From the McDonald Report to the Kelly Committees: The Government Research and Policy Making Process Connected to Oppositional Political Terrorism in Canada

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Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the Canadian government's research and policy-making processes in connection with oppositional political terrorism during the time between the McDonald Report (1977) to the Third Kelly Committee (1999). In particular, the article examines this subject by reviewing popular, scholarly, and governmental literature; relying on personal experiences; and, most importantly, focusing on information gathered during a series of interviews with key informants conducted over a 14-year period. The article concludes with a list of factors that impeded government research and policy development connected with this subject and policy area and a handful of suggestions for overcoming these difficulties which may improve the Canadian government’s ability to effectively deal with future acts of terrorism.

KEYWORDS: terrorism, Canada, research and policy-making process

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I. INTRODUCTION

In October 1970, Canada was thrust into the world spotlight with the simultaneous kidnappings of British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Québécois legislator Pierre Laporte in Montréal by Québécois Separatists claiming membership in the Front de Liberation du Québec (FLQ) terrorist organization. Almost immediately, the federal government instituted the dormant War Measures Act, which severely curtailed civil liberties. For example, under this Act anyone suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization could be arrested and held incommunicado for 48 hours. The “October Crisis,” as it was called, came to a head some 10 days later when the kidnappers boarded a plane to Havana, Cross was released, and Laporte’s strangled body was found in the trunk of an abandoned car in the parking lot of Wondel Aviation in Saint-Hubert (Laurendeau, 1974; Fournier, 1984).¹

Since that time, a number of periodic headline-grabbing terror scares have occurred in Canada, or have Canadian roots, including the downing of an Air India flight in June 1985, the hijacking of a tour bus on Parliament Hill in Ottawa in April 1989, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, (a.k.a., the Millennial bomber) in December 1999 in Port Angeles, Washington, and the roundup of suspected al Qaeda members planning an attack in Toronto in June 2006.

Indeed, acts of terrorism in Canada can be traced back to before Confederation (Ross, 1988a). More importantly, terrorism has been prevalent in varying degrees of frequency in Canada over the past five decades (Ross, 1988a; 1994b). Although the amount of domestic terrorism--largely perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors and the Québécois Separatist factions (e.g., Front de Liberation du Québec) during the 1960s and early 1970s--has subsided (Ross and Gurr, 1989; Ross, 1995), Canada has had a steady (albeit considerably low) level of international terrorism.²

The problem of terrorism prompted three Canadian Senate inquiries; two were held during the late 1980s, and one in 1999. The Canadian government's ability to effectively prevent, detect, and respond to terrorism has been a topic of concern during periodic reviews of Canada's national security apparatus (e.g., Canadian Security Intelligence Service -CSIS). All of these assessments typically led to recommendations and sometimes changes in Canada's counterterrorism policies and practices. Finally, in December 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed

¹ For purposes of specification, all references to terrorism refer to oppositional political terrorism (OPT). Although official definitions of OPT, vary among the various government entities consulted, with some modifications (Ross, 2006) the author uses Schmid’s definition of terrorism (Schmid, 1983) as the definition used for this research.

² According to Ross (1994), between 1960-1990 there were 58 incidents of international terrorism, compared to 411 domestic events for this same period.
Bill C-36, the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, which is similar in intent to America’s PATRIOT Act.

9/11 called into question Canada’s role as a conduit for terrorism in the United States and in the global war against terrorism. Members of al Qaeda were reported to be living (or did live) in major centers in Canada, and were alleged to have crossed the border undetected into the United States. While claims were proven questionable or false, citizens from both countries were left wondering why these individuals were able to enter Canada in the first place, and why the CSIS, arguably Canada’s most important national security organization, was not able to detect them.

Less understood is the Canadian government’s capability to conduct, contract, and use research on terrorism and the anti-terrorism policy development process by the federal bureaucracy. Understanding these interconnected processes may lead to better counterterrorism policies and practices. Indeed this subject is not new. Merari (1991) has argued that “government officials have failed to utilize even sound knowledge and competent professional advice of academics” (p. 88). He argues that this has had a negative affect on counter-terrorist policies and practices.

In general, this article presents the results of an in-depth analysis of the Canadian government's terrorist research and policy-making from the McDonald Committee Report (1977) to the Third Kelly Committee (1999). Although other periods could be chosen, the researcher is most familiar with this time frame. In the context of this article, government research refers to work that has been done in-house and/or which is sponsored by the bureaucracy. This should be contrasted with “investigations,” that would be conducted by security personnel. When the term policy is used, it refers to the creation and analysis of the rules, procedures, and regulations that guide an organization’s work. In particular, this article focuses on the responses to a series of interviews with subject-matter experts and government bureaucrats and identifies a number of problem areas and solutions that the affected ministries might implement.

II. METHODOLOGY

Two primary techniques were used in order to conduct the research for this article. First, a literature search and review was performed. Not only did this involve an analysis of the popular, scholarly, and governmental reports (produced by a variety of committees and commissions), but it also included newspaper and magazine articles on terrorism in Canada.

More importantly, three sets of unstructured, face-to-face interviews were conducted in June 1989, December 1989, and August 2003 with former and active senior governmental researchers, bureaucrats, directors of associations, officials in the grant-making community, and members of the academic community--all of
whom have experience, an expertise, or interest in terrorism research and policy.\(^3\)

In sum, 27 people were interviewed. One of these interviews included a meeting with a former head of the CSIS.

Names of informants/sources were culled from a number of sources, including the list of expert witnesses that appeared before the Kelly Committees (see discussion below). Initial contact with these individuals was made through written correspondence or telephone calls. Most of the people contacted agreed to be interviewed. Others who were asked to be interviewed declined, often suggesting that the researcher speak to someone else who had more expertise, and one who agreed to be interviewed never appeared for our meeting. Still others never responded to requests for interviews, and a few potential informant/sources said that they would be busy or out of town during the period the investigator/researcher was conducting interviews. Those sources who said they would be unavailable were recontacted at a later point in time, however, none of those who did not respond or did not show up were contacted again. In short, the research used a snowball sample (i.e., sources are asked by the researcher whom they should contact and the investigator follow-upped with that individual), and thus no claims of representativeness are being made.

Interviews lasted anywhere from a half hour to two hours and were conducted without a tape recorder. Occasional notes regarding key names and dates were taken, but the substance of the interviews were transcribed from memory, typically immediately after each interview. The majority of interviews were conducted in the sources’ offices, while others took place at neighborhood bars, restaurants, or cafes. Finally, some conversations began in a source’s office and continued in one of the aforementioned public places.\(^4\)

### III. RESEARCH ON TERRORISM IN CANADA

#### A. Introduction

Over the past five decades, a considerable amount of research on terrorism in Canada or on terrorism that directly affects Canada has been conducted. This work

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\(^3\) For reasons of confidentiality, individuals interviewed were granted anonymity.

\(^4\) Frequently, when the researcher asked to speak to someone who worked for a governmental agency, and they agreed, they often brought along two co-workers or subordinates. Sometimes the primary source asked if it was okay to bring along their colleagues because they may be able to answer a question that they can’t. Most of the time the primary source simply brought the person without asking the investigator’s permission. The researcher had the feeling that the primary source hoped that the additional people would serve to intimidate the investigator. The inclusion of the additional person, often made it difficult for the investigator to distinguish who said what and when.
can be divided into three categories: popular, academic/scholarly, and governmental.

B. Popular Research

In addition to the day-to-day reporting in the news media on the subject of terrorism in Canada, a number of English-language trade books that primarily deal with terrorism in Canada have been published. Some have looked at the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors (e.g., Holt, 1964; Woodcock and Avakumovic, 1977); the Front de Liberation Du Québec/October Crisis (e.g., Haggart and Golden, 1971; Vallieres, 1971, 1977; De Vault and Johnson, 1983; Fournier, 1984; Loomis, 1999). The Air India Tragedy/Sikh Terrorism led to a number of books, including those by Jiwa (1986), Blaise and Mukherjee (1988), and Mulgrew (1988). And finally, a miscellaneous category includes books such as those by Kinsella (1992); Hansen (2002); and Bell (2004). This last group of monographs are personal memoirs of either terrorists or exterrorists, or parties to a conflict), journalistic accounts of major terrorist movements, or insights from government insiders. Most of the books have a similar treatment of terrorism and were written by sole authors who were either reporters or former journalists.

C. Scholarly/Academic Research

A number of scholarly articles and books focus on terrorism in Canada. This research includes work by Ross (e.g., 1988a; 1988b; 1994b), that of Kellett (2004), and the efforts of Leman-Langlois and Brodeur (2005) to develop separate databases on terrorism in Canada. Other efforts have examined patterns of terrorism in Canada (e.g., Mitchell, 1985; Ross and Gurr, 1989; Charters, 2008). Some scholarly research has examined Québécois Separatist/FLQ Terrorism and the October Crisis (e.g., Hagy, 1969; Morf, 1970; Breton, 1973; Laurendau, 1974; Fournier, 1984; Munroe, 2009). Some work looks at the role of criminal justice in the suppression of terrorism in Canada (e.g., Crelinsten, 1985). Still other research has examined police-media relations in the context of terrorism (e.g., Scanlon, 1981; 1982). In recent years, some scholars have chosen to focus on the Anti-Terrorism Act implemented in the wake of 9/11 (e.g., Daniels, Macklem, and Roach, 2001, Roach, 2003; Gabor, 2004), while other research has looked at the Canadian government’s counterterrorism response (e.g., Charters, 1991; Smith, 1993; Fawn, 2003; Rudner, 2004).

Some readers may fault the investigator for not including many French language sources, but the reality is that only a handful of the books published on terrorism in Canada that were originally written in French were not translated into English.
D. Governmental Research

A handful of publicly available government reports have focused, in whole or in part, on terrorism. These include the McDonald Commission findings (Canada, 1981) and the three Kelly Committee reports (Canada, 1987; 1989; 1999). Anthony (Tony) Kellett, a researcher with the Department of National Defence (DND) produced two reviews on the threat of terrorism to Canada (Kellett, 1981; Kellett, 1988). Finally, Lemyre, Corneil, and Clément (2005) produced a report on responding to the possibility of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism in Canada. In terms of volume, the government produced information pales in comparison to the amount of research produced by journalists and the academic community.

IV. CANADIAN FEDERAL AGENCIES THAT MONITOR TERRORISM

A. Introduction

During the period under investigation, to varying degrees, terrorism was a policy concern of four principal federal ministries: External Affairs, Department of Justice, Transport Canada, and the Solicitor General of Canada (“SolGen” for short). These are large bureaucracies with multiple missions. In other words, not all divisions are concerned with terrorism. More specifically, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)-Criminal Division, and the National Security Policy Directorate of the former SolGen were the most involved with monitoring and responding to terrorism. Moreover, it is not easy separating the creation of subunits in the bureaucracy and governmental research and policy.

The majority of the counterterrorist function within the Canadian government lies with law enforcement and intelligence, not with the military. “Military aid to civil power is a measure available to the government in extraordinary circumstances,… but Canadian policy does not include the use of the Canadian Forces (CF) as an instrument of retaliation” (Smith, p. 61).

In Canada, the federal government assumes a lead role in responding to terrorism. Since the 1960s, policy development and implementation in connection with terrorism was the duty of the Police and Security Branch of SolGen. In 2003, SolGen was reconfigured and called Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. In 2005, the name of the Ministry was shortened to Public Safety Canada. The terrorism policy and development function remained with Public Safety Canada. According to Smith, “for reasons of jurisdictional legalities associated with the Canadian Constitution, the Federal government must consult and co-ordinate with the provincial governments. Thus, the initiation and
implementation of measures in response to the threat of terrorism are often complex matters. The problems are magnified when international diplomatic conventions and considerations must also be taken into account” (p. 66).

B. The Federal Government’s Approach to Research and Policy Development on Terrorism

Anti-terrorism policies can be divided into two types: macro and micro (Hewitt, 1984). The first category has a broad mandate and includes emergency legislation, reliance on security forces, and rule of law. The second classification is more specific and subsumes hostage negotiations and strategies such as surveillance. According to Smith, “Policy obviously generates policy” (p. 27), and that “it also generates policy measures. The distinction is often finely drawn, and frequently the two may appear to represent one and the same thing” (p. 28).

Smith claimed that “The combination of such circumstances makes it possible to appreciate the sense of complacency and confidence which have marked Canada’s response to the threat of terrorism. That is not to say that Canada has failed to regard terrorism in a serious manner; to make such a claim would be invidious…..” (p. 52). He said,

Canada’s dearly and serious encounter with terrorism through the medium of the FLQ, and the October Crisis in particular, had significant and long-lasting effects. Those effects were both positive and negative in nature and impact. They are best illustrated by reference to two major principles which underlie and guide Canadian counter terrorism policy: (1) adherence to the rule of law; and (2) perception of the threat (p. 49).

During the 1970s, ministries concerned with crime and justice in the Canadian government expanded in terms of personnel and responsibilities (Solomon, 1981). This included the “Secretariat of the Federal Solicitor-General’s Department and the comparable entities in the Federal Ministry of Justice and in various provincial ministries” (p. 13). In 1971, after the October Crisis, the SolGen established the Security Planning and Research Group (SPARG). It was supposed to “assist the Solicitor General in assessing the significance of security intelligence reports from the RCMP, the Group underwent a series of vicissitude to emerge in the 1980s as the PSB” (Smith, p. 68). Finally, CSIS had produced a number of open-sourced research documents. The most well known is called Commentary. Since this publication started in 1990, about 12 of the 90 reports (now on-line) have focused on terrorism. Few, however, dealt with this problem in Canada.

http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol8/iss1/8
V. THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE FIELD OF TERRORISM

A. Introduction

During the 1960s and 1970s, policy-related research in each government ministry was done on an ad-hoc basis. None of the ministries had an explicit terrorist research component. For example, the DND’s Office of Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), a semi-autonomous research organization within the DND that has minimal direction from the actual department, produced two reports, both conducted by in-house staff member Kellett on international terrorism (1981; 1988). The employees, who were largely civilian, were given a list of topics from which to draw to write reports that were believed to be of some benefit to the actual ministry. Alternatively, DND staff are required to write papers as part of their training at the Canadian Forces College. Sometimes they choose to write on the topic of terrorism. These are very basic kinds of analyses that may or may not be published in an in-house DND publication.

In the SolGen's office, the Research Unit of the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), Police and Security Branch carried out the majority of the research on terrorism. Research was very basic; no work using sophisticated methodologies was conducted; the majority of research consisted of literature reviews.

Smith, writing in 1990 stated,

Notwithstanding, the failure to adopt a long-term perspective, or to heed the lessons of other nations, coupled with fading memories of the tension-filled days of 1970, have inhibited urgency in the development of Canadian counter-terrorism policy or measures. A low perception of the threat has not inspired the need for greater action, and expediency and pressure for financial economies have often taken priority (p. 54).

Smith, added that,

The Canadian attitude, especially through the decade following the October Crisis, has not reflected a perception of terrorism as constituting a major or immediate danger to the nation or to its interests overseas. Understandably, other matters... have brought more pressure to bear on legislators and on public opinion than a phenomenon which lacked prominent domestic visibility from 1970 until the early 1980s. While sympathetic to the problems of terrorist
threats and activities elsewhere in the world, Canadians have not felt endangered by such developments. It has been a narrow perception which failed seriously to take into account the numerous and growing ethnic communities within the nation and their potential as sources of terrorist activism (pp. 60-61).

B. McDonald Report (1977)

Despite the historical legacy of terrorism in Canada, it did not become a major policy concern until the 1970s. Most of the response was from an operational standpoint. In 1977, the first governmental inquiry that investigated selected aspects of terrorism in Canada was the McDonald Commission (named after its director, Justice Donald C. McDonald). The primary purpose of this effort was to review allegations of wrongdoing by members of the RCMP-Security Service in connection with their investigations into the activities of Québécois Separatists and terrorists. The final report was primarily written by individuals who had a background in constitutional law and very little expertise in matters of political conflict. The report had a small section dealing with terrorism. Its general observation in terms of terrorism was, "the internationalization of terrorists' activities since the late 1960's has significantly increased the severity of this threat to the security of Canada...it would be rash to predict a disappearance of the 'terrorist' threat in the future. Political fanaticism is not on the wane, and modern technology increases the power of a few to threaten the many" (Canada, 1981, p. 40).

As a result of the review of the federal government's response to the October Crisis in Québec, the SolGen of Canada was designated in 1978 as the lead ministry responsible for coordinating the response to hostage-taking and related incidents. After the attempted and successful assassination of Turkish diplomats in Ottawa in 1982, by members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), an internal governmental review was performed. The principal recommendations resulting from this process were that the government should establish a national counter-terrorism program and that a center be established within the government to bring together the diverse policy, planning, and coordination activities and interests of federal departments and agencies to implement an integrated program (Canada, 1987, p. 46). The responsibility for this laid squarely on the shoulders of SolGen.

Other organizational and policy developments took place during this time. In 1986, for example, the Canadian government established the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT), an elite armed unit housed with the RCMP with specialized training to deal with hostage negotiation, barricade and rescue situations, and other terrorist-related crises (Smith, p. 35). In general, these teams
can minimize the number of injuries and deaths in an armed standoff. In 1993, SERT was disbanded in favor of a more clandestine organization called the Joint Task Force Two (JTF2).

Some of the McDonald Commissions’ most important recommendations included the separation of the Security Branch from the RCMP, and the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), primarily staffed by civilians. It would be similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. This became a reality in 1984 with the passage of the CSIS Act.

C. Kelly Committee One, 1987

In September 1985, shortly after the Progressive Conservative Party assumed power and the Air India tragedy occurred, a motion was made on the Senate floor by Sen. William M. Kelly (Progressive Conservative) to investigate Canada's terrorism capability. The matter did not make it to the end of the parliamentary session and was revisited in the fall of 1986 when the Senate met again. The measure to create the inquiry was narrowly passed and finally commenced work in November. In general, the Senate committee deliberated for almost five months, and produced a report released in June 1987. While operating as a committee, its research was subject to constant review, and the focus of the inquiry seemed to change as the committee did its work.

Among its numerous findings included the observation that "There appears to be considerable potential for counter-productive and inefficient effort, duplication, overlaps, inconsistencies, and turf battles” (Canada, 1987, p. 58). The Kelly Committee recommended the amalgamation of the federal government's coordination and response mechanisms for terrorist incidents, disasters, wars and insurrections" (Canada, 1987, p. 59).

The Committee garnered criticism from a number of communities and constituencies, both during the hearings and after the report was released. First, the most vocal were anti-abortion groups who believed that they were unfairly characterized by the report. Second, some media personnel and academics objected to the fact that the sessions were held in camera (i.e., not open to the public). Third, in partial response to the poor quality of research that was produced, David Charters, a leading Canadian academic on terrorism matters, organized Canadian experts to present papers at a conference in order to refine these papers for a book (Charters, 1991). Fourth, although most governmental administrators suggested that the best thing that the Kelly Committee did was show the cracks in the anti-terrorism system and bring to light longstanding hostilities and problems amongst government agencies, they thought that Kelly was just using the committee for self publicity. Many senior-level bureaucrats said that since Kelly was a member of the
Progressive Conservative Party, he was mainly motivated by his desire to embarrass the previous Liberal Party administration by showing that it was incapable of responding adequately to a terrorist threat. This observation was prompted because of a perception that the committee’s original mandate appeared to be unfocused. Finally, comments that are more virulent were used to describe C.G. Management, the sole-sourced consulting company that provided technical assistance to the committee and assembled the final report.

As a response to the recommendations of the Kelly Committee, the SolGen established the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (also known as the Sheraton Task Force, named after the DND officer responsible for leading it). This unit was responsible for implementing the recommendations. It finished its study in February 1987. As part of the process the very first National Counter-Terrorism Plan was developed.

In 1989, the National Security Coordination Office of the SolGen of Canada, assembled a team, led by Kellett from the DND, to compile a database on terrorism in Canada. The ostensible goal was to aid in conducting research and informing policy and procedures in this subject area. In addition to Kellett, the group consisted of four assistants (i.e., Bruce Beanlands, James Deacon, H. Jeffrey, and C. Lapalme), two of whom who had recently earned their master’s degrees under Canadian terrorism researcher Ron Crelinsten, and were contract employees. They produced two publicly available documents: a relatively comprehensive bibliography on terrorism (Beanlands and Deacon, 1988), and an analysis of their database (Kellett, Beanlands, Deacon, Jeffrey and Lapalme, 1991).

The bibliography replicated the work of other respected bibliographies at the time (e.g., Lakos, 1986; Mickolus, 1980). The database introduced previously unexamined variables (especially incidents in support of terrorism such as criminal activities) that were not present in other databases (i.e., Ross, 1988b; 1994) and was an effort to bring SolGen’s work on terrorism up to date.

E. Kelly Committee Two, 1989

In the wake of the previously mentioned bus highjacking, Kelly spearheaded another investigation into the government’s ability to detect and effectively respond to terrorists. In 1989, a disgruntled Lebanese Christian commandeered a tourist bus and ordered its driver to take the passengers to Parliament Hill (Ottawa). The event ended without incident, but reminded Canadians just how susceptible they are to terrorist incidents in their country’s capital. Perhaps because of the criticism of the first Kelly committee, a new one was arranged (Canada, 1989). Once again, the Kelly Committee noted a handful of shortcomings in Canada’s ability to counter terrorism. The committee made its’ report public in July 1989.
F. Kelly Committee Three, 1999

In March 1998, a decade after the last inquiry, Kelly once again successfully convinced the Senate to sponsor another inquiry into Canada’s ability to handle not only threats of terrorism in Canada, but also expand the scope to look at all security issues. The committee held its hearings between April and October 1997 and listened to 74 witnesses. The committee made its report public in January 1999. It stated that it “was impressed by the progress in competence, professionalism and preparedness made over the last decade within the Canadian security and intelligence community, but also reported that there is no cause for complacency… The tactics and tools available to terrorists have broadened and the threat posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has increased” (http://www.parl.gc.ca/361/parlbus/commbus/senatem/com). It made 33 recommendations ranging from better data gathering on terrorist incidents to the formation of a “Standing Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence.”

G. Changing From SolGen to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (2003), and then to Public Safety Canada

In December 2003, when John Martin (Liberal Party) became prime minister, the Canadian government changed the name and mission of SolGen to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). It was later shortened to Public Safety Canada (PS). This ministry currently includes the Canadian Border Services Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security Intelligence Services, Correctional Service Canada, and National Parole Board. Many of the functions PS provides are similar to the American Department of Homeland Security. Despite selected issues of Commentary, and periodic reports (e.g., CSIS, 2000) little research conducted by this ministry is publicly released. In sum, several issues impeded the research and policy development on terrorism in Canada. Overcoming these problems may improve the government’s ability to effectively deal with future acts of oppositional political terrorism.

VI. PROBLEMS THAT IMPEDED THE RESEARCH AND POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

A. Introduction

Based on the researchers’ interviews, experience, and own insights, eight problems that impeded the Canadian government’s ability to effectively conduct research, develop appropriate policy and practices, and thus deal with terrorism were identified. These difficulties included, from least to most important: changing
personnel and retirements, failure to consult affected constituencies, minimal inter- and intraministry cooperation, perceptions of terrorism in Canada among the bureaucrats, lack of in-house expertise, failure to adequately utilize outside expertise, lack of support and/or coordination of terrorist research by government and private funding agencies, and a paucity of directed resources.

B. Changing Personnel and Retirements

Not only did the ministers and many of the senior civil servants of the key departments change on a continuous basis, but so too did the employees with specialized knowledge. For example, and for a variety of reasons, particularly in the parliamentary system like that of Canada, prime ministers periodically shuffle his or her cabinet and give elected members of parliament from their party different ministry leadership positions. According to insiders, being the head of SolGen is traditionally one the least prestigious cabinet positions, and those occupying this role are only too happy to leave.

Shortly after the Air India bombing, the SolGen created the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) (Smith, 1990: 259-261). This short-lived unit was responsible for conducting research on terrorism and monitoring ongoing terrorist events. Unfortunately, this unit appeared to be subject to constant personnel changes. This was not simply a result of retirements or careerism among civil servants, but was also due to personality conflicts with senior management. One head of the NSCC fit that model and, predictably, fell from grace. He was originally an academic and rose quickly through the federal civil-service ranks. However, he was not too adept at remaining quiet when he disagreed with his superiors. In other words, he spoke his mind too often and consequently alienated a lot of field workers who believed that they had paid their dues.

Since that time, a number of people who were intimately involved in terrorism research and policy development retired or were transferred. Quite often, those with some expertise in terrorism were seconded to and from the SolGen for a particular job, and when this was completed, were sent back to their ministry of origin. According to one informant, in the history of the SolGen, the number of people concerned with terrorism research, policy, and training constantly rises and falls. Thus, in terms of staffing, the SolGen typically responds to crises. In short, the constant personnel changes and the failure to maintain staff contributed to a loss of institutional memory.

C. Failure to Consult Affected Constituencies

Some ministries do more consultation with their constituencies then others. Transport Canada, for example, regularly consults with the airlines and unions

http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol8/iss1/8
when a new law is being implemented. Some feed into international organizations (e.g., Aviation Transportation Association of Canada; ANZAC, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the National Science Council of Canada. The failure to consult affected constituencies was abundantly clear with the reaction of right to life activists to the first Kelly Committee Report.

D. Minimal Inter and Intraministry Cooperation

As previously mentioned, there are numerous federal departments and agencies having some form and degree of counter-terrorist or anti-terrorist role and mandate of which eight or nine play central roles (including but limited to: Canadian Border Services Agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Defence, Transport Canada, etc.). This presents numerous problems and challenges in terms of coordination.

E. Perceptions Concerning the Terrorism Threat Among the Bureaucrats

Most people interviewed insisted that terrorism in general was random, and thus too complicated and not worthy of research, and this led to many of the problems connected to research, policy development, and implementation. There was also a disjuncture between bureaucrats who were in operations and those who were in research.

Many bureaucrats believed that all they did was “put out fires.” They concurred that policies are needed for many things, but they only have a limited shelf life. Many from the operations side did very little research, including pleasure reading on terrorism, other than the intelligence reports that crossed their desks. Many admitted that they never read the Kelly Committee’s report.

Undoubtedly, resources are always limited, and most sources interviewed believed or were told by their superiors that terrorism was last on the priority list. They said that senior bureaucrats tend to not think that terrorism is a problem. One compared the challenge of terrorism to that of child abuse. People identify with the victim and the victim’s family greater than with the act.

Some ministry officials also suggested that it took too long for regulations to get passed and even longer for laws. They believed that this state of affairs undermines the country’s ability to combat terrorism.

F. Lack of In-house Expertise

The field of terrorism studies is interdisciplinary, requiring expertise in different disciplines. Access to primary sources is difficult. Interviewing perpetrators and supporters of terrorism is next to impossible, and government bureaucrats in the
counterterrorist field are most often less than willing to respond to offers of assistance by selected outsiders in all but general terms.

Cultivating in-house government expertise is also difficult. This is why, as previously mentioned, government agencies directly involved with terrorism research or policy often had to rely on borrowing talent from other ministries. Naturally, this creates a sense of imbalance. Loyalties to former departments are hard to break and trying to maintain some sense of camaraderie in the host ministry is difficult. In some follow-up interviews, bureaucrats in the terrorism policy field, did not have a grasp on the terrorism literature and appeared as if they could not wait until their next posting out of the terrorism policy field.

G. Failure to Adequately Utilize Outside Expertise

In the United States, the terrorist research and policy landscape includes numerous consultants, private and nonprofit think tanks, and foundations, the most notable being the Rand Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, both with offices in Washington, D.C. In Canada, the situation is considerably different. There are only a handful of experts and organizations in the private sector that have achieved some visibility in conducting research on terrorism in Canada. These include entities such as the Rand Corporation and quasi government organizations like the Canadian Institute of Peace.

The SolGen used to support research by giving grants and/or contracts on an annual basis to centers for criminology throughout Canada (Woods, 1999). Unfortunately, if you were not affiliated with one of these your ability to do criminology/criminal justice research was severely curtailed. This situation changed in the mid-1980s, when government funding for criminological/criminal justice research literally dried up (Stenning, 1999; Woods, 1999).

Although sources indicated that the SolGen was trying to entice academics to conduct research on terrorism as a way of cutting costs, when pressed further, they would not be specific. Unfortunately, for one reason or another, none of the scholars interviewed, who were doing research in the terrorism field, mentioned this kind of arrangement. It also appeared that the SolGen does not use any consulting companies to conduct research or is unwilling to talk about these kinds of relationships. Answers to questions about whether or not consulting groups were utilized were often avoided by sources during interviews. It appeared that, in order to obtain research-related contracts, one needed to be an insider. Several of the sources talked to were also concerned that the consultants were conducting research too quickly or were publicly releasing the results of their findings and should not have. Others said that they rarely have a chance to read material that they receive before they are interrupted, and that is why they have difficulty with academics who cannot write concisely. Other criticisms were that the work of outside scholars was
too verbose, complicated or long, or that it provided statistics without any interpretation.

Most operations people expressed distaste for theory and a preference for applied research. Although the SolGen is supposed to be the lead agency in terms of terrorism research and policy development, sources who were interviewed suggested that during selected crises, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has taken control. In the initial formation of the CSIS, both CSIS and the RCMP-Criminal Division were very mistrustful of each other and did not pass along information to each other.

H. Lack of Research Funding for Terrorism-related Research by Government and Private Funding Agencies

Government agencies that have an interest in terrorism research rarely subcontract and/or provide inducements for others to do it for them. Unlike other countries (especially the United States), government funding to do research on terrorism pales in comparison. For example, the largest government agency in Canada that sponsors research is the Social Sciences Research and Humanities Council of Canada (SSRCH). Few if any grants from this organization cover terrorism. The SSRCH website only covers grants given during the years 1998-2009. Using the keyword “terrorism” as the subject of the project field, one discovers that 35 grants were awarded. Upon closer examination, however, based on a title examination only, it appears that only three grants covered terrorism in Canada. The 32 other studies were not directly related to Canada.

Certainly, other venues are available to conduct research. For example, the Canadian Embassy sponsors Canadian Studies Grants for foreign-based individuals and organizations. Once again, a review of recent grants reveals that only one looked at cross-border security and one would assume that this includes the potential for terrorism.

Canada, unlike the United States, does not have an abundance of foundations that support social science research. Although the Donner Foundation in Canada has supported some research on terrorism, to date the U.S. Institute of Peace and Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation have not funded any research on terrorism in Canada.

I. Lack of Directed Funding

Traditionally, the problem of terrorism has been at the bottom of the priority list for most of the ministries of the Canadian government. This is partially a result of a lack of directed funding and the perception that it is not that important a policy concern.
VII. HOW TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS

Many of the aforementioned difficulties are endemic to large organizations, especially government bureaucracies (e.g., Weber, 1947; Ross, 2000). Also, it is typically easier to point out problems then to suggest realistic ways to improve the situation. Nevertheless, three areas could be improved in the bureaucracy: increased use and reliance on knowledgeable, reputable, and responsible academics and outside consultants (Merari, 1991); enhanced dialogue between operations/practitioners and policy-makers; and more incentives to private organizations to increase their funding of terrorism-related research.

First, terrorism scholars can provide rigorous research to government agencies and responsible commentary to the news media. As one source lamented, academics are generally unbiased and have a breadth of knowledge that is relatively wide. Government agencies, however, must be ready, willing and able to solicit and thoroughly evaluate academics research and provide appropriate feedback so they can properly communicate to academics their research needs and wants. On the down side, journalists and some media outlets know that some academics are all too willing to provide outrageous comments. Some are just trying to make a name for themselves without doing their homework. Terrorism scholars need to guard against falling victim to this kind of approach.

Some academics have ideological reasons why they do not want to become involved with research for government ministries doing this sort of research. The alternative is to take money and do research on their own without any strings attached. Thus, an appropriate granting mechanism and monitoring system must be established.

Responsible and subject matter expert consultants need to be hired by key government agencies, committees and commissions. The ones used by the very first Kelly Committee had primary expertise in technical assistance (i.e., making travel arrangements, scheduling hearings etc.), but did not have experience in doing work on terrorism. Although a number of people were initially contacted to do the “intellectual” work, in many cases there was no follow-up consultation with them. Thus, they were left in a holding pattern. Sources suggested that the consulting company also alienated both people inside the respective ministries and the expert witnesses.

Second, a continuous dialogue should be maintained between academics and the relevant ministries. It should be formalized and not done on an ad hoc or an as-needed basis. Moreover, transparency in this process should be a dominant communication strategy. Otherwise, charges of favoritism are rampant, and this may undermine the free flow of information and quality of analysis. In the United
States, the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department continuously hire academics to perform studies on various issues that are of importance. A number of contracting models exist that can be easily transported to the Canadian case.

Counterterrorism practitioners need to continually dialogue with those who are developing and implementing policy. Too often, the two are separated, and there is a lack of cooperation and collaboration. For reasons that I could not understand, two areas of needed research were stressed by the people with whom I spoke. First, there was a preference for case-studies on groups that have the potential to engage in terrorism. This, it was argued, could be adequately done from open source literature. Second, long-term public opinion research on citizens attitudes was advocated. At the same time this was stated, it was also pointed out that if a ministry does any public-opinion research, it must go through the Treasury Board as the finding may be perceived to be damaging to the government in power.

Foundations can be given increased tax breaks if a percentage of their funded research focuses on terrorism. And thus, the respective ministries could recommend this to Revenue Canada. In short, in many respects, the terrorism research and policy sector in Canada conforms to Lindblom’s (1959) idea, which he articulated some four decades ago, when he laid out his theory of incrementalism. He suggested that, contrary to a rational technological approach to solving the problems of the day (i.e., Weber, 1947); this process was next to impossible. Instead, policymakers engaged in a process of satisficing.

Since this research was conducted, particularly after 9-11, and the passage of Bill C-36, there is an impression in some quarters that terrorist threats to Canada are radically different. This may be true, however, the manner and types of research on terrorism in Canada that is conducted do not seem to have changed. This perception may be influenced by where the investigator lives, where there is a relatively transparent and highly competitive research atmosphere, where scholars and research consulting firms are constantly applying for state and federal research and technical assistance dollars, and that most new legislation has a set aside in their budget for these kinds of activities. This money is channeled into the National Science Foundation, or given to the respective departments to disperse as needed.

As the United States most important trade and national security partner, it is important that the Canadian government bureaucracies charged with monitoring and responding to terrorism invest the proper resources to studying terrorism. Moreover, insuring that this research is done in a rigorous and nonpartisan fashion, and that it thoroughly and properly integrates domestic and international subject matter expertise in these pursuits is important. The Canadian government bureaucracy has the capacity to achieve these noble goals, but seems to be disproportionately preoccupied with responding to the changing and distracting daily headlines (i.e., a the crisis of the day/firefighting approach) rather than
establishing a process that is more long term with respect to national security planning and terrorism prevention.

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED

1. Did the Kelly Committee focus on the right issues?
2. If you were Kelly, what would you have done differently?
3. What sort of research projects have been established because of the Kelly Committee?
4. How would you rank the utility of the Kelly Committee?
5. What can you tell me about the team that was instituted in the SolGen’s office to do research on terrorism in Canada?
6. Was the Kelly Committee long overdue?
7. Have more personnel been hired to conduct terrorism related research?
8. Are enough resources directed toward research on terrorism in Canada?
9. Does the government have enough experts?
10. Does Canada have enough experts?
11. Does your ministry contract research on terrorism?
12. What sort of nongovernmental groups (e.g., interest groups) do you consult with regard to terrorism?
13. Is there any relationship between government agencies like SSRCH and research on terrorism?
14. Is there any relationship to private organizations such as the Canadian Institute of Peace?
15. Do corporations (including the media and airlines) consult with you?
16. How much connection do you have with the academic community?
17. Should you consult with those people?
18. Do these views differ between senior and lower bureaucrats operations and policymakers or between departments?
19. What issues impede the policy-making process regarding anti terrorism measures in Canada?
20. What issues help the policy making process?
21. What sort of research are government policymakers interested in?
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