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2004

Land, Labor, and Leadership: The Political Economy of Hualapai Community Building, 1910-1940

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Native Pathways
American Indian Culture and Economic Development in the Twentieth Century

University Press of Colorado
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The day finally arrived in the late twentieth century when American Indians became an economic force to be dealt with in the U.S. business world. Previously, American Indian communities and their tribal governments had reacted to U.S. actions and policies. Now the rest of America began responding to American Indian enterprises, largely as a result of the success of Indian gaming, an annual $10 billion industry involving over 200 tribes in twenty-four states. As a result, American Indian economic development in the twentieth century marked the greatest pivotal change in Native American history. How did this happen? The seeds of successful economic practices had already been sown in the reservation lands of American Indian tribes. There were hard times and lessons to be learned. That enormous change and how it has occurred throughout Indian country are what this book addresses.

Brian Hosmer and Colleen O'Neill have carefully chosen essays that broadly cover Indian country, ranging from the late nineteenth century to the present. These important studies are about commerce and incorporation, wage
30. Newspaper clipping, "Indian Features," 1909, and Charles Shell to L. L. Legtees, August 17, 1909, both in CAA 46, "Indian Fairs"; Hootie, A Final Promise, 5; Moses, Wild West Shows, 39.


32. Wichita Eagle, August 28, 1902, CAA 45, "Indian Dances."


34. Farrand Sayre to S. M. McCowan, September 20, 1903, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, October 1903," OHS.


40. Moses, Wild West Shows, 122, 173–176, 256; Miller Brothers to Cheyenne and Arapaho Agent, February 2, 1908, CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

41. DeWitt, "Behind the Scenes of the Old '101'"; High Chief to Charles Shell, March 12, 1907, and Lillard High Chief to Unknown, September 30, 1914; Agency Farmer to W. W. Scott, March 1, 1915, all in CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

42. Mack Hagg, Coyote, Red Cloud et al. to Agent, November 23, 1910; Sam Grayson to Agent, November 25, 1910; William Freer to Sam Grayson, December 7, 1910, all in CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; Telegram from San Antonio International Fair Association to United States Indian Agent, November 22, 1923, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs." Although included in the Kiowa Agency files, this letter was addressed to the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent.


44. Henry Pahoscut to John Blackmon, April 14, 1906, KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

Increasingly, scholars are exploring the complex interplay between economic change and cultural identity, in which native communities and individuals respond creatively to the challenges posed by capitalism and wage labor. Utilizing political economy as his interpretive framework, Jeffrey Shepherd explores the ways Hualapai incorporated changes around them into their individual and collective worldviews and agendas. In doing so he moves beyond agency and adaptation, persistence and innovation, and suggests that scholars consider how "incorporation," frequently seen as a undi-

I would like to thank several members of the Hualapai community for their support and commentary on this chapter and the larger dissertation of which it is a portion. Lucille and Philbert Watabomigje Jr., Monza Honga, Joseph T. Flies Away, Louise Benson, Lonnie Wilder, Loretta Jackson, Cherlyee Beecher, Greg Glasses, and several others have provided valuable insights on the issues I address here. Not only have they been generous with their expertise as Hualapai historians, they have also been generous with their friendship, patience, and understanding.
rectional, not to mention wholly destructive, phenomenon, can in fact be multifaceted and constructive.

When Hualapais irrigated their crops from rivers and streams in northwest Arizona, long before non-Indians migrated to the region, they engaged in economic development. When Hualapais participated in extensive trade networks that connected people from present-day southern California to northern New Mexico, they became a vital link in an intricate chain of diverse cultures seeking mutual economic gain and community security. And as local and not-so-local political alliances shifted, Hualapais adapted to these changes and sought new alliances with different people, much like they adjusted to environmental conditions such as drought, flood, erosion, or overuse of hunting grounds. Their responses to these economic, political, cultural, and environmental fluctuations provided them with a rich array of individual and community values that persisted into a new era of their history best represented by wage labor, nonnative migrants, cattle ranching, mining companies, and, of course, American capitalism.

For several decades after Hualapais' first interactions with these newcomers, they had to adapt to changes in federal policy that ranged from the forced assimilation of their land and identity into the American body politic to the tentative support for a reservation-based culture and society. Hualapais, much like other American Indians, now had to decide how they would react to capitalist industrialization and the impact of railroads, demographic growth, wage labor, and other manifestations of marketplace economics. They also had to respond to the imposition of nonnative forms of political representation and new conceptualizations of humans' relationship with the natural world. But rather than simply react, they incorporated the changes around them into their individual and collective worldviews and agendas. Their history reflected a new familiar combination of adaptation and resistance, continuity and change.

Between 1910 and World War II, the Hualapai economy rested on wage labor in regional industries and a tribal cattle business on the reservation. These developments represented two competing tendencies: increased integration into regional and national markets and a tenuous preservation of tribal self-determination. More specifically, Hualapais had to embrace wage labor to survive the demands of a cash economy, but they tried to do so in ways that made sense to them as a distinct group of people with important beliefs and values. As Hualapais engaged the marketplace, they confronted several crucial issues at the nexus of economic change and cultural identity. How did Hualapais perceive these new systems? To what extent could they truly control the nature and scope of interactions with capitalist development? Why did they adopt particular patterns and strategies in response to development, and what were the implications for Hualapai culture? Answers to these questions rest in larger patterns seen throughout Indian history whereby communities relied on kinship networks, band structure, and knowledge of the regional environment to selectively incorporate elements of capitalist development into their cultural identity. Capitalism undoubtedly demanded that Hualapais confront new institutional and social arrangements, but individuals challenged and modified many of the assumptions underlying this new economic regime.

A growing chorus of authors has investigated this interplay between cultural identity and economic change in American Indian communities, and this chapter seeks to contribute to that discourse. Yet this chapter attempts to investigate the nuances and particularities of some of the important topics, eras, and themes illuminated by leading scholars in the field. For instance, when scholars discuss labor specifically, they often focus on experiences in the Civilian Conservation Corps, war industries, and relocation programs without critically analyzing how Indian labor relates to band and tribal identity, how wage work becomes part of "new tribal traditions," or how individuals might find wage labor attractive and useful. At worst, Indian people appear as hopeless victims forced to work for wages rather than as creative and flexible individuals choosing wage labor as an economic strategy that might also maintain cultural institutions. This does not mean, however, that native individuals have enjoyed the same options and opportunities granted non-Indians, and it should not imply that American Indians happily or easily embraced these changes. The complex web of relations between economics and identity produced a collage of responses and competing agendas shaped by human emotion, tradition, and pragmatism. Tracing these relationships requires us to avoid dichotomies that polarize or distort the lives and identities of Indians in relation to economic change. Older traditions persisted, new ones emerged, and both helped tribes cope with the impact of "progress and modernization" on the cultural and economic practices of non-European peoples.

These themes require numerous methodologies and interpretive perspectives, but I embrace political-economy generally to illustrate how Hualapais experienced these regional changes. Political-economy is a useful framework because it links the political decisions of Pai bands to the economic structures surrounding them. These political decisions, in turn, were intertwined with cultural ideals that shape kinship networks, social obligations, and ties to the
land. Political structures within Pai society were rooted in the allocation of resources such as food, thus linking them back to economy, but the structures also reflected symbolic cultural representations of leadership and legitimacy. The degree to which Pai bands served as social organizing principles depended on the internal commitments to them as viable, familiar, and useful versus the competing external factors—particularly capitalism—pressuring them to splinter.

Pais valued the nature of their society, but by 1900 many Pai leaders speculated that political, ethnic, and economic unity was preferable to total resistance even if it meant coalescing under the term, category, or symbol tribe. Charting such a moderate course ultimately enabled them to maintain some of their “old ways” within economic structures that appeared inimical to their values and beliefs. Negotiations like this also provided them with political skills to protest against local, regional, and federal demands on their tribal sovereignty. Political economy is not the only interpretive stance, but it nonetheless helps demonstrate how these thirteen Pai bands negotiated wage labor regimes and evolved into the “Hualapai Tribe,” which, in turn, struggled to build a viable community on the reservation. Their decision to hold on to a distinct homeland and forge a common identity should prove that Hualapais were not powerless victims, one-dimensional relics of the past, or monochromatic economic beings. Their decisions should, however, demonstrate the vitality of Hualapai identity in the twentieth century.

HISTORY, PLACE, AND IDENTITY

The Hualapai, Yavapai, and Havasupai are members of the Pai branch of the Upland Yuman language group in what are now Arizona, California, Nevada, and southern Utah. The name Hualapai translates to “People of the Ponderosa Pines” and refers specifically to one of thirteen Pai bands that occupied nearly 5 million acres in northwest Arizona. Oral histories locate Pai origins in Spirit Mountain, on the Colorado River near present-day Davis Dam.1 Pairs migrated from Spirit Mountain and populated the region where they developed distinct social structures knit together by origin stories, sense of place, and language. Anthropological and ethnographic work spanning nearly a century roughly echoes this assessment. Scholars have debated pre- and early contact Pai history for nearly a century, but although they often disagree on historical and methodological grounds, most generally agree that bands of families formed the foundation of Pai society. Bands congregated in specific camps, where they maintained small irrigated farms and seasonally migrated around the region in search of game and plants.1 Political alliances and interband relationships shifted depending on a variety of environmental, economic, and social factors—often coalescing into what some scholars termed subtribes, led by “headmen” chosen largely on the basis of familial status, diplomatic skill, and intelligence.2 Linguistic similarities and interband marriages cemented relationships and fostered the appearance of “tribal” cohesion noted by non-Indian observers in the nineteenth century.3 Finally, interaction with non-Indians and administrative structures imposed by the Indian Bureau contributed to the coalescing of Pai bands into the “Hualapai” Nation.

Hualapais’ experiences with non-Indians during the 1860s and 1870s profoundly affected their social, cultural, and political organization. In 1865, mining enterprises in the middle of Hualapai territory convinced Schrum, the principal leader of the Middle Mountain Band, to trade Pai buckskins for blankets and blankets for guns and horses in preparation for conflict.10 The unprovoked murder of Pai leader Wauba Yuma sparked the “Walapai Wars” from 1865 to 1869, which brought death and destruction to Pai communities. In 1874 the U.S. Army relocated and interned most of the people 100 miles south to La Paz, Arizona, on the Colorado River Reservation.11 A year later Hualapais escaped and returned north to their homelands, only to find cattle ranchers, mining companies, and frontier towns dotting the landscape. Cattle companies used traditional water sources, settlers shot animals essential for Pai dietary needs, and Anglo attempts at agriculture ruined important native plants. These intrusions necessitated significant adaptation if Pai hoped to survive the new world they now inhabited.

WAGE LABOR AS A CULTURAL SURVIVAL MECHANISM

Although the Hualapai Reservation became the central location for Hualapais in the mid-twentieth century, its creation in 1883 did not tangibly change their condition. The 1 million acres constituted only a fifth of Pai aboriginal territory that stretched westward from Seligman to the present Arizona-California border and southward to the Bill Williams River. The rugged terrain and rolling high desert country that became the home to several Pai bands were unfamiliar to others who lived further to the west and south. Moreover, the executive order reservation encompassed only a portion of Pai hunting grounds. So when Pai returned from La Paz, they had to decide how they would live with new towns, industries, laws, political structures, and economic relationships. Making a living and preserving their families became the first and most immediate goal for the people, and many looked toward the new economic system to achieve this.
Arizona Indians were familiar with the new economic realities, and many chose wage labor as a potential pathway for cultural and economic survival. To a considerable degree, many had little choice. Native workers found employment in cattle ranching, mining, agriculture, railroads, and tourism, as well as in several budding towns. Apaches, Tohono O'odham, Maricopas, Yavapais, Navajos, Hualapais, Mohaves, and others had worked in copper mines, in cotton fields, and on railroads in eastern and southern central Arizona territory for decades. By 1915, Indians in the Salt River Valley worked in the 36,000 acres of long staple cotton. Growers' associations advertised good working conditions and promised a future for the nearly 50,000 Indians in the state "wanting to work." The vice president of the Santa Fe Railroad wanted to hire more Indians on its line, west of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations, and hoped the recently built houses for laborers would encourage "more consistent" work patterns.

However erratic and whimsical their work habits appeared to employers, Hualapais strove to incorporate wage labor into the social context and economies of their camps and kinship networks. Hualapais grappled with the meaning of the markets, and their motivations for work reflected cultural beliefs partially at odds with the expectations of capitalists. Whereas managers viewed employees as resources to integrate into their larger process of industrial capitalism, Hualapais perceived employment as a "resource" to integrate into their larger cultural and environmental landscape. Instead of becoming part of a rural proletariat, Hualapais traded jobs between family or band members to lessen the toll taken by manual labor. The monotony of the work and a tradition of rotating hunting excursions also compelled Hualapais to change jobs frequently so that several band members shared a single position in an industry. Trading work also diffused the physical effects of labor exploitation common to industries of the era.

Eventually, Hualapais and managers created a continuum of labor relationships rooted in two divergent value systems. At the extreme embraced by capital, Hualapais represented a local labor pool managers could exploit by paying them low wages, relegating them to the most difficult work, and firing them before they fired non-Indians. Conversely, cultural and economic self-determination represented the opposite extreme embraced by Hualapais. Most interactions between Hualapai workers and regional industries fluctuated between the two poles of this value system. For instance, employers could not simply exploit Hualapais when they depended on Indian labor for seasonal agricultural harvests or in remote regions Anglos avoided. Hualapais could also avoid dependency by relying on economic support provided by kinship ties. Men avoided wage labor by hunting in the mountains, whereas women gathered piñon nuts to sell in town. Yet Hualapais needed wages to buy cloth, food, and other necessities they could not acquire as easily since cattle ranchers, farmers, and other new arrivals had occupied historic Hualapai homelands. Although employers and managers benefited more from economic inequalities, tribal members did retain some control over their choices and actions. Indeed, if Hualapais wanted to survive, they had to embrace some aspects of the new economy.

Geographic settlement patterns of Hualapai families illustrate how communities and individuals integrated wage labor into their cultural landscape. Like Linkinyaya and the 26 members of his small camp near Hackberry, most Hualapais worked on the railroad and packed hay for ranchers who paid them wages and treated them moderately well. Women and young Hualapai girls washed clothes for residents to supplement male hunting-and-gathering activities. Five families totaling nearly 60 people lived in or near Kingman and worked on the railroad and at a stamp mill as well as herding cattle and sheep for wages. Many of these families occupied public or private lands and built small but rickety houses. A group of 23 people led by Leve-Leve resided in the Hualapai Mountains east of Kingman where they grew vegetables until the city relocated them in the 1920s. Hualapai Charley lived near Canyon Station, along the Santa Fe Railroad, with 14 people, stock, and a fenced garden. Thus, Hualapais combined wage labor with traditional subsistence patterns to support their families in traditional places and locations.

These labor trends continued into the following decades. One report noted over 100 Hualapais working in mines, for cattlemen, or for the Santa Fe, and at least 6 people joined the Barnum and Bailey Circus. An agency census reported that most Hualapais lived without rations and most earned $1.50 a day, whereas some of the best Hualapai cowboys received a monthly salary of $35.00. In 1925, 12 Hualapais worked in the mines in the immediate vicinity, earning $5 a day, whereas others in Kingman worked as chauffeurs, in a saloon, and in a barbershop. The railroad continued employing some Hualapais in the baggage department at $160 a month, and a utility company employed 2 Hualapais as general laborers. Even a slaughterhouse employed 1 Hualapai, who the manager claimed was "as good a beef skinner as any white man," and he earned $7.50 a week to support his family. Hualapais also worked in a Kingman department store and hotel, where they cleaned rooms and waited on customers.
Hualapai women played an important role in the ways bands and families adapted to economic change in northwest Arizona, but it has been difficult to find documentary evidence of this, most likely because of biases of observers and agency employees. Although many scholars have investigated the intersection of labor and gender regarding women of other races and ethnicities, only a few have seriously analyzed the role of Indian women as wage laborers in the United States during the early twentieth century. This omission is disconcerting, since thousands of native women worked in their own homes and farms, as well as in the houses and fields of Anglo and African Americans. Many women worked in schools, for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and in various service-sector jobs. Insightful studies by Beatrice Medicine, Patricia Albers, Theda Perdue, Martha Knack, Gretchen Bataille, Katherine Osburne, and others have begun to address native women’s labor and its cultural implications, and it is hoped scholars will continue this path of research.20

Native women indisputably worked and labored for wages in new industries across the United States before World War II. In particular, Hualapai women played a crucial role in providing income to their families by working in the homes of Anglo women as domestics in towns such as Kingman, Seligman, and Hackberry. Women also tended the gardens of Anglos and frequently worked on farms alongside their husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons. Indeed, Hualapai women often worked twice as hard as and frequently earned more than men since they worked in the camps at home and for wages in town. In 1905, Superintendent Gates observed this and noted in his records that women made the most money in some families because of their work as domestics and their efforts selling baskets to tourists.21 When jobs proved scarce a few women took their craft and went into grocery stores and markets and tried to trade for goods or clothing, whereas others obtained credit from merchants and repaid them when they could. This infusion of cash generally provided women with new opportunities, such as increased mobility, greater personal independence, and increased contributions to the family economy. Although Hualapai women relied on the wages to purchase food and other household items, they also used the cash to visit nearby camps and to attend social gatherings and ceremonies held by Mohaves, Chemehuevies, and other tribes in northwest Arizona.22

As men and women adapted to the gendered dimensions of capitalist penetration, Hualapai continued to grapple with the cultural implications of wage labor and the larger structural context behind it. For instance, regional demo-
Whereas many Paiú responded to capitalist development by solidifying ties across band identities, others had more individualistic reactions. Indian Grover was from the Big Sandy Band of Paiú, approximately sixty miles south of the reservation. He and his family had a garden and cattle, and they worked sporadically for nearby whites. In 1919 he submitted an application for title to land on the Big Sandy, and in his testimony to the Department of the Interior he stated, “I have resided on this land practically all my life; since 1905 I have had possession of it and have lived continuously on the land, and have cultivated about eight acres of it.” Additionally, he had “a frame house upon the land . . . about fourteen [square] feet this house, and I have lived there since 1905.” Grover still had to work for ranchers and farmers to supplement his income, but he believed title to the land would assure him of a stable life. He wanted the land “as an Indian allotment,” declaring that he was an “Indian of full blood, and a member of the Walapai tribe.” On his land he hoped to use occasional temporary wage labor to supplement his long-term goal of farming.

CATTLE RANCHING: FROM WAGE LABOR TO TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Cattle ranching as a native development strategy drew upon Hualapais’ experiences with wage work, and it eventually became the most important industry on the reservation. Despite its ambiguous effect on Hualapai society, it created economic opportunities for many tribes across the West, especially in arid regions. Hualapai experiences with ranching dated back to the 1860s when thousands of cattle grazed on the open range. In those early decades Hualapai “stole” cattle, worked for the better-paying ranchers, and eventually lobbied state and national authorities to remove ranchers from their land. Ranchers’ experiences with Hualapais proved equally ambivalent, since they depended on Hualapais to maintain their farms and assist with roundups; but they found some Hualapais difficult to deal with, “undependable,” and inscrutable. Moreover, many ranchers wanted to open the Hualapai Reservation for allotment and relocate the “difficult” Hualapais to the Colorado River Reservation several hundred miles to the south.

After several decades of working in the cattle industry, many Hualapais wanted to begin their own livestock operation on the reservation. Lack of capital, economic competition, hostility from non-Indians, and BIA restrictions complicated Hualapais’ attempts at organizing a cattle association. Previously, Hualapais had confronted the new cash economy with marginal success, but accumulating the resources to start a herd proved more difficult. Banks refused them loans, and merchants overcharged them for supplies. Few Hualapais fully understood the technical aspects of range management, and those who did had difficulty hydrating their cattle. Hualapais confronted more obstacles, since Anglo ranchers had run thousands of cattle on the reservation decades before tribal members had the opportunity to start their own operations. Additionally, Hualapais spent considerable energy combating the local movement to allot their reservation by ranchers who never thought the tribe deserved the land in the first place.

Fortunately, several factors merged between 1910 and 1920 to facilitate a reservation cattle operation. Whereas the BIA, through the Dawes Act and related measures, promoted individualized agriculture on private property as the highest form of assimilation, when applied to the arid Southwest this agrarian ideal collided with environmental conditions. Dry farming and the well-known romance with giant dams on the Columbia and Colorado would alleviate some of the problems in arid lands, but most reservations still lacked the water they needed to develop significant farms. Cattle ranching provided an alternative to agriculture on the Hualapai Reservation, so in 1914, Superintendent Charles E. Shell assigned fifteen families ten head of cattle each, charged them for the stock, and informed them that they had to repay the debt within five years. In addition to cattle assigned to individual tribal members, in 1915 Shell began a tribal cattle herd for the benefit of the entire community. In doing so, he planned to transform the Hualapais into capitalist entrepreneurs who embraced individual accumulation of private property. For Shell and the BIA, the cattle industry was as much an economic endeavor as it was an instrument of social control and cultural change. Indeed, families resented this assault on their culture, and a few people eventually seceded from raising cattle. Cattle sales slowly generated additional income, which the agent invested in reservation infrastructure and, in 1916, in an expanded tribal herd of 900 cattle and 100 horses. Ranching, according to Peter Iversen, did indeed enable “Native communities to build a local economy and rebuild a society.”

Despite these efforts, agents’ ambivalence toward the cattle industry proved frustrating, Hualapais wanted the ranchers off the reservation, but agents countered that grazing fees generated income when he could collect them. In approving lease applications submitted by Anglo ranchers, Shell acknowledged that “no applicant has been denied a permit except where it was thought that more stock would over-graze and injure the range.” So although Shell provided more cattle to individual tribal members, he also approved grazing permits for 10,000 head of white-owned cattle, which might provide an annual
income of $15,540. To complicate the matter, in a letter to the commissioner, Shell said, “As a matter of truth, the reservation is not fit for an Indian reservation but it belongs to the Indians,” an ironic point since individual Hualapais avoided the reservation because Anglo ranchers monopolized already scarce water supplies.

Hualapais reacted to this complex economic and environmental condition by protesting the situation on and off the reservation. Many of these protests highlighted the fact that tribal leadership had evolved into a hybrid mixture of older cultural characteristics indicative of Hualapais’ decentralized band structure and “modern” institutions influenced by the new political and economic landscape. Despite inevitable internal differences, Hualapais seemed to present a somewhat unified voice in the region’s affairs, as leaders of a few bands now tentatively represented more than a dozen increasingly interconnected ones. Reports from the Board of Indian Commissioners stated that Hualapais questioned the practices of Superintendent Shell and several employees in charge of the tribal herd. Hualapais also complained that Shell treated them poorly and refused to listen to their thoughts on running the herd. The commissioner reprimanded the superintendent and replaced the other employees in an effort to address the contested situation on the reservation. At the end of 1918 the association’s report stated that the tribe had cooperated with the new plans for the cattle industry.

POLITICAL RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Continuing difficulties with the cattle industry prompted leaders to demand an investigation into conditions on the reservation. In 1923, tribal members signed petitions to the BIA protesting the leasing situation, and Fred Mahone echoed that discontent in a letter to the commissioner: “For forty years, 1883 to 1923, our government collected thousands of dollars per year from lease holders upon the Wallapai Indian Reservation and such sums are held in the U.S. Treasury at Washington D.C. to be released to all Wallapai Indians in equal shares.” He also addressed the cattle-leasing issue:

We want the use of these reserve funds for the purpose of developing the reservation in approved businesslike enterprises, employing our own people under a competent manager [and] we want freedom from the ‘restrictions or wardships’ under which Indians exist. We want all reservation land leases cancelled and lessees removed in our favor so that we may occupy the grazing land and use the waters upon it.

Mahone elaborated on the relationship between the community, land, and even the United States: “We want to be as Americans are, free to develop our resources, as a community, and to hold as community property, our reservation land for... future generations. No separate allotments do we desire, but urge that the Executive Order of January 4, 1883 be enforced.” This was a particularly powerful statement, since Mahone defined Americanism in terms of property held collectively rather than individually.

Mahone’s comments highlighted the interaction among Hualapai land, leadership, and community in the midst of rapid economic change. And just as Hualapai culture tried to absorb the impact of the new economy by altering the meaning and duration of work, Hualapai leadership channeled the new political currents to the long-term benefit of the tribe. Yet Hualapais’ twentieth-century political structure, although influenced by new ideologies, still retained elements of “the old ways.” Leadership during this era depended on the characteristics of precontact Pai identity that enabled Hualapais to formalize older leadership organizations to address contemporary concerns. Leaders still acted independently, but they also formed multiband institutions and a pre-Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) Tribal Council to present their grievances. These hybrid bodies spanned generations, nurtured traditional patterns, knitted bands together, and reflected individual achievement as well as community concerns.

Traditional Hualapai leadership grew out of the broad basis of extended family relations constituting thirteen regional bands. These bands occasionally met under the representation of three “subtribes” to voice the perspectives of individual bands and families. The leaders of these bands and subtribes had to possess these qualities: Tokunet, which meant “generally respected”; Akinomi, which recognized the individual’s accomplishments; and pukawa, or talker, which referred to an individual’s oratorical abilities. Marriage across bands provided a limited but nonetheless important indicator of leadership, and reciprocity and kinship also bound the bands together. Hereditary lineage conferred some legitimacy on individuals but did not preclude intelligence and diplomacy. Finally, leadership required good judgment, care for the general welfare of the tribe, and an overall sense of justice.

These qualities remained important during the early twentieth century, when Hualapai politics centered on the efforts of the “Welfare Committee” and the pre-Indian Reorganization Act Tribal Council, which coalesced in the 1920s. In 1919 the Tribal Council protested the renewing of grazing leases on the reservation and requested control of the tribal herd from the agents running
in it. In 1925, Hualapais living in and near Kingman created a Welfare Committee, with a speaker and a chairman, to address individual civil rights off the reservation and tribal land rights on the reservation. The committee met with Kingman leaders to discuss education, treatment of tribal workers, and the status of Hualapai camps on the outskirts of town. The committee provided Hualapais with an important venue for developing leadership skills and concentrating band identity into a more centralized institution that professed to represent the interests of many individuals. Yet although these new institutions helped people adapt to changing political and economic conditions, they also undermined band identities by shifting decision making from band leaders to the leaders of the new institutions, which increasingly represented “the Hualapai” as a politically and ethnically distinct group of people.

A series of events in the 1920s illustrates the concerns of the Welfare Committee and the pre-IRA Tribal Council. Since 1920, tribal members had complained about Superintendent William Light and his management of economic affairs for the Hualapai, and their concerns culminated in an inspection by a federal investigator, John T. Atwater. Council members protested leases to Anglos cattlemen and miners, the arrangement of grazing units, the handling of cattle monies, and Light’s general attitude toward the tribe. Jim and Fred Mahone, Steve LeVe Leve, Ray Parker, Edith Wellington, and others signed petitions and offered testimony against Light. A 1922 investigation exonerated Light, but Hualapais remained frustrated with the policies imposed upon them, and many wanted direct control of the cattle industry. This desire to engage capitalist institutions with a tribal run business venture provided a focal point for Hualapai energies throughout the decade. For instance, in 1927 Bob Schrum advocated an end to leasing tribal land: “We are much disturbed about our land leased to cattlemen. We asked [sic] that it shall not be renewed. We want to use our reservation from now on.” Schrum argued that the leasing system kept the tribe off the land, and he addressed the assumption that Hualapais did not want to live on the reservation: “There are Indians who wish to establish a home. But the agent objected, that we must stay out of the land that [is] leased to cattlemen. Why?”

Correspondence in 1929 echoed similar concerns and illustrated the role of the committee. Responding to a meeting with BIA officials, the members of the “executive committee of the Walapai Tribe” expressed their grievances to Arizona senator Lynn K. Frazier and requested “the President of the United States and the Attorney General to assign attorneys for the Walapai Tribe on the Peach Springs water case.” The case involved a growing debate over conflicting claims to natural springs on the reservation. Philip Quasala, Chief Bob Schrum, and Jim Fielding signed the letter and reminded the officials of the tribe’s service in the “Great War” and its participation in the nineteenth-century Apache campaigns. The committee even told Senator Frazier that he could find maps in the U.S. Surveyor General’s Office in Phoenix proving that the land belonged to the tribe.

Drought in the late 1920s and early 1930s hurt the cattle industry and exacerbated preexisting tensions with the BIA. Agency workers slaughtered cattle to reduce the impact of grazing on the range but failed to consult Hualapai cattle owners, even though decades of underregulated grazing caused much of the original erosion. The BIA denied culpability, although it contributed to the situation by allowing white ranchers to graze their cattle. Forecasting programs of the 1930s on other reservations in the Southwest, the decision to reduce range capacity in the late 1920s penalized the Hualapai just when the tribal cattle industry began to succeed. In 1931 several Hualapai cattlemen contacted the Indian Rights Association to protest previous stock reduction and Superintendent D. H. Watson’s management of the herd. Writing on behalf of “all Walapai Cattle Men,” Fred Mahone said he and the others wanted to “move all our cattle at our own time and expense” on the reservation. He noted a meeting in which “a heavy argument developed . . . between Watson and the Cattlemen” over Watson’s decision to withhold money from sales to force Hualapais to follow his directions. Mahone requested assistance from S. M. Brosius of the Indian Rights Association who contacted Commissioner Rhoads.

In response, D. H. Watson wrote, “With reference to the letter of October 3rd written to Mr. Brosius by Fred Mahone and complaining of the cattle situation, this is just another effusion from an inveterate trouble maker and has little foundation in fact.”

Testimony from another round of hearings highlighted debates over cattle ranching, labor, land rights, and identity. In May 1930, representatives from Congress, Arizona, and the Department of the Interior held meetings at the agency in Valentine to clarify the legal ownership of nearly half the reservation. Nearly thirty Hualapais sat behind prominent Hualapais Kate Crozier and Bob Schrum, son of Chief Schrum. Both answered questions posed by Special Commissioner H. J. Hagerman and BIA officials. In an effort to deflect the discussion away from the land debate with the Santa Fe Railway, Hagerman implied that the tribe did not deserve the land because it had failed to utilize the range, but Bob Schrum returned to the original issue: “We once had this...
whole country to ourselves, but were put on a small reservation by the Government, and the Railroad is now after this reservation. We lived here before the white men came into this country, therefore it is ours.” District Supervisor Farris responded, “[W]hat we would like to see is all the men and women of the Walapai Tribe say, ‘We are going to work and do something.” This typified the divergent concerns held by the tribe and the BIA: Hualapais focused on land rights and identity, whereas authorities stressed work and industry.

In 1931, members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs convened on May 22, with Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs J. Henry Scatteredgood, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, and Arizona senator Carl Hayden. After Hayden’s opening remarks, the committee heard the testimony of Fred Mahone, a central figure in the tribe’s campaign to protect the reservation. Mahone, who lived in Peach Springs, went to the heart of the matter: “To begin with, this land belongs to the Walapai Indians in Arizona. I protest against the leasing of the land or appraisal of this land because this land as our reservation itself was set aside by the United States Army officials in the early days.” When Wheeler requested evidence, Mahone brought in the elder Jim Mahone, who had served in the military on its excursions against the Apache. Jim Mahone claimed President Arthur had established the reservation to reward Hualapai scouts for their services and to protect the tribe because “there were a lot of people all over the world, just like a bunch of worms, and . . . they [were] coming to crowd out the Indians.” The leaders had established an interesting method of response in the hearings: the middle-aged, boarding school generation opened up the testimony and then brought in elders to legitimize their claims. Fred Mahone followed this pattern later in the day when he addressed the issue of original occupancy and introduced Chief Schrum. Schrum argued: “We are people who have lived in this country far back. It is way back. [I am] one of the descendants from the early chief. [My] father was chief.” He went on to say that the tribe opposed the division of the reservation, claiming it would “prevent us from going into civilization.” He said the descendants of the old chiefs would testify that the tribe deserved exclusive use of the reservation. Indeed, Philip Quasala was the grandson of a prominent headman, as were Jim Fielding, descendant of Suwim Fielding, and Butch Clark, another descendant of Chief Hualapai Charlie. All would testify.

After listening to Mahone the committee returned to the tribe’s apparent failure in the cattle business. Charles McGee, one of the few successful Hualapai cattlemen, provided a compelling example of the challenges facing the tribe. McGee had lived off the reservation in Trout Creek until he and his family moved onto the reservation. They relocated to Pine Springs and began building a small farm for their cattle, but Superintendent Light ordered them to leave even though whites allegedly leased the land. Eventually, McGee found land below Peach Springs Wash where he and his father grazed 135 head of cattle. Scatteredgood commended him and asked what was the matter, since he had done well. McGee protested that he “could not make a living off that bunch of cattle. You know that. It is the same way with a lot of these younger fellows. They would say the same thing.” Scatteredgood seemed surprised, but Senator Hayden asked McGee to go on. “To support ourselves we have to have more range and more cattle. This is the point I want to get at, and I think that is what the rest of these younger fellows would say.” McGee must have smiled when the stockman for the agency informed Hayden that a white family needed 200 to 250 head of cattle to survive.

THE EMERGENCE OF A RESERVATION COMMUNITY

The onset of the Great Depression and the implementation of President Roosevelt’s “Indian New Deal” brought significant changes to American Indian communities. The Indian New Deal generally, and the Indian Reorganization Act specifically, centralized political power in the hands of tribal councils, incorporated tribal business ventures, developed reservation lands, initiated work relief programs, and attempted to conserve tribal ranges. These programs were part and parcel of a larger confluence of forces that made the million acres economically viable and culturally attractive for the tribe. Yet the Depression seriously crippled the cattle industry, and the superintendent forced the tribe to cut more stock and encouraged its members to simply consume their beef. By the mid-1930s, white ranchers had terminated their leases or pulled their remaining cattle off the tribal range, thereby opening up grazing lands to Hualapai families. Open access to rangeland was helpful, but the tribe struggled to use those lands in light of ongoing stock reductions and lack of revenue. Additionally, tribal unemployment rates rose as local employers fired Hualapai workers. As more Hualapais lacked work off the reservation, they turned to government labor projects and conservation programs located on the reservation.

Federal programs did not dictate Hualapai’s responses to economic development, nor did they wholly re-create Native American cultural landscapes. Rather, wage labor, political leadership, geographic dispersal, band identities, ecological conditions, education, and cultural “conservatism” or “progressiv-
ism” all influenced Hualapais’ responses to programs such as the Indian Emergency Conservation Work (IECW) and the Civilian Conservation Corps-Indian Division (CCC-ID). Initiated in the spring of 1933 under the oversight of the BIA, the IECW adjusted many of its programs to benefit tribal communities. For instance, it allowed married men to join conservation programs despite regulations reserves work for single males. The IECW supervisors also opened many of their work camps to families so that conservation work did not sever bonds between family and tribal culture. The IECW and the CCC-ID had an important impact on the social organization and geographic dispersal of Hualapai bands because they helped transform the reservation into a geographic locus for the community. Before the 1930s, people across the region had lived on the outskirts of towns, searching for employment, but the Depression forced them to disperse and become unemployed.

Many CCC-ID programs drew upon skills Hualapais had acquired from previous experience with wage labor. Erosion control projects such as the one headed by Philip Quasala and Jack Jones utilized their experience working for ranchers and tending to small farms owned by non-Indians. Some Hualapais honed their leadership abilities by delegating responsibilities to workers in projects across the reservation. Hualapais such as Rupert Parker brought unique skills. As a carpenter he built furniture and houses for Anglos, and he used this expertise to construct “fireboxes” in trees to monitor reservation range fires. Other projects relied on Hualapai experience derived from previous labor and provided them with opportunities to obtain new work and leadership skills. Suwin Fielding, for instance, was an older foreman in charge of a crew working with a bulldozer and explosives on the Horse Flat Truck Trail in the southeastern portion of the reservation. By late September 1935 the trail provided the community with a road to ease transportation of goods and stock. The crew also helped the reservation erosion project fortify walls on the washes and faces of several check dams that were part of a small irrigation system. Mike Matuthanya also headed several projects and provided leadership to those working with him. He and his crew developed Sunrise Springs and Horse Trough Springs into watering holes for cattle on the western side of the reservation. They also erected large water tanks as part of the range and water management program. These programs improved infrastructure and made the reservation a more viable location for economic activities such as ranching, but Hualapais’ labor left a new set of cultural footprints on land that represented their real and symbolic future.

The Indian Reorganization Act: Limits to Cultural and Political Self-Determination

The lingering impact of previous political developments combined with new events during the 1930s to alter the economic and cultural landscapes of the reservation. The efforts of traditional headmen from the nineteenth century and the decisions of the Welfare Committee and the pre-Indian Reorganization Act Tribal Council left Hualapai leaders with a mixture of approaches reflecting their adaptation to life in the twentieth century. Leaders who had attended boarding school worked beside elders who had served as scouts in the 1870s and remembered internment in La Paz. Both groups had at one point in their lives resided off the reservation, and many congregated alongside the railroad. Most of them, young and old, worked for wages in regional industries. Elder leaders spoke Hualapai fluently, whereas the younger generation was frequently bilingual. This multigenerational coalition built upon previous decisions and dedicated itself to confronting new political and economic changes presented by the Indian Reorganization Act.

The institutionalization of the Tribal Council under the Indian Reorganization Act marked a watershed in pre-World War II Hualapai history. The legislation highlighted an important shift in Indian policy and reflected a greater awareness of Indian cultures within the BIA, but greater attention to Indian perspectives has refined our understanding of the scope of the reforms. The IRA impacted Indian political structures and status, offered economic opportunities, loosened religious restrictions, altered education policy, and eliminated some elements of colonialism. Yet in many respects the reforms remained painfully limited. Roughly half the tribes rejected the IRA, and the voting turnout rarely reflected tribal members’ true feelings, since many expressed their opposition by simply refusing to participate in elections.

Hualapais approved this mixed bag of reforms in 1938, perceiving it as a limited improvement on the political and legal limbo they inhabited. A group of older leaders argued that the IRA represented the only mechanism available for the tribe to hold on to the reservation in the face of poverty and unemployment. To many, the IRA linked Hualapais with the federal government through its own, somewhat modified form of government. A different group remained suspicious of the new policies and structures and either opposed it outright or withheld support from the boilerplate constitution. On the other hand, younger members with experience in boarding schools perceived the legislation as a systematic improvement upon previous informal methods of self-government. Representative institutions that embraced tribal collective
values appealed to them, and the economic opportunities embodied in the corporate charter attracted them as well. However, population figures for 1938 indicate that of approximately 200 eligible voters, only 62 supported the IRA, and 34 actively rejected it. Fifty percent of tribal members did not vote, although that did not necessarily mean they disagreed with the legislation. Some surely opposed the IRA, but many members may not have understood its implications, and a few may not have been able to travel to the voting site. Regardless of the reasons for the low turnout, the marginal support for the IRA government foreshadowed future problems for the legitimacy and authority of the council.

Familiar leaders nonetheless participated in the new form of government on the reservation, and pre-IRA Tribal Chairman Charles McGee presided over the vote and the writing of the constitution. He and others addressed the dispersed settlement of the tribe by conferring membership to everyone on the tribal rolls with one-half or more Hualapai ancestry. The charter created a nine-member Tribal Council that would represent multiple band loyalties and the interests of members in nearby towns. Eligible adults elected council members for staggered three-year terms by secret ballot and chose a chairman and vice chairman for one-year terms. The council retained the hereditary chief to provide cultural continuity, and initial elections linked the leaders of the previous generation with the new political structures of the current era. Council members were older, prominent men who had experienced the struggles in the late nineteenth century, and the younger members were frequently descended from them. The first tribal chairman elected under the new government, Philip Quasala, was the grandson of the preeminent Chief Waba Yuma, and he best represented the tradition of established political leadership. Quasala participated in the Santa Fe land claims cases and freely spoke his mind. The following year the tribe elected Charles McGee as chairman. McGee also played a prominent role in congressional hearings and directly critiqued government cattle policy, increasingly a badge of leadership.

For the remainder of the 1930s, Hualapai government focused on cattle as the basis for a tribal economy. In this sense politics and economics converged and made self-determination a more realistic goal. Range management programs expanded in the late 1930s, and leasing to non-Indians ended in 1936. During the 1938–1939 winter, the Tribal Council established the Indian Livestock and Protective Association to oversee roundups, movement of cattle, branding, and sales. By 1946 it had established the maximum number of cattle allowed on the reservation—7,800, all of which the tribe owned. By 1941 nearly 200 adults, approximately half of the tribe, had moved to the reservation and congregated in Peach Springs near the new reservation day school. Indian traders increased their business on the reservation, and two stores provided food and groceries for the budding community. Traditional dwellings cropped up alongside new frame houses, and cars traveled along dirt roads still frequented by horses and cattle.

CONCLUSIONS

The congressional hearings and ensuing court cases, as well as the Indian Reorganization Act, remain important aspects of the broader changes in Hualapai society between 1910 and 1940. These developments represented part of a complicated and larger whole that comprised Hualapai tribalism and national identity. Although community life defies easy compartmentalization, these decades witnessed important changes in Hualapai political-economy that affected and relied upon continuity in cultural and social identity. The ability of Pai bands to adapt to forced economic and political change by merging into a more cohesive “tribe” enabled them to survive as a people. Although band distinctions and differences decreased, they remained important components of Hualapai identity by reminding people of older family lineages that often played important political roles. Band identities remained strong, but intermarriage, for instance, made them more fluid. Economic ventures such as the Livestock and Cattle Association also strengthened the sense of Hualapai nationhood. Interaction with state and federal officials, as well, institutionalized the growing sense of a community tribal identity.

But the evolving cultural identity that many tribal and nontribal members labeled “Hualapai” also had its roots in earlier interactions between Pai bands and the new economic regimes they encountered. Rather than work full-time all year, Hualapais alternated jobs among tribal members and shared wages between families. During work they followed their own conceptions of time and place. Hualapai crew leaders and labor contractors served as a new form of leadership that combined sociopolitical functions that focused band members in a culturally familiar way, even as they also disrupted band distinctions by distributing jobs among many people regardless of band affiliation. The fact that women worked as much as men reflected and reinforced Hualapai notions of gender relations just as much as it signified women’s important economic status. Additionally, Hualapais continued their yearly migrations and celebrations. Finally, they supplemented wages with small gardens, proceeds from baskets and beadwork, and occasional “taking” of cattle owned by
Anglo ranchers. These decisions enabled Hualapais to use wage labor within larger structures beyond their control.

Political developments carried this same mixture of change and continuity that integrated new processes into familiar contexts as leaders appealed to traditions (and created new ones) in the early twentieth century. The Welfare Committee and the pre-IRA Tribal Council united a geographically dispersed people and provided a site for intergenerational transferal of leadership. The council also served as a focal point for bands to coalesce around, and it formed a nucleus for the evolving layer of Hualapai tribal identity. New leaders respected cultural traditions by preserving the position of hereditary chief even after the tribe adopted an IRA government. And although BIA authorities claimed that yearly appointments of presidents destabilized the Hualapai’s government, the terms reflected their lingering suspension of the position of president and their reliance on the hereditary leader and the more palatable Tribal Council.

As World War II eclipsed the Depression, Hualapai continued struggling to gain control of their future. With an economic base, more families could return to the reservation, and with a new tribal government they bridged past traditions with modern political structures. Many Hualapais remained off the reservation for part of the year, but they knew they had a protected space to return to. The changes they had faced—wage labor, political restructuring, marginal economic dependency, and limited autonomy—simultaneously undermined some traditions and strengthened tribal identity. Ultimately, individuals and the tribe as a whole sought to build upon the events of the nineteenth century and add meaning to the Hualapai Nation.

NOTES


5. Leanne Hinton and Lucile Watamomigis, eds., Spirit Mountain: An Anthology of Yuman Story and Song (Tucson: Sun Tracks and University of Arizona Press, 1984); Lucile Watamomigis, “Origins of the People,” Plateau 53 (June 1991): 24–27. A note on spelling: today the official spelling accepted by the Tribal Council is “Hualapai,” although scholars and tribal members have previously used spellings such as Wallapai, Walapai, and Hualapai. When directly quoting historical documents I will follow the spelling in the documents, but in my own narrative I will use the contemporary official spelling “Hualapai.”

7. Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler have worked with the Hualapai since the 1950s, when they began research for the Indian Claims Commission. Their work has proven useful and insightful, although tribal members and other researchers have not always agreed with their analyses of Pai history and culture. Timothy Braatz, in particular, has assailed their conclusions on Pai identity in a series of articles contained in the American Indian Quarterly 22, 3 (Summer 1998). Braatz has done work with the Yavapai, and one of his points of contention is that Pai bands and "subtribes" were not as formal as Dobyns and Euler claim. I cannot make definitive arguments on these points in this chapter, but I thought it necessary to illuminate one of many scholarly debates over precontact Hualapai culture and identity.


9. Thomas D. Hall, Social Change in the Southwest, 1550-1880 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 25-31. Hall discusses different types of social organization in the Southwest, and Pai seem to fit within his category of "band" or rancheria peoples commonly associated with indigenous communities in southern California. He notes (as do other scholars) how small bands coalesce into "tribes" as they increasingly interact with larger societies, usually in an attempt to survive the hegemonic forces of incorporation. He also casts doubt upon the term tribe, as he feels it is more of an anthropological convention than a "real" unit of social organization. Over time, however, many natives and nonnatives have embraced the term tribe, although they often use it more for expediency than sociopolitical accuracy.

10. Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, "The Lives of Churum, the Pai Tokumet," American Indian Quarterly 22 (Summer 1998): 365. Churum is an important figure in Hualapai history, but his name is often written as Scurum, a spelling frequently used by descendants.


15. These responses to wage labor regimes are discussed repeatedly in the chapters in Littlefield and Knack, Native Americans and Wage Labor, 10.


18. H. L. Haskell to the Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, August 20, 1878, in Weapapai Papers, 119.

19. Merriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, 690.


21. Dobyns and Euler, The Weapapai People, 65. Women (and to some extent men) made baskets, beadwork, and other "crafts" in native communities throughout the Western Hemisphere before contact with Europeans. Arguably these objects served utilitarian functions such as storing food and carrying supplies, although they also served ceremonial purposes. As interactions with Europeans and Americans increased, these objects gained an aesthetic value projected upon them by middle- and upper-class tourists. This crossroads of native talent, tourism, and Anglo wealth transformed Indian baskets into commodities and cultural artifacts of considerable monetary value. Native women quickly realized the economic value of their baskets and related "artwork" and began selling them along railroad lines such as the Santa Fe.

22. Merriam Report, 686; Letter from Malcolm McDowell, Member of the Board of Indian Commissioners to the Trustyton Canyon Agency, Arizona, September 23, 1923. Folder 81.572-23, Truston Canyon Agency, Box 7, Central Classified Files, Record Group 75, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC; hereafter F-TCA, B, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

23. For trenchant discussions on the roles of Indian "crew leaders" or "labor contractors," see Robert Carrico, Florence Shipke, and Harold Prins, in Littlefield and Knack, Native Americans and Wage Labor, 45, 200, 204, 212.

24. Weapapai Papers, 140-142.

25. George W. James, In and Around the Grand Canyon (Boston: Little, Brown, 1901), 173.


29. Testimony of Nama, or, Indian Grover in His Application for Allotment of Land, September 28, 1919. F-52970-17 TCA 308.2, 25, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

30. Letter from Superintendent William Light to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Regarding the Application of Indian Grover for Allotment on Lands Outside the Reservation, Valentine, Arizona, November 13, 1919. F-52970-17 TCA 308.2, 25, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

68. Ibid., 282.


72. Donald Parman, “The Indian and the Civilian Conservation Corps,” Pacific Historical Review 40 (1971): 39–50; Calvin Grower, “The CCC Indian Division: Aid for Depressed Americans,” Minnesota History 43 (1972): 3–13. Although federally funded, the IECW committed itself to local economic development and to meeting the unique needs and conditions of several regions. Projects in the Northwest focused on timber resources and farming, whereas those in the Great Plains and the Southwest centered on range management, cattle raising, erosion control, and water resources. After Congress passed the CCC Act in 1937, the IECW became the Indian CCC and added job training and education to its list of functions. It facilitated 120 different types of work, spent nearly $72 million, and employed over 85,000 Indians. After 1940, thousands of individuals benefited from vocational training in war-related industries that facilitated entrance into urban industrial wage labor during and after the war. In July 1942, Congress ended the CCC program.

73. May 1, 1935, Knight, Indians at Work, 35.


76. Phillips, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 166; Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism, 32.

77. Dobyns and Euler, The Waiapai People, 82.

78. American Indian Technical Services, Haupai Plateau, 54.

79. Dobyns and Euler, The Waiapai People, 82.

80. Ibid., 84.

81. Ibid., 86.