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Contribution to Book
What Attracts a Bidder to a Particular Internet Auction?
Organizing the New Industrial Economy (Advances in Applied Microeconomics, Volume 12) (2003)
  • Jeffrey A Livingston
Abstract

Livingston (2002) shows that bidders in Internet auctions are easily convinced of a seller’s trustworthiness: they bid large amounts even if sellers have barely established a reputation for performance, suggesting that they believe that typical sellers usually perform. This study reinforces this conclusion by looking at how bidders choose which auction to bid in when there are several that are selling the same item. The analysis shows that so long as a seller has some history, bidders consider bidding in the seller’s auction. They then choose auctions that offer the best chance to obtain the good at the lowest price.

Publication Date
2003
Editor
Professor Michael Baye, Professor John Maxwell
Publisher
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Series
Advances in Applied Microeconomics
ISBN
0-7623-1081-2
Citation Information
Jeffrey A Livingston. "What Attracts a Bidder to a Particular Internet Auction?" Organizing the New Industrial Economy (Advances in Applied Microeconomics, Volume 12) Vol. 12 (2003)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_livingston/5/