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Knowledge is not enoughAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Document TypeJournal article
- experimental philosophy,
AbstractDiscussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.
Funding InformationThe work described in this paper was fully supported by a Grant from the Research Grants Council ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU 359613).
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Citation InformationNado, J. (2017). Knowledge is not enough. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Advance online publication. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959