Article
Davidson and a Twist of Wittgenstein: Metaontology, Self-Canceling Paradox, and Settled Insight
Philosophia
(2017)
Abstract
The paper proposes with Davidson that the talk of metaontology is literally meaningless, but with Wittgenstein that it is so in a way that grants a unique type of insight. More specifically, it argues both that Davidson’s arguments have a cogency that is hard to dismiss, and also that, since his own arguments are metaontological, they are self-referential, and consequently in turn undermine their own meaning as well. The paper argues further that metaontological statements cannot be avoided. Consequently, this kind of statement constitutes an unavoidable self-referential paradox that means what it also excludes as capable of meaning. The result is a reinstatement of the meaning of ontological insight and in fact, the paper argues, a deep enrichment and also a particularly cogent justification of it. In addition, the logical peculiarity of the paradox involved has further useful consequences for the outcome of this justification, including a mutually illuminating commonality with some versions of metaethics.
Disciplines
Publication Date
2017
Citation Information
Jeremy Barris. "Davidson and a Twist of Wittgenstein: Metaontology, Self-Canceling Paradox, and Settled Insight" Philosophia (2017) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jeremy-barris/25/