among multiple potential legal relationships, about a particular thing. It is rather the very foundation of liberty and freedom. If a “right” is that thing –

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⁵² See John Commaroff, The End of Neoliberalism? What is Left of the Left, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141, 144-145 (2011); see also
⁵³ Harvey at 64; see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (arguing that the protection of private property is one of the most important roles of the state).
⁵⁵ Id.
the only thing — that protects us against tyranny, and keeps the Leviathan at bay, the circumstances in which rights can be curtailed are extremely limited. In that context, the import of conceding the rhetorical landscape — and accepting that all land-use disputes are about “rights” — is obvious.


One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true solution of legal problems frequently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to “rights” and “duties,” and that these latter categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal interests.\(^\text{56}\)

The core of my argument is that a more accurate description of the property interests affected by land-use or other regulation will improve the success rate of natural-, social- or cultural-resource protective initiatives. The antecedent argument is that there is a more accurate, and thus better, way to describe those various property interests.

While the exclusive use of the phrase “property rights” to define American property relationships serves an obvious purpose, as implied in the preceding section, it is not necessary. Property interests protected by the 5th and 14th Amendments include the property privileges that are the focus of this article, as well as powers and immunities. We don’t often speak of those interests in a regulatory takings context, for example, and the elevation of “rights” in our political and legal discourse has been matched by a denigration of “privileges.” Although the distinction is somewhat less important now,\(^\text{57}\) throughout the 20th Century, judges regularly distinguished between rights and privileges in Constitutional cases.\(^\text{58}\) The issues were distinctly

\(^{56}\) Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16, 28 (1913).

\(^{57}\) See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights").

\(^{58}\) See generally William W Van Alstyne, The Demise of The Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982). As initially described by Justice Holmes, then on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, “rights” were those things protected by Constitutional guarantees, whereas mere privileges were not. For example: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), abrogation recognized by O’Hare Truck Service, Inc., v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,
property related, answering questions about the types of circumstances that might enjoy the protection of the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. But the Court’s decision to reject the right-privilege distinction (and to replace it with the similar entitlement approach)\textsuperscript{59} was not grounded in a more nuanced understanding of privileges in the property context. The Court grounded its rejection of the right-privilege distinction in the developing “unconstitutional conditions” approach to assessing governmental regulation.\textsuperscript{60} Rather than characterizing privileges as independent Constitutionally-protected interests, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reaffirms the idea that privileges are distinct and lesser interests than “rights.”\textsuperscript{61} But this distinction was and remains both inappropriate and confusing. The problem is not that there is no distinction between property rights and property privileges; the problem is that it is not this distinction.\textsuperscript{62}

Identifying and understanding the appropriate distinction between rights and privileges (and the ultimate failure to distinguish between them) is primarily consequential not from a legal perspective, but rather from a political perspective. Both rights and privileges are property interests potentially, although not necessarily, protected by the guarantees of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. To say that something is a “property privilege” rather than a “property right” is not to say that it does not enjoy the same Constitutional protections. But there exists a real, and often significant, gap between the reach of local governmental authority allowed by those Constitutional provisions and the reach of local governmental authority allowed by the political conditions of a particular community, culture, or time. Most local governments

\textsuperscript{716} (1996) (“The Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment rights[,]”).

\textsuperscript{59} Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-572 (1972) (“[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights. The Court has also made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. By the same token, the Court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process.”).

\textsuperscript{60} See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1968).

\textsuperscript{61} See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) (“the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit”), citing United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003).

\textsuperscript{62} It is worth mentioning again that most property scholars prefer the word “liberties” to refer to the settings that Hohfeld characterized as “privileges.”
refuse to regulate to the extent allowed by the Constitution, even as they frame those local political limitations as Constitutional limitations. It is within this gap between Constitutionally-allowed regulation and politically-allowed regulation that the distinction between rights and privileges matters most.

a. Understanding Property Interests

One hundred years ago, Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld first articulated a more nuanced understanding of competing property interests. That article – *Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning*\(^63\) – and its companion article four years later\(^64\) provided an understanding of property relationships that inspired the principles established in the first five sections of the Restatement (First) of Property.\(^65\) Professor Hohfeld identified four distinct property interests and their correlatives. Those property interests are: right, privilege, power and immunity. The respective correlatives are: duty, no right, liability, and disability. In creating these distinct legal categories, Hohfeld sought to improve understanding of legal relationships by clarifying, and more precisely defining, the nature of those legal relationships:

In this connection the suggestion may be ventured that the usual discussions of trusts and other jural interests seem inadequate (and at times misleading) for the very reason that they are not founded on a sufficiently comprehensive and discriminating analysis of jural relations in general. Putting the matter in another way, the tendency—and the fallacy—has been to treat the specific problem as if it were far less complex than it really is; and this commendable effort to treat as simple that which is really complex has, it is believed, furnished a serious obstacle to the clear understanding, the orderly statement, and the correct solution of legal problems. In short, it is submitted that the right kind of simplicity can result only from more searching and more discriminating analysis.\(^67\)

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\(^65\) Restatement (First) of Property, §§1-5 (1936)


Hohfeld’s simplest and most important insight is that a legal interest only makes sense in a relational context.\textsuperscript{68} That is to say, because a legal interest necessarily changes the status of any other person or entity with a potential interest in the same property, the nature of the legal interest can only be understood in relation to the situation of all other relevant actors. Following naturally from that antecedent insight is the understanding that the nature of the relationships between actors can vary. It is one thing to say “you cannot stop me from doing X.” It is something else to say “you must allow me to do X.”

The two sides of this relationship are not always, or even regularly, two individual persons expressing a claimed interest in the property, nor are there always only two sides to the relationship.\textsuperscript{69} An individual may have a legal relationship with another individual, demonstrated by a basic contract. The individual may have a legal relationship with a community, for example, the duty not to engage in acts amounting to a public nuisance, in which the community has a right to be free from the public nuisance.\textsuperscript{70} And the individual may have a legal relationship with the state as demonstrated by certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution.\textsuperscript{71} But it is impossible to conceive of a legal interest without some type of relationship with another legal actor. In the absence of community – even a community of two – law is unnecessary and the notion of “legal interest” is meaningless.

A legal relationship can be viewed from the perspective of either actor, and it is for this reason that Hohfeld described legal interests as a series of four correlatives—each identifying the nature of the legal interest on each side of the relationship. This understanding of legal relationships is useful for two reasons. First, it furthers understanding of the overall relationship

\textsuperscript{68} Id. at 30 (1913). Hohfeld was not the first to recognize this, of course. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 148 (2009 [1881]) (arguing that rights can only be understood by considering the logically antecedent duty).

\textsuperscript{69} This might be inconsistent with Hohfeld’s original understanding, but we won’t let that limit us here. See James E. Penner, Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS: FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 164, 166 (J.W. Harris ed., 1996) (“The genius of Hohfeld’s scheme, or fatal flaw, depending on your perspective, is his disintegrating urge to define each legal relation in its most sparse possible form. Thus, every legal relation can only exist between two individuals”).

\textsuperscript{70} “A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.” REST. 2D TORTS §821B (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{71} See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amend 1 (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech[,]”) The U.S. Supreme Court regularly characterizes this prohibition on Congressional action as creating a “right to freedom of speech.” See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis added). Or perhaps more appropriate for our present purposes: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. AMEND V. This provision creates a duty to provide just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. It also recognizes a privilege to take property for public use whenever just compensation is provided.
by recognizing the condition of both actors. And second, the correlative increases understanding of the legal interest possessed by each party.

For example, when one actor has a right, the other has a duty to do or not do a given act.\textsuperscript{72} In a property context, a landowner might have a right to exclude. All other individuals would have a duty not to trespass. Outside of the property context,\textsuperscript{73} one of the most important rights in the American tradition is the right to “freedom of speech.”\textsuperscript{74} The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech[.]” The Supreme Court determined in \textit{Gitlow v. New York}\textsuperscript{75} that this protection applies to state governments as well. What the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 14\textsuperscript{th} Amendments create is the right to be free from government interference in participating in certain forms of speech. The government has a correlative duty not to interfere with those forms of speech—i.e, “Congress shall make no law…”.

It is tempting to qualify the government’s duty by saying it is subject to certain exceptions. For example, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Amendment’s protections do not apply to “fighting words,”\textsuperscript{76} or advocating imminent forceful action against the government.\textsuperscript{77} “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”\textsuperscript{78} But these are not “exceptions” to the government’s duty not to interfere with speech; they are areas in which the 1\textsuperscript{st} Amendment does not extend the duty, and consequently there is no correlative right to engage in those forms of speech. In other words, there is just the right, as articulated by the Supreme Court, and talk of “exceptions” to the right is somewhat nonsensical: “Your right to

\textsuperscript{72} See \textit{Restatement(First) of Property, }\S 1, Comment a, Correlative Duty: “The relation indicated by the word ‘right’ may also be stated from the point of view of the person against whom that right exists. This person has a duty, that is, is under a legally enforceable obligation to do or not to do an act.”

\textsuperscript{73} Although not completely: free speech rights affect rights in land in a number of ways, from billboards to adult entertainment. \textit{See, e.g.,} Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding the regulation of billboards); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theaters).

\textsuperscript{74} Stephen Siegel suggests that First Amendment rights occupy the “preferred position” in contemporary American understandings of Constitutional values. \textit{See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, }60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 57 and discussion at fn. 278 (1986). Professor Siegel is not using “privilege” in a Hohfeldian sense in the argument presented in this article.

\textsuperscript{75} Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”)


\textsuperscript{77} Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

\textsuperscript{78} Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.” The other man’s nose is not an “exception” to the right; it is beyond the right.

Given its nature as limitation on the authority of government, the Constitution does not create an absolute right to be free from interference from other private actors, and in some cases, those private actors have the capacity to interfere directly with speech. In my home town, as in many similar towns across the country, a group of individuals gathers regularly in our version of a town square to protest American involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan (and more recently to support the Tea Party or Occupy movements). This is precisely the type of behavior, in precisely the type of location, that the authors of the First Amendment had in mind. The government has a duty not to interfere with this speech, and the speakers have a right to be free from government interference.

But what about other private actors? With respect to their fellow citizens, these public speakers are exercising a privilege without any corresponding duty on the part of passersby to allow the behavior. Those passersby have no duty to allow or protect the speech, but also have no right to prevent it. They can try to drown it out by engaging in similar speech, but have no other mechanism to affect the speech in any fashion short of refusing to listen. To the extent that the passersby have a duty at all, it is to avoid battering the speakers (i.e., physically forcing them to alter their behavior). But that duty is wholly unrelated to the speech itself. In that case, the correlative right is not the right to freedom of speech, but the right to be free from unwanted...
touching. The “right” guaranteed by the Constitution only affects the speaker’s relationship with the government; it does not affect the speaker’s relationship with other private actors.83

Boundaries do exist limiting the privilege to criticize under certain circumstances. This free speech privilege is not limitless. There is a point at which the speaker’s privilege to criticize stops and a duty begins—the duty not to make defamatory assertions about another person.84 Where society has created those duties, the subject of the criticism has a right to be free from defamatory assertions. Even here, again, we find that the “right” created is not unlimited, as the duty to avoid defamatory assertions itself is not unlimited: “One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.”85 A speaker has the privilege of speaking the truth, and the object of the speech has no right to prevent it, no matter how defamatory it might be.86

b. Rights and Privileges on the Ground

Returning to the example that is the focus of this article, it is similarly common to describe all of our interactions about land as concerning property rights. Of course, property rights in land do exist in many circumstances, with both the government and other private actors having correlative duties. But it is also possible for land-use privileges to exist without rights “protecting” the same activity, and this is precisely the situation that is the primary focus of this article. There are at least two situations in which it is appropriate to think of land-use privileges rather than land-use rights: where a government actor has refused to act (e.g., by declining to find a duty in a nuisance case), and, more important, where the government actor has simply not acted yet. Many of our uses of land remain untouched by regulation of any sort. Put another way, a community has yet to opine on the validity of the use, or has perhaps implicitly acknowledged that the particular use is occurring, but has not indicated whether it is allowed, supported or potentially permanent. These two situations (the governmental refusal and failure to act) can

83 This point is a bit more obvious in other areas, e.g., the ability of private universities to constrain speech. See Kelly Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (2010).
84 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (1977).
86 Of course, the privilege to speak the truth is itself bounded by a limited right to privacy. As articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652D (1977): “One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”
overlap in significant ways, and in both cases—depending on the context and specific relationships—might suggest that property rights do exist, rather than privileges. But the distinction is useful for explaining the broader thesis: that we use “rights” in many circumstances when “privileges” would be more useful and appropriate. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued that the existence of a duty is “logically antecedent” to the existence of a right. The same concept applies for property privileges: we can only understand the property interest claimed by first considering the legal position of the individual (or community) on the other side of the relationship.

The idea that a property right can exist in isolation, separate from the community or constellation of relationships within which it is embedded, is contrary to basic legal, and practical, understandings of property. As Holmes recognized, absent a legal duty to act or not act, there can be no correlative legal right. The addition of the qualifier “legal”—implied so far in this article—completes our understanding of the right-duty correlative. A duty that is enforceable—i.e., “legal”—within a given institutional arrangement does not emerge spontaneously. To the contrary, those duties must be created, or recognized, by specific acts. The act can be legislative, judicial, or a combination of the two. But since the creation of a duty necessarily requires a determination regarding the appropriate allocation of various income streams between individuals or between an individual and a community (or group of individuals), that allocation must be the product of a conscious act if it is to achieve and retain any legitimacy among the affected persons. There must be an explanation for the conditions and relationships that emerge (or persist), and where explanations address human relationships, they can only follow a specific and identifiable choice. Even where the explanation relies on theories of natural rights, or “that’s how it’s always been,” there must be the antecedent choice to believe in that particular explanation in the face of multiple competing explanations. But again, when focusing on the descriptor “legal,” we recognize that the choice can be identified as a specific legislative act or judicial decision creating the duty and the subsequent, correlative right.

Absent that specific legislative or judicial act creating a duty, the claim that a “right” exists is only an argument that a duty should exist which might allow or protect a specific type of behavior on the part of the “right” holder. This is something of an inverse argument in Peircean

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87 Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Common Law 148 (2009 [1881]).
88 Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Common Law 148 (2009 [1881]).
Pragmatism, in which a potential outcome is characterized as having already occurred in order to justify the specific choice that would ultimately give rise to that outcome. In this understanding, the purpose of arguing that a right exists is to create that set of political circumstances that would allow the choice to create the right in the first place. This is, perhaps, a useful rhetorical approach for the rights proposer, but it is misleading. It necessarily assumes that a choice has already been made, and consequently, that there remains no choice to make. This beguilingly obvious point is important because the choice does remain, and that choice is to deprive other landowners, and the community, of their own potential rights, or even currently exercised privileges. To the extent that privileges exist, they are themselves legitimate property interests that would be taken (albeit not necessarily in the 5th Amendment context, although that is possible) by the choice to accept the created imaginings proffered by the beneficiary of the right to be created.

More important, this inverse pragmatic approach – attempting to justify future choices based on potential outcomes that are alleged to already exist – is inconsistent with the American legal tradition’s well-established and accepted understanding of property. The focus on “rights” that are alleged to already exist converts property from a triadic constellation of thing and relationships to a dyadic relationship between the individual and “her” property (as she understands that term). But our legal tradition understands “property” as a specific set of “legal relations between persons with respect to a thing.” It is not the individual’s relationship with the thing, nor is it a concept inherent in the thing itself. But when a person argues that “I have a right which you can’t take,” that argument fails to recognize the effect that choice has on the person to whom the new duty will now apply; a person that also might have an equally legitimate story to tell about property “rights.”

Consider a situation in which a community has not yet acted regarding potentially competing property interests. In this circumstance, an individual landowner might be using the land in a particular fashion, and the community has yet to decide how to address the use and its effects on neighboring landowners or the community at large. There is nothing to prevent the

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89 As interpreted and popularized by William James, Peirce’s pragmatic method involves an inquiry into the conceivable consequences of alternative choices. We identify the better choice by identifying better potential outcome. See William James, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: A READER, 93-111, 94-96 (Louis Menand, ed. 1997).

90 RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OF PROPERTY I, 1 Introductory Note (1936).

acting landowner from using her land as she desires. But that is because the community has yet to decide whether it desires to prohibit the use, not because the community has assigned a “right” to the landowner that is correlated with a duty on the part of the community not to interfere with the activity, even if the duty might ultimately arise due to detrimental reliance, or the passage of time, for example. But even then, the right does not, and cannot, exist until the community attempts to interfere with the activity and the landowner succeeds in convincing the relevant decision maker (e.g., local government or state or federal court) that the community has a duty to allow the use, thus creating a right in the landowner.

From the perspective of the community, or the neighboring landowners, this choice to recognize a duty where no such duty previously existed has the necessary consequence of eliminating a potential right in the community. For example, the legally-unexamined potential “nuisance” – i.e., a situation where one landowner’s use of her land affects a neighboring landowner in some negative way – is best thought of initially as a privilege and lack of right, rather than a right and a duty. The affected landowner might think she has a “right” to be free from the alleged nuisance, and that the neighbor has a duty not to create the negative effect, but until a qualified decision-maker so decides, we are left with an inactive legal system and the ongoing privilege (or better said, hope for a privilege). But at the moment the decision-maker determines how to assign the interests in the dispute, one of the parties loses a potential property interest. Either the “polluter” loses the privilege to pollute free of interference from her neighbor, or the neighbor loses the potential right to exist free of her neighbor’s pollution. But up to this point, there can exist no rights to use land in a particular way.

It is tempting to characterize a legal decision that a suffering neighbor has no right to stop pollution as creating a right on the part of the polluter to continue polluting. This is, in fact, how we normally characterize this circumstance. But conceptually this is both unnecessary and inaccurate. As Holmes suggests, rights only exist where we have identified an antecedent duty that affirmatively prohibits or specifies particular legal behaviors of another actor. It might be that the finding of “no right” gives rise to a duty. A duty is a “legally enforceable obligation to do or not do a given act.” The alleged duty in this example would be the duty not to interfere

92 See, e.g., DANIEL BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 53 (2006) (describing a privilege as existing in a circumstance of “no law” with some subsequent legal act converting the privilege into a right).
93 RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OF PROPERTY, §1, Comment a.
with the pollution-causing activity, leading to a correlative right to engage in the pollution-
causing activity. But this is conceptually troubling. The polluter has no capacity to call upon the
coercive power of the state to force the neighbor to allow the harmful activity, and it is not clear
how that could happen. If the neighbor were trespassing and interfering in the polluting activity,
the right at issue would be the right to exclude, rather than the right to pollute. This is a right the
polluter already possessed, prior to the dispute regarding the pollution. The polluter cannot call
the sheriff to force the neighbor to breathe the dirty air or drink the dirty water. But if the initial
decision is that the polluter cannot pollute, the determination is that the neighbor has a right to be
free from the pollution, and the polluter thus has the duty not to pollute. In contrast to the
opposite outcome, the neighbor now can call upon the coercive power of the state to force the
polluter to stop the harmful activity.

What this means is that there can never be a “right” to pollute – or even to use land – in
the same way there might be a right to exclude (with a correlative duty not to trespass) or a right
to access (with a correlative duty not to block an easement). But this does not mean that the
privilege to pollute is not a Constitutionally-protected property interest, at least potentially. For
example, the ability to construct a home on a particular parcel of land is a property privilege. The
local government, through its exercise of the police power, might have created a related duty to
issue a building permit (assuming certain requirements are met), but that is a tangential
correlative interest that is not inherently a part of the fundamental property privilege at issue. The
government does not have a duty to allow the basic use of the land – to build a house, in this case
– but rather lacks the legal right to stop the use, short of using its eminent domain power and
buying the right to stop the use. So if the relevant government actor determines that the
“pollution,” or other community harm, caused by constructing the home is too great, it might

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94 Zoning ordinances generally identify “permitted uses” that will always be approved so long as the landowner
satisfies whatever legitimate requirements are imposed on the particular use proposed (e.g., lot-line and road
setbacks, height restrictions, building codes, etc.). See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMeyer & THOMAS E.
ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW, 2D ED.AT §4.2(B), 71-72 (2007). To the extent these
regimes create any duties on the local government’s part, those duties are to abide by the ordinances as then in
effect. Those requirements can and do change without changing any of the property rights of the affected
landowners. See, e.g., Hale v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for Town of Blacksburg, 673 S.E.2d 170, 180 (Va. 2009)
(“when a landowner has only a future expectation that he will be allowed to develop his property in accord with its
current classification under the local zoning ordinance, there is no vested property right in the continuation of the
land's existing zoning status”).
decide to take away the privilege to construct.\textsuperscript{95} If it takes away all of the use privileges associated with a particular parcel of land, that act might require compensation under the 5\textsuperscript{th} Amendment’s takings clause.\textsuperscript{96} The privilege to use the land remains a privilege, but it enjoys the same Constitutional protections as any other property interest.

c. Property Interests as a Matter of Scale

The purpose of the rights-privileges distinction is not that it necessarily leads to different legal or Constitutional outcomes. It is largely a distinction to be used for its rhetorical effect as we engage in community discussions about how we should or should not regulate land. The reason it has some rhetorical effect, if not legal effect, is a function of scale: understanding a property interest as a “privilege” forces a focus on the community of interests being harmed by the use. In contrast, a property “right” – as understood by the person asserting the right – can exist in isolation from that community, and more to the point, as protection against it.

The examples in the previous section – or any understanding of property – only make sense if we consider both sides of the relationship at the same time. In the land-use context, the distinction between a right and a privilege is simultaneously obvious and hidden, depending on the scale at which the issue is addressed. A primary goal of legal analysis – and of legal communication and education between the legal academy and its experts and the relevant and regulated public – is to identify and describe that scale at which legal relationships are both best and most easily understood. Outside of questions of actual physical jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state or local governments),\textsuperscript{97} we don’t often think of legal distinctions as questions of scale. But that is a mistake that complicates our understanding of both property interests and property disputes.

\textsuperscript{95} Short of a compete taking of all beneficial uses of property, determining whether a 5\textsuperscript{th} Amendment taking has occurred requires consideration of the factors articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

\textsuperscript{96} See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding that a taking had occurred where the landowner lost all economically beneficial use of his land due to a building setback requirement. The goals of the coastal zone protection regime were perfectly legitimate, but still required compensation for taking of Lucas’s privilege to build two homes).

Many property disputes occur when an individual landowner protests some governmental act he perceives as being unduly restrictive. In those disputes, the scale at which the property interests are considered consists of the single parcel of land, with the single landowner, affected by a single act of government. But that is not the only scale available for considering property disputes. Geography understands scale as representing different approaches for understanding or framing a particular problem or phenomenon.98 We tend to think of geography as focusing primarily on spatial scale, but it also addresses temporal scale and thematic scale.99 Within these general approaches, scale can refer to the physical representation of a phenomenon (cartographic scale), the boundaries of a particular investigation (analysis scale), or the actual size at which the phenomenon occurs, regardless of how it is characterized or studied (phenomenon scale).100

In the resolution of legal disputes, there is often a significant difference between analysis scale – the boundaries of the specific dispute – and the actual phenomenon scale. Often the analysis scale is constrained – appropriately in many cases – by jurisdictional issues. But this can also lead to absurd results. For example, in 2000, a group of environmental organizations challenged a decision by the Bureau of Land Management to lease 49 discrete parcels of the public lands for natural gas development.101 The environmental organizations claimed that the BLM failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act before offering the leases for sale. In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that the BLM had failed to comply with NEPA.102 The court ordered the agency to prepare the appropriate environmental documents before offering the leases for sale. But between February 2000 (the date of the original challenged lease sale) and August 10, 2004, when Tenth Circuit had finally determined that the BLM had violated NEPA, the agency issued 285 leases, covering 170,663 total acres.103 Developers had already drilled 114 new wells on these lease parcels. All of the leases were issued without complying with NEPA.104 Because the appeal only considered three

99 See id.
100 See id.
102 See id.
103 See Bureau of Land Management, Oil and Gas Leasing Environmental Assessment, August 2005 at Table 1-1 (available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/bfodocs/og-leasing.Par.8845.File.dat/01ea.pdf)
104 See id. at 1-1.
leases, throughout the more than four years between the first lease sale and final decision, only those three leases were stayed pending resolution of the case.

Why were the analysis scale (the three leases) and the phenomenon scale (all coal bed methane leasing in Wyoming) so different? Because the plaintiffs had only been able to demonstrate that they actually used three of the original forty-nine lease parcels, and thus only established standing to challenge those three leases.\textsuperscript{105} While this outcome might have been required by the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence,\textsuperscript{106} the decision created an analysis scale completely disconnected from the phenomenon scale, despite the obvious conditions on the ground. That it might have been required by the Supreme Court’s Article III cases and controversies jurisprudence does not change the fact that the chosen scale of analysis could not address the phenomenon purportedly being analyzed.

In a property context, this disconnect between analysis scale and phenomenon scale is less apparent but no less significant. And it is directly connected to the rights-privileges distinction. As the \textit{Pennaco} leasing decision demonstrates, legal disputes can often focus on an arbitrarily limited analysis scale, without any explicit (or even implicit) consideration of the appropriate phenomenon scale.\textsuperscript{107} In many cases, arbitrary jurisdictional boundaries require legal analyses without the benefit of understanding and using an appropriate cartographic scale.\textsuperscript{108} But for the typical landowner facing undesirable land-use regulation, this discussion misunderstands the role scale plays in determining the rhetorical landscape, and in many cases, the political (if not legal) outcome. For that aggrieved landowner, the analysis scale \textit{is} the phenomenon scale: the perceived effect on the individual landowner is all that matters—there is no other broader phenomenon to consider.

It is that characterization of the \textit{claimed} phenomenon scale of land-use disputes that makes the right-privilege distinction somewhat difficult to tease out in individual controversies.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{See} Wyoming Outdoor Council, et al., 153 IBLA 379 (Oct. 6, 2000).
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{See} Lujan \textit{v.} Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 591 (1992) (requiring a “description of concrete plans” to visit the specific location where the harm would occur); \textit{see also} Summers \textit{v.} Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate specific connections to specific parcels of land where the Forest Service’s salvage timber sale procedures would cause legal harm).
\textsuperscript{107} Without using this language, Judge Posner describes how judges engage in both analysis scale and phenomenon scale decision making as they balance the various desirable policy outcomes relevant to a particular case, e.g., that the specific outcome be fair, that the outcome in the specific case be consistent with broader policy concerns, that the outcome be consistent with previous decisions, etc. \textit{See} RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 64 (2003).
But it also demonstrates the rhetorical value in making that distinction. The usefulness of Hohfeld’s property interests lies in the explicit recognition of correlatives—that each property interest is defined by its relationship to affected interests. The independent, isolated landowner holding steadfastly to his “right” in opposition to the Leviathan need not consider the effect of that right on his neighbor, at least not beyond the somewhat abstract reasoning that his right benefits the community in the sense that we are all better off if we have similar, isolated rights.

At this scale with its focus on the individual as individual (rather than as member of a community), there are no other actors, save for the Leviathan. The only possible way to understand property is in a libertarian state of “use however the owner sees fit” subject only to the very minimum regulation necessary to ensure a functioning civil society: “The private rights of individual relationships are thereby preserved as much as possible even after the formation of civil society, modified only to secure the internal and external peace for which the political power is necessary.”

But with an appropriate phenomenon-scale approach, properly incorporating the off-parcel effects of particular activities, it becomes more obvious that we need some other way to complete our understanding of the property interests at issue. The phenomenon-scale approach necessarily recognizes that there are competing property interests, with the Leviathan nowhere to be found. Without the Leviathan, the only way to make sense of the relationship is to focus on the effect on the adjoining landowner. But for the adjoining landowner who suffers from the odors of a stockyard, for example, it is pointless to identify legal interests possessed by the stockyard operator. What would those legal interests represent if not the ability to cause harm to the neighbor? The focus then moves, appropriately, to the fact that it isn’t the stockyard operator that has a legally protected right to operate the stockyard, but rather the neighbor who lacks a legally-protected right to prohibit operation of the stockyard.

That is not to say that the stockyard operator does not possess a legal interest. Upon recognizing that the stockyard neighbor has “no right” to prohibit its operation, it is clear that the stockyard operator’s legal interest is a privilege. At this point, the situation begs a simple

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110 The trained and domesticated Leviathan – the community -- is, of course, the ultimate enforcer of the property interest. But assuming an enforcement mechanism, we do not need the community to understand the nature of the interest to be enforced.
111 See, for example, the classic coming to the nuisance case, Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Web Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Az. 1972).
question: which land-use activity should the community allow? The community can either choose to prefer the stockyard, and formalize the privilege and neighbors’ absence of any right to stop it. Or it can choose to prefer the stockyard-free condition, without the odors and other negative effects of its operation. And the choice made might vary over time in the same place, depending on the nature of the interests involved. What should be clear about this situation is that there is nothing inherent in the land, nor in the landowners, that recommends or requires either outcome.

4. Competing “Rights” and the Rhetoric of Beach Sand

The primary relevance of the distinction between rights and privileges is in its effect on the stories the parties (and the community) create as they go about articulating the future that describes the best outcome to a particular conflict. Consider again the two neighbors, one with the smelly stockyard and the other in her pristine (or ideally so) rural retreat. Assume both arrived and began their competing uses simultaneously. Negotiations over the years have failed, and the rural retreat neighbor, finally fed up with the smells and “nuisance,” appeals to a sympathetic board of county commissioners. After appropriate study, and consistent with duly enacted local land-use plans, the commissioners choose to prohibit stockyards in this particular area. The stockyard operator challenges the outcome. What result?

In the ideal rhetorical world I am proposing, a court would balance the various interests, as articulated by the community, assess the process used to reach the community decision, potentially require or approve some form of amortization, and approve the rezone. What the

112 See, e.g., Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (1972). While the Arizona Supreme Court required indemnification on the facts of this case, it also recognized that under certain circumstances, particularly the normal expansion of an urban area into an agricultural area, the privilege of operating the stockyard might change to a duty not to operate the stockyard, without the payment of compensation, either by a private claimant or the government. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted almost a century ago, “a vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community.” Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).

113 For another approach to this same issue involving different property interests, see ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND, vii-x (2007) (discussing Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (3d Dist. 1949)).

114 Because changes in land-use regimes often affect significant investments in existing businesses or installations, many state and local governments allow the elimination of the now non-conforming uses or installations with amortization of that investment over a period of time before the use must finally cease. See DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, 5TH ED., §5.82 (2003); JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEYER, & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW, 2ND ED., §4.39 (2007);
court should not do, in this context, is assume that the stockyard operator already possesses “rights” to operate the stockyard. But most courts begin with an assumption of rights. One compendium of land use law, in a section titled “Rights of Property Owners,” notes that “[i]n the adoption of zoning changes, consideration generally must be given to the rights of the individual landowner of the property involved, as well as the interests of adjoining landowners and others.”115 Whether a right exists is the very question being asked, but courts regularly start with an assumption of rights and proceed from there.

An explicit component of this discussion is the recognition that legitimate interests can conflict. In the Coasean parable, the rancher’s interests in raising beef conflicts with the farmer’s interests in raising crops. Coase recognized that the “cost of exercising a right . . . is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right[,]”116 Coase, “above all,” recommended that the assignment of legally-protected property interests, or the creation or evolution of social arrangements that govern the assignment or exercise of those interests, take into account both the gains and losses that would result from any particular assignment:

It would clearly be desirable if the only actions performed were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was lost. But in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government department) as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.117

For our purposes, Coase is important because of his focus on the moment when property interests are initially ordered and assigned. More important is his focus on the effects – positive and negative – of particular assignments and his recognition that property “rights” are the result of a specific choice to prefer one setting or circumstance over another. Coase’s farmer and rancher were not arguing about which one had the greater legally-protected property interest. They were arguing about who should have the only legally-protected property interest in this context—either the rancher had the duty to keep his cows from trespassing by building a fence

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115 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 71
117 Id.
(and the farmer a correlative right to exclude the cows), or the farmer had no right to require the rancher to build a fence to control the cows (and the rancher had the correlative privilege to let his cows wander). In this context, the notion of “conflicting rights” doesn’t make much sense. It is the assertions of rights that conflict, not the boundary between the legal interests that are ultimately assigned. Once a right is assigned, its boundaries are established, and there should be no conflict remaining—that is the very purpose of the decision to assign the right. But what happens when a court – particularly the Supreme Court – talks of “subordinate” rights?

a. Conflicting “rights” in Stop the Beach Renourishment

In 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision specifically addressing the issue of how we define various, potentially competing, property interests.\(^{118}\) While most of the commentary on that case has focused on the application of the 5\(^{th}\) Amendment’s takings clause to judicial decisions,\(^{119}\) for the purposes of this article, the decision’s most interesting aspect is how the U.S. Supreme Court described the property interests at stake in the context of articulating who owns those interests. With apparently little concern for the consequences of particular word choices, the Supreme Court ignored more useful and accurate means of describing the conflict before it, adding both semantic and practical confusion to an already complicated dispute. To be sure, the Florida Supreme Court initiated the confusion, but the U.S. Supreme Court unnecessarily continued it.

The dispute before the court required consideration of the two simple questions that arise in the first few weeks of a first semester Property law course.\(^{120}\) First, and most comfortable to most current or prospective landowners, whether lawyers or not, is the question of who owns a particular piece of land—a newly created strip of beach. Second, and more important, is the question of what it means to own something. The Court did not, and of course could not, shy away from this second question, because even after determining that the State of Florida owned the new strip of beach, it had to determine what that ownership meant in relationship to the equally valid ownership of the neighboring piece of dry land. But it was on this point that the

\(^{118}\) Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).


\(^{120}\) See discussion supra at Section ___.
Court failed to heed or understand the advice of Holmes, Coase and others – including, of course, Hohfeld – that it is the relationship that determines the property interest, not the assumed property interest that determines the relationship.

The beaches near the City of Destin in Walton County, Florida suffered significant cumulative erosion due to Hurricanes Erin and Opal in 1995, Hurricane Georges in 1998, and Tropical Storm Isidore in 2002. Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act in 1986, having earlier recognized that “beach erosion is a serious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people of this state.” This Act authorized local units of government to request permission to use Florida’s sovereign lands (those lands seaward of the mean high water line) for the renourishment of critically-eroded beaches. In 2003, after a series of studies and construction design conferences with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Walton County and the City of Destin requested permits for coastal construction and use of Florida sovereign lands to renourish 6.9 miles of beach. In 2005, the Florida DEP granted the permits.

In Florida, the owners of land abutting navigable waters, or waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, possess certain property interests that depend in varying degrees on the particular parcel’s relationship to other parcels. These interests include the ability to access the water, and the ability to obtain certain interests in new land that accretes or relicts to the littoral property. The Florida Supreme Court described these interests as follows: “upland owners hold several special or exclusive common law littoral rights: (1) the right to have access to the water; (2) the right to reasonably use the water; (3) the right to accretion and reliction; and (4) the right to the unobstructed view of the water.” The Florida court went on to describe these rights as

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121 Unless otherwise noted, the facts of the case are taken from the original district court opinion, Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) decision quashed sub nom. Walton County v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008) aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (U.S. 2010); see also Consolidated Notice of Intent to Issue Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands, Filed Aug. 20, 2004, included in Joint Appendix before United States Supreme Court, 2009 WL 2576003 (2009).
122 See Florida Statutes Chap. 161.
126 Walton County v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1111 (Fla. 2008) aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (U.S. 2010)
being “such as are necessary for the use and enjoyment of the upland property, but these rights may not be so exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights.”\(^{127}\)

The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Florida court’s basic understanding of the dispute, both in terms of the property interests as stake, and the manner in which those property interests interact. The Court noted that the first “core principle” of Florida law was that “the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral landowners.”\(^{128}\) The Court further described the conflict as being a question of which rights were “subordinate.” Thus: “Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for purposes of ownership. The right to accretions was therefore subordinate to the State's right to fill.”\(^{129}\)

While it might seem useful initially to characterize this conflict as a question of which “rights” were better, or more important, or superior in a given context, that characterization is somewhat illogical. This approach misunderstands the meaning of the word “right” in a legal context, and complicates, rather than facilitates, reaching an appropriate final outcome. Perhaps more significant, it also misunderstands the meaning of the word “right” in a non-legal context. For many people in this country, the notion that the government might have “rights” that are superior to the rights of an individual would seem nonsensical. The very purpose of a legal right is to establish a boundary between various potentially competing interests. If I have a right in some setting, that necessarily means that no other interest holder has a superior right in the same setting.

Yet at the same time, the notion that two adjoining landowners might have interests that compete is both widely-understood and widely-accepted by the public and legal communities alike. The law is but a reflection of public habit, and legal principles like nuisance reflect an engrained public understanding that freedoms can be limited in the event they cause harm. But describing this understanding as competing rights does not adequately represent that inherent understanding. In \textit{Stop the Beach Renourishment}, the state’s rights end where the private

\(^{127}\) Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).


\(^{129}\) Id. (emphasis added).
landowner’s rights begin; there is no overlap, subordination or competition between “rights.” The Court’s analysis, and the public’s understanding of and respect for it, would have been simplified had it recognized this fact. 130

But perhaps more significant, we do not need a Hohfeldian understanding to appreciate the problems with the Court’s “subordinate” rights rhetoric. The crucial question in Stop the Beach Renourishment – from a property-interest perspective – was not which landowner had the “greater” right, but rather whether the legal consequences of a specific factual occurrence – an avulsion – would extend to an avulsion that occurred artificially—that is to say, the issue was how to define “avulsion.” If an avulsion had occurred, the littoral landowner had no rights to the land under long-standing riparian law. Once the Supreme Court determined that the state’s act of filling its sovereign lands would be – and always had been, for legal purposes – treated as an “avulsion” for property-allocation purposes, the case’s primary dispute had been resolved, and it need not have stated, in the next sentence, that the littoral landowners rights were “subordinate” to the state’s right to fill. 131 It is unnecessary to compare hypothetical rights in two discrete factual scenarios – avulsion and accretion – that cannot happen at the same time in the same place.

Back to our Hohfeldian frame, the state’s “right to fill” was not a right at all, but rather a privilege to fill, with the correlative lack of right to prevent the fill in the littoral landowners. Put another way, according to Florida law, the littoral landowners have no right to prevent “avulsions” – whether natural or not – so as to protect access to some potential accretion in the future. The “right to accretions” does not extend that far. The landowners do have a right to access the water, with Florida’s correlative duty not to impede that access, but that right is not affected by the State’s privilege interest in avulsions—a privilege which does not extend to impeding access. In other words, it is possible to describe the entirety of property relations in the dispute without resorting to a rhetoric of “subordinate” or conflicting rights.

130 Please note that my argument is not that the outcome of the case would have been different had the Court adopted a more nuanced understanding of the property interests in the dispute; the outcome would have been more legitimate.
b. Miller v. Schoene: Avoiding the conflicting “rights” minefield

Courts have not always struggled rhetorically with conflicting property interests. In the classic property case Miller v. Schoene, the United States Supreme Court faced a Coasean dispute in which it had to assess the validity of a community’s choice to prefer one property setting over another—specifically, a decision to assign a property right to one type of interest rather than to recognize and continue a legitimate privilege in another. 132 Rather than get confused with a discussion of competing or subordinate “rights,” the Miller v. Schoene Court assessed the conflict for what it was: a community’s choice about what types of land uses and harmful effects it should allow. 133 Miller v Schoene might be an anomaly in a history of rights rhetoric, but it demonstrates how a more careful consideration of property interests and relationships can facilitate dispute resolution.

The conflict was relatively simple. The Red Cedar Tree, 134 indigenous to the eastern United States, is host to the cedar-apple rust, a fungal plant disease. 135 While the fungus does not significantly harm the cedar tree, the rust’s co-host is the apple tree. The rust requires both trees to survive, overwintering on the cedar and infecting the apple in the summer. 136 Unfortunately, the rust does cause substantial harm to apple trees, causing pre-mature defoliation of the leaves and small, misshapen and marked fruits. The fungus’s two-host requirement suggests a straightforward method of control: separate the trees.

In the early 20th-century, apples were an important agricultural product in Virginia. Due to the economic harm the cedar-apple rust might cause, the Virginia legislature enacted the “Cedar Rust Act” in 1914. The Act made it illegal to “keep alive or standing” any cedar or other tree infected by the rust. The Act further declared all such trees within one mile of an apple orchard to be a public nuisance, and authorized the State Etymologist to order the destruction of

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133 Miller v. Schoene has been the subject of a number of law review articles assessing or criticizing the property assignment choice identified here. See, for example, Warren J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 435 (1971); James M. Buchanan, An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 439 (1972).
134 The eastern red cedar tree is not a cedar at all, but is rather a type of juniper, Juniperus virginiana. It is named a “cedar” because early settlers confused it with European cedars based on a hope that it might have the same economic value. See William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England, 9 (1983).
135 For a contemporary discussion of the cedar-apple rust and its effect on apple trees, see James LeRoy Weimer, Three Cedar Rust Fungi. Their Life Histories and the Diseases They Produce, 390 CORNELL UNIV. AGRIC. EXP. STAT. BULL. 505 (May 1917).
any infected cedar trees within two miles of an apple orchard, under certain conditions. The Act did not require any reimbursement of the value of the infected cedar tree: “Neither the judgment of the court nor the statute as interpreted allows compensation for the value of the standing cedars or the decrease in the market value of the realty caused by their destruction whether considered as ornamental trees or otherwise.”

Given the authorization to destroy trees without compensation, *Miller v. Schoene* is unsurprisingly about the claim of a landowner that the Cedar Rust Act violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of property without due process of law. What might be surprising, at least to modern observers of land-use disputes, is that the Court never uses the phrase “property rights,” nor even the word “rights,” in analyzing the dispute. The Court instead recognized this conflict for what it was—the intersection of legitimate but incompatible property interests in which a “rights” rhetoric would be of little use. Prior to the emergence of the cedar rust in Virginia, no relationship existed between growers of cedars and apples trees that required any exploration of which might have a right relative to the other. At the moment the dispute arose, no rights existed for either party.

The most crucial aspect of this particular dispute is that it involves two incompatible property interests. Whatever the government chooses to do – to act or not to act – it will harm or eliminate one of those property interests. It is this aspect of the dispute that is often ignored in similar modern disputes. The Court recognized that Virginia “was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked.” This choice exists whether it is the legislature assigning or not assigning the right, or a court in a nuisance action.

Most property disputes involve similar choices. Choosing to regulate water pollution, for example, limits to some extent the ability of the regulated landowner to use her property. But

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137 *Miller v. Schoene* at 277
138 See James M. Buchanan, *An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene*, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 439, 441 (1972) (acknowledging this point but criticizing the decision – and the legislative choice – from a law and economics perspective). Buchanan argues that the parties agreed that the cedar tree owners had a right (or more accurate, privilege) to grow diseased trees notwithstanding the harm to apple growers. He bases this argument on the apparent lack of claims made by apple growers against cedar growers to cease the growing of diseased trees. See id. at 441, fn. 8 and accompanying text.
139 *Miller v. Schoene* at 279.
failing to regulate water pollution causes some harm to downstream landowners. It is precisely this type of dispute that land-use or environmental regulation seeks to address, and as the Court noted, “When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”140 It is therefore the public interest, or “considerations of social policy” which determine the appropriate outcome to the dispute.141 It is not a pre-conceived and untested notion of “rights.” In this case, which “right” would be greater? The right of a landowner to have ornamental cedar trees, or the right of an orchard owner to have disease-free apples? If both are “rights,” how might we decide between the two? 

Comparing Miller v. Shoene to Stop the Beach Renourishment suggests that the Court has adopted (or continued) its own property rights rhetoric over the past century. But it isn’t just this most recent case that demonstrates the Court’s over-reliance on the rhetorical power of the word “right.” Particularly in land-use or regulatory takings cases, the Court habitually begins with an assumption of property rights before assessing what should be the more appropriate question: of two competing interests, which should we prefer and protect? Even when the property rights assumption isn’t explicit, the Court reveals its assumption in its approach to the issue.

For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,142 the Court considered a state statutory regime that attempted to balance the development interests of private landowners with the state’s legitimate police power concerns regarding eroding barrier islands. By the 1980s, the negative effects of development on barrier islands and beaches were widely understood.143 Because natural beaches and shorelines are more durable than even human-reinforced shorelines,

140 Id.
141 Id. at 280.
the best approach to preserving those shorelines is to prohibit development. The South Carolina program therefore established a setback line and prohibited development on the seaward side of this line. Unfortunately for Mr. Lucas, he owned two lots within this new setback.

Now two decades after the decision, hundreds of law review articles analyze its effect on regulatory takings jurisprudence, and several thousand more cite to the case in some fashion. And the case appears in casebooks teaching property, environmental law, land use law, Constitutional law, and perhaps others. The take home message for law students is relatively simple: a regulatory provision that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of her property is a categorical taking requiring compensation under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, unless the land use activity prohibited would not have been allowed under the particular state’s background principles of property or nuisance law. For my present purposes, what is interesting about the case is not the specific substantive outcome, but rather the manner in which the Court considered and communicated that outcome. From this perspective, the fundamental issue in cases like Lucas is not whether a complete deprivation of all economically beneficial use occurred, but rather how we should define the property interest at issue. In other words, the Lucas Court got it backwards, assuming a property right, identifying the effect of a regulation on that property right, and then only after the fact thinking about whether the landowner had any capacity to use the land in the proposed fashion to begin with. That is to say, the Court waited until after assuming a property right and analyzing the effect of a regulatory provision on that property right before it got around to determining – or rather, acknowledging that someone should determine – whether a property right existed in the first place. It did this even as it recognized that the “background principles” discussion is “the logically antecedent

inquiry.” While the substantive outcome might not change were a court to consider the logically antecedent inquiry first, the rhetorical effect would.

The *Lucas* approach is both conceptually and practically problematic. The practical problems are amply demonstrated in the wonderful (from a pedagogical perspective) case, *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.* In many ways, *Palazzolo* was a perfect set of facts to push back against what the plaintiff (and his lawyers) considered an overzealous regulatory state. Mr. Palazzolo had been attempting to develop his land in some fashion since 1962. In a number of proposals over two decades, Mr. Palazzolo proposed filling approximately eighteen acres of coastal wetlands to allow construction of a beach club and subdivision. After Mr. Palazzolo had initiated his proposal, and received a few of the necessary government approvals, Rhode Island adopted a new coastal resource regime that prohibited the filling of the coastal wetlands on the Palazzolo parcel.

To the extent we discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in public or in law school classrooms, our discussions tend to focus on two components of the case: the Court’s determinations that (1) any remaining economically viable use – even if less than 10% of the value of the landowner’s proposed use – does not rise to the level a categorical taking under *Lucas,* and (2) the mere passage of title after the effective date of a regulation does not bar a regulatory takings claim by creating a background principle of the state’s law of property. This last point was cause for some celebration among private property advocates:

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, handing a major victory to landowners and a defeat to state and local governments. This closely-watched case, in which a landowner has been fighting the state since 1962 to develop his beach-front property, has sustained national prominence. The outcome of the case helps define the boundary of permissible land use as regulated by individual states and the Federal government.

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149 *Lucas,* 505 U.S. at 1027.
152 For a chronology of the case up to 2001 (immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision), see *Analytical Chronology of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,* 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171 (2002-2003).
153 See *id.*
Of course, the Supreme Court’s approach to any case is limited by the procedural history and factual determinations presented to it. And so on its surface, stripped of all the nuances and intricacies that make property disputes fascinating, the Pallazolo case might have seemed like a success for anti-regulation activists, particularly in its holding on the effect of post-acquisition regulatory enactments on the background principles determination. But we find the real significance of Mr. Palazzolo’s claims after the case left the Supreme Court. On July 5, 2005, almost twenty years after Mr. Palazzolo first challenged Rhode Island’s regulation of his land, and more than forty years after he first purchased the land, a Rhode Island Superior Court determined that based on the public trust doctrine and the state’s background principles of property and nuisance law, Mr. Palazzolo did not have the property rights he claimed, and that his land would in fact likely be worth more to him after regulatory enforcement than without it. That determination should have come first, rather than last.

A property-rights rhetoric was not the sole nor primary cause of Mr. Palazzolo’s unfortunate journey through our legal system. The original trial court may have made a key factual error regarding when Mr. Palazzolo acquired the land. This error influenced its cursory Penn Central analysis. But even so, Mr. Palazzolo’s experience does identify a potential problem with the Lucas-demonstrated habit of assuming property rights at the outset of our property-interest-allocation conversations. And it isn’t that the initial rhetorical assumptions necessarily determine the outcome. There are many examples of cases—Palazzolo included—in which a court begins with a property-rights rhetoric but still upholds a “communitarian” allocation of property interests. Rather, the property rights assumptions have the potential to increase our

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155 Although to be sure, the case does not indicate that new statutory provisions can never affect a landowners legitimate expectations: “Today's holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (J. O’Connor, concurring).


158 This is partly Mr. Palazzolo’s doing, given his argument that the regulations deprived him of all economically beneficial use, and thus were a per se taking under Lucas. The trial court did have the opportunity to engage in a Penn Central analysis, but its review was somewhat cursory given its initial determination that Mr. Palazzolo’s investment backed expectations were limited by the legislative enactment that allegedly occurred after he purchased the property. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001).


160 For example, in Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Killingworth, before upholding a somewhat ad hoc application of the town’s accessory use provisions, the court begins by stating that “[b]ecause zoning regulations
transaction costs by obfuscating the variety of legitimate interests at play in any given dispute, and particularly the legitimate property interests held by neighboring landowners and the community at large. A property-rights rhetoric is not only potentially anti-communitarian, but it is also inefficient and complicates the formation and protection of the very property interests the rhetoric allegedly seeks to support. And our courts continue to follow this inefficient and ineffective path.

5. Conceding by Example: How the Academy Fails to Model Clarity

*Private property is in bad shape today, not economically or politically, but rather intellectually.*\(^{161}\)

Given our broader cultural trajectory, and the role of “rights” in explaining much of that trajectory, it is unsurprising that the land-owning public might prefer a rights-oriented rhetoric when discussing the proper role of the state in regulating the use of land. And while we might expect more out of our court system, that our judges and justices might eschew Hohfeldian nuance in favor of a rights rhetoric is also understandable. It was, of course, a lack of precision in contemporary jurisprudence that motivated Hohfeld in the first place.\(^{162}\) And perhaps more significant, courts also largely respond to – and adopt the language of – the arguments presented to them. It is that last point that is most troubling: courts adopt a rights rhetoric because that is the rhetoric advocates use in addressing those courts. Even those who are defending reasonable land-use regulation, and the “rights” of a community versus the individual, adopt a potentially self-defeating property-rights rhetoric. This is particularly concerning when those advocates are academics or other similarly-situated individuals with both the capacity and desire to influence the rhetorical landscape of the dispute. The use of a rights rhetoric by academics and activists concedes the rhetorical landscape to anti-regulatory advocates before a discussion of the appropriate allocation of interests can even begin. If the purpose of the academy is to provide the

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stories, explanations, or models that facilitate understanding, we might start by recognizing where our language has the potential to confuse.

In his classic work on ownership, A. M. Honoré identified eleven standard incidents that are present in the “liberal concept of full individual ownership.”¹⁶³ Of the eleven incidents, eight are appropriately characterized as property interests consistent with the understanding of that term as used here.¹⁶⁴ Two of these eight are correlatives of Hohfeld’s property interests, if not specifically recognized as such.¹⁶⁵ Honoré characterizes his first six incidents as rights: to possess, to use, to manage, to the income, to the capital, and to security.¹⁶⁶ Because Honoré generally disagrees with the Hohfeldian approach,¹⁶⁷ it might seem unsurprising that he would not use property privileges, even where appropriate (for example, with the “right” to use¹⁶⁸). But in Ownership, Honore specifically and intentionally adopts the Hohfeldian understanding of property. However, he does so while simultaneously collapsing the interests into a rights short hand: “In this article I identify rights with claims, liberties, etc.”¹⁶⁹ It is perhaps appropriate for Honoré, within a distinctly academic work, to use “rights” as a short hand for a much more nuanced understanding of property, and to leave the recognition of that rhetorical move to a footnote and a different work.

But in other cases when the very purpose is to articulate a communitarian understanding of property, in which property interests can and should evolve over time and place in reaction to specific cultural or socio-ecological conditions, that rights short hand is much less appropriate.

If we understand property as a political or social construct,¹⁷⁰ it is appropriate to think about the specific political act that cause a particular property interest to emerge. For example, Professor Daniel Bromley argues that “[p]roperty rights are not protected because they are, a priori, property rights. Rather, those settings and circumstances that gain protection by the

¹⁶⁴ The remaining three incidents – transmissibility, absence of term, and residual character – largely reflect the “duration” of ownership addressed in estates in land and future interests concepts.
¹⁶⁵ See id. at 123-124. The incident of “the prohibition of harmful use” is better understood as a property duty, and the incident of “liability to execution” is just that, a liability that is correlative to a property power held by another.
¹⁶⁶ Id. at 113-120.
¹⁶⁷ See A. M. Honoré, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34 Tul. L. Rev. 453, 457 (1960) (“It seems preferable, therefore, to reject Hohfeld’s axioms.”).
¹⁶⁹ Honoré, Ownership at 113 n. 1.
¹⁷⁰ Not all property theorists are comfortable with this description of property. However, because my specific focus is on the effects of language choices on our understandings of property, I will pass by natural rights theory for the moment.
Supreme Court acquire, by virtue of that protection, the status of property rights. A property right is not the cause of protection but rather its effect.” In this understanding, it is only those circumstances that we *decide* to protect using the coercive power of the state that earn the title “right.” And if only specific social or cultural settings or circumstances might give rise to a right, new or changed settings or circumstances might justify reconsideration of those “rights.”

Given that understanding, the interesting component of Professor Bromley’s argument is not his perception of the Supreme Court’s role in determining what constitutes a property right, but his use of the word “right” itself. As suggested above, there are two very general strands of property theory in American academia: natural rights and social construct. The basic natural rights approach understands property as pre-existing social organization and thus, at some fundamental level, not subject to that organization’s regulation or control. Alternatively, the social construct understanding recognizes property as existing to service societal ends, and thus subject to the regulation and control of that society. This understanding is neither new nor inconsistent with the ideas or ideologies that founded the United States. As Benjamin Franklin noted, “[p]rivate property therefore is a creature of society, and is subject to the calls of that society, whenever its necessities shall require it, even to its last farthing[.]”

Professor Bromley is among those in this second category, recognizing that property is fundamentally social. And more to the point, Professor Bromley – in much of his writing – adopts a “property relations” nomenclature to represent the “constellation of benefits that give [property] its empirical content.” His purpose in adopting the property relations approach is

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171 Daniel Bromley, *This Land is Whose Land?* 48 WISC. ACAD. REV. 60, 63 (Summer 2002).
172 Ultimately, we find out what constitutes a property “right” when a local government changes its mind about what it will or will not allow. If it can take something away that it previously allowed, that use was not legitimately a “right.” But if the Supreme Court (or, obviously, a lower or state court) determines the local government cannot change its mind, the previously allowed use was, in fact, a property right. *See, e.g.*, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
173 Given that even a natural rights approach requires some conversation and agreement about the appropriate structure and allocation of those “natural” rights, a natural rights approach is really just one form of a social construct. *See, e.g.*, 174 174 175
177 *See, e.g.*, DANIEL BROMLEY, *SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS* 57 (2006);
178 *Id.* at 56;
specifically to achieve the clarity Hohfeld imagined.\textsuperscript{178} And it is this aspect of his scholarship that is most curious: despite explicitly recognizing the value of Hohfeldian nuance, Professor Bromley continues to describe our ongoing resource allocation discussions as being significantly about “rights.”\textsuperscript{179}

But Bromley is somewhat lonely in his explicit – if not pervasive – use of Hohfeldian correlatives to explain and understand property interests. Academics from a variety of disciplines ignore this potentially useful approach to discussing property in favor of a rights rhetoric that concedes the rhetorical landscape anti-regulation advocates. Within the legal academy, there are a number of property theorists that maintain the “competing rights” approach. For example, Professor Eric Freyfogle has written a number of books and articles that are works in property theory.\textsuperscript{180} And each of these works approaches property from a Franklinian social benefit understanding of property.\textsuperscript{181} But notwithstanding beginning with this fundamental premise – that property begins and ends with the social arrangements that justify it – Freyfogle uses an exclusively rights-based rhetoric in making this argument.

For example, in criticizing claims that any inherent rights – i.e., rights that pre-exist law – exist in property, Professor Freyfogle bemoans the “muddled thinking about how the rights of one owner are restrained by the rights of neighbors and about how private property rights fit with the pursuit of the public’s well being.”\textsuperscript{182} It is certainly appropriate to address the role of a community in defining private interests in land, but in his criticism, Professor Freyfogle demonstrates the same rights-based “muddled” thinking. For example, a few pages later he

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Id.} at 52-54. It says something about the traditional Property education in law school, or at least my participation in that course, that it was not until I took a class in Institutional Economics with Daniel Bromley – taken after I had graduated from law school and practiced law for several years – that I first heard about Hohfeld and his property correlatives.

\textsuperscript{179} See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990); Daniel Bromley, \textit{This Land is Whose Land?} 48 WISC. ACAD. REV. 60, 63 (Summer 2002) (suggesting that only “rights” are protected by government); Daniel W. Bromley, \textit{Formalising Property Relations in the developing World: The Wrong Prescription for the Wrong Malady}, 26 LAND USE POL’Y 20 (2009) (“To have a right – a civil right, a contractual right, or a property right – is to have the capacity to compel some authority system to come to the defence of the specific interest associated with that right. To have a right is to have the ability to command the agents of government (or a similar authority structure) to come to your aid.”).

\textsuperscript{180} ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, \textit{THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD} (2003); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, \textit{ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND} (2007);


articulates the primary thesis of the book: “Private property, in fact, has been an evolving, organic institution with ownership rights that have varied greatly from era to era and place to place.” In response to legitimate concerns about the motivations for Oregon’s Measure 37, and the nationwide private property rights movement, Professor Freyfogle proposed a “landowner’s bill of rights” to clarify the rights all landowners hold. But perhaps Professor Freyfogle’s most interesting use of the rights rhetoric occurs when he argues that rights can and should change: “Legitimate changes in the prevailing laws of ownership – even new laws that fundamentally revise the rights and responsibilities of ownership – are proper and often necessary legal acts that landowners simply must accept.”

Assuming the validity of a Hohfeldian approach, this language is both unintentionally careless and potentially counterproductive. As understood by much of the public, and certainly by property-rights activists, the phrase “property right” does not allow for evolving understandings subject the whims of a given society, even if that is a widely recognized – if not accepted – argument in the legal academy. As Holmes famously argued, the “felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, [and] intuitions of public policy” are more important in identifying appropriate outcomes than notions of a priori and immutable laws or rules. But as noted previously, for many people, rights – including importantly rights in land – are “natural.” They pre-exist the state and social society. They stand as the “bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government.” Property rights, in short, are the last line of defense against the Leviathan, and as such, cannot be diminished or altered by that Leviathan. The “felt necessities of the time” are irrelevant in this understanding.

The law is not alone in elevating “rights” in its interest-allocation decisions, as we find similar uses of “property rights” in related disciplines. Harvey Jacobs, a planning professor whose work focuses in large part on our understandings of property and the role of the state in its

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183 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
186 There are a wide variety of cases outside of this specific context (property) in which the public has recognized that rights (or other legal interests) can and should change over time. But that acceptance of evolving legal interests has not visited property in the same fashion.
regulation, approaches property from a similar Franklinian perspective that property is a creature of society and subject to changes as society changes:

What’s important about this legal and economic conception of ownership is how it allows land to respond to changing social circumstances. If land is conceived of as a bundle of rights, then rights can be taken from or added to the bundle, and the very shape and content of those rights can change.\footnote{HARVEY M. JACOBS, ED., \textit{WHO OWNS AMERICA?: SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS} xi-xii (1997).}

But this passage demonstrates simultaneously the mischaracterization of property interests of concern here, and the potential political consequences of that mischaracterization. Professor Jacobs’ primary argument – that property interests can change over time as social or community values change – is legitimate and supported by the Supreme Court.\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (adjusting a landowner’s “right to exclude” by prohibiting discrimination in allocated rooms in a hotel).} But Professor Jacobs’ characterization of these changing interests as “rights,” and the notion that “rights” can be taken from the bundle, and change over time, is again directly contrary to the widespread – if colloquial – understanding of what the word “rights” represents. To suggest that rights can be taken away is directly contrary to our understanding of what it means to possess a legally-protected right, and the argument thus immediately de-legitimates itself with the community it must convince.

The use of a rights rhetoric places all of these arguments at a disadvantage at the discussion’s outset. If the conversation is about “rights,” then it is obvious to most participants how it should end. Proponents of reducing rights – as if any American would ever dare suggest such a thing – thus must find other rhetorical approaches that might overcome this initial deficit.

Returning to Professor Freyfogle, we find his recent efforts to connect land-use regulation to increased liberty. He begins with a summary of a common land-use dispute:

In the typical tale used to frame discussions about private property rights, an individual landowner is pitted in battle against a government regulatory body. The landowner wants to exercise her individual liberty by using her land in some way; the government body, desirous of promoting some public conservation goal, opposes the proposed land use and deploys a law to restrict it.\footnote{Eric T. Freyfogle, \textit{Property and Liberty}, 34 \textit{Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.} 75, 77 (2010)}
As Professor Freyfogle accurately notes, there are “countless” cases involving these basic facts. In each of them, the landowners perceive the two sides of the dispute largely as Professor Freyfogle articulates it: the individual landowner – claiming property rights – on the one side, and the Leviathan seeking to take away those rights on the other. There is no question that the regulation of property both increases and decreases liberty, as Professor Freyfogle describes, and it is worth discussing the various ways in which things that might be characterized as a taking of rights actually do more to increase liberty than restrict it. But although he makes an effort to think more carefully about the various relationships in a property dispute, note again that we begin the discussion with an assumption of property rights: “The core component of private property, I argue, is not the right to use land, nor is it exactly the right to exclude. It is instead the right to halt interferences with one's use of land.”

And even at our most practical, as legal actors or advisors seeking to effect real outcomes on the ground and avoid the effects of the property-rights meta-narrative, we still use rhetoric that reinforces that narrative. For example, one mechanism to address the impacts of previous development or to reduce future development is to “down zone” remaining undeveloped land. While local governments are free to reduce the potential capacity to develop a specific parcel, absent the recognition of some vested rights, those reductions in potential development capacity have significant political implications. In order to reduce the political impact of reducing development capacity through a zoning or other ordinance, in the 1960s, New York City implemented a density-transfer mechanism as part of its landmarks preservation law.

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192 Id. at note 6.
195 “Down zoning” occurs when an area is re-zoned to a less intensive of less dense use, e.g., from commercial to residential use, or from small lot residential zoning to relatively larger lot residential zoning. See, e.g., DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, 5TH ED., §6.36 (2003).
196 Landowners are not guaranteed the continuation of any particular zoning ordinance. But generally speaking, once a landowner relies on some affirmative governmental act, rights vest to develop land in a manner consistent with that act. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976).
197 See Hershel J. Richman & Lane H. Kendig, Transfer Development Rights—A Pragmatic View, 9 URB. LAW. 571 (1977) (acknowledging that TDR programs emerged in part to avoid regulatory takings problems).
approach – now know generally as a “transfer of development rights” (TDR) program – spread across the country in the ensuing four decades. Described simply, a TDR program allows the development “rights” to be severed from a specific parcel and transferred to another parcel within a designated district, often through the use of a development rights “market.”

As the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated in *Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York*, the transfer of development rights was not strictly necessary to avoid paying compensation for the reduced development potential of a protected landmark. And in fact local governments are free to reduce development potential by often significant margins without creating a compensable regulatory taking: “several Supreme Court decisions suggest that dimunitions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate the existence of a taking…. [T]his court has likewise relied on dimunitions well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking.” In other words, only very significant down zoning would run into Constitutional problems. Why then do TDR programs begin with an assumption of development rights? In attempting to avoid the political problems associated with land-use regulation, TDR advocates only reinforce the rights rhetoric that makes the program necessary in the first place.

Some of the more careful considerations of property’s triadic nature (i.e., “thing”, owner and community) fall back on the rights rhetoric, at least to some limited extent. For example, Professor Arnold’s thorough and useful critique of the dominant “bundle of rights” metaphor focuses not on criticizing our understanding of property as predominantly a suite of rights, but rather on the potential for the Hohfeldian understanding of the rights-duty correlative to ignore the “thingness” of property. Professor Arnold critiques the bundle of rights metaphor for perpetuating a dyadic understanding of property, but not the owner-thing dyad I’ve criticized

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throughout this article. Instead, his dyad is between owner and the duty-obligated community, ignoring the “thing” that is the ultimate reason for the relationship. He suggests we would be better off – that we would be better able to take care of, preserve, or protect the land – if we could think and talk more like the “amateur” property theorist (i.e., the typical American property owner) who focuses on property as “thing-ownership” rather than relationship.204

From an ecological perspective, the focus on a “web” of interests, and the inclusion of the “thing” (e.g., land) within that web, has the effect of turning the focus from the individual to the consequences of that individual’s actions on her socio-ecological community. This focus on developing a triadic (at least) understanding of property as a “web of interests” is therefore warranted and useful, and consistent with the general thrust of the rhetorical argument I present here. But the characterization of the new metaphor as a “web of rights”205 is less useful. Again, my critique is not substantive; I agree with Professor Arnold’s Leopoldian argument that all parts of the property triad have legitimate interests that must be respected. And his use of “web of interests” as his metaphor ably communicates the value of that substantive argument. But the potential trouble lies in characterizing the new metaphor as “an image of property that enables us to see the objects of our rights, responsibilities, and relationships, as well as the shared, interconnected nature of those relationships with regard to objects.”206 This return to a rights-duties approach, and particularly our cultural difficulty with recognizing that land might itself have “rights,” risks subsuming the value of the “web” metaphor and continuing the individual versus Leviathan understanding of rights that plagues property rights discourse.

Professor Arnold is not alone in his efforts to re-imagine our property conversations. But similar efforts to recast the property rhetoric in a fashion that might have real effects on the ground also misunderstand the potential problems with continuing the rights rhetoric. In their “Property Frames” approach, Professors Nash and Stern address directly the capacity of particular initial property descriptions to influence a property holder’s willingness to accept later rights limitations.207 Nash and Stern present empirical evidence that “rights perceptions,” and specifically the reaction to later “rights infringement,” varies depending on how the property

204 See id. at 297.
205 See id. at 346 and 364. Professor Arnold elsewhere relies on the “web of interests” metaphor.
206 Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
rights were originally characterized and understood. The authors conducted experiments comparing the consequences of two rhetorical options for describing the same suite of interests: a “discrete-asset” approach that focused on ownership of a specific thing, and a “bundle of rights” approach, that described a suite of rights in the thing. Nash and Stern describe the bundle of rights understanding as originating, in part, as an effort by legal realists to “depict property as limited, flexible rights capable of ceding to social needs and obligations.” The “discrete-asset” understanding is more similar to the Blackstonian “sole and despotic dominion,” over a single, unified thing rather than a combination of disaggregable interests. The discrete-asset understanding is thus more “absolute” than the bundle of rights understanding.

Nash and Stern determined that when property interests were characterized as a bundle of rights, rather than a discrete asset, the property owner was more likely to accept subsequent limitation or infringements on those rights, particularly where the potential for such infringement was described in advance. This empirical work reinforces the value of a more accurate description of property interests and relations, even as it retains a “rights” approach. To be sure, in their “bundle of rights” approach, the word that matters is “bundle” rather than “right.” In this sense, Nash and Stern are most of the way toward the Hohfeldian “bundle of interests” – and specifically the bundle of privileges – that would allow for a more complete understanding of property. But insisting on the use of “rights” to characterize the property interests retains the individual v. Leviathan “frame” for understanding property.

Returning to Honoré to close our critique of the academy, we find a final example of how our property rhetoric unnecessarily detracts from a richer understanding of property as one component of a larger cultural conversation, albeit not directly in the “rights” context that has been discussed so far. In this case, it is Honoré’s use of the word “prohibition” rather than “duty”

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208 “[T]he student would ‘have ownership and control of the laptop and, among other things, [could] use, possess, and enjoy the laptop, exclude others from using the laptop, and transfer the laptop.’” Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 449, 467 (2010).
209 “[S]tudents would ‘own a set of rights to the laptop. These rights include, among other things, the right to use, possess, and enjoy the laptop, the right to exclude others from using the laptop, and the right to transfer your rights in the laptop.’” Id. at 467.
210 Id. at 455.
211 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES 1 (1813); see also A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 108 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (describing ownership – in one sense – as “the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes”).
212 Nash and Stern, Property Frames at 471-479.
to describe his ninth property incident.\textsuperscript{213} Consistent with the individualist’s understanding of property rights as being a bulwark against the Leviathan, characterizing the obvious and necessary boundaries of our property interests as “prohibitions” again calls to mind the image of property existing on this boundary between individual and governmental power. But as Honoré’s examples make clear, his ninth incident identifies those circumstances in which a property owner has duties that she owes to her neighbors or her community.\textsuperscript{214} And of course, this means that the neighbors, or the community, possess rights relative to that individual’s private property.\textsuperscript{215} Understanding this relationship from a Hohfeldian perspective allows again for a focus on how particular interests in land might affect the community within which those interests arise. But Honoré’s focus is on the individual, refusing to acknowledge that non-owners can in fact possess rights in their neighbors’ property.

The academy exists because our cultural settings have identified it as that group of particularly specialized or educated individuals that is best able to identify and explain truth claims. But if those truth claims are to be accepted as truth \textit{in fact}, they must provide some legitimate and useful explanatory power to the cultural settings that requested the truth claims in the first place. There is a distinction between what the academy identifies as a warranted belief – the settled belief of a particular group of disciplinary adherents – and what a community identifies as a \textit{valuable} belief.\textsuperscript{216} Only those truth claims that are valuable for the relevant community – those claims that motivate action – obtain the blessing “truth.” A property-rights rhetoric within the academy that is inconsistent with broader cultural understandings of what rights are and why they exist will never obtain that blessing it seeks: truth.

\textsuperscript{213} Honoré at 123.

\textsuperscript{214} This notion is of course inherent in nuisance actions, which require the identification of a specific duty on the part of a particular landowner, e.g., the affirmative duty not to cover your neighbor’s house with dust. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).


6. Conclusion: Rights, Privileges and the Physical Consequences of Word Choice

Clifford Geertz argued that “man is suspended in a web of meaning that he himself has spun”. At its most fundamental, law is one component of that web—the constellation of signs, symbols and meanings that create culture. And legitimate law must therefore reflect the other aspects of that culture; ultimately, law requires the blessing of the community or communities it regulates. A group of cultural actors will – and should – reject legal rhetoric, and the substantive choices that rhetoric recommends, that are inconsistent with the larger suite of their cultural understandings. In the property law context that matters – the context on the ground – the relevant cultural actors are not judges, lawyers and academics, but rather the property owners whose interests the rhetoric seeks to change. In communicating with that group of relevant cultural and political actors, it doesn’t matter what “we” – as academics, activists, or judges – understand when we use particular words. What matters is how our word choices play out in that broader property-related cultural context, on the ground, where understandings of property have real effects on our lands and landscapes.

So this is not an article about how we understand property; it is an article about how the ways in which we talk about property affect the ways our communities understand property. And its argument is simple: talking about property as if it were something that cannot be regulated by government turns it into something that cannot be regulated by government. The reliance on the word “rights” – with all of its political and cultural meanings – to describe and understand property limits our capacity to accurately describe both the costs and benefits of particular interest-allocation decisions. Use of the word “rights” allows for a narrowed analysis scale that focuses exclusively on the individual with little concern for that individual’s place in a broader community. That narrowed focus limits the quality of the property that results. It does not matter whether we begin from a natural rights or social construct understanding of property, our ultimate goal is to achieve that set of institutional and property relations that promote the greatest cultural and societal, and thus individual, good. A rights rhetoric may not achieve that goal.

\footnote{Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973).}